仲裁庭與法院間關於「仲裁管轄權」之審查權限分配

Abstract

仲裁制度作為「裁判外紛爭解決制度」，程序之開啟係本於「當事人自治原則」，透過仲裁協議之約定，以排除國家法院之審判權限。然而，仲裁程序開啟時，首要面臨的問題為：「受理之仲裁庭是否有管轄權」。而此「管轄權」之「判斷權限」涉及「仲裁庭審查仲裁管轄權之權限原則（簡稱：權限原則）」，即仲裁庭是否有權審查自身之管轄權，以及法院介入審查之容許性與審查密度。 權限原則之內涵具有積極效力與消極效力，後者饒富爭議，即仲裁庭就仲裁管轄權之審查權限，是否具有優先於法院之效力。本文就此聚焦於「比較法解釋方法」，以2006年聯合國模範法、紐約公約、德國民事訴訟法、瑞士國際私法與瑞士民事訴訟法為主要比較對象，並將研究架構區分為四種情況：仲裁繫屬前（情況一）、仲裁繫屬中（情況二）、仲裁庭為中間判斷（或稱中間決定）後（情況三）以及仲裁判斷作成後（情況四）。 我國過去實務穩定見解採取「實質審查說」，就仲裁協議之成立、生效、主客觀範圍進行細緻審查，法院將透過契約解釋原則等方式，並不限於卷證資料中之形式審查。然而，在近年實務穩定見解轉向「表見審查說」，認為應優先尊重仲裁庭之判斷權限，除非仲裁協議「明顯無效」，否則法院應優先尊重仲裁庭之權限，以節制國家之司法審判權。 本文透過比較法上重要之規範，首先認為情況一與情況二時，我國仲裁法第4條之文義解釋並未限縮法院之審查密度，且同法第22條並未採取權限原則之消極效力，即無透過第22條作為限縮第4條之依據。同時借鏡德國民事訴訟法「儘早決定仲裁管轄權」之立法意旨，並觀察我國法之「最終決定權限」，仍在於法院，若法院僅為表見審查，將導致無效之仲裁協議延續至撤銷仲裁判斷階段方受檢視，反而嚴重浪費程序成本，有違仲裁制度追求迅速經濟之本旨。因此，我國現行解釋論應採取：「實質審查說」，即毋須承認權限原則之消極效力。 惟在情況二時，因仲裁繫屬中，可能有當事人透過「仲裁管轄抗辯」以浪費他造當事人之程序成本，因此，在例外不符合「程序法上誠信原則」時，應例外採取「表見審查說」。 另外，於情況三仲裁庭得否為中間判斷，在現行法未明文，惟觀察賦予權限原則之目的、仲裁法第30條與撤銷仲裁判斷之事由，即認為我國立法者未拒絕以模範法第16條第3項之方式，賦予仲裁庭為中間判斷之權限，並得以使當事人就系爭判斷為救濟。現行解釋論下，不妨依仲裁法第19條準用模範法或民事訴訟法之程序規範，若未來修法，宜參考模範法而明文規範。然而，就模範法「仲裁庭否定管轄權之中間判斷」無法救濟者，應不予承認，而應參考德國民事訴訟法修法草案與瑞士國際私法，承認「仲裁庭否定管轄權之中間判斷」亦得救濟之。 至於在情況二與三之交錯，即訴訟程序與仲裁程序競合時，本文既認為法院與仲裁庭均具有審查仲裁管轄權之權限，並無仲裁庭優先之說。進一步區分①法院先決定與②仲裁庭先決定之類型。 當法院先行依仲裁法第 4 條作成肯定管轄權之判斷時，應承認系爭裁定具有既判力，或承認爭點效之法理，以避免矛盾判斷並節省司法資源。若法院否定管轄權之判斷時，就管轄權判斷先為中間裁定，系爭裁定亦應承認爭點效之法理，縱法院未為中間裁定，亦應認為法院作為仲裁管轄權之終局審查機關，與民事訴訟法第182條之1規範「民事訴訟與行政訴訟」不同審判權間，發生衝突時，普通法院與行政法院間避免重複否認審判權，而由最高法院統一決定審判權歸屬之制度目的，有相類似之處；當仲裁庭先行判斷，不論仲裁庭是「肯定」或「否定」管轄權，皆應准許及時之司法救濟，儘早確定紛爭解決途徑。

Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The commencement of arbitral proceedings is grounded in party autonomy, whereby the parties, through an arbitration agreement, exclude the national jurisdiction and submit disputes to arbitration. The allocation of authority to determine jurisdiction concerns the competence-competence principle, namely whether arbitral tribunals may rule on their own jurisdiction and the extent of judicial review. Competence-competence principle encompasses both positive and negative effects. The latter remains particularly controversial, as it concerns whether the arbitral tribunals take precedence over national courts. This thesis adopts a comparative-law approach and examines the 2006 UNCITRAL Model Law, the New York Convention, the German Code of Civil Procedure, the Swiss Private International Law Act and the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure. For analytical purposes, this thesis categorizes the relevant issues into four scenarios: (1) prior to the commencement of arbitral proceedings; (2) during pending arbitral proceedings; (3) after the arbitral tribunal has issued a preliminary ruling on its jurisdiction during pending arbitral proceedings; and (4) after the final arbitral award has been rendered. Taiwanese judicial practice traditionally adopted a substantive review approach, under which courts conducted a thorough examination of the existence, validity, and subjective and objective scope of arbitration agreements. Such review was not confined to a prima facie examination of the documentary record but extended to detailed contractual interpretation. More recently, however, judicial practice has shifted toward a prima facie review approach, emphasizing deference to the arbitral tribunal unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly invalid. Through a comparative analysis of the relevant legal frameworks, this thesis argues that, in situations (1) and (2), the wording of Article 4 of the Taiwanese Arbitration Act does not restrict the intensity of judicial review. Furthermore, Article 22 of the Act does not adopt the negative effect of the competence-competence principle and therefore cannot serve as a basis for limiting judicial review under Article 4. Drawing further upon the legislative objective of the German Code of Civil Procedure to secure an early determination of arbitral jurisdiction, and considering that the ultimate authority to decide jurisdiction remains vested in the courts, this thesis contends that a mere prima facie review would allow invalid arbitration agreements to persist until the stage of annulment proceedings, thereby increasing procedural costs and undermining arbitration's fundamental objective of providing an efficient and economical means of dispute resolution. Accordingly, Taiwanese law shall adopt the theory of substantive review and shall not recognize the negative effect of competence-competence. Nevertheless, in situations (2), a party may abuse jurisdictional objections to increase the opposing party’s procedural costs. Hence, where such conduct violates the principle of procedural good faith, courts should exceptionally apply a prima facie review standard. With respect to situation (3), although the current Arbitration Act contains no explicit provision authorizing preliminary rulings on jurisdiction, the purposes underlying competence-competence, Article 30 of the Act, and the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards suggests that Taiwanese legislators did not reject the mechanism embodied in Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Accordingly, arbitral tribunals should be recognized as having the authority to issue preliminary rulings on jurisdiction, and parties should be entitled to seek judicial review thereof. Under the current framework, Article 19 of the Arbitration Act may serve as a basis for incorporating the Model Law or Civil Procedure's procedural mechanism. Future legislative reform should expressly codify such a system. However, unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law, which does not provide a remedy against a preliminary ruling denying jurisdiction, Taiwanese law should instead follow the approach reflected in the draft amendments to the German Code of Civil Procedure and the Swiss Private International Law Act, allowing judicial review of preliminary rulings that deny jurisdiction as well. Regarding the overlap between situations (2) and (3), namely the parallel proceedings, this thesis argues that no priority should be accorded to the arbitral tribunal. A distinction should therefore be drawn between: (i) cases in which the court renders its decision first, and (ii) cases in which the arbitral tribunal renders its decision first. Where a court first issues a decision affirming arbitral jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Arbitration Act, such decision should be accorded res judicata, or at least issue preclusion, to prevent inconsistent decisions and conserve judicial resources. Where a court first denies arbitral jurisdiction, a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction should likewise be accorded issue preclusion. Even absent such a preliminary ruling, courts should be regarded as the ultimate authority for reviewing arbitral jurisdiction. In this regard, a parallel may be drawn with Article 182-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which seeks to prevent repeated denials of jurisdiction between civil and administrative courts and entrusts the Supreme Court with the final determination of the competent adjudicatory forum. Conversely, where the arbitral tribunal renders its jurisdictional decision first, timely judicial review should be available regardless of whether the tribunal affirms or denies jurisdiction, thereby ensuring the prompt determination of the proper forum for dispute resolution.