公司治理與大股東干政之行政規制手段--以金融機構為例

Abstract

隨著我國金融產業之發展，家族企業控股之結構在大型金融機構中極為普遍，進而衍生出「大股東干政」之特殊公司治理困境。所謂大股東干政，係指未擔任公司負責人職務之實質控制股東，透過其股權優勢介入人事、財務或業務決策，繞過董事會之職責，形成權責不符之治理漏洞。近年我國主管機關金管會雖陸續對新光、開發、中信及永豐等金融機構，針對大股東不當介入經營之行為處以高額罰鍰及停職處分，然現行法規多仰賴事後裁罰，對於權益保障與預防效果仍顯不足。 本文研究重點在於分析行政機關應如何透過法律手段，有效規制大股東不當干政之行為。透過比較法之觀點，本文檢視新加坡與美國之監理制度。新加坡法制強調控制股東之「適當人選（Fit and Proper）」標準，不僅在事前須經審查核准，於持股期間亦須持續符合誠信、財務與專業之要求，若其行為導致銀行無法穩健經營，監理機關有權撤回許可並要求限期處分持股。美國法制則透過《銀行控股公司法（BHCA）》等明確定義「控制影響力」，針對「不安全或不健全之行為」進行嚴格規制，其對於剥奪股東身分之重罰多須具備具體損害結果或經嚴謹的司法判決。 針對我國2023年提出之金控法及銀行法修正草案，雖參考星、美制度擬增訂「限制表決權」及「命其限期處分持股」等行政規制手段，卻因「不當干預」之定義過於抽象、不確定法律概念過多，引發學界對於法律明確性、比例原則及財產權侵害之強烈質疑。此外，強制處分持股恐引發市場劇烈波動，並對經營權穩定性造成衝擊。 綜合上述分析，本文建議：我國主管機關在加強監理之同時，應先具體化「不當干政」之實質認定標準，並將規制邏輯從「不聽話的處罰」轉向「適格性之持續審查」。在手段執行上，可參酌新加坡金融管理局（MAS）之作法，採取「有序處置」與「市場穩定措施」，如透過分階段出售、私下協議接手人選，並配合金融機構之「恢復與解決計畫（RRP）」，以確保在落實監理目的之同時，亦能維持金融市場之健全與穩定。

As Taiwan's financial industry continues to evolve, the prevalence of family-controlled structures in major financial institutions has led to a unique corporate governance challenge known as "inappropriate interference by major shareholders". This phenomenon occurs when controlling shareholders, without holding official management positions, exploit their equity dominance to intervene in personnel, financial, or business decisions, thereby bypassing the board's responsibilities and creating a gap between power and accountability. In recent years, Taiwan's Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has issued heavy fines and suspension orders against institutions like Shin Kong, Development Financial, CTBC, and SinoPac for such interference; however, current regulations rely heavily on ex-post sanctions, which are often insufficient for proactive prevention and stakeholder protection. This thesis focuses on analyzing how administrative authorities can effectively regulate inappropriate interference by major shareholders through legal mechanisms. Adopting a comparative law perspective, this study examines the regulatory frameworks of Singapore and the United States. Singapore's legal system emphasizes continuous "Fit and Proper" standards for controlling shareholders, requiring them to meet integrity, financial, and professional criteria not only at the time of approval but throughout their period of influence. If their actions prevent a bank from operating prudently, regulators may revoke their status and mandate the disposal of shares. The U.S. framework, primarily through the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), strictly defines "controlling influence" and regulates "unsafe or unsound practices," where severe penalties like the deprivation of shareholder status typically require specific harm or rigorous judicial determination. In Taiwan, the 2023 draft amendments to the Financial Holding Company Act and the Banking Act proposed administrative measures such as restricting voting rights and ordering the mandatory disposal of shares. However, these proposals faced significant academic criticism regarding legal clarity, the principle of proportionality, and potential infringements on property rights due to the vague definition of "inappropriate interference" and the use of excessive uncertain legal concepts. Furthermore, mandatory divestment could trigger market volatility and threaten the stability of corporate control. Based on these findings, this thesis suggests that while strengthening supervision, Taiwanese authorities should first concretize the substantive criteria for identifying "inappropriate interference" and shift the regulatory focus from "punishing disobedience" to "continuous suitability review". Regarding enforcement, Taiwan could adopt Singapore's Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) approach by implementing "orderly disposal" and "market stabilization measures." This includes staged divestments, private placement arrangements, and integration with the institution's "Recovery and Resolution Planning (RRP)" to achieve regulatory objectives while ensuring the overall health and stability of the financial market.