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標題: | 高階經理人薪酬實證研究 Essays on Executive Compensation Research |
作者: | Hung-Hua Pan 潘虹華 |
指導教授: | 王泰昌 |
關鍵字: | 高階經理人薪酬,內部負債,紅利,風險追求,盈餘管理,學習,薪酬委員會, Executive compensation,inside debt,bonuses,risk-taking incentive,earnings management,learning,compensation committees, |
出版年 : | 2014 |
學位: | 博士 |
摘要: | There are three essays in this dissertation. The first essay discusses the role of bonuses in CEO inside debt holdings. Prior literature states that the advantage of inside debt holdings is that they mitigate managerial risk-taking incentives and increase earnings quality. After considering the composition of inside debt in which pension benefits are contingent on bonus plans, my results show that once CEO inside debt holdings are related to bonus plans, the advantage of inside debt holdings may disappear. The second essay discusses that the learning process of shareholders reduces the variance of stock returns, thereby making stock return become a more direct estimate of an executive’s level of efforts. My results suggest that according to learning theory, firm age is an important factor determining executive stock-based incentives. The third essay discusses whether the presence of overlapping memberships on the compensation committee impacts the effective structure of executive compensation. Firms with the compensation committee members on other firms’ compensation committees (“external overlapping memberships”) and on the audit committees (“internal overlapping memberships”) may have different compensation structures than those without. My study provides evidence that overlapping memberships on the compensation committee influence the compensation setting process. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16957 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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