乳品廠與其上下游業者間垂直協調關係之研究

Abstract

酪農、乳廠與通路商三者為乳業供應鏈之個別廠商；酪農為生產端，乳廠為製造端、通路商為銷售端，彼此為取得對方資源而存在環環相扣的交易關係，尤其以乳廠為乳業整體發展之關鍵。本文試圖以組織經濟學相關理論做為研究方法，藉由交易成本理論分析生乳與乳品之交易特性，探討衍生的交易成本對交易雙方治理結構的影響。並利用代理理論及財產權理論，分析契約內容的誘因調整及其他相關因素對交易關係穩定性的影響。 分析結果顯示，乳廠與酪農的契約交易，考量交易成本及生產成本因素，是當前最佳的交易關係，且政府的輔導政策是促進廠農交易關係穩定性最為重要的因素。而乳廠與通路商的交易關係，受制於交易雙方的資產專屬性相差較大，通路商成為交易關係中強勢的一方；所以，乳廠需要整合通路商以避免投入的資產面臨套牢的風險，並降低現貨交易模式的交易成本。然所有權的整合非國內一般中小型乳廠規模所及，透過契約的整合是目前普遍使用的交易模式，因此契約內容的制定顯得重要，合宜的契約內容使交易關係更具穩定，而穩定的交易關係亦能提升乳廠的經營績效。 本研究之台農乳廠個案，為屬中小型乳廠規模，自1969年建廠以來，與上游的酪農戶之治理結構一直採行契約產銷，交易關係相當穩定；與下游的通路商之治理結構，則有現貨交易、契約交易、組織內部交易等3種交易關係，其中以97％的契約交易為主要。然因組織特性、人性、環境等因素影響，使得契約內容的執行力相對薄弱，契約的誘因調整績效亦顯得不彰，因此值得藉由組織經濟學理論探討問題所在，供台農乳廠經營者之參考。

Dairy farmers, processors, and distributors are the three kinds of firms in the supply chain in Taiwan’s dairy industry. There are interlocking vertical coordination problems among these three kinds of firms, dairy farmers on the production side, processors on the manufacturing side, and distributors on the sales side. Each obtains its resources from the other and the processors play the key role in the development of dairy industry. This thesis intends to use organizational economics theory to analyze the vertical coordination problems among these three kinds of firms. In particular, this thesis applies transaction cost economics to analyze the trading characteristics of raw milk and dairy products and the effects of transaction costs on the choice of governance structure between firms, and uses agency theory and property rights theory to analyze the effect of economic incentives on the stability of transactional relations among these three kinds of firms. The empirical results of this thesis show that the current contractual relationship is the most appropriate form of vertical coordination between dairy farmers and processors, when both transaction costs and production factors are considered. Moreover, Government's guidance policy is the most important factor in promoting the stability of this contractual relation. On the vertical coordination between dairy processors and distributors, dairy distributors become the stronger side considering asset specificity involved in this transactional relationship. Therefore, dairy processors need to integrate their distributors to avoid transactional risks and reduce transaction costs in spot market. However, integration of their distributors is impossible for Taiwan’s small and medium sized processors. Thus presently contractual transaction is still the commonly used mode of transaction in Taiwan. For this reason, contracts and their specification of economic incentives are important. Appropriate contracts make transaction relations stable which will in turn help enhance the performance of dairy processors. A small to medium scale dairy processor, Taiwanese Farmers Dairy Processor (TFDP), is also studied in this thesis. Since its establishment in 1969, TFDP maintains a contractual relationship with its upper dairy farmers and this governance structure has been quite stable in both its production and marketing operation. In the vertical coordination with its lower distributors, TFDP adopts governance structures such as spot trading, contractual transaction, and hierarchical trading within its own organization. Contractual transaction accounts for 97 percent of TFDP sale and is the dominant form of its transaction with distributors. However, under the adverse influence of some organizational characteristics, human and environmental factors the execution of contract is rather inefficient. It seems that the economic Incentives of the contract were not effective in improving contract efficiency. Therefore, it deserves to investigate further the problems that TFDP faces nowadays with organizational economics theory so that constructive solutions could be proposed to the operators of TFDP.