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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 湯明哲 | |
dc.contributor.author | Shih-Yu Lee | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李詩瑜 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T00:43:40Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2015-08-20 | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2015-08-11 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 1. Albrecht v. Herald Co., No. 390 U.S. 145 (Supreme Court of the United States
2. 1968). 3. Bork, R. H. (1966). Legislative Intent and the Policy of Sherman Act. Journal of Law and Economics, 7-28. 4. Bowker. (2012). Self-Publishing in the United States, 2006-2011: Print vs. Ebook (Vol. 2015). the US: Bowker Inc. 5. Brunet, E. (1985). Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by 'Facial Examination' of Restraints: the Burger Court and the Per Se - Rule of Reason Distinction. Washington Law Review(60), 1-32. 6. Chen, W.-R., & Yu, Z.-X. (2013). Platform Strategy. Taiwan: Business Weekly Publications, Inc. 7. Clerides, S. K. (1999). Book Value : Price and Quality Discrimination in the U.S. Book Market. University of Cyprus: Department of Economics Journal(99-15). 8. Cooper;, T. E., & Fries, T. L. (1991). The Most-Favored-Nation Pricing Policy and Negotiated Prices. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9(2), 209-223. 9. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 72 220 (U.S. Supreme Court 1911). 10. Haw, R. Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal. Texas Law Review, 89(2010), 1247-1291. 11. Herfindahl, O. C. (1950). Concentration in the Steel Industry. 12. Horn;, H., & Mavroidis, P. C. (2001). European Journal of Political Economy(233-279). 13. Hyatt, M. (2010). Top Ten U.S. Book Publishers for 2009. Retrieved June 1, 2015, from http://michaelhyatt.com/2010/01/top-ten-u-s-book-publishers-for-2009.html. 14. Johnson, J. P. (2012). The Agency and Wholesale Models in Electronic Content Markets. Paper presented at the FTC Microeconomics Conference. 15. KieferStewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., No. 340 U.S. 211 340 (U.S. Supreme Court 1951). 16. Parloff, R. (2014). Second Bite: Can Apple clear its name in the ebooks drama? [Press release]. Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2014/12/02/apple-ebooks-litigation/ 17. Posner, R. (2001). Antitrust Law (Second Edition ed.). United States: University Of Chicago Press. 18. PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2012). Global Entertainment and Media Outlook: 2012 to 2016 (14 th ed.). 19. Publishers, A. o. A. (Producer). (2011, May 20). AAP StatShot Annual, 2011. [Industrial Report] 20. Rostow, E. V. (1949). Monopoly under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? Illinois Law Review, 43(6), 47-95. 21. Santosy;, B. D. l., & Wildenbeestz, M. R. (2014). E-Book Pricing and Vertical Restraint. NET Institute Working Paper, No. 14-18 22. Semeraro, S. (2013). Should the E-Book Case Presage the Decline of the Per Se and Market Share Doctorines? Tomas Jefferson Law Review, 35, 15-28. 23. State Oil Company v. Barkat and Khan Associate Inc. 96 (Supreme Court of the United States 1997). 24. Stenovec, T. (2014). Amazon Finally Explains Why It's Fighting A Big Publisher. The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/30/amazon-hachette_n_5634123.html 25. United States v. Apple Inc., No. 13‐3741‐cv ( United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2015). 26. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. , No. 388 U.S. 365 388 (U.S Supreme Court 1967). 27. United States v. Board of Trade of Chicago No. 246 U.S. 231 246 (Supreme Court of the United States 1918). 28. United States v. Chicago Board of Trade, No. 246 U.S. 2 (Supreme Court of the United States 1918). 29. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., No. 310 U.S. 150 310 (U.S. Supreme Court 1940). 30. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey No. 221 U. S. 2 221 (Supreme Court of the United States 1911). 31. United States v. Toys and 'R' No. 221 F.3d 928 98 (Appeals to Seven Circuit Court 2000). 32. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n No. 166 U.S. 290 290 (U.S. Supreme Court 1897). 33. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. , No. 273 U.S. 392 (Supreme Court of the United States 1921). 34. Untied States v. Apple Inc. 1 (United States District Court Southern District of New York 2013). | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17794 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 過去蘋果公司進入已存在新市場時,如果該市場具有強烈競爭優勢的競爭者,蘋果公司傾向採取非價格競爭的策略,而選擇以其他優勢和既有廠商競爭,例如在電子書市場,蘋果公司即以代理者模型和最惠協定和美國的六大出版社訂立契約,提供iBookstore使用者電子書市場中最優惠的價格。然而其行為因為影響出版社及既有競爭者亞馬遜的供應契約,亞馬遜公司因市占率共計超過百分之六十的五大出版社的聯合要求,重新簽訂了和蘋果公司相同的供應契約,必須放棄先前以低於供書成本的低價策略。
美國司法部(Department of Justice)於亞馬遜檢舉後介入調查,並認定蘋果公司違反美國休曼法第一條(Sherman Act Section 1)禁止反競爭協約的規定,紐約地方法院認同美國司法部的調查結果,並依據本身違反法則(Per Se Rule)認定蘋果公司的行為違反公平交易法。 本研究分析美國法的既判例,嘗試建構本案在本身違反法則和合理原則(Rule of Reason)間的定位,使用平台分析及情境分析解釋代理模式和最惠協定構成反競爭結果的依據,研究結果認為蘋果公司為水平聯合定價的幫助者,符合美國法判例本身違反法則,因此違反休曼法第一條,縱使不使用本身違反法則,其行為因為無法證明是有益市場競爭、且是新進入市場者所必須,亦難以通過合理原則的檢驗,仍舊構成反托拉斯契約,違反休曼法第一條。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | As there were strong competitors existing in the e-book market, Apple Inc. choose a strategy to avoid a price war when entering that new market, choosing to compete via non-price advantages. In pursuit of its strategy, Apple Inc. signed contracts combining an agency model and price parity provisions with the Big Six publishing companies. This conduct influenced the contracts of supply between Amazon and those publishing companies which, comprising more than sixty percent of the publishing market, forced Amazon to yield to a renegotiation of prior contracts meeting the same terms to which Apple Inc. had agreed with those companies. Thus Amazon abandoned its low pricing strategy.
The US Department of Justice started its investigation after Amazon filed a complaint to the government accusing Apple Inc. of violating the anti-trust law, the Sherman Act, Section 1. The U.S. Federal Southern District Court of New York agreed with the argument of the Department of Justice to assess the case on the basis of the per se rule. This research explores the precedents of the Supreme Court of United States in defining the legal precedents and case histories involving both relevant bases of legal analysis via the per se rule and the rule of reason. After analyzing the intricacy of the agency model and price parity provisions through the platform theory and scenario analyses, this research concludes that Apple Inc. did indeed violate the Sherman Act Section 1 even as the courts had ruled. This is because Apple Inc. had facilitated horizontal price-fixing which is deemed as a per se illegality. Even by the rule of reason, Apple Inc. failed to prove that its conduct benefited the e-book market and /or was necessary for it to enter the market as a new entrant. Therefore, Apple could not prove that it had not violated the Sherman Act Section 1. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T00:43:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02724013-1.pdf: 1197844 bytes, checksum: 5b7f02daa48fa19b4abc0373d340fa24 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii ABSTRACT iv CONTENTS v LIST OF FIGURES vii LIST OF TABLES viii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Motivation of Study 1 1.2 Research Objectives 2 1.3 Research Structure and Methodology 3 Chapter 2 Literature Review 4 2.1 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 4 2.2 The Per Se Rule 8 2.3 Rule of Reason 11 2.4 Wholesale Model and Agency Model 13 Chapter 3 An Industry Analysis of the E-Book Market 15 3.1 Market Size and Growth Prospects 15 3.2 The Platform Effect and Groups in the Market 17 3.3 The Bargaining Power of Content Providers 22 3.4 An Analysis of Platform Providers 25 Chapter 4 Anti-trust Suit: United States v. Apple Inc. 28 4.1 The Background of United States v. Apple Inc. 28 4.2 A Discussion of the Possible Incentives to Publishing Companies from the Agency Model 34 4.2.1 A Lower-Margin E-Book Market Had Eroded the High-Margin Hardcover Market 34 4.2.2 Amazon Extended Its Power in regard to Content 35 4.2.3 The Reaction of Publishing Companies before the Entrance of Apple Inc. 37 4.3 The effect of Most Favored Nation Clause 38 4.4 An Analysis of the Most Favored Nation Clause by Scenario 39 Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusions 48 5.1 The Critical Factors involved in the Court Ruling 48 5.1.1 Per se Illegal Price-Fixing 48 5.1.2 Vertical Price-Fixing 49 5.1.3 Horizontal Price-Fixing 51 5.2 Research Conclusions and Future Research 55 5.2.1 Research Conclusions 55 5.2.2 Future Research 57 REFERENCES 59 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 蘋果公司電子書公平交易法一案給予未來公平交易實務的啟示 | zh_TW |
dc.title | An Examination of the case, United States v. Apple Inc., with implications towards Future Practices of Anti-Trust Law | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳政衛,欒錦榮 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 蘋果公司電子書案,反托拉斯,本身違反原則,平台分析, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | United States v. Apple Inc.,anti-trust law,per se rule,platform analysis, | en |
dc.relation.page | 61 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2015-08-12 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業學系 |
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