非執行董事薪酬與公司避稅之關聯性

Abstract

本研究旨在探討美國公司非執行董事之權益誘因薪酬（Non-Executive Director Equity-Based Incentive Compensation）對於公司避稅行為之影響。過去關於公司治理與企業避稅的文獻大多聚焦於董事會特性上，較少關注直接與董事利益相關的薪酬所造成的影響。近年來有越來越多公司調整董事薪酬結構，提高權益誘因薪酬在總薪酬之中的比重，顯示公司越來越重視董事與股東利益及公司績效之間的連結。而非執行董事擁有較高之獨立性，在公司治理機制下扮演重要的監督角色，透過辨明其權益薪酬對公司避稅程度之影響，可了解權益薪酬是否提供非執行董事監督公司長期規劃之誘因。 本研究以2006年至2015年美國S&P 1500之公司作為樣本，以調整後三年期現金及應計有效稅率作為衡量公司避稅程度之代理變數，以非執行董事之權益薪酬占總薪酬比重作為主要變數，另外考量變數之間的內生性問題，本研究使用二階段最小平方法來進行線性迴歸分析。實證結果顯示，非執行董事的權益薪酬比重與公司避稅程度之間存在顯著正向關係，意味著權益薪酬確實可以提供非執行董事協助提高企業績效表現的長期誘因，督促公司進行長期稅務規劃以提高未來的績效表現。另外本研究亦發現在經營策略（Business Strategy）型態較偏向保守的Defender公司下，非執行董事權益薪酬對公司避稅程度之影響會較為顯著。本研究之結果說明權益薪酬可有效連結非執行董事與公司績效，使非執行董事影響企業避稅程度，並豐富避稅及董事薪酬等相關文獻。

This study examines the relationship between non-executive directors’ equity-based incentive compensation and corporate tax avoidance. Prior literature focuses more on the overall effect of board characteristic on corporate tax planning; however, there is little evidence on the relationship between director compensation and corporate tax avoidance. Since many companies start to modify their director compensation structure and adopt more incentive compensation, and non-executive director plays an important monitoring role in corporate governance mechanism, it is important to understand whether equity-based awards provide non-executive director incentives to improve long-term performance through tax planning. To effectively measure tax planning behavior, this study uses adjusted 3-year cash and GAAP effective tax rate as the tax planning proxies. As for major proxy, this study uses the percentage of equity-based compensation to total compensation. Using a sample of S&P 1500 companies during 2006-2015, this research finds a positive association between non-executive director equity-based incentive compensation and corporate tax avoidance. Additionally, when the companies belong to defenders under their strategy, this positive association is even stronger. Overall, the result suggests that equity-based compensation can establish the link between director and shareholder interest, and give non-executive directors more incentives to monitor long-term tax planning. This research concludes that equity-based compensation provides non-executive director incentives to affect corporate tax planning by connecting their interest with financial performance, and contributes to related literature.