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標題: | 雙重股權架構與集體訴訟風險 Dual Class Structure and Securities Class Actions |
作者: | Wei-Chin Wen 溫偉芩 |
指導教授: | 許文馨 |
關鍵字: | 雙重股權,股權架構,集體訴訟,代理問題, Dual class,Ownership structure,Securities class actions,Agency problem, |
出版年 : | 2017 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 過去文獻多著重探討雙重股權架構對公司治理之影響,本文則以雙重股權架構與集體訴訟風險之關係為研究方向。雙重股權架構時常導致控股股東的投票權與現金權比例存在巨大差異,此差異所衍生之代理問題,可能導致雙重股權公司之控股股東傾向於在犧牲股東利益之下追求個人私利,而為了掩飾剝削股東利益的行為,雙重股權公司則可能採取行動來避免外部股東的監督,外部股東則可能需要透過集體訴訟作為事後自保的機制。本研究以過去文獻為基礎,預期雙重股權架構與集體訴訟之間呈正相關。實證結果發現,雙重股權公司之集體訴訟風險較高,此外,控股股東投票權與現金權分離程度愈高的雙重股權公司,其涉及集體訴訟之可能性也愈高。 Most prior studies focus on the impact of dual class structure on corporate governance, this study examines whether firms with dual-class structure are more likely to engage in securities class actions (SCAs). Dual-class structure often resulted in a significant separation between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights. This divergence aggravates agency conflicts and dual class firms thus tend to extract private benefit at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. To conceal the extraction, dual class firms may take actions to avoid monitoring of outside shareholders. Outside shareholders may need to resort to SCAs as an ex post governance mechanism. Motivated by prior literature, this study hypothesizes the relation between dual class and SCAs is positive. My empirical results show that firms with dual class structure are more likely to involve in SCAs, and the likelihood of litigation occurrence increases as the gap of the rights separation widens. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20775 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201701648 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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