董事改選前後之財務報表操縱: 主要股東持股與外部審計品質的調節效果

Abstract

本研究探討(1)董事改選所引發之控制權不確定性，如何影響企業之財務報導行為以及(2)主要股東間絕對和相對持股比例與外部審計品質在該項關係所扮演角色。本研究以2005年至2024年臺灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本進行實證分析，採用 Beneish M-Score 及其拆解後可區分操縱誘因與實際操縱行為之差異變數作為衡量指標，檢驗董事改選前後企業財務報導之變化。結果顯示，董事改選後企業出現財務報表向上操縱；當控制股東與其他主要股東之持股差距越大時，改選後財務報表向上操縱程度越高，表示控制股東間制衡力量不足時，企業會更可能向上操縱財務數字 。此外，四大事務所擔負外部審計責任有助降低改選後之財務數據操縱，緩和主要股東競爭失衡對財務報導品質之不利影響。

This study investigates (1) how potential threats of losing corporate control triggered by board re-elections serve to explain corporate financial reporting bias, and (2) the roles regarding mitigating such bias played by the shareholding concentration among major shareholders and external audit quality in this relationship. Using a sample of Taiwan-Stock-Exchange- plus Taipei Stock Exchange-listed companies from 2005 to 2024, this research conducts an empirical analysis with dependent variable(s) of Beneish M-Score and its decomposed variables. Specifically, I distinguish between Manipulation Motivation and Operating Abnormal, which are alternately employed as measurement indicators to reflect changes in financial reporting bias before and after board re-elections. The results indicate that companies exhibit upward manipulation of financial statements following board re-elections. Specifically, when the shareholding gap between the controlling shareholder and other major shareholders becomes greater, the upward manipulation after the re-election becomes more pronounced. This finding suggests that when the voices of checks and balances from non-controlling shareholders turn weaker, the companies are more likely to manipulate financial reporting upwards. Furthermore, Big-4 firms, which may represent the external auditors with higher quality, outperform the others in mitigating financial data manipulation following re-elections and thus the adverse impact of imbalanced competition among major shareholders on financial reporting quality.