論獨立董事形式獨立性之解構與重構

Abstract

藉由現行獨立董事違反形式獨立性要求之規範內容及案例分析，本文主張，現行當然解任之法律效果產生「獨立性要求限於列舉事項而過於狹隘」及「可能影響董事會及審計委員會決議效力」之問題，此二問題凸顯當然解任之法律效果過於強烈。 本文整理比較法之相關法制，發現比較法上對於獨立董事違反形式獨立性要求之法律效果，係以「喪失獨立董事資格，但仍保有董事身份」為主流。此一立法模式相較我國現行法制，不僅較能落實「獨立董事客觀監督功能之確保」之規範目的，且透過強化公司對於獨立董事獨立性判斷之透明性，更兼顧市場監督、企業自治與交易安全。 因此，本研究考量對於現行實務運作影響之最小化，參考比較法調整獨立董事違反形式獨立性要求時之規範模式，在法制上提出若干修法建議。

Based on an examination of the current regulatory framework governing independent directors’ failure to satisfy formal independence requirements, together with case analyses, this article argues that the existing mechanism of automatic forfeiture of office (ipso facto dismissal) gives rise to two problems, namely that the independence requirements are overly narrow in being confined to enumerated circumstances, and that the forfeiture may affect the validity of resolutions adopted by the board of directors or the audit committee. These two problems highlight that the legal consequences attached to ipso facto dismissal are excessively severe. By conducting a comparative survey of corporate governance regimes, this article finds that, in the researched jurisdictions, the predominant approach to the legal consequences of an independent director’s breach of formal independence requirements is the director’s loss of status as an independent director while the person retains office as a director. Compared with Taiwan’s current framework, this regulatory model better gives effect to the normative goal of securing the objective monitoring function of independent directors, and, by enhancing transparency in the company’s assessment of director independence, better reconciles market oversight, corporate self-governance and transactional certainty. Accordingly, with a view to minimizing disruption to existing practice, this study draws on comparative law to recalibrate the regulatory approach applicable when an independent director breaches formal independence requirements, and puts forward several proposals for statutory and regulatory amendments.