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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 李艷榕(Yen-Jung Lee) | |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Hsuan Chien | en |
dc.contributor.author | 簡于萱 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:40:43Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-03 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-22 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15451 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 美國的《多德法蘭克法案》法案要求所有公開發行公司從2011年起,必須定期舉行say-on-pay投票以及say-on-pay frequency投票,讓股東針對公司的高階經理人獎酬以及say-on-pay投票舉辦頻率進行表決。本研究以美國2011到2018年的公開發行公司為樣本,研究say-on-pay舉行頻率與盈餘管理之間的關係,並且進一步檢驗say-on-pay投票結果對於兩者間的影響,以及短期機構投資人的監督效果。本研究以裁決性應計數取絕對值作為盈餘管理之替代變數,結果發現相較於say-on-pay投票舉行頻率為每兩年或每三年一次的公司,每年舉辦投票之公司,其經理人從事盈餘管理程度會相對較高;除此之外,當say-on-pay反對票率較高時,say-on-pay舉辦頻率與盈餘管理間之呈現顯著正相關;短期機構投資人持股較高的公司,兩者間的關係也是呈現顯著正向的關係,表示每年舉辦投票的公司,會導致經理人做出較短視近利的行為,尤其是受到股東期待較大壓力的公司經理人。最後,本文將say-on-pay投票結果與短期機構投資人持股的影響綜合考量時,發現say-on-pay投票結果帶來的影響,較短期機構投資人持股的影響還要顯著,表示對於公司經理人而言,股東藉由say-on-pay投票帶來的壓力,較短期機構投資人持股帶來的壓力還要沉重。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The Dodd-Frank Act (2011) requires all public companies to give their shareholders the opportunity to vote on executive compensation, known as “say-on-pay” (SOP) vote. Moreover, it also requires a vote on the frequency of future SOP votes (known as “say on pay frequency” vote). In this study, using data from US publicly traded companies between 2011 and 2018, this study examines the relationship between SOP frequency vote and earnings management, as well as whether the SOP voting outcome and transient institutional ownership affect this relationship. The absolute value of the abnormal accruals is used as a proxy variable for earnings management. This study shows a significantly positive correlation between SOP frequency and earning management, implying that more frequent SOP leads to managerial short termism. Moreover, such a relationship is stronger when a firm received high against rate in the SOP vote or has high transient institutional holding, suggesting that more frequent SOP leads to managerial short termism, especially those firms receiving more performance pressure from shareholders. At last, this study tests the combination impact of SOP voting outcome and transient institutional ownership, the result shows that SOP voting outcome has a stronger impact than transient institutional ownership, implying that firms receiving more pressure from SOP voting results than from transient institutional ownership. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:40:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2207202000150300.pdf: 1435238 bytes, checksum: e19a7baadc1af95a82605cec548e218a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i 致謝 ii 摘要 iii ABSTRACT iv 目錄 v 第一章 緒論 1 1.1研究背景與動機 1 1.2研究架構 2 第二章 文獻探討 3 2.1 say-on-pay 3 2.2 say-on-pay frequency 5 2.3盈餘管理 6 第三章 研究方法 9 3.1假說發展 9 3.2樣本選取與資料來源 11 3.3實證模型 11 3.4變數衡量 15 第四章 實證結果 19 4.1敘述性統計 19 4.2相關係數分析 22 4.3迴歸分析 24 4.4額外測試 30 第五章 結論及研究限制 33 5.1 結論 33 5.2 研究限制與建議 34 參考文獻 35 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | Say-on-Pay舉行頻率與盈餘管理之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | A Study of the Relationship Between Say-on-Pay Frequency and Earnings Management | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao),劉心才(Hsin-Tsai Liu) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 多德法蘭克法案,盈餘管理,say-on-pay,say-on-pay舉辦頻率,短期機構投資人, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Dodd-Frank Act,earnings management,say-on-pay,say-on-pay frequency,transient institutional ownership, | en |
dc.relation.page | 37 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001715 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-07-23 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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