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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳業寧(Yeh-Ning Chen) | |
dc.contributor.author | Szu-Hsiu Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林思秀 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:33:28Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-10 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15377 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 在過去探討研發活動對企業價值影響之文獻中,較少有文獻研究公司治理對研發活動與企業價值關聯性之影響。本論文以台灣上市上櫃電子產業為研究對象探討此議題。文中以經理人及大股東持股結構、席次盈餘偏離差、法人及外資持股結構三大公司治理層面作為公司治理的代理變數。實證結果顯示,若經理人及大股東持股比率愈高,則研發活動對企業市場價值的正面影響越大;若席次盈餘偏離差愈大,則研發活動對企業市場價值的正面影響越小;若法人及外資持股比率愈高,則研發活動對企業市場價值的正面影響越大。此外,本論文分群樣本的實證結果顯示,在資訊不對稱程度較高的企業,公司治理較能提高研發活動對企業市場價值的正面影響。整體來看,好的公司治理有助於減緩代理問題,減少研發活動過程中的不必要支出,提高研發活動對企業市場價值的正面影響。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The effect of corporate governance on the relationship between research and development (R D) expenditures and firm value remains much unexplored in prior studies. This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on the relationship between R D expenditures and firm value by using the sample of Taiwan’s electronics industry. We employ three aspects of empirical proxies for corporate governance: (1) manager and blockholder ownership structure; (2) the deviation between board seat-control rights and cash flow rights, and (3) institution and foreign ownership structure. Our empirical findings show that manager and blockholder ownership will increase the market valuation of innovation activities. The deviation between board seat-control rights and cash flow rights will decrease the market valuation of innovation activities. Institution and foreign ownership will increase the market valuation of innovation activities. In addition, the empirical results from subsample indicate that corporate governance is associated with higher market valuation for innovation activities in high degree of information asymmetry firms. Better corporate governance can alleviate agency problem and impede unnecessary expenditure during innovation activities, which is associated with higher market value. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:33:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2206202020205900.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 5927f2886eaa47fb32aa68d6cf049551 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i 摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 表目錄 v 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻探討及假說建立 3 第一節 研發費用支出與企業價值關聯性之文獻回顧 3 第二節 公司治理與企業價值關聯性之文獻回顧 4 第三章 研究樣本及研究設計 10 第一節 樣本選擇及資料來源 10 第二節 研究變數衡量 11 第三節 實證模型 15 第四節 樣本統計敘述與相關係數 17 第四章 實證結果與分析 21 第一節 以經理人及大股東持股結構作為公司治理代理變數之實證結果 21 第二節 以席次盈餘偏離差作為公司治理代理變數之實證結果 23 第三節 以法人及外資持股結構作為公司治理代理變數之實證結果 25 第五章 穩健性測試 27 第一節 加入應變數落後項之實證結果 27 第二節 綜合迴歸模型之實證結果 29 第三節 分群樣本之實證結果 31 第六章 結論 35 第一節 研究結論 35 第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向建議 36 參考文獻 38 一、國外文獻 38 二、國內文獻 41 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 以公司治理角度探討研發活動對企業價值之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Corporate Governance, R D Expenses, and Firm Value | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳彥行(Yan-Shing Chen),張晏誠(Yen-Cheng Chang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 研發活動,公司治理,持股結構,席次盈餘偏離差,資訊不對稱,代理問題, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Research and Development (R D) expenditures,corporate governance,ownership structure,deviation between seat-control rights and cash flow rights,information asymmetry,agency problem, | en |
dc.relation.page | 41 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001106 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-07-10 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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