中央與地方政府環境政策的衝突與變化－環境政策規範對政府主導意願的影響

Abstract

回顧美國環境保護政策的發展，由於環境汙染有擴散性，早年環保政策由聯邦政府主導，近年來地方政府對環境政策越來越積極，在某些跨區域的汙染管理上，甚至比聯邦政府更積極。本研究想探討這樣的情形如何發生，當政府採取不同的政策，是否對中央、地方政府的主導意願產生影響。由於地方政府對所轄地區汙染最敏感而直接，地方政府會先定調自己的立場，中央政府再視地方政府的反應做決策，故本研究採用循序管制賽局（sequential-move stackelberg game）地方政府先行動中央政府後行動的方法，探討當環境政策採「直接管制政策」或「誘因管制政策」，對政府主導意願的影響。結果發現，直接管制政策下，由中央政府主導環境保護政策；在誘因管制政策下，由地方政府主導環境保護政策。所以政策的改變，將影響中央政府及地方政府的主導意願。

In terms of the US environmental protection policies developed over years, owing to the diffusivity of environmental pollution, the federal government used to lead environmental protection policies in the early days whereas the local governments have been applying more and more proactive approaches to environmental protection policies in the recent years since they apply even more proactive approaches than the federal government does to certain cross-regional pollution. The author attempted to inquire how this happened and if diverse policy alter the central and local governmental aspirations for leadership. Since the regional pollution affects the local governmental in the most sensitive and direct way in the jurisdiction, the local government will set the stance first and the central government makes decisions in accordance with the reaction made by the local government. Consequently, the author employed the Stackelberg competition (sequential-move games) model i.e. the local government acts before the central government does to investigate how the command and control approach and the incentive-based regulation alter the governmental aspirations for leadership of environmental protection policies. The findings are as follows. If the command-and-control approach is used, the central government leads environmental protection policies. If the incentive-based regulation is used, the local government leads environmental protection policies. This evidences that diverse policy alters the central and local governmental aspirations for leadership.