CEO能力、股權誘因與盈餘操弄

Abstract

本論文以台灣高科技公司為樣本檢驗CEO能力、股權誘因與盈餘操弄之關係。和先前盈餘操弄文獻一致，本研究將盈餘操弄區分為應計基礎盈餘操弄和實質盈餘操弄。研究結果顯示CEO能力與應計基礎(實質)盈餘操弄呈現顯著正向(負向)關聯。此外，研究也顯示高股權誘因會導致CEO使用較多(少)的應計基礎(實質)盈餘操弄。更特別的是，能力較高的CEO相較於能力較低的CEO更會專注於實質盈餘操弄造成的長期後果，所以CEO能力與實質盈餘操弄之負向關聯在高股權誘因之下更為強烈。此現象的合理解釋是因為能力較高的CEO有更多的知識以瞭解實質盈餘操弄之下背離正常營運活動所造成的負面後果。因此，當能力較高的CEO擁有高的股權誘因時他們比較不會使用實質盈餘操弄此種方式以拉抬盈餘。整體來說，本研究指出CEO能力和股權誘因都會影響盈餘操弄，而且高股權誘因對於CEO能力和盈餘操弄的關係具有一個調節效果。

This study examines the relation of CEO ability, equity incentives, and earnings manipulation in Taiwanese high-tech firms. Following the recent literatures on earnings manipulation, this study divides earnings manipulation into accrual-based earnings manipulation (AEM) and real earnings manipulation (REM). The results show that CEO ability is positively (negatively) associated with AEM (REM). The results also suggest that AEM (REM) is increasing (decreasing) with high equity incentives. Specifically, high-ability CEOs are more concerned about long-term implication of aggressive REM than low-ability CEOs are when they have high equity incentives, thereby high equity incentives result a relatively greater negative association between CEO ability and REM. The reasonable explanation is that high-ability CEOs have more knowledge to recognize the negative consequences of abnormal business practice with REM activities. Therefore, high-ability CEOs with high equity incentives appear to be less likely to use REM activities to boost reported income. Collectively, this study finds that CEO ability and equity incentives can and do impact earnings manipulation. In addition, high equity incentives have moderation effect on the relation between CEO ability and earnings manipulation.