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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/103353
標題: 從侵害性、社會性重新檢視法益概念—兼論以關係性重構性自主、性隱私法益
Rethinking the Concept of Legal Interests through Harmfulness and Sociality: On the Relational Reconstruction of the Legal Interests of Sexual Autonomy and Sexual Privacy
作者: 江允然
Yun-Jan Chiang
指導教授: 謝煜偉
Yu-Wei Hsieh
關鍵字: 法益論; 法益適格性; 違憲審查; 侵害原理; 社會性共感; 關係性; 妨害性自主; 性隱私
Legal Interest Theory; Eligibility of Legal Interests; Constitutional Review; Harm Principle; Socially Shared Negative Emotion; Relationality; Sexual Autonomy; Sexual Privacy
出版年 : 2026
學位: 碩士
摘要: 近期越來越多論者質疑法益理論發展至今法益概念仍無法找出一個穩固的操作標準,進而主張法益無法發揮立法批判機能,將立法論層次的關注重心改置於違憲審查架構之上。在對於法益理論發展史進行回顧之後,本文認為雖不應直接否定法益的立法批判機能,但針對既有法益理論所採取的法益觀確實有必要進一步重新調整,並以社會經驗為基礎重新建構出一套另類法益觀。為此,本文從「侵害原理」此一所有法益理論共通的起點出發,在逐步釐清「侵害性」是由哪些要素共同構築而成之後,本文主張在侵害性之外還需要另外加上「社會性」。其中社會性係以「社會共同負面情感的惹起」作為具體內涵,且需再進一步檢視此一社會共同負面情感是否係由各該利益類型所對應的、真正重要且合理的具體核心理由所支撐。如此一方面應可適度修正既有法益觀下的人際互動圖像,使其不至於過度脫離於社會現實脈絡,另一方面也能夠保有對現行犯罪規定提出立法批判,或者在刑事立法的過程中為立法者提供一定指引的可能性,避免懲罰的施加單純的淪為集體情緒的發洩。
最後,為了檢驗這套「另類法益觀」在具體實踐上的可行性,本文進一步將此一法益觀分別套用至妨害性自主罪章、妨害性隱私及不實性影像罪章,並以「關係性」作為個人層次性相關法益侵害的具體核心理由,分別重構出「關係中的性自主」以及「關係中的性事務自主」這兩個本文認為係唯一具有適格性的個人層次性法益。本文將關係中的性自主/性事務自主侵害的具體內容界定為:行為人對被害人同時造成「創造性互動能力」與「關係性能力」這兩種不同面向之關係能力的侵害。並從此一侵害內容出發,對上開罪章中之各罪提出立法論上建議。
立法論上,本文主張應將強制性交/猥褻罪限定於行為人對被害人製造強制情境的情形,並針對不具強制情境的情形另立「違反意願性交/猥褻罪」,以體現兩種情形在雙重能力妨害上的差異。而乘機性交猥褻罪基於其關係能力所受侵害程度較強制性交/猥褻的情形略低,刑度級距設計上也應略低於現行條文所定之刑度。與未成年人性交猥褻罪及利用權勢性交猥褻罪部分,基於負面關係經驗可能對被害人關係能力造成的潛在危險性,雖仍具一定立法上正當性,但為避免過度壓縮行動雙方的人際互動形成空間,仍分別應排除「與具備超真摯同意之未成年人進行性交猥褻」與「居於權勢地位者『利用機會』與被害人性交猥褻」這兩種情形的可罰性。至於妨害性隱私及不實性影像各罪,本文主張刑法第319條之1至第319條之3尚具立法上正當性,惟刑法第319條之4所定之不實性影像罪因無法符合關係性的具體核心理由要求,若要將本罪保護法益繼續定位為性法益恐將欠缺法益適格性,立法論較適宜的做法應係將本罪刪除。
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have questioned whether legal interest theory (Rechtsgutstheorie) has succeeded in developing a stable and operational criterion for identifying legally protected interests. On this basis, they argue that the concept of legal interests is incapable of fulfilling a legislative-critical function and advocate shifting the focus of normative evaluation at the legislative level from legal interest toward constitutional review. After examining the historical development of legal interest theory, this thesis argues that the legislative-critical function of legal interests should not be dismissed outright. Nevertheless, the conception of legal interests adopted by existing theories indeed requires further revision. Accordingly, this thesis reconstructs an alternative conception of legal interests based on social experience.
To this end, the thesis begins with the harm principle, a common starting point shared by all theories of legal interest. After clarifying the elements that collectively constitute the idea of harmfulness, this thesis argues that harmfulness alone is insufficient and must be supplemented by an additional requirement of sociality. Sociality refers to the “evocation of shared negative social emotions”, which still need to be examined further whether such emotions are supported by genuinely important and reasonable core justifications corresponding to the particular type of interest involved. This framework seeks, on the one hand, to revise the image of interpersonal interaction presupposed by existing legal interest theories so that it better reflects social reality. On the other hand, it preserves the possibility of offering legislative critiques of current criminal provisions and providing legislators with guidance during the criminal law-making process, thereby preventing criminal punishment from becoming merely an outlet for collective emotions.
To examine the practical feasibility of this alternative conception of legal interests, this thesis applies it to the chapters on offenses against sexual autonomy and offenses against sexual privacy and synthetic sexual images. Taking “relationality” as the concrete core justification underlying the infringements of individual-level legal interests relating to sexuality, this thesis reconstructs two legal interests which this thesis considers to be the only ones possessing the eligibility of legal interest in sexual sphere (at individual-level): : “sexual autonomy within relationships” and “sexual-affairs autonomy within relationships”. The infringement of these interests is defined as conduct that simultaneously impairs two dimensions of the victim’s relational capacities: the capacity for creative interaction and the capacity for integrating the various interpersonal relationships in which the individual is situated. Based on this definition of the infringement, this thesis advances a series of proposals for legislative reform concerning the offenses contained in the aforementioned chapters.
From a legislative perspective, this thesis argues that the offenses of forcible sexual intercourse and forcible indecent assault should be confined to situations in which the offender creates a coercive circumstance for the victim. In cases lacking such coercive situation, separate offenses of “sexual intercourse or indecent assault against the victim’s will” should be established to reflect the differing degrees of impairment inflicted upon the victim’s relational capacities. As for the interpretation of Art. 225 of the criminal code, this kind of sexual offenses involve a comparatively lower degree of impairment of relational capacites than coercive sexual offenses, the applicable sentencing range should likewise be lower than that prescribed under current law. With respect to interpretation of Art. 227 and Art. 228 of the criminal code, this thesis maintains that these offenses retain a degree of legislative legitimacy because negative relational experiences may pose potential risks to the victim’s relational capacities. Nevertheless, in order to avoid unduly restricting the space for interpersonal interaction between the parties involved, criminal liability of “sexual intercourse or indecent acts with a underage person who has given particularly authentic consent” and “sexual conduct in which a person occupying a position of authority merely takes advantage of an opportunity’” should be excluded respectively.
As for offenses against sexual privacy and synthetic sexual images, this thesis argues that Art. 319-1 through 319-3 of the Criminal Code remain legislatively justified. By contrast, the offense of synthetic sexual images under Art. 319-4 fails to satisfy the requirement of a concrete core justification grounded in relationality Accordingly, insofar as the offense continues to be understood as protecting a sexual legal interest, it lacks the eligibility of legal interest. Consequently, from a legislative standpoint, the preferable solution would therefore be to repeal the offense.
URI: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/103353
DOI: 10.6342/NTU202602517
全文授權: 同意授權(全球公開)
電子全文公開日期: 2026-08-12
顯示於系所單位:法律學系

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