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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15750完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 謝德宗(Der-Tzon Hsieh) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chih-Kai Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張智凱 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:51:19Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-10-09 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-09-26 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、 中文部分
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Lang, 1999, “Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia,” Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC. 9. Claessens, S., S. Djankov and L. Lang, 2000, “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), pp.81-112. 10. Cochran, G.S., and S.L.Wartick., 1994, “Corporate Governance-A Review of the Literature.” 11. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, 1985, “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 12. Dennis, D.K. and J.J. McConnell, 2003, “International Corporate Governance,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), pp.1-36. 13. Fama, E.F., 1980, “Agency Problems and the Informativeness of Earnings,” Journal of Political Economy, 88, pp.288-307. 14. Fama, E.F., and M.C. Jensen., 1983, “Separation of Ownership and Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.301-325. 15. Fosberg, R., 1989, “Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring,” Akron Business and Economic Review, 20, pp.24-32. 16. Jensen, M.C. 1993, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,” Journal of Financial, 48, pp.831-880. 17. Jensen, M.C. and R. Ruback, 1983, “The Market for Corporate Control: the Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, pp.5-50. 18. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.305-390. 19. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 1989, ”Agency Theory : An Assessment and Review”, Academy of Management Review, 14(1),p.59. 20. Kesner, I.F., 1987, “Directors’Stock Ownership and Organizational Performance: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies,” Journal of Management, 13(3), pp.499-509. 21. Kosnik, R., 1987, “Greenmail: A Study in board Performance in Corporate governance,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 32, pp.163-185. 22. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1999, “Corporate Ownership Around the World,” Journal of Finance, 54(2), pp.471-517. 23. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1998, “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 106, pp.1115-1155. 24. Leland, H. and D. Pyle, 1977, “Informational Asymmetrics, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Finance, 32, pp.371-385. 25. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, R.W., 1988, “Management Ownership and Marketing Valuation,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.293-315. 26. Morck,R., Shleifer A., and R. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), pp.293-316. 27. Pearce J.A., and S.A. Zahra., 1991, “The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors: Associations with Corporate Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, 12, pp.135-153. 28. Pound J., 1988, “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversigh,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.237-265. 29. Rechner P.L., 1989, “Corporate Governance: Fact or Fiction,” Business Horizons, 32, pp.11-15. 30. Salancik, G.R., and Pfeffer, J., 1980, “The Effect of Ownership and Performance on Executive in U.S. Corporations,” Academy of Management Journal, 23, pp.653-664. 31. Shleifer A. and R. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance, LII(2), pp.738-783. 32. Shleifer A. and R. Vishny, 1986, “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp.461-488. 33. Stulz, R.M., 1988, “Managerial Control of Voting Right: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1-2), pp.25-54. 34. Weisbach, M.S., 1988, “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.431-460. 35. Williamson, O.E. 1983, “Organization form, Residual Claimants and Corporate Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.351-366. 36. Yermack, D., 1996, “Higher Market Evaluation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 40, pp.185-211. 37. Zahra, S. A., and J.A.Pearce, 1989, “Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrated Model,” Journal of Management, 15, pp.291-334. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15750 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 面對全球化競爭環境，企業想要從資本市場籌資，需吸引投資人注意，因此如何加強公司治理機制便是必須重視的議題。在台灣眾多產業中，電子業一向被認為最具國際競爭力，電子業屬資本密集產業，外部融資需求大，更需獲得投資人信任，因此本研究針對台灣電子業上市公司治理，探討對其公司績效的影響。
本研究選擇電子業上市公司為研究對象，並將研究樣本分為權值股與非權值股兩個子樣本進行比較，樣本資料期間涵蓋2005∼2011年，本研究以OLS、GLS與Panel Data迴歸模型進行分析，並檢定出本研究資料以Panel Data 個體固定效果回歸為最適模型，故本研究以此模型分析結果為結論。 本研究以董事會組成、股權結構兩類變數為自變數，以EPS、ROA、ROE為公司績效變數，以Panel Data迴歸模型分析出的結果為家族或集團控制董事會降低公司的績效；獨立董監事對於權值股公司發揮了監督功能，有助於提高績效，但對非權值股則不顯著；最終控制者需負擔大部分因本身失職行為而造成的公司損失時，較有動機監督管理者以提升績效，故對公司績效有正面影響；法人持股比例與績效呈現正向關係，顯示法人更具有專業能力可監督公司。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In the competitive world, business corporations need to attract investors’ attention from the capital market. Thus, how to enhance corporate governance mechanism becomes a worth-noting issue. Among all the industries in Taiwan, electronic industry has always been considered the most competitive on the global market. Electronic industry is capital intensive with a high demand for external financing, thus requiring more trust from investors. This study explores the influence of listed companies’ corporate governance on company performance.
The research objects are electronic listed companies and two sub-samples are compared: weighted stocks and unweighted stocks. The duration of the sample information is from 2005 to 2011. This study uses OLS, GLS and Panel Data regression model for analysis, and tests out Panel Data entity fixed effect model to be the optimal model. Therefore, the researcher draws conclusions based on the results of this model. This study uses director board and ownership structure as independent variables, and EPS, ROA and ROE as variables for corporate performance. The results of Panel Data regression model analysis are: family or corporate groups lower company performance; independent directors serve as monitoring effect and thus improve company performance, but their influence on unweighted stocks is insignificant; when final controllers have to bear most of the responsibilities for the loss of the company, they have a higher motivation to monitor managers and thus it improves company performance. Institutional investors’ holding rate has a positive influence on company performance, showing that institutional investors are more professional in monitoring a company. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:51:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-P99323017-1.pdf: 4112526 bytes, checksum: af07043defb3738c963963f2dacef600 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii 中文摘要 iii 英文摘要 iv 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景與動機 1 1.2 研究目的 3 1.3 研究架構 3 第二章 文獻探討 5 2.1 公司治理概念 5 2.2 代理理論與公司治理 13 2.3 董事會組成與公司績效 16 2.4 股權結構與公司績效 18 第三章 研究設計與方法 22 3.1 實證架構 22 3.2 研究臆說 23 3.3 實證模型與變數定義 27 3.4 研究期間與資料來源 32 第四章 實證結果與分析 34 4.1 敘述性統計 34 4.2 混合迴歸模型估計 36 4.3 最適模型選擇 45 4.4 Panel Data迴歸模型估計 47 第五章 結論與建議 57 5.1 結論 57 5.2 研究限制與建議 58 參考文獻 59 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 公司治理之董事會組成、股權結構與公司績效關聯性研究—以台灣電子業上市公司為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Relationship among Director Board, Ownership Structure and Firm’s Performance – Evidence of Listed Electronic Companies in Taiwan | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李顯峰,黃淑惠 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,公司績效,Panel Data迴歸模型,個體固定效果回歸,董事會組成,股權結構, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance,company performance,Panel Data regression model,entity fixed effect model,director board,ownership structure, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 63 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-09-27 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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