薪酬顧問利益衝突與CEO薪酬誘因機制關聯性之探討

Abstract

薪酬制度係公司治理的重要機制之一，透過薪酬制度的設計連結經理人與股東利益，可以減緩代理問題，並激勵經理人努力。公司也可以藉由有效率的薪酬契約來吸引、留任適任的經理人。隨著薪酬制度日趨複雜，許多公司會聘用薪酬顧問來協助設計薪酬制度。然而，薪酬顧問與公司股東之間存在潛在之利益衝突可能導致其提供有利於經理人的薪酬建議而損及股東利益。過去研究針對薪酬顧問的聘用與其利益衝突對於經理人薪酬水準及薪酬品質的影響有許多探討，並有不同的結論。本研究進一步發掘薪酬顧問還可能透過哪些其他的方式來影響經理人薪酬，透過檢驗薪酬顧問之利益衝突與經理人薪酬之存續期間、績效既得條件薪酬的使用之間的關係，來驗證薪酬顧問的獨立性可能影響薪酬制度的其他特性。研究結果發現薪酬顧問存在之利益衝突愈嚴重時，CEO薪酬存續期間愈短，此外，績效既得條件薪酬的使用程度也較低，顯示薪酬顧問之利益衝突可能使他們傾向提供有利於經理人的薪酬建議。

Compensation system is one of the important mechanisms of corporate governance. By designing compensation system, corporate can align the interests of managers with those of shareholders which mitigates agency problems and motivates managers to work hard. Corporate also can attract and retain qualified managers with efficient compensation contracts. As compensation system becomes more complex, many firms retain compensation consultants to assist them in designing compensation packages. However, the potential conflicts of interest between the firms and its consultants might lead them to provide compensation advice beneficial to managers, which harms shareholders. The prior literature focus on whether the retain of compensation consultants or their conflicts of interest influence executives’ pay levels and compensation quality, and do not show a consistent conclusion. I research if compensation consultants influence compensation by other means. By examining the relationship between conflicts of interest of compensation consultants and CEO pay duration and the relationship between conflicts of interest of compensation consultants and the use of performance vesting provision compensation, I find that the more severe conflicts of interest compensation consultants face, the shorter CEO pay duration. Also, the firms less likely to use performance vesting provision compensation. The finding suggests that conflicts of interest of compensation consultants might lead them to provide advice in favor of executives.