影子銀行監理改革探討--以貨幣市場基金為核心

Abstract

「影子銀行」在2008年美國次級房貸危機中扮演關鍵角色，並且其作用更進一步促成該危機擴大為全球性金融危機，尤其在危機發生後數年間，美國以及國際上針對「影子銀行」所引發一連串金融監管問題進行諸多監管改革討論，如「影子銀行」經營銀行業務，卻未受有如一般銀行嚴格之監管，而有所謂監管套利之問題，又或者「影子銀行」體系中，透過證券化大量生產複雜性衍生性金融商品進行短期融資，但於風險揭露以及管控上卻無法完整反映實際風險問題等。 貨幣市場共同基金為影子銀行體系中不可或缺之部分，因貨幣市場共同基金本質，是以其投資標的受有限制，多以低風險、高品質的債務證券，例如國庫券、商業本票、短期買回協定等為主，因而被視為最安全的工具之一。特別在美國，更有投資人因為對於貨幣市場共同基金投資本質的誤解，而將其作為存款帳戶使用。於次級房貸所引發之全球金融危機中，由於美國投資人各種過於樂觀之預想，次貸危機爆發後，投資人始發現貨幣市場共同基金並非如同銀行存款帳戶一般安全，當貨幣市場共同基金發生動盪，恐慌即因運而生，使其成為了金融危機的重災區。由於貨幣市場基金在影子銀行體系中屬於資金提供者，一旦大量贖回，便使其無力支撐原已瀕臨崩潰的房貸市場；更甚者，貨幣市場基金產業本身亦陷入系統性恐慌，最終迫使美國政府介入，並推出多項暫時性措施以穩定市場。 自2008年危機至今約近十年，在此期間各國針對引發全球金融危機原因提出各項猜測以及各種改革，本文將以美國為主軸，分析在貨幣市場共同基金上，歷年改革修法重點。因我國對於貨幣市場共同基金相關法制發展以及監督機制未如美國、歐洲等金融強國一般活躍，相關改革以及思考方向尚須參考國外立法，再加以建構，本文將提供相關討論比較作為參考分析。 本文提供我國貨幣市場共同基金相關改革建議，針對貨幣市場共同基金本質上之基金治理，除提供改進目前獨立監督第三者地位權能不明之基金保管機構等建議外。另針對貨幣市場共同基金規範上，對照歐美大國並考量我國情況後，提議針對流動性須給予更細緻化區分、針對流動性資產於貨幣市場共同基金中之剩餘不同程度應採取不同措施、給予暫停贖回之明文權限、發生危機後可能近一步補救措施研討等措施之思考建議。

The "Shadow Banking" played a critical role in the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, and its influence further contributed to the escalation of this crisis into a global financial crisis. In the years following the crisis, there has been extensive discussion regarding regulatory reforms related to the financial regulatory issues arising from the "Shadow Banking" both in the U.S. and internationally. These discussions highlight problems such as "Shadow Banking" engaging in banking activities without facing the same stringent regulations as traditional banks, leading to regulatory arbitrage. Additionally, within the shadow banking system, complex derivative financial products are produced in large quantities through securitization for short-term financing, while the management and disclosure of risks fail to adequately reflect actual risk issues. Money market mutual funds are an indispensable part of the shadow banking system. By nature, money market mutual funds invest primarily in low-risk, high-quality debt securities, such as Treasury bills, commercial paper, and short-term repurchase agreements, which makes them one of the safest investment tools. In the United States, some investors, due to a misunderstanding of the investment nature of money market mutual funds, have utilized them as if they were deposit accounts. During the global financial crisis triggered by subprime mortgages, American investors, driven by overly optimistic expectations, soon realized that money market mutual funds were not as safe as bank deposit accounts. When turmoil occurred in the money market mutual funds, panic ensued, making them a focal point of the financial crisis. As money market funds are providers of capital in the shadow banking system, large-scale redemptions rendered them unable to support the already crumbling mortgage market. Moreover, the money market fund industry itself fell into systemic panic, ultimately forcing the U.S. government to intervene and implement several temporary measures to stabilize the market. Since the 2008 crisis, nearly a decade has passed, during which various countries have proposed speculations and reforms regarding the causes of the global financial crisis. This paper will primarily focus on the United States to analyze the key reforms and legislative changes concerning money market mutual funds over the years. Given that Taiwan's development of regulations and supervisory mechanisms related to money market mutual funds has not been as active as those in financial powerhouses like the United States and Europe, relevant reforms and directions for consideration should draw from foreign legislation for further construction. This paper aims to provide comparative discussions for reference and analysis. This paper further offers reform proposals for Taiwan’s MMF regime. With respect to MMF fund governance, this paper recommends strengthening the role and authority of independent third-party custodians, whose supervisory functions remain insufficiently defined. With respect to MMF regulation, this paper proposes: (1) adopting more granular classifications of liquidity; (2) imposing differentiated measures depending on remaining liquidity levels within the MMF; (3) explicitly authorizing gate provisions and temporary suspensions of redemption; and (4) further evaluating potential ex post crisis-mitigation measures.