薪酬顧問與薪資標竿個體之選擇

Abstract

本文係建立於以薪酬顧問與總經理薪資之關聯性為研究主題之相關文獻。薪酬顧問主要工作為輔助企業發展其自身之薪資標竿個體，本研究探討薪酬顧問與薪資標竿個體選擇之關聯性，了解薪酬顧問是否可以幫公司選擇輔合股東利益的標竿個體，或者是幫助公司總經理合理化其薪資溢酬。研究顯示，雇用薪酬顧問之公司較可能選擇擁有較高薪資水準之標竿個體，並以其合理化較高之總經理薪資。此發現與管理階層擴權觀點一致。除此之外，雇用規模較大之顧問無法減緩投機性之薪資標竿選擇。最後，證據支持若顧問提供其他非薪酬顧問服務予公司，對於標竿個體之選擇將相較於顧問未提供其他服務者，更會操弄標竿個體之選擇。此偏誤選擇與公司治理之好壞並無關連，而係由薪酬制度之結構所導致。

This paper builds on prior research on compensation consultants and executive pay, which argues that consultants are hired to justify higher levels of compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Waxman, 2007). As compensation consultants mainly develop peer comparison and benchmarking groups for their clients, this study examines the relation between compensation consultants and the choice of compensation peer groups. I find evidence that firms hiring consultants are more likely to justify their CEOs' compensation by referencing companies with highly paid CEOs with whom they claim to compete for managerial talent. Consistent with managerial power view, consultants select peers in a manner that biases compensation upward. The evidence also shows that benchmarking manipulation becomes more severe for firms hiring large consultants. Large consultants cannot mitigate firms' opportunistic peer benchmarking of CEO compensation. Finally, I find that consultants providing non-compensation services (NCS) may give biased advice on the choice of peer groups. The bias in peer group selection, however, is unrelated to corporate governance and instead appears to be an institutionalized or structural part of the pay setting process.