政府有償取得公共服務案之付款機制、履約管理及契約條款設計之研究

Abstract

我國促進民間參與公共建設法於民國111年增訂第9條之1，正式建立「有償取得公共服務」之法制基礎，使主辦機關得以政府付費方式向民間機構購買公共服務，補充傳統促參案使用者付費模式於部分公共建設無法適用之侷限。惟財政部113年頒布之投資契約範本，於付扣款機制等核心條款多以「○○」的方式留白，而履約管理階段之稽核與工程控管強度亦未有進一步區分，主辦機關於個案辦理時欠缺具體可循之條款依據，實務上亟需參考已簽約案例歸納契約設計之原則。本研究以3件具代表性案例為研究對象，即高速公路電子收費案(ETC，民國96年簽訂)、桃園污水下水道案(101年簽訂)及臺中市文山焚化廠案(114年12月簽訂)，就付扣款機制、稽核及工程控管等契約條款進行跨個案比較分析，並輔以8位資深實務工作者之深度訪談，強化研究發現之實務基礎。本研究並綜合公益性判斷標準及產出規範理論等面向，分析3個案於有償PPP契約條款設計上之差異成因與制度精進方向，進一步提出有償取得公共服務契約條款之設計指引，以供未來政府付費型促參案件作為契約設計之參考。

In 2022, Article 9-1 was added to Taiwan's Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects (the "PPP Act"), formally establishing the legal basis for the "paid acquisition of public services." This mechanism enables a competent authority to purchase public services from a private institution through a government-pays model, addressing the limitations of the traditional user-pays approach, which proves inapplicable to certain types of public infrastructure. However, the model investment contract issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2024 leaves core clauses-such as the payment mechanism-largely blank, and, at the contract performance management stage, provides no further differentiation in the intensity of auditing and construction control. As competent authorities therefore lack concrete contractual references when handling individual cases, there is a pressing practical need to derive contract-design principles from cases that have already been signed. This study examines three representative cases: the Electronic Toll Collection project (ETC, signed in 2007), the Taoyuan Sewerage System project (signed in 2012), and the Taichung Wenshan Incineration Plant project (signed in December 2025). It conducts a cross-case comparative analysis of the contract clauses governing the payment mechanism, auditing, and construction control, supplemented by in-depth interviews with eight senior practitioners to strengthen the empirical basis of the findings. Drawing on perspectives including the public-interest criterion and output-based regulation theory, this study analyzes the causes of the differences among the three cases and the directions for institutional refinement in the design of government-pays PPP contract clauses. It further proposes design guidelines for the contract clauses of government-pays public-private partnerships, offering a reference for the contract design of future government-pays PPP projects.