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標題: | 多種廠商污染物在集中與分別管制之賽局分析 Environmental Regulation of Multiple Pollutants: Simultaneous-move vs. Sequential-move Games |
作者: | Li-Ling Cheng 鄭立苓 |
指導教授: | 宋玉生 |
關鍵字: | 集中管制,分別管制,分離函數,同步賽局,循序賽局, centralized regulation,compartmentalized regulation,separable function,simultaneous-move Nash game,sequential-move Stackelberg game, |
出版年 : | 2014 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文假設廠商在生產過程中會有兩種汙染物產生,且由不同政府部門或單位負責管制污染物排放量上限。在現實生活中,廠商在生產過程中會產生二氧化硫(SO2)及二氧化碳(CO2)兩種污染物,當負責管制這兩種汙染物排放量的單位在訂定廠商排放上限時,均致力於追求滿足社會福利最大,在此管制政策具有約束力的假設情況下,則廠商最後的污染物排放量將會遵從此規範標準。
從負責管制汙染物排放量的政府部門或單位來看,可將其分為兩種情況,一為集中管制(centralized regulation),即指廠商兩種汙染物的排放量均由同一個政府部門或單位負責管制;另一情況為分別管制(compartmentalized regulation),即指廠商兩種汙染物的排放量分別由兩個不同政府部門或單位負責管制。一般而言,當這些廠商在生產過程中產生的數種汙染物排放量均由同一政府單位管制時,其結果具有效率性。本文主要探討當這些廠商汙染物排放量為分別管制時,其結果和集中管制的情況下相比是否同樣具有效率性,並分析其在「同步管制賽局」(simultaneous-move Nash regulation game)及「循序管制賽局」 (sequential-move Stackelberg regulation game)中所得到的結果是否會有所差異。 文中各章節分析研究後的結果顯示,當廠商生產成本函數及汙染物所造成的傷害函數為可分離情況時,在市場機能具有效率性的假設下,廠商汙染物排放量為分別管制時,其均衡值和集中管制時一樣,即兩種情況下其廠商產出及汙染物排放量決策會相同。然而,當廠商生產成本函數和汙染物所造成的傷害函數為不可分離時,在廠商汙染物排放量為分別管制情況下,其結果將不具效率性。 This thesis assumes that a single firm generates two kinds of pollutants during the process of manufacturing and the regulation of two pollutants is responsibly controlled by two independent governmental sectors or departments. In real life, an example is the emission of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2) of a factory during the production process. While the responsible units set such volume to the upper limit for the two pollutants, they devote themselves to maximize social welfare. Under the assumption that the controlling policy bearing legal force, the manufacturers would make their final discharge of pollutants to comply with the norms. Judging from the governmental authorities responsible for controlling the emission of pollutants, two types of regulations may be applied to. One which regulates both pollutants at an identity is called 'centralized regulation' while the other at two different entities is called 'compartmentalized regulation.' Generally speaking, while the discharge of pollutants are controlled by a governmental authority, the results bear efficiency. This thesis mainly explores whether or not the efficiency similarly exists in the results of the emission of pollutants performed by compartmentalized regulation and centralized regulation. The paper further analyzes whether or not a deviation exists in the results performed under the simultaneous-move Nash regulation game and the sequential-move Stackelberg regulation game. After reviewing each paragraph in this thesis, the results show while the firm cost functions and pollution damage functions are both separable, under the assumption that market mechanism bears efficiency, the equilibrium under the compartmentalized regulation are the same as the centralized one. However, while the firm cost functions and pollution damage functions are inseparable, the results bear inefficiency under compartmentalized regulation. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/18379 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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