日本與美國普天間基地談判研究(1996年～2012年)

Abstract

談判是當前國家互動的主要方式之一，且大多數的談判均屬不對稱談判。面對權力凌駕於己國之上的談判對手，權力較小的一方該如何追求自身的國家利益？本文擬以1996 年至2012 年間的日美普天間基地談判為研究對象，利用權力不對稱理論與雙層賽局理論中的「獲勝組合」概念，分析在不對稱談判中，權力較小的一方所面臨的國內外機會與限制，以及其議價與追求國家利益的能力。 本文將先交代駐日美軍與普天間基地問題的歷史背景，並以2009 年民主黨黨魁鳩山由紀夫出任首相一職作為分水嶺，將談判過程分為兩階段。再分別探討各階段談判內，日本與美國的議題權力狀態、日本為追求談判目標所使用的談判策略、該策略效果對雙方「可能協議空間」的影響，以及兩階段談判同樣面臨國力差距卻有不同結果的原因。 本文發現，即使面對顯著的國力差距，日本仍可藉由對議題與談判策略的操作去影響彼此的「獲勝組合」。談判者若能善用議題權力與行為權力，將有助於增加自身獲益的機會。

Nowadays, negotiation is one of the main methods to interact with other nations, and most of negotiations are asymmetric. How do weaker states pursue their own national benefits in negotiations with a much more powerful one? This paper studies the Japan-U.S. Futenma Base negotiation process from 1996 to 2012, and the approaches I adopt here are “asymmetry negotiation theory” and the concept of “win-set” among “two-level game theory”. Through the lens of these theories, this paper analyzes the restrictions and opportunities Japan faced at both domestic and international level, Japan’s bargaining power, and the ability of pursuing its preferred outcomes. At the beginning, this paper illustrates the historical background of the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) and the Futenma base issue, and then takes Japan’s political party rotation in 2009 as a watershed, which divided the negotiation process into two phases. In each phase, this paper examines Japan’s and the U.S.’ issue-specific power and strategies respectively, analyzes their influence on the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), and has a further discussion on the unlike outcomes. After comparing these two phases, this paper finds out that though in the face of power asymmetry, the negotiator could still affect both parties’ win-set through strategic maneuver. By applying issue-specific power and behavioral power properly, the weaker state is more likely to gain more in the negotiation.