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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17669
標題: | 長期勞工雇用契約風險 - 美國職棒大聯盟實證研究 Risk of Long-Term Employment Contract – Empirical Research in Major League Baseball |
作者: | Hsiang-Chieh Yu 游向傑 |
指導教授: | 曾郁仁 |
關鍵字: | 美國職棒,勞工,契約,風險,隱藏資訊,隱藏行為,道德風險, MLB,labor,contract,risk,hidden information,hidden action,moral hazard, |
出版年 : | 2013 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本論文主要探討美國職棒大聯盟球團提供長期勞工雇用契約給球員時潛在的風險。對於美國職棒大聯盟的球隊而言,自由球員市場造成的球員隱藏資訊與簽約後球員的隱藏行為可能會導致支付過多薪水的風險,而這兩種主要的風險也是影響球團財務最嚴重的風險。將不同衡量球員表現的變數嵌入多元回歸模型來做美國職棒大聯盟的實證研究,可發現相較於舊合約換成一個新的短期契約,球員從舊合約換成新的長期契約時表現會變差,但在舊契約是短期契約時比較明顯。這樣的結果符合隱藏資訊與隱藏行為的假設,然而實證結果進一步顯示自由市場中的隱藏資訊風險可以被避免掉,但簽約後的隱藏行為在勞工雇用契約中是很嚴重的風險。 The paper examines the risk for teams offering long-term employment contract to players in Major League Baseball. Two major risks – hidden information in the free agent market and hidden action of the player could result in overpaying, which is a serious problem for Major League Baseball teams. Empirical results from Major League Baseball using a least-squared multiple regression model with different variables to evaluate a player’s performance suggests that players perform worse after signing long-term contracts compared to signing short-term contracts but specifically for players who is changing from a short-term contract into a long-term contract, which is consistent with the hypothesis of hidden information and hidden action. Evidence also shows that hidden information in the free agent market could be avoided but hidden action is a serious problem in contract signing. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17669 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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ntu-102-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 875 kB | Adobe PDF |
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