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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳榮華 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Jia-Dai Tau | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陶嘉代 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:55:49Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-19 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-08-15 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考書目
I. 外文部分 Bacon, F. (2000). The New Organon, trans. L. Jardine & M. Silverthorne. New York: Cambridge University Press. Baker, G. P., & Hacker, P. M. S. (1980). Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ------- (1983). Wittgenstein, Meaning and Understanding: essays on the Philosophical Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ------- (2004). Wittgenstein's Method: neglected aspects, ed. K. J. Morris. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. Bernstein, R. J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: science, hermeneutics, and praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Cavell, S. (1976). Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Descartes, R. (1991). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ------- (2006). A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, trans. I. Maclean. New York: Oxford University Press. Dilman, I. (1998). Language and Reality Modern Perspectives On Wittgenstein. Leuven: Peeters. ------- (2002). Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution : the question of linguistic idealism. New York: Palgrave. Dostal, R. J. (2002). The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Frege, G. (1948). Sense and Reference. [Journal Article]. Philosophical Review. 57 (3):209-230. Gadamer, H. -G. (1976). Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. & trans. D. E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press. ------- (1980a). Dialog and Dialectic : eight hermeneutical studies on Plato. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ------- (1980b). The Eminent Text and Its Truth [Journal Article]. The Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), 3-10. ------- (1981). Reason in the Age of Science, trans. F. G. Lawrence. MIT-PR : Cambridge. ------- (1985-1995). Gesammelte Werke, 10 vols., Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr ------- (1986). The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other essays, trans. N. Walker, ed. R. Bernasconi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ------- (1996). Truth and Method, tans. J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, New York: Continuum. ------- (1997). The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. L. E. Hahn. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court. ------- (2002). The Beginning of Knowledge, trans. R. Coltman. Continuum : New York. ------- (2003). A Century of Philosophy, trans. R. Dottori. New York: Continuum. Glock, H.-J. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell Reference. ------- (2004). Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher? [Journal Article]. Metaphilosophy. Jl, 35(4), 419-444. Grondin, J.(2003). The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. K. Plant. Chesham: Acumen. Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Insight and Illusion : themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ------- (1997). Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. ------- (2001). ‘Philosophy’ in Wittgenstein: a critical reader, ed. H. -J. Glock. MA: Blackwell Publishers, 233-347. ------- (2004). Wittgenstein : connections and controversies. New York: Clarendon press. ------- (2010). ‘Meaning and Use’ in The later Wittgenstein on Language, ed. D. Whiting. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 26-44. Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1963. ------- (1977). Being and Time, trans. J.M. Anderson & E. Robinson, New York: Harper. Hintikka, M. B., & Hintikka, J. (1986). Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Horn, P. R. (2005). Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the Unity of language: reality and discourse without metaphysics. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Husserl, E. (1913) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy—First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff 1982 (= Ideas). Hutchinson, P. (2007). What's the Point of Elucidation? [Journal Article]. Metaphilosophy (691-713), O 2007. Johnston, P. (1989). Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge. Kenny, A. J. P. (2006). Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell Pub. Kern, Andrea (2004). ‘Understanding Scepticism’ in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, ed. D. McManus. New York: Routledge, 200-217. Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an elementary exposition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Kuusela, O. (2005). From Metaphysics and Philosophical Theses to Grammar: Wittgenstein's Turn. [Journal Article]. Philosophical Investigations. Ap, 28(2), 95-133. ------ (2006). Do the Concepts of Grammar and Use in Wittgenstein Articulate a Theory of Language or Meaning? [Journal Article]. Philosophical Investigations. O, 29(4), 309-341. ------- (2008). The Struggle against Dogmatism : Wittgenstein and the concept of philosophy. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. Lawn, C. (2004). Wittgenstein and Gadamer : towards a post-analytic philosophy of language. New York: Continuum. Malcolm, N. (1986). Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's criticism of his early thought. Oxford, OX, UK: Blackwell. McGinn, M. (1989). Sense and Certainty : a dissolution of scepticism. Oxford: B. Blackwell. Mill, J. S. (1873). System der Deductiven und Inductiven Logik : eine Darlegung der Grundsatze der Beweislehre und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Leipzig: Fues. ------- (1936). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. New York: Longmans, Green. Minar, E. (2005). ‘On Wittgenstein’s Response to Scepticism: the Opening of On Certainty’ in Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Moore, G. E. (1925). ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ in Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series), ed. J. H. Muirhead. Allen and Unwin, London, 193-223. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers and in G. E. Moore: selected writings, 106-33. ------- (1939). Proof of an External World. [Journal Article]. Proceedings of the British Academy 25, 273-300. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers and in G. E. Moore: selected Writings, 147-70. ------- (1993). Selected writings, ed. T. Baldwing. New York, NY: Routledge. Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004). ‘On Certainty and the Grammaticalization of Experience’ in The Third Wittgenstein : the post-Investigations works, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock. Burlington, V.T.: Ashgate, 43-62. ------- (2005). ‘Unraveling certainty’ in Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W.H. Brenner, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 76-99. ------- (2009). Introduction to Proceedings Issue of The Third Wittgenstein. [Journal Article]. Philosophia 37 (4): 557-62. Mueller-Vollmer, K. (2011), ‘Wilhelm von Humboldt’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/wilhelm-humboldt/>. Mulhall, S. (2003). ‘Stanley Cavell’s Vision of the Normativity of Language: Grammar, Criteria, and Rules’ in Stanley Cavell, ed. R. T. Eldridge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 79-106. Pitchard, D. (2005). ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism’ in Readings of Wittgenstein's On certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pitcher, G. (1964). The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Pole, D. (1958). The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein: a short introduction with an epilogue on John Wisdom. London: Athlone Press. Ringma, C. (1999). Gadamer's Dialogical Hermeneutic: the hermeneutics of Bultmann, of the New Testament sociologists and of the social theologians in dialogue with Gadamer's hermeneutic. Heidelberg : C. Winter. Risser, J. (1997). Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: re-reading Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Suny-Pr: Albany. Scheibler, I. (2000). Gadamer: between Heidegger and Habermas. Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Schmidt, L. K. (2006). Understanding Hermeneutics. Stocksfield: Acumen. Strawson, P. F. (1971). Logico-linguistic Papers. London: Methuen. Stroll, A. (1994). Moore and Wittgenstein On Certainty. New York: Oxford University Press. Wachterhauser, B. R. (1994). Hermeneutics and Truth. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. ------ (1999). Beyond Being: Gadamer's post-platonic hermeneutical ontology. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Weinsheimer, J. C. (1985). Gadamer's Hermeneutics. Yale-Univ-Pr: New Haven. Wittgenstein, L.(1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden. London: Routlege & Kegan Paul. ------- (1953). Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: B. Blackwell. ------- (1958). Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations' : generally known as the Blue and Brown books. New York: Harper and Row. ------- (1967). Zettle. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ------- (1969). On Certainty , ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Harper. ------- (1974). Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell. ------ (1976). Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 : from the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ------- (1979). Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35, ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford: Blackwell. ------- (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology , vol.1 , ed G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ------- (1993). Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, ed. J. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hacket Pub. Co. Williams, M. (2004). ‘Refutation of idealism’ in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, ed. D. McManus. New York: Routledge, 76-96. ------- (2005). ‘Why Wittgenstein Isn’t Foundationalist’ in Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 47-58. Wright, C. (1985). ‘Facts and Certainty’ in Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. LXXI, 429-472. Wright, K. (1990). Festivals of Interpretation: essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's work. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. II. 中文部分 高達美 (1993)，《真理與方法：哲學詮釋學的基本特徵》，洪漢鼎譯，臺北：時報文化出版公司，初版。 ------- (1995)，《真理與方法：補充和索引》，洪漢鼎與夏鎮平繹，臺北：時報文化出版公司，初版。 陳榮華 (1992)，《海德格「存有與時間」闡釋》，臺北市：輔仁大學出版社。 ------- (2011)，《高達美詮釋學》，台北市：三民書局。 張鼎國 (2011)，《詮釋與實踐》，汪文聖與洪世謙編，台北市：政大出版社。 維根斯坦（1992），《哲學探討》，范光棣與湯潮譯，臺北市：水牛。 ------- (2003)，《维特根斯坦全集》，涂纪亮主编，石家庄: 河北敎育。 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15935 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 語言與實在的關係是哲學研究的基礎，對語言與實在關係的哲學研究則具體落實哲學不遺漏自身基礎之深入反省的目標。本文主要根據《真理與方法》與《論確定性》，評析高達美與後期維根斯坦對此議題的可能貢獻。為了對這兩位哲學背景、用字譴詞與論述風格迥異的哲學家作出公允的比較，本文強調把握他們哲學取向的重要性。哲學取向是哲學家使用其哲學論述的方式，而這決定其哲學論述的確切意義。為此，本文採取以下論述方式：首先致力於從《真理與方法》與《論確定性》各自處理的哲學問題與處理方式分別握他們的哲學取向，繼而貼合著他們各自的哲學取向來探查《真理與方法》與《論確定性》對於本文論題的可能貢獻，最後才以本文論題為中心對於這些貢獻進行直接比較。
經由以上論述方式，本文研究結果如下：《真理與方法》在理論式哲學取向下，對於本文論題提出的貢獻是---語言與實在在問與答的對話中，具有原初的統一或一致性關係。《論確定性》在治療式哲學取向下，對於本文論題提出的貢獻是---語言與實在在客觀確信的語言行為或實踐中，具有原初的統一或一致性關係。《真理與方法》與《論確定性》對於本文論題的共同主論點是：語言與實在具有原初的統一關係；亦即語言本身是夠好的，能夠向我們呈現或開顯出實在。在此共同主論點下，他們的一個共同關切或目標是：在語言使用上，向本身夠好的語言盡可能地保持開放與不獨斷。本文認為，相較於《真理與方法》在理論式哲學取向下所提出的問與答的對話，《論確定性》在治療式哲學取向下提出的客觀確信的語言行為或實踐，較能具體落實此共同關切。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The relationship between language and reality is a fundamental issue in philosophy. This dissertation tries to analyze and compare Gadamer’s and the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical contributions on this issue. The main reference in this study is composed of two important works of them: Truth and Method and On Certainty. Since these two philosophies are diverse in academic background, vocabularies and style, it turns out to be important to grasp their philosophical approaches which, I think, serve as the foundations of their philosophies. My research method is a three-step process, (i) by an investigation of Truth and Method and On Certainty, to define their philosophical approaches by way of an analysis on the fundamental questions they deal with, and the responses they maintain. (ii), I examine their philosophical contributions in the thesis of the relationship between of language and reality. (iii), I give a comparison of their contributions.
The findings underline that Gadamer’s philosophical approach is theoretical, and that of later Wittgenstein is therapeutic. The former approach justifies that: in the dialogue of questions and answers, language and reality are in a primordial unity; while the latter justifies that: in the objective certainty of linguistic practice, language and reality are in a primordial unity. Their common conclusion is: language and reality are in a primordial unity, i.e., language is good enough to disclose reality to us. According to this conclusion their common concern would be: to keep open and undogmatic as far as possible in the use of language. In my conclusion I argue that, in contrast to Gadamer’s theoretical approach of dialogue of question and answer, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach of linguistic practice is more satisfactory in the working out of their common concern. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:55:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-D91124005-1.pdf: 11216089 bytes, checksum: f6b5800cc65500b22f3a428fe5b84c74 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要 v
Abstract vii 凡例說明 ix 略語表 ix 引用說明 x 導論 1 I. 論題說明與主要研究成果 1 II. 研究方法與論述範圍 6 III. 前人研究成果與本文特點 10 IV. 章節安排與研究內容 14 1. 高達美的哲學問題---人文科學喪失真理地位 17 1.1 人文科學喪失真理地位 17 1.2 高達美的「自然科學方法」圖像 20 1.2.1 “過時”的問題 20 1.2.2 高達美的對於「方法」的一般性刻畫 23 1.3 高達美對自然科學方法的質疑 27 1.3.1 方法論的預設 27 1.3.2 自然科學方法忽略的理解要素 28 1.4 小結 31 2. 高達美對其問題的回應---正視理解的前見 33 2.1 如何正視理解的前見/歷史性 34 2.1.1 效應歷史 36 2.1.2 歷史效應意識 38 2.2 理解作為視域融合的過程 40 2.2.1 視域融合 40 2.2.1.1 時間距離 40 2.2.1.2 融合的視域與問題的優先性 42 2.2.1.3 視域融合與「應用」 44 2.2.2 視域融合的過程具現為人際間的對話關係 45 2.2.2.1 「我—你」關係 45 2.2.2.2 問題在詮釋經驗中的優先性 47 2.2.2.3 問與答的結構 48 2.2.3 將問與答的對話普遍化為理解的基本模式 50 2.2.3.1 從人際對話到文本詮釋 50 2.2.3.2 小結 52 2.2.3.3 對於外語的對話與詮釋經驗 54 2.2.4 理解/思考與語言的一致 57 2.2.4.1 理解對象的語言性 57 2.2.4.2 理解過程的語言性 59 2.3 語言與世界的一致 63 2.3.1 人類世界經驗的語言性格 63 2.3.1.1「環境」、「世界」與「世界觀」 63 2.3.1.2 語言與世界的原初統一 65 2.3.1.3 哲學詮釋學作為普遍的理解模式 67 2.3.2 在其自身的世界與世界自身 68 2.4 思考、語言與世界的原初統一關係---語言與實在的關係 72 2.4.1 思考隸屬於事物本身 73 2.4.2 詮釋關係作為隸屬關係的基礎與特點 75 2.4.2.1 理解的有限性 75 2.4.2.2 理解經驗的事件性格 77 2.4.3 詮釋語言的有限性&思辨/隸屬結構 81 2.4.4 詮釋學的普遍面向---從詮釋語言的思辨性/隸屬性談事物的存有 83 3. 後期維根斯坦的「哲學」概念與對懷疑論的態度 91 3.1 後期維根斯坦的「哲學問題」與「哲學」概念 92 3.2 對後期維根斯坦的詮釋 94 3.3 對懷疑論特徵的刻畫 103 3.4 懷疑論的誤解 106 3.4.1 摩爾的證明與日常的懷疑 106 3.4.2 「哲學的懷疑」及其誤解 111 3.5 懷疑論者與實在論者共同的誤解根源 116 3.5.1 具有懷疑論憂慮的人如何將「有物體存在」視為一經驗假設 116 3.5.2 感覺與料經驗的知識論優先性 118 3.5.3 懷疑論的知識圖像---知道即知覺 120 4. 維根斯坦對懷疑論的治療 123 4.1 維根斯坦對於語言使用的一個區分 ---經驗命題與文法命題 123 4.2 對懷疑論憂慮者語言使用之內在衝突的概念探究 129 4.2.1 摩爾式命題是否使用為事實命題 129 4.2.1.1 無法使用為一般日常情況下的事實命題 129 4.2.1.2 無法使用為非一般日常情境下的事實命題 131 4.2.1.3 知道不作為一種擔保事實的特定心理狀態 133 4.2.1.4 小結 137 4.2.2 摩爾式命題是否使用為文法命題 138 4.2.2.1 模爾式的命題是否可使用為文法命題？---意義使用理論 139 A. 阻礙性觀點 139 B. 黑克對維根斯坦意義使用理論的詮釋 141 C. 黑克詮釋的優缺點 146 4.2.2.2 摩爾式命題是使用為文法命題 150 A. 數學命題作為文法命題的原型（prototype） 154 B. 維根斯坦對於摩爾式命題作為文法命題的刻畫 159 a. 不能懷疑 159 b. 不能犯錯 161 c. 所有事情都支持而不反對的原則 162 d. 懷疑摩爾式命題的practical effects 162 e. 以判斷作為判斷的原則 170 C. 摩爾式命題作為文法命題的重要結果 ---感覺與料命題使用為文法命題 176 a. 下判斷是否奠基於感覺與料經驗 176 b. 對於下判斷的學習 177 4.3 從OC看語言與實在的關係 189 4.4 維根斯坦對於文法命題的“使用” 194 4.5 小結 197 5. 語言與實在之關係：高達美 vs. 後期維根斯坦 199 5.1 對於語言與實在之關係的相近觀點 199 5.2 不同的哲學取向 202 5.2.1 高達美對後期維根斯坦哲學取向的批判 202 5.2.2 對高達美批判的反省 205 5.2.3 後期維根斯坦對高達美哲學取向的可能批判 208 5.2.3.1 高達美對後期維根斯坦哲學取向的誤解 208 5.2.3.2 具有獨斷危險的理論式哲學取向 210 5.2.3.3 高達美的理論式哲學取向具有獨斷的危險 215 5.3 對於「語言」概念以及語言與實在之關係的相異觀點 224 結論 231 I. 總結與反省 231 II. 展望 235 參考書目 237 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 論高達美與後期維根斯坦哲學中語言與實在的關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | On Language and Reality in Gadamer and the Later Wittgenstein | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 楊金穆 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 方萬全,林維杰,孫雲平 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 高達美,後期維根斯坦,語言,實在,哲學, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Gadamer,later Wittgenstein,language,reality,philosophy, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 242 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-08-15 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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