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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳聖賢(Sheng-Syan Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Po-Jung Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳柏蓉 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T01:15:39Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-08-17 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-08-13 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Alicke, M., 1985, Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49, 1621-1630.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/18625 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本篇以高階經理人更換後再謀職為例，高階經理人若為適度過度自信且自願離職、較年輕、過去績效佳、從大公司離職，較容易在離職後再被其他公司聘為高階經理人。公司具有較好的成長機會和較多的研究發展費用支出，較有可能聘用過度自信的高階經理人。過度自信的高階經理人要求較高的薪資，並且當公司面臨成長機會時會增加公司的投資支出。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | What happens to CEOs after they turnover? We examine CEOs who can be hired as CEO by another firm after turnover. CEOs with moderately-optimism, who voluntary left from departing firm, younger, better prior performance and from big departing firm are more likely to be hired as CEO by another firm after turnover. Firms with higher growth opportunity and R&D expenditures are willing to hire overconfident CEOs. More optimistic CEOs can receive higher total compensation than less optimistic CEOs. Finally, Overconfident CEOs will increase firm investment while firm with high growth opportunity. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T01:15:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-D96723004-1.pdf: 1060294 bytes, checksum: e99e12951b9208afd108f1c47c656b05 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
Chinese Abstract………………………………………………………i Abstract……………………………………………………………….ii Contents……..……………………………………………………….iii List of Tables……………………………………………………... v 1. Introduction…..…………………………………………….....1 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development…………...6 2.1 The likelihood for overconfident CEOs who can be hired as CEO of another firm after turnover.………………………..6 2.2 Compensation and overconfident CEO………………………..7 2.3 Investment decision…………………………………………….9 3. Sample and Methodology………………………………………..10 3.1 Sample………………………………………………………….10 3.2 Measuring overconfidence………………………………….11 3.3 Other explanatory variables………………………………14 3.4 Sample distribution and summary statistics………….16 4. Empirical Results……………………………………………….18 4.1 The likelihood for overconfident CEOs who can be hired as CEO of another firm after turnover…………………19 4.2 CEO / firm characteristics and compensation of new hire firm................................................22 4.2.1 Subsample analysis on CEO/firm characteristics of new hire firm……….…………………………………………..22 4.2.2 Regression results of CEO compensation of new hire firm…..............................................25 4.3 Investment decision……………………………………....29 4.3.1 Regression model…………………………..........29 4.3.2 Regression results of overconfident CEO and investment decision......................................30 4.4 Alternative explanations…………...………………....32 4.4.1 Overconfidence and governance…………………….33 4.4.2 Overconfidence and private information…………33 5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………35 Reference………………………………………………………………38 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 過度自信、薪酬水準與投資決策：以高階經理人更換後再謀職為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | What happens to CEOs after they turnover? Overconfidence, compensation and investment decision | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳業寧(Yeh-Ning Chen),陳彥行(Yan-Shing Chen),黃嘉威(Chia-Wei Huang),林玟君(Wen-Chun Lin),游景德(Chin-Te Yu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 過度自信,行為財務學,高階經理人,薪酬,投資決策, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Overconfidence,Behavior Finance,Chief Executive Officer,Compensation,Investment Decision, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 50 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-08-13 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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