請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/102856完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 張國暉 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Kuo-Hui Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 全容生 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Rong-Sheng Chuan | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-22T17:00:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-23 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2026-07-22 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2026 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2026-07-14 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 壹、中日文
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(2025). FCC moves to ban Chinese labs from testing electronics sold in the US. Techspot. https://www.techspot.com/news/107755-fcc-moves-ban-chinese-labs-testing-electronics-sold.html Retrieval Date: 2025/9/5. The White House. (2020). National Strategy to Secure 5G. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/National-Strategy-5G-Final.pdf Retrieval Date: 2025/9/12. The White House. (2021). Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders’ Summit. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/ Retrieval Date: 2025/9/12. The White House. (2022). FACT SHEET: President Biden and G7 Leaders Formally Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-formally-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment Retrieval Date: 2025/9/12. The White House. (2022). FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders’ Tokyo Summit 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022 Retrieval Date: 2025/9/12. The White House. (2022). FACT SHEET: U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Establishes Economic and Technology Policies & Initiatives. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/16/fact-sheet-u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-establishes-economic-and-technology-policies-initiatives Retrieval Date: 2025/9/12. The White House. (2022). FACT SHEET: United States and 60 Global Partners Launch Declaration for the Future of the Internet.https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/28/fact-sheet-united-states-and-60-global-partners-launch-declaration-for-the-future-of-the-internet/ Retrieval Date: 2025/9/12. The White House. (2023). 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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/102856 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 第五代通訊技術(5G)的發展近年來深刻影響全球電信科技、資通安全與半導體供應鏈,華為作為中國推動5G技術全球化的代表性企業,其快速擴張引發美國對國家安全、技術透明性與自由國際秩序的高度關切。2020 年後,美國對華為的安全疑慮進一步上升為科技政治威脅,並透過出口管制、供應鏈封鎖、投資限制、政府採購排除及民主夥伴合作等方式,逐步建構針對華為 5G 事業的科技制裁體系。台灣身為全球半導體供應鏈與民主陣營科技網路的重要角色,無法迴避美中科技競爭及其所引發的制度調整壓力。
本研究旨在分析 2020 年後美國對華為 5G 事業的科技制裁政策,如何形塑台灣的科技安全路徑與資通政策調整。過程以科技國族主義、科技全球主義、安全化理論與經濟性制約為理論基礎,並將美國對華為的制裁工具歸納為若干類型,以分析政治與科技意涵。再透過時間序列整理、靜態結構分析與動態節點分析,檢視2020 年至2025年間美國官方及相關監管機關的政策作為變化,以進一步比對我國各方在資通安全、政府採購、通訊設施監理,甚至技術替代的推動等面向的回應。 本研究發現,美國對華為的科技制裁已逐年發展為以國家安全為核心的制度化科技治理模式,透過出口管制、規範性權力擴張與民主陣營合作呈現。受此影響,台灣2020年後的資通政策呈現由公部門先行、再逐步延伸至民間與供應鏈的推進路徑。而所謂美國制裁對台灣的影響,其並非單純要求台灣全盤跟進,事實上,更是透過科技安全化論述、制度工具與民主陣營合作機制,促使我國將外部的科技政治驅動轉化為對國內資安制度的轉型投入。整體而言,台灣未來應在科技主權、產業競爭力與民主陣營合作之間維持政策彈性,並透過定期的制度化監管與治理,提升面對美中科技衝突,甚至未來 6G 技術競爭的戰略自主空間。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The development of fifth-generation mobile communication technology (5G) has, in recent years, profoundly affected global telecommunications technology, information and communications security, and semiconductor supply chains. As a representative enterprise in China’s effort to globalize 5G technology, Huawei’s rapid expansion has triggered heightened concerns in the United States regarding national security, technological transparency, and the liberal international order. After 2020, U.S. security concerns over Huawei further escalated into a technology-political threat. Through export controls, supply chain restrictions, investment limitations, exclusions from government procurement, and cooperation with democratic partners, the United States gradually constructed a technology sanctions regime targeting Huawei’s 5G business. As a key actor in the global semiconductor supply chain and in the technological networks of the democratic camp, Taiwan cannot avoid the pressures of institutional adjustment arising from U.S.–China technological competition.
This study aims to analyze how U.S. technology sanctions against Huawei’s 5G business after 2020 have shaped Taiwan’s technological security trajectory and adjustments in its information and communications policies. The study adopts techno-nationalism, techno-globalism, securitization theory, and economic statecraft as its theoretical foundations. It classifies the sanctions tools adopted by the United States against Huawei into several types in order to examine their political and technological implications. Furthermore, through chronological organization, static structural analysis, and dynamic nodal analysis, this study examines changes in policy actions taken by U.S. official agencies and relevant regulatory authorities between 2020 and 2025. It then compares these developments with Taiwan’s responses in areas such as information and communications security, government procurement, telecommunications infrastructure regulation, and the promotion of technological alternatives. This study finds that U.S. technology sanctions against Huawei have gradually developed into an institutionalized model of technology governance centered on national security, manifested through export controls, the expansion of normative power, and cooperation among democratic countries. Under this influence, Taiwan’s information and communications policies after 2020 have followed a trajectory in which the public sector took the lead, followed by a gradual extension into the private sector and supply chains. The so-called impact of U.S. sanctions on Taiwan is therefore not simply a matter of requiring Taiwan to fully follow the United States. Rather, through discourses of technological securitization, institutional tools, and mechanisms of cooperation within the democratic camp, external technology-political drivers have encouraged Taiwan to transform these pressures into domestic institutional investment in information and communications security. Overall, Taiwan should maintain policy flexibility among technological sovereignty, industrial competitiveness, and cooperation within the democratic camp. Through regularized institutional supervision and governance, Taiwan can further enhance its strategic autonomy in responding to U.S.–China technological conflict and even future competition over 6G technologies. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2026-07-22T17:00:00Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2026-07-22T17:00:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
謝誌 ii 摘要 iv Abstract v 目次 vii 圖次 x 表次 xi 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景 2 第二節 研究動機 3 第三節 研究目的 4 第四節 研究問題 5 第五節 研究核心理論:科技國族主義VS科技全球主義 6 壹、理論概要與研析 7 貳、對本研究的實踐 9 第二章 文獻回顧 11 第一節 從三個視角解讀民主陣營制裁華為的論述與脈絡 17 壹、 地緣政治與台灣的科技政策抉擇 17 貳、 對抗威權科技:團結民主陣營的挑戰 21 參、衡量我國與中國的科技依存關係 24 第二節 科技制裁的建構與困境 26 壹、 整合三個視角的必要性 26 貳、 安全化理論 27 參、 安全化理論與科技全球主義的權衡 28 第三章 研究設計 31 第一節 研究方法 35 第二節 研究限制 41 第三節 章節安排 42 第四章 2020年後美國對華為實施的科技制裁 45 第一節 制裁工具的分類 45 第二節 統整2020年後美國推動的行政與立法措施 47 第三節 37件制裁工具的內容結構分析 55 壹、立法排除 59 貳、行政命令 63 參、出口管制 66 肆、團結民主夥伴 74 第五章 美國對華為科技制裁政策的動態差異分析 81 第一節 制裁的推進與重大變化紀錄 82 第二節 我國對美國科技制裁政策的年度回應差異 85 壹、2020年起美國對華為若干制裁的動態變化 86 貳、2020年以來我國所推動的各種資通安全促進性措施 87 參、比較2020年後台灣和華為關係當中的美國因素 92 第三節 實證分析結果與研究發現 101 壹、制裁華為和管控5G技術是先進行跨部會協調,再逐漸將法規範納入民間 102 貳、Open RAN可作為我國兼顧科技政治安全與產業布局的重要政策選項 102 參、對於我國民間通訊設施與科技輸出的監管制度,仍處於執行初期 103 第六章 討論與結論 105 第一節 政策建議 106 第二節 2020年後我國跟進美國制裁華為的戰略總評估 107 第三節 研究展望 109 參考文獻 111 壹、中日文 111 貳、英文 113 附錄 119 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 美中5G科技戰 | - |
| dc.subject | Open RAN | - |
| dc.subject | 科技制裁 | - |
| dc.subject | 安全化 | - |
| dc.subject | 資通安全 | - |
| dc.subject | 地緣政治 | - |
| dc.subject | U.S.–China 5G Technology War | - |
| dc.subject | Open RAN | - |
| dc.subject | Technology Sanctions | - |
| dc.subject | Securitization | - |
| dc.subject | Information and Communications Security | - |
| dc.subject | Geopolitics | - |
| dc.title | 2020 年後美國對中國的科技制裁政策:針對華為5G 事業的威脅、管控及其對台灣的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | U.S. Technological Sanctions Policy Against China After 2020: Threats and Controls of Huawei’s 5G Business and Their Impacts on Taiwan | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 114-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林竣達;周冠竹 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Jiun-Da Lin;Kuan-Chu Chou | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 美中5G科技戰; Open RAN; 科技制裁; 安全化; 資通安全; 地緣政治 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | U.S.–China 5G Technology War; Open RAN; Technology Sanctions; Securitization; Information and Communications Security; Geopolitics | en |
| dc.relation.page | 121 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202601808 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2026-07-14 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國家發展研究所 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2026-07-23 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 國家發展研究所 | |
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