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| ???org.dspace.app.webui.jsptag.ItemTag.dcfield??? | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 胡星陽 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Shing-Yang Hu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張琳 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Lin Chang | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T23:51:10Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-09-11 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2002-01-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 杜榮瑞、陳煬楊、黃馨儀(2019)。企業社會責任績效與CEO薪酬的關係。當代會計,20(1),1-28。 林郁琪(2017)。企業舉債程度對管理階層薪酬及員工薪資之影響。國立臺灣大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文。 林淑惠、胡星陽(2003)。上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構。經濟論文,31(2),171-206。 葉日武(2006)。企業聲望與財務績效之研究。國立東華大學企業管理學系博士論文。 Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999). Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 54(6), 1999-2043. Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract theory. MIT press. Boschen, J. F., Duru, A., Gordon, L. A., & Smith, K. J. (2003). Accounting and stock price performance in dynamic CEO compensation arrangements. The Accounting Review, 78(1), 143-168. Carrasco-Hernandez, A., & Sánchez-Marín, G. (2007). The determinants of employee compensation in family firms: Empirical evidence. Family business review, 20(3), 215-228. Datta, S., Iskandar‐Datta, M., & Raman, K. (2001). Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2299-2336. Devers, C. E., Cannella Jr, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007). Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of management, 33(6), 1016-1072. Dow, J., & Raposo, C. C. (2005). CEO compensation, change, and corporate strategy. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2701-2727. Ellul, A., Pagano, M., & Schivardi, F. (2018). Employment and wage insurance within firms: Worldwide evidence. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(4), 1298-1340. Faleye, O., Reis, E., & Venkateswaran, A. (2013). The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 3258-3272. Focke, F., Maug, E., & Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 123(2), 313-336. Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M. (2003). The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of management journal, 46(2), 226-237. Gupta, N., & Shaw, J. D. (2014). Employee compensation: The neglected area of HRM research. Human resource management review, 24(1), 1-4. Heyman, F., Sjöholm, F., & Tingvall, P. G. (2007). Is there really a foreign ownership wage premium? Evidence from matched employer–employee data. Journal of International Economics, 73(2), 355-376. Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 324-340. Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1), 129-149. McConaughy, D. L. (2000). Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family-controlled firm: An examination of the level and sensitivity of pay to performance. Family Business Review, 13(2), 121-131. Mishra, V., & Smyth, R. (2014). Technological Change and Wages in C hina: Evidence from Matched Employer–Employee Data. Review of Development Economics, 18(1), 123-138. Oyer, P. (2004). Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects?. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1619-1650. Perotti, E. C., & Spier, K. E. (1993). Capital structure as a bargaining tool: The role of leverage in contract renegotiation. The American Economic Review, 1131-1141. Rigoni, B., & Adkins, A. (2016). What Millennials Want from a New Job. Harvard Business Review. Rosen, S. (1990). Contracts and the Market for Executives (No. w3542). National Bureau of Economic Research. Stuebs, M., & Sun, L. (2010). Business reputation and labor efficiency, productivity, and cost. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(2), 265-283. Titman, S. (1984). The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision. Journal of financial economics, 13(1), 137-151. Wayne, J. H., & Casper, W. J. (2012). Why does firm reputation in human resource policies influence college students? The mechanisms underlying job pursuit intentions. Human Resource Management, 51(1), 121-142. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16966 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 薪資是工作報酬的重要指標,但並非高階經理人或員工決定任職、留任企業的唯一因素。本研究以《天下雜誌》最佳聲望標竿企業做為企業聲望的代理變數,探討台灣企業是否存在高階主管薪資與企業聲望的抵換關係,以及一般員工薪酬與企業聲望的關聯性。實證結果顯示,企業聲望與高階主管薪資呈顯著負相關,名列《天下雜誌》最佳聲望標竿企業之高階主管,其薪資低於未上榜企業之高階主管7.5%;而此抵換效果受薪酬計算方式影響,計入績效獎金、分紅之高階主管整體薪酬,與企業聲望呈顯著正相關。 此外,企業聲望與一般員工薪資呈顯著正相關,且不論是否計入獎金、分紅,均得到一致的實證關係,顯示名聲好的公司不論是在員工基本薪資,或是獎酬、分紅的發放,都傾向提供更優渥的薪酬水準。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Compensation is perceived as a core factor in return for work, but not the only one for executives or employees to consider whether to accept the offer or stay at the company. This study uses CommonWealth's survey of the most admired benchmark companies as a proxy for firm prestige, to investigate if the executives in prestigious firms are willing to accept lower monetary compensation, and the relation between employee compensation and firm prestige as well. The empirical results indicate a negative relation between executive salary and firm prestige, with a statistical significance that salary is 7.5 % lower for firms ranked on CommonWealth's list of the most admired benchmark companies. However, the trade-off effect depends on the type of compensation. When it comes to executives' total compensation, which includes performance incentives and bonuses, firm prestige is positively related to the total pay of executives. Besides, frim prestige is positively related to employee compensation, and this significant correlation exists no matter it includes incentives and bonuses or not. The empirical result implies prestigious companies tend to provide a higher level of salary base and bonuses for their employees. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T23:51:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-0908202010490100.pdf: 1696491 bytes, checksum: d93b1a6cdfaf9b3c719876846cb00ddf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書i 致謝ii 中文摘要iii 英文摘要iv 第壹章 緒論1 第一節 研究背景與動機1 第二節 研究目的2 第貳章 文獻回顧3 第一節 高階主管薪酬之影響因素3 第二節 一般員工薪酬之影響因素4 第參章 研究設計6 第一節 研究假說6 第二節 研究方法7 第三節 樣本選取與資料來源14 第肆章 實證結果與分析15 第一節 樣本敘述15 第二節 企業聲望與高階主管薪酬的關聯性23 第三節 企業聲望與一般員工薪酬的關聯性26 第四節 企業聲望對於高階主管與員工薪酬比值的影響29 第伍章 結論與建議31 第一節 結論31 第二節 未來研究建議32 參考文獻33 附錄35 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 員工薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 抵換效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 高階主管薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 企業聲望 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 《天下雜誌》最佳聲望標竿企業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Trade-off | en |
| dc.subject | Firm Prestige | en |
| dc.subject | Executive Compensation | en |
| dc.subject | Employee Compensation | en |
| dc.subject | CommonWealth's List of The Most Admired Benchmark Companies | en |
| dc.title | 企業聲望與薪酬之關聯性—以台灣上市公司為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Firm Prestige and Compensation: Evidence from Taiwan’s Listed Companies | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳業寧;何耕宇 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Yeh-Ning Chen;Keng-Yu Ho | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 企業聲望,高階主管薪酬,員工薪酬,抵換效果,《天下雜誌》最佳聲望標竿企業, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Firm Prestige,Executive Compensation,Employee Compensation,Trade-off,CommonWealth's List of The Most Admired Benchmark Companies, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 36 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202002699 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-11 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學系 | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|
| U0001-0908202010490100.pdf Restricted Access | 1.66 MB | Adobe PDF |
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