論自由貿易協定下勞工條款之爭端解決機制

Abstract

國際貿易法下之勞工議題爭論已久，隨著世界貿易組織（World Trade Organization，以下簡稱「WTO」）會員於1996年新加坡部長宣言中，明確表示國際勞工組織才是制定並處理核心勞動標準之權責機構，此議題在WTO之架構下似已達成共識。惟除WTO協定以外，越來越多自由貿易協定將勞工議題納入談判項目，而勞工與貿易議題究竟應相互連結或彼此分割，仍迭有爭論。 WTO會員國雖亦於1996年新加坡宣言中指出，國際勞工組織才是國際社會間勞工權益保障之主導者，但國際勞工組織（International Labour Organization，以下簡稱「ILO」）對於各項國際勞動基準之執行力並不高。因此，各國在自由貿易協定下作成各項保障勞工權益之實體承諾，並建立爭端解決條款與制裁措施之作法，相形之下具有更高之執行力，看似為國際勞工權益保障帶來一線新曙光。然而，自1994年北美自由貿易協議簽署至本文完成為止，逾十五年間，仍僅有二件案例實際適用爭端解決機制處理勞工條款下產生之爭議，至於以貿易制裁促使締約國遵守勞工條款之案例，更尚未出現。 基於上述背景，本文擬探討自由貿易協定下勞工條款爭端解決程序及其制裁措施之制度設計良窳，並嘗試提出改善建議。經檢視國際勞工組織之勞工保障規範與執行機制，以及美國與歐盟自由貿易協定下勞工條款之實體承諾與勞工爭端解決機制與實務案例後，本文認為，現況下自由貿易協定中勞工條款爭端解決機制之缺失，應包括：（1）儘管勞工爭議之源頭係因勞工權利遭受侵害，締約國仍以國家政治意願，而非違反勞工條款（即勞工權利是否獲得保障）之具體情形，做為決定開啟及推進爭端解決程序之關鍵性因素，導致目前僅有少數使用勞工爭端解決程序之案例；（2）即使勞方得於爭端解決程序中表達意見，實務上，勞工往往因擔心雇主報復，而不願或僅願以匿名方式提供證詞，當事國對於此等匿名證據效力之爭執，可能延宕爭端解決程序之時程，且將使仲裁/專家小組難以對相關事實形成心證，最終仍導致勞方意見難以為仲裁/專家接受；以及（3）自由貿易協定下勞工條款之爭端解決程序多十分冗長，實務上，從國內公民團體要求締約國政府與被指控違反勞工條款之締約國政府進行諮商，到締約國正式提起諮商，乃至於雙方透過仲裁獲得爭端解決結果間，所需時間長達約九年。 鑒於前述缺失，本文認為，為消除締約國政府因缺乏政治意願而拒絕或延宕勞工爭端解決程序之進行，勞工爭端解決機制中增訂非國家行為者開啟勞工爭端解決程序之管道，亦即，如經具代表性之非國家行為者請求就另一締約國違反勞工條款之事實開啟勞工爭端解決程序，則締約國應於確認此等違法事實合理可信後，立即就該違法事實向另一締約國依相關勞工條款提起正式諮商，並應於諮商未果後，進一步請求成立小組解決爭端，進而於另一締約國未能執行仲裁/專家小組之建議時，立即實施制裁，以確保另一締約國及時改正違反勞工條款之行為。再者，為強化勞工於爭端解決程序中以非匿名方式提供證詞之意願，並建立其對於身分保密之信心，應將禁止雇主報復勞方納入締約國之實體承諾，並要求締約國明定於仲裁/專家小組不當揭露匿名證人之身分時，得準用各國國內對於保密證人之保障規定論處。最後，宜針對勞工條款爭端解決程序訂定更完整之參考時程。藉由上述改革，期能使自由貿易協定下之勞工爭端解決程序發揮應有之功能，進而促使締約國遵守自由貿易協定下之勞工條款，避免雇主侵害勞工權利之情況，因冗長之勞工爭端解決程序而長期難獲改善。

The issue on the linkage between trade law and labor standards has been long debated under the international trade laws. After the members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) indicated in the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration that International Labour Organization (“ILO”) is the competent body to set and deal with core labour standards, it seems that this issue has come to an end under the WTO framework. Nonetheless, labor provisions were still included into the negotiations of many free trade agreements and the debate on the linkage between trade law and labor standards continues outside of the WTO. Compared to the soft implementation mechanism under the ILO, labor provisions under the free trade agreements appears to be more effective in forcing the Parties to implement their commitments to protect labor rights in that such provisions usually contain a dispute settlement mechanism with sanction/retaliation measures. However, after more than 15 years from the execution of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, there were only two times when the labor dispute settlement mechanism was applied to solve disputes arising from labor provisions under the free trade agreements and neither of these two cases has resulted in sanction/retaliation measures to improve the compliance of the respondents to the labor disputes. Given the above, the author intends to analyze the design of the labor dispute settlement mechanism and sanction/retaliation measures under the free trade agreements and propose a reform thereto. After reviewing and analyzing the substantive and procedural rules under the ILO framework and labor provisions of U.S. and EU free trade agreements (including the two cases thereunder), the author argues that the shortages of the current labor dispute settlement mechanism include the following: (1) The initiation and development of a labor dispute settlement would depend on the State government’s political needs instead of the non-compliance situation of the labor provisions, resulting in the rare application of labor dispute settlement mechanism. (2) Theoretically, labor is allowed to act as a witness in the labor dispute settlement process. Nonetheless in practice the labors tend to refuse or chose to give testimony in an anonymous basis because they would be afraid of being laid off due to their testimony. Such anonymous testimony would delay the timeline of dispute settlement process and affects the credibility of testimony. (3) The labor dispute settlement mechanism under the free trade agreements is pretty lengthy and redundant. In practice, it would take around nine years from the submission by the domestic civil groups until the issuance of the final report of labor dispute settlement. To solve the above problems, the author proposes that: (1) To eliminate the obstacles arising from State government’s lack of willingness to initiate and push forward the labor dispute settlement procedure, it is recommended to add a new channel in the labor dispute settlement mechanism so as to provide the non-state actors with an opportunity to initiate such procedure. A suggested mechanism is that: Upon receiving a request from the representative non-state actors to initiate labor dispute settlement procedure for another Party’s non-compliance of labor provisions, the Party should consult with the complained Party for such non-compliance immediately after confirming the authenticity of the non-state actor’s complaints and further request to establish a panel and imposing applicable sanction/retaliation measures in a timely manner. (2) In order to raise labor’s willingness to give testimony in the labor dispute settlement process and to build up their confidence in the confidentiality of witness’ identity, it is recommended to include commitments to ensure a prohibition of employer’s retaliation due to labor’s testimony and to request the Parties to punish the panel members as applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to domestic laws and regulations when they breach relevant confidential obligations. (3) To facilitate the dispute settlement procedure, it is also advisable to establish a comprehensive time schedule for such procedure. Through the above proposals, it is expected to function the labor dispute settlement mechanism under the free trade agreement, to make the Parties to comply with labor provisions under free trade agreement, and to protect labor rights from employers’ continuous infringement due to the lengthy labor dispute settlement procedure.