美國證管會提高擬制性盈餘監管之影響

Abstract

本研究旨在探討美國證管會於2001年起加強對擬制性盈餘監管之影響。我們手動蒐集2009年至2013年S&P 500公司擬制性盈餘揭露之資訊。敘述統計及相關係數結果顯示於美國證管會提高擬制性盈餘監管後，擬制性盈餘之揭露具有一致性，而非視當期績效決定是否揭露擬制性盈餘。我們發現在美國證管會加強監管後仍自願且持續提供擬制性盈餘資訊之公司，較有可能達到或打敗分析師預期。我們亦檢視公司是否利用擬制性盈餘排除金額從事盈餘管理，結果顯示，管理階層仍會利用擬制性盈餘排除項目的裁量空間進行盈餘平穩化。我們也發現擬制性盈餘的調整和應計項目盈餘管理具有替代關係。此結果說明美國證管會提高對擬制性盈餘之監管後，雖使公司不再以當期績效決定是否揭露擬制性盈餘，資訊品質有所提升，但公司仍有動機在裁量空間內透過擬制性盈餘的排除強度進行盈餘管理。

This paper investigates the impact of the SEC’s scrutiny on non-GAAP reporting. We use hand-collected non-GAAP earnings disclosures from S&P 500 firms with fiscal period starts in 2009 and ends in 2013. Based on the finding that the propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings becomes a more consistent behavior post related SEC’s regulations, our results show that firms voluntarily and persistently disclose non-GAAP earnings are more likely to meet or beat the mean analysts’ consensus forecast. When we employ the difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings to explore whether firms disclose non-GAAP earnings opportunistically through non-GAAP exclusions, we find that firms take advantage of discretion on non-GAAP exclusions for purpose of income smoothing. We also find a substitute association between non-GAAP exclusions and accruals management. The results indicate that the SEC’s oversight is effective only in partly curtailing the misuse of non-GAAP reporting.