臺灣火險費率政策對經營效率之實證研究：從自由化到類規章費率

Abstract

臺灣產險業自 2002 年起歷經三階段費率自由化，期望透過鬆綁管制提升市場競爭力。然而在完全自由化初期，因市場陷入惡性削價競爭，主管機關為維持市場穩定，自2014 年起針對商業火險陸續實施具備價格下限的「類規章費率」制度。過去文獻多聚焦於費率自由化對經營效率之影響，並未將類規章費率制度獨立探討。因此，本研究旨在彌補此缺口，探討此一政策轉向對於火險市場效率之影響，檢驗該制度是否因過度保護反而抑制了經營效率的提升。 本研究選取 2006 年至 2021 年間 13 家本國產險公司之資料，將政策實施期間劃分為「管制與轉型期」（2006-2009 年）、「完全自由化期」（2010-2014 年）及「類規章費率期」（2015-2021 年）。研究方法綜合運用資料包絡分析法（DEA）衡量各公司之技術效率、純技術效率、規模效率及成本效率，並透過 Malmquist生產力指數探討跨期動態變化，最後建立普通最小平方法（OLS）迴歸模型檢視不同政策時期對經營效率之淨影響 。 實證結果顯示：(1)「完全自由化期」因惡性競爭導致資源配置不當，生產力與純技術效率皆顯著衰退。(2)「類規章費率期」生產力雖因產業整體技術進步而回升，但反映個別公司管理能力的純技術效率呈現停滯。(3) 迴歸對照發現，相較於全險種市場顯著的成本優化，火險市場在類規章制度下效率表現相對落後。整體而言，火險市場實施類規章制度並無法實質提升經營效率。 研究結論指出，類規章制度之價格僵化削弱了業者精簡成本與優化管理之動機。建議主管機關在業者風險控管意識已提升之背景下，逐步讓類規章制度退場，回歸真實反映風險對價之市場機制，促進業者提升經營效率之動機。

Since 2002, Taiwan's property-liability insurance industry has pursued rate liberalization to enhance market competitiveness. However, to mitigate destructive price competition during the early stages of full liberalization, the regulator introduced a "Quasi-Tariff Rate System" with price floors for commercial fire insurance in 2014. This study aims to fill the research gap by investigating whether this policy shift toward "re-regulation" has inadvertently inhibited efficiency improvements. Analyzing data from 13 domestic property-liability insurers between 2006 and 2021, the study categorizes the timeline into three phases: the "Control and Transition Period," the "Full Liberalization Period," and the "Quasi-Tariff Rate Period." Methodologically, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Productivity Index are employed to assess efficiency dynamics, followed by an OLS regression model to examine the net impact of these policies. The empirical results reveal three key findings: (1) During the "Full Liberalization Period," excessive price competition led to resource misallocation, causing significant declines in both productivity and pure technical efficiency. (2) In the "Quasi-Tariff Rate Period," while total factor productivity recovered due to industry-wide technological progress, pure technical efficiency—reflecting internal management capabilities—remained stagnant. (3) Regression analysis further indicates that the fire insurance market’s efficiency significantly lagged behind the aggregate market’s cost optimization under the quasi-tariff regime. Overall, the implementation of the quasi-tariff system in the fire insurance market has failed to substantively improve operating efficiency. The study concludes that the rigid pricing of the quasi-tariff system has weakened insurers' incentives for cost reduction and management optimization. Given the matured risk management capabilities of current insurers, the study recommends a gradual phase-out of the quasi-tariff system. Returning to a market-driven mechanism based on risk-reflective pricing will revitalize the motivation for insurers to enhance their operating efficiency.