公司治理對總經理獎酬不對稱性之影響

Abstract

研究動機與目的 本文係根基於Leone (2006)及Garvey (2006)兩篇探討總經理獎酬對績效指標不對稱性之論文，Leone (2006)認為總經理現金獎酬對負市場報酬較敏感，Garvey(2006)認為總經理獎酬有pay for luck 情形，即總經理獎酬對正績效指標較敏感。兩篇論文同樣探討總經理獎酬之不對稱性，卻有相反之實證結果，引起本文探討造成此差異之原因，本文認為公司治理架構係造成此差異之原因。因此提出假說一(H1)：公司治理良好情況下，總經理現金獎酬對負市場報酬較敏感。假說二(H2)：公司治理不佳情況下，總經理現金獎酬對正績效指標較敏感。 研究方法 為了測試不同公司治理架構對總經理現金獎酬不對稱性之影響，本文實證研究從台灣經濟新報(TEJ)選取西元2000 年至2004 年共五年之樣本資料，選取標準為上市發或上櫃發行普通股之公司。為探討不同公司治理情況下，總經理現金獎酬對績效指標之不對稱性，本文將所有樣本資料依公司治理總分區分為公司治理良好及公司治理不佳，公司治理總分由四項公司治理指標組成：董事會持股、外資法人股東持股、設置獨立董事及董事長兼任總經理，此四項公司治理指標之選取係參考Marianne (2001)、考量實際可取得資料及台灣產業情形。分別測試公司治理良好及公司治理不佳樣本對總經理現金獎酬不對稱性之影響。 主要發現與建議 本文實證研究之結果如下：(1)當公司治理良好時，實證結果為總經理現金獎酬對負市場報酬相較正市場報酬更為敏感，與假說一(H1)相符。(2)當公司治理不佳時，實證結果為總經理現金獎酬對正會計盈餘為不顯著之負向關係，無法證實假說二(H2)。(3)當公司治理不佳時，實證結果為總經理現金獎酬對正市場報酬為顯著之負向關係，不符合假說二(H2)。本文認為與預期不符之原因為，當市場報酬表現良好時，總經理基於自身利益，可能向董事會要求提高以股票為基礎獎酬比重、降低現金獎酬比重，如此可比僅領取現金獎酬獲得更高之獎酬。綜合以上實證結果，證實不同公司治理架構對總經理現金獎酬不對稱性確實有所影響。

The literature provides divergent evidence about CEO’s asymmetric compensation. While Leone (2006) found CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to negative stock returns, Garvey (2006) found CEO compensation is more sensitive to the positive performance indicators. This paper proposes corporate governance that causes the conflict in the literature. Specifically, this paper develops the below two main hypotheses as the reason. In the first hypothesis, when corporate governance is good, CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to negative stock returns. In the second hypothesis, when corporate governance is poor, CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to the positive performance indicators. The sample consists of firms in TEJ database between 2000 to 2004. The sample is further divided into good and poor corporate governance groups by corporate governance scores. The paper combines four corporate governance measures to calculate corporate governance score：(1) Stock holdings of boards of directors (2) Stock ownership of foreign institutional investors (3) The presence of independent directors (4) CEO duality. The top 50％ and the last 50％ ranked firms by corporate governance scores are classified as good and poor corporate governance groups, respectively. This paper uses different models to test CEO asymmetric cash compensation. Each group is applied to one of the two models to test the two hypotheses in the paper. The empirical results are as follows：(1)When corporate governance is good, CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to the negative stock returns, supporting the first hypothesis. (2)When corporate governance is poor, CEO cash compensation isn’t significantly sensitive to positive accounting earnings, inconsistent with the second hypothesis. (3) When corporate governance is poor, CEO cash compensation is significantly negative to positive stock returns, rejecting the second hypothesis. This paper concludes that a firm’s corporate governance structures affect the side of CEO asymmetric cash compensation.