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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 張佑宗(Yu-Tzung Chang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Cheng-Hsin Lee | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李晨心 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T03:33:36Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2021-02-22 | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2021-01-25 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/21421 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 威權國家中的經濟菁英如何回應統治聯盟的重組?威權研究文獻大幅關注名義上的民主制度將增強威權韌性或是引領民主化,卻缺乏針對威權國家中經濟菁英行為的實證研究。在政治不穩定的時期,威權議會將扮演提供公共財的產權保護制度,還是專屬內部人的尋租平台?本文關注中國企業主在胡錦濤到習近平政治繼承時期的行為,並發現有議會關係的企業主在領導人繼承時期有更高的機率留在市場中,但該現象並未發生在領導人續任時期,這隱含了歧視性的產權保護與一朝天子一朝商的菁英自我篩選。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | How do economic elites respond to the ruling coalition realignment in authoritarian regimes? While the existing literature on authoritarian politics pays immense attention to whether the nominally democratic institutions strengthen authoritarian resilience or lead to democratization, empirical research on economic elites’ behavior under authoritarian settings is lacking. During politically unstable times, do authoritarian legislatures serve as property protection institutions as a public good or as rent-seeking forums for insiders? This article focuses on how entrepreneurs acted during China’s political transition from Jintao Hu to Jinping Xi and demonstrates that entrepreneurs with legislature connections have a higher probability of staying in the market during the leadership succession period, but this effect was not significant while the leader continued in office, which is suggestive of discriminatory property protection and elites’ self-selection. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T03:33:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2501202106232700.pdf: 1601063 bytes, checksum: a44ad7d4b2f265b98bf9fabd8ecb8082 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i 中文摘要 ii Abstract ii 第一章 緒論 v 第一節 問題意識 1 第二節 研究背景 3 第三節 理論觀點 6 第四節 研究設計 9 第二章 文獻回顧 11 第一節 威權議會的運作機制 11 第二節 正式制度與非正式制度 14 第三節 中共繼承政治的制度化與個人化 16 第四節 小結 18 第三章 威權政黨換屆與經濟菁英行為 20 第一節 領導人更替與經濟菁英產權持有 20 第二節 資料來源與操作化 21 第三節 迴歸結果與機制可能性 25 第四節 關係與議會 34 第五節 遺漏變數:派系 37 第四章 結論 40 參考文獻 42 壹、中文部份 42 貳、西文部份 42 附錄一 受訪者資料與代號對照表 48 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 偏私的產權保護:政治繼承時期的威權議會與經濟菁英 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Discriminatory Property Rights Protection: Authoritarian Legislatures and Economic Elites during Leadership Succession Period | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 109-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 周嘉辰(Chia-Chen Chou) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 寇健文(Chien-Wen Kou),吳親恩(Chin-En Wu) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 威權議會,經濟菁英,政治繼承,政商關係,中國政治, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Authoritarian Legislature,Economic Elite,Leadership Succession,State-Business Relations,Chinese Politics, | en |
dc.relation.page | 48 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202100147 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2021-01-25 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
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