中國轉移支付制度與地方政府財政支出行為之研究

Abstract

中國自1950年代以來經歷了多次的財政改革，特別是在1994年後中國採行分稅制劃分了中央與地方政府的基本的財政收入，而其中轉移支付則對於平衡中央與地方政府財政關係扮演著重要的角色，本論文主要探討1994年分稅制後，在地方政府承擔著經濟發展責任的中國財政體制特色下，轉移支付制度如何影響地方政府財政支出行為。 第二章探討了中國地方經濟發展進程與政府支出型態之關聯，利用1995至2006年的省級財政資料，分析地方政府支出比重與人均GDP水準之間的關係，若將地方政府的財政支出劃分為經濟性支出、社會性支出與行政性支出三類，發現隨著人均GDP增長，地方政府的經濟性支出比重將先提高後下降，反之，社會性支出比重則先下降後增加，而行政性支出比重則保持穩定。此結果顯示中國地方政府在經濟發展優先的政策目標下，會優先將財政資源投入經濟性支出，直到經濟發展成熟後，再將資源投入社會性支出。 第三章則討論中國轉移支付制度與地方社會福利支出的關係，由前一章可知地方政府會優先將財政資源投入經濟發展，而後再投入社會性支出，但由資料發現中國中西部地區的經濟條件並不如東部地區，但中西部地方政府仍然會投入資源在社會福利支出。本章使用與第二章相同資料，指出其主要原因在於中央政府在2000年後開始重視社會福利與社會保障的問題，東部地區可以就其經濟發展較高的優勢，自然提高社會性支出的水準；然而在中西部地區普遍地方政府財力不足的情況下，難以同時執行經濟與社會兩項目標，是故，透過中央政府的轉移支付成為支應地方政府社會福利與社會保障支出的財源。 最後，第四章探討中國轉移支付制度與地方財政供養人口規模的關係，利用1995年至2005年的縣級財政資料進行研究，本文指出中國東部地區因經濟發展較好，故決定財政供養人口的主要因素為地區經濟發水準(人均GDP)與轉移支付中的稅收返還；而中西地區經濟發展尚未成熟，其財政供養人口與人均GDP無關，反之，呈現出財力性補助與專項補助使得財政供養人口增加，特別是專項補助的影響最大。因此，過去文獻提及專項補助將使地方政府的財政供養人口膨脹的現象只存在中國的中、西部地區，並非適用於所有的地方政府

Since 1950s, China had experienced several fiscal reforms. The most influential one would be the adoption of the tax sharing system, which divided the basic fiscal revenue of the central and the local government’s, after 1994. Since then, the transfer payment system played an important role in the fiscal relations between the central and the local governments. This thesis mainly discussed how the transfer payment system in China had influenced the local governments’ spending behavior while the local government also had to take on the responsibility of their own economic development which is considered to be the unique feature of China's fiscal structure. In the second chapter, we focus on the relationships of the progress of China's economic development and the local governments’ spending patterns. Based on the 1995-2006 provincial fiscal data, we analyzed the relationships between local governments’ expenditure ratio and GDP per capita level. If we divided the local governments’ expenditure into three types, the economic expenditure, the social expenditure and the administrative expenditure, we would find that as the GDP per capita grown, the economic expenditure ratio would increase first and then drop; on the contrary, the social expenditure would decrease first and then go up, while the administrative expenditure ratio remained the same. This result showed that under the policy prioritizing economic development, China’s local governments would first allocate their fiscal resources to the economic expenditure until the economic development had reached its target, and then, the remaining resources to the social expenditure. In the third chapter, we would discuss the relationships between China’s transfer payment system and local governments’ social welfare expenditure. Based on the analysis of the previous chapter, the local governments would first allocate their fiscal resources to improve their economic development, and then the social expenditure. However, we also found out that even though the economic conditions of China's mid- and western regions was not as good as the east, the mid- and western local governments would still allocate their fiscal resource to social welfare expenditure. From the same data source as Chapter Two, we pointed out the main reason was that after year 2000, China’s central government started to emphasize and focus on social welfare and social security issues. Naturally, the eastern region had no difficulty in raising their levels of social expenditure due to their more advantageous economic status, while the local governments of mid-west, where financial resources were insufficient, needed to take the usage of transfer payments of central government as their sources of funds for social welfare and social security expenditure in order to reach their goals in both the economic and social developments at the same time. Finally, in the fourth chapter, we study the relationships between China’s transfer payment system and the size of local fiscally dependent population. The 1995-2005 county-level fiscal data was being used in this chapter. This paper pointed out that because the economic development of the eastern region was better, the main factor influencing the fiscally dependent population was the level of regional economic development level (GDP per capita) and the tax rebate. However, while the economic development of the western region was less advanced, the fiscally dependent population was less affected by the GDP per capita level, but more by the financial subsidies and the earmarked subsidies. Especially the earmarked subsidies had the greatest impact. Therefore, the past studies about the phenomenon that earmarked subsidies would cause expansion of local government’s fiscal dependent population only existed in China's mid- and western regions, and could not be applied to all of China’s local governments.