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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 李艷榕(Yen-Jung Lee) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ping-Hua Chao | en |
dc.contributor.author | 趙秉華 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-12T09:33:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-07-19 | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-12T09:33:59Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2018-07-19 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2018-07-14 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/1191 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 經理人股權持有準則為要求公司高階經理人持有公司特定比例股數之政策。在公司所有高階經理人中,CEOs對公司決策擁有最顯著影響力,因此本研究將經理人股權持有準則之對象鎖定為公司的CEOs。本研究分析公司採用經理人股權持有準則後,使得風險趨避的CEOs財富不具多樣性,進而影響公司CEOs的風險胃納程度,包含公司財務及投資策略、公司本身之風險係數,以及公司是否採用避險之衍生性金融工具。本研究發現當公司採用經理人股權持有準則時,CEOs會增加資本支出此一較不具風險之財務及投資策略,降低研究及發展費用支出,降低財務槓桿比率此兩項較具風險之財務及投資策略,增加系統性風險,降低非系統性風險,因此對公司整體風險係數影響並無定論,此外,採用經理人股權持有準則後的CEOs會使公司持有更多衍生性金融工具以進行避險。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Executive stock ownership guidelines policies are corporate policies mandating executives to hold a specific amount of firms’ stocks. Among all corporate executives, CEOs have the most significant impact on firm policies. Thus, this study focuses on the executive ownership guidelines for CEOs. I examine how the adoption of executive stock ownership guidelines affects risk-averse CEOs to change corporations’ risk appetite including financial and investment strategies, risks, and hedge derivatives. My study finds that the adoption of executive ownership guidelines for CEOs is associated with more capital expenditure, fewer research and development expenditure, and a lower leverage ratio. My study also finds that the adoption of executive ownership guidelines has a positive effect on systematic risk, a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk, and thus an insignificant effect on total firm risk. Moreover, after adopting executive ownership guidelines, CEOs make corporations hold more derivatives to hedge risks. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-12T09:33:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R05722040-1.pdf: 1588940 bytes, checksum: c4235a3b818ef76fa568020e952026aa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝誌..............................................................i
摘要..............................................................ii Abstract...........................................................iii 目錄..............................................................iv 表格目錄..........................................................vi 第一章、 緒論.....................................................1 第一節、 前言及研究動機.......................................1 第二節、 研究架構.............................................3 第二章、 文獻回顧及假說建立.......................................4 第一節、 代理理論以及獎酬制度在美國之發展.....................4 第二節、 經理人股權持有準則制度之應用.........................5 第三節、 經理人股持有準則對CEOs風險誘因之影響...............9 第三章、 研究方法及設計...........................................12 第一節、 樣本選取與資料蒐集...................................12 第二節、 經理人股權持有準則對公司投資及財務政策之影響.........14 第三節、 經理人股權持有準則對公司總風險、系統性 及非系統性風險之影響.................................21 第四節、 經理人股權持有準則對公司持有衍生性金融工具之影響.......24 第四章、 敘述統計與實證結果分析...................................27 第一節、 財務及投資策略風險模型...............................27 一、 資本支出..............................................27 二、 研究及發展費用........................................31 三、 財務槓桿..............................................36 第二節、 總風險、系統性及非系統性風險模型.....................41 第三節、 衍生性金融工具模型...................................49 第五章、 研究結論、限制及建議....................................55 參考文獻.........................................................56 附錄、變數之處理.................................................61 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 以經理人股權持有準則作為CEOs獎酬合約條件對公司風險之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effect on Corporations’ Risk for Taking Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines as a Condition of CEOs’ Compensation Contracts | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 106-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉心才(Hsin-Tsai Liu),尤琳蕙(Lin-Hui Yu) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 經理人股權持有準則,CEOs,財務及投資政策,風險,衍生性金融工具, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Executives stock ownership guidelines,CEOs,Financial and investment strategies,Risks,Derivatives, | en |
dc.relation.page | 61 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201801538 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2018-07-16 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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