董監責任險與投資效率關聯性之實證研究

Abstract

本研究探討企業投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險，對於投資效率的影響。本文利用臺灣經濟新報社（TEJ）資料庫，並選取西元2008年至2011年期間臺灣非金融業上市（櫃）公司作為研究樣本。研究結果顯示，企業投保董監責任險與投資效率呈顯著負相關，且企業投保董監責任險較容易造成過度投資問題；另外發現投保金額佔營收比例亦與投資效率呈顯著負相關，且當投保金額愈高時，愈容易過度投資，但不容易造成投資不足。研究結果支持投機假說，亦即董監事與高階經理人可能因責任險的保護而從事有害股東權益的行為。

This study examines the association between directors and officers liability insurance（D&O insurance）and investment efficiency. Using a sample of listed non-financial Taiwanese companies from years 2008-2011, we find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with investment efficiency. In particular, firms having D&O insurance are more likely to have overinvestment. We also find that the amount of D&O insurance is positively associated with overinvestment and negatively associated with underinvestment. The results support the opportunism hypothesis that directors and officers are more likely to act opportunistically under the protection of D&O insurance.