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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 黃奎隆(Kwei-Long Huang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wei-Hsin Peng | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 彭維姺 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T00:47:05Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-07-30 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-07-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 1. Ba, S., Whinston, A. B., & Zhang, H. (1999). Building trust in the electronic market through an economic incentive mechanism. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Information Systems, Charlotte, North Carolina, USA.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17958 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 隨著通訊技術的進步和智慧型裝置的普及，人們對於網路數據的需求量急遽上升。尤其使用於及時娛樂，例如串流影音、網路遊戲等的網路數據需求更佔了數據成長的一大部分，因此造成網路壅塞的問題。但網路壅塞並不會在一天當中持續發生，因為使用者對於特定時段有使用偏好，例如：上下班交通時間或是晚上的時段，因此導致尖峰時段壅塞的發生。若電信商為了應付尖峰時段的需求，選擇擴建網路設備，其背後的成本和風險都較高，因此須尋求更具經濟效益的方法。本研究同時考慮網路之尖峰時段和離峰時段之時段差異和使用者對於服務的喜好度，盼以獎勵機制設計及定價的手法，在不減少使用者效用下，建立一數學模型，有效的處理網路尖峰壅塞的問題，並透過數值分析得到其管理意涵。本研究模型的使用者效用同時考慮其使用網路服務所得到的正向效用和網路壅塞導致的負面效用，因此可以避免尖峰轉移的狀況，並利用獎勵機制設計吸引使用者在最大化自身效用前提分配自身用量到尖峰和離峰時段。透過賽局理論及數學模型方法求得本模型下電信商提供之最佳轉移獎勵及使用者之最佳用量分配比例兩者的解析解。此外透過數值方法分析具獎勵機制之下使用者的效用和整體社會福祉的變化；最後得到的結論為在具獎勵機制下，當電信商提供最適轉移獎勵時，可以最小化自身的成本並且吸引使用者依據其提供的獎勵選擇最佳的分配比例，並且可以有效提升使用者效用和整體社會福祉。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Due to the popularity of smart device and the improvement of communication technology, data demand increase rapidly. Especially in instant entertainment, for example: stream video or mobile game. Those activities have a great influence in growing data, which leads to network congestion. However, network congestion is not happened continuously in a day, for preference in specific time from users, which becomes peak time. As an example, congestion occurs during transportation time or at night due to lifestyle of majority. Instead of infrastructure, which have a high cost and risk. ISP would like to overcome the problem with an economic method. Our research proposed a method that consider peak time and off peak time difference and preference from the users with incentive mechanism in solving network congestion problem. A mathematical model is created to describe the situation and game theory is used in further calculation for ISP’s optimal reward and user’s optimal usage allocation rate. In consequence, total utility (social welfare) can be improved under the proposed incentive mechanism with optimal reward and usage allocation rate. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T00:47:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02546010-1.pdf: 5035565 bytes, checksum: a5728645b779eb1897c800620c355a2e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員會審定書 I 誌謝 II 摘要 III ABSTRACT IV 目錄 V 圖目錄 VII 表目錄 IX 第1章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景 1 1.2 研究動機與目的 5 1.3 研究範圍與架構 11 第2章 文獻探討 13 2.1網路服務訂價模式 13 2.2 壅塞管理 16 2.3 獎勵機制 18 第3章 問題描述與模型建構 21 3.1 問題描述及定義 21 3.1.1電信商設定 22 3.1.2使用者設定 23 3.1.3獎勵機制與用量分配 25 3.2參數設定與異質性顧客模型求解 25 3.2.1異質性顧客模型推導及求解 26 3.2.2模型求解與假說推導 33 3.3同質性顧客模型推導與求解 34 3.3.1同質性顧客模型推導 34 3.3.2同質性顧客模型假說 35 第4章 數值分析 41 4.1 基礎模型分析 41 4.1.1時段差異參數之影響 41 4.1.2 使用者網路喜好度參數對同質性顧客之影響 44 4.1.3 使用者總數之影響 50 4.2模型情境分析 54 4.2.1 考慮社會福祉之情境分析 54 4.2.2 使用者效用變化 58 4.3異質性顧客模型情境分析 60 第5章 結論 65 參考文獻 68 附錄1：目標函式之凸性和凹性推導 71 附錄2：4.3節泡泡圖資料對照表 77 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 網路服務壅塞下考慮負荷平衡和回饋之獎勵機制設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Incentive-Rewarding Mechanism for Load Balancing under Network Congestion | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 孔令傑(Ling-Chieh Kung),楊朝龍(Chao-Lung Yang),洪一薰(I-Hsuan Hong) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 網路壅塞,獎勵機制,社會福祉,賽局理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Network congestion,Incentive mechanism,Social welfare,Game theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 77 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-07-27 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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