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| ???org.dspace.app.webui.jsptag.ItemTag.dcfield??? | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 廖咸興 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yu-Tien Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃于恬 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T02:43:58Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2018-02-23 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2018-01-22 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20279 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 同產業公司之間之互動及影響一直是財務領域上的議題，本論文利用Bill Francis et al.(2016)建構相對同儕品質之方法，以同產業為組別，建構出相對同產業品質作為同產業品質之代理變數，同時利用Demerjian (2012)建構的管理能力變數建構出同產業平均管理能力分數為同產業品質之另一代理變數，用此兩個變數探討同產業公司品質高低對目標公司價值之影響。結果顯示，具有高同產業品質之目標公司，公司價值及股價報酬率表現越佳，然而在公司債利差為正相關，顯示與債權價值呈現負相關。本論文另探討同產業品質可能影響公司整體價值的四個機制，薪資激勵機制、學習機制、風險追求效果及盈餘操弄效果之現象進行檢測。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the relationship between peer firms’ management ability and company performance. We employ the relative peer quality(RPQ) constructed by Bill Francis et al.(2016) and peer average management ability score(MA PEER) as two proxy of industry-level management quality. The empirical results of this study show that the higher the industry management quality, the higher the reporting firms’ performance, stock return and credit spread, suggesting agency problem between management team and debtholder. Moreover, we also explore that mechanism through which industry-level management quality affects firm performance. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T02:43:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-106-R04723088-1.pdf: 1280579 bytes, checksum: 91288ffd57ae7c558ee69adf50d224ff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 ii
誌謝 iii 摘要 iv Abstract v 目錄 vi 圖表目錄 vii 第一章、概述 1 第二章、研究假說 5 第三章、研究樣本與研究方法 6 第四章、研究結果與分析 10 A. 同產業公司之管理能力對公司價值之影響 10 B. 同產業公司之管理能力對公司股權價值之影響 11 C. 同產業公司之管理能力對公司債債券利差之影響 12 第五章、同產業管理能力影響目標公司之機制 14 A. 同產業公司之薪資激勵機制 14 B. 同產業公司之學習機制 15 C. 目標公司是否有風險追求之現象 15 D. 目標公司是否有操弄盈餘之現象 16 第六章、結論 17 參考文獻 18 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 相對同產業管理能力品質對公司價值之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | How does Relative Industry Peer Quality affect Firm Value? | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 106-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳宗岡,陳彥行 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 同產業品質,管理能力分數,公司價值,公司債利差, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Peer affect,Management ability,Firm performance,Yield spread, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 32 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201800113 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2018-01-22 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-106-1.pdf Restricted Access | 1.25 MB | Adobe PDF |
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