以補償成本分攤機制控管通路塞貨之存貨減價風險

Abstract

本研究探討代理人在佣金報酬之下的塞貨行為，所謂塞貨是指供給下游超過通路實際需求的存貨數量，通路塞貨浮報了代理人的銷售數據，代理人因此獲得更多的佣金報酬，但在產品銷售期結束後會產生大量剩餘存貨，倘若產品的生命週期較短，這些剩餘存貨會有明顯地價格減損，讓持有存貨的經銷商蒙受損失；故只有在達成供應鏈風險共擔協議之下經銷商才願意提高訂購數量，以減價補償契約為例，製造商要補償經銷商因塞貨造成的存貨減價損失，如此一來，代理人塞貨可能違背了製造商的利潤目標，且塞貨程度不容易在銷售結束之前被查覺，當中產生典型的代理問題，製造商須從激勵設計的階段進行改善。 基於上述背景，本研究以製造商立場建立存貨風險共擔模型，以補償成本分攤機制將部分的存貨減價損失轉嫁給代理人承擔，製造商因此可間接影響代理人的塞貨數量決策。根據數值範例分析的結果，當產品的價格減損程度不高時，製造商可以利用補償成本分攤機制誘導代理人進行適量地塞貨，並增加自身的期望利潤；反之，當產品的價格減損程度很高時，代理人會因為期望補償成本提高而減少塞貨數量，降低通路的存貨減價風險。另外，當經銷商原先的存貨目標較低時，製造商應鼓勵代理人塞貨來增加本身的獲利。一般而言，經銷商備貨會維持在一定的需求滿足率，隨著產品的需求變異增加，製造商與代理人因塞貨而增加的利潤也越高，此時通路塞貨的現象更為明顯。總結以上，補償成本分攤機制可有效控管通路塞貨下的存貨減價風險，確保佣金制度的完備性。

This study discusses on channel stuffing motivated by an agent: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows an agent to report sales in excess of real demand in order to get more commission. But there is much more remaining stock of a dealer at the end of selling period. If the product life cycle is short, the remaining stock will be significantly price depreciated. The dealer will be damaged owing to holding the remaining stock. Once the dealer takes a huge inventory risk caused by channel stuffing, it will not accept the padding quantities unless getting a risk sharing agreement (i.e. a markdown money contract) with the manufacturer. Then manufacturer has to compensate the inventory markdown losses of dealer, which goes against the purpose of manufacturer’s profit. Since it’s not easy to find out the agent’s padding quantities, there is a classical agent problem between agent and manufacturer. Base on the above-mentioned, this study in the view of manufacturer to control inventory markdown risks caused by channel stuffing. In our model, manufacturer and agent share the inventory markdown risks together by the apportionment of compensation cost. So that manufacturer can control the padding quantities indirectly. According to the result of numerical analysis, manufacturer could improve its profit with a proper degree of padding quantities when the product price depreciation is slight. On the contrary, manufacturer should induce agent to reduce the padding quantities when the product price depreciation is serious. In addition, we also know that manufacturer should induce more pads of agent when dealer’s original order up to level is low. At the result of keeping the constant full-fill rate by dealer, the more variance of demand the more extra profit due to channel stuffing. In conclusion, manufacturer could effectively control inventory markdown risks by the apportionment of compensation cost. This mechanism ensures the completeness of an incentive plan of commission compensation.