規範不足之違憲審查--以司法違憲審查權之立法功能為中心

Abstract

我國大法官審理「規範不足」是否違憲之理論基礎及判準尚不明確。且大法官於此類案件往往進行司法造法，宣示應填補之制度內容，引發司法違憲審查權是否取代立法權之爭議。對此，我國釋憲實務及學界之討論聚焦於執行諭知，基此證成或否認大法官立法之正當性。惟執行諭知並非真正意義之司法造法行為，此種討論並未正面回應大法官立法的爭議。 本文旨在說明，憲法對應有規範之要求（基本國策、受益權、基本權保護功能、比例原則、平等原則及權力分立原則等義務規定）即為「憲法秩序」，而立法行為（包括「立法作為」及「立法不作為」）使得應有規範有所欠缺，不符合上開憲法秩序者，即屬「規範不足」之違憲狀態。 大法官填補規範不足，將作成國家制度決策。此種制度決策具有不可逆之效果，立法者無權取而代之，此方為真正意義之司法造法行為。至於執行諭知僅係為實現制度決策之執行方案，且僅暫時性替代立法者，待立法者完成立法隨即退場。欲檢驗及說明大法官立法之正當性，當以大法官所為國家制度決策為對象。 司法違憲審查權之本質亦蘊含立法權，以分擔國家一部分之立法功能。基此，為審查、填補規範不足之大法官立法，並未牴觸權力分立原則，該立法權力毋寧是源自憲法秩序之要求及憲法解釋活動之必然。並且，透過司法違憲審查制度對於國家權力運作之合憲性監督，大法官立法得以強制執行，並非僅是單純諭知。 最後，本文提出「對抗移轉模型」，藉以解釋司法違憲審查權與立法機關兩者兼有立法功能之情境下，兩者的權力運作關係。並確認當今已展現出立法功能的我國大法官，其與立法機關之間可以相互和諧運行，不生侵奪權力之問題。

Although Taiwan’s constitutional interpretation practice has developed a robust system of constitutional review, there remains a lack of clear standards when adjudicating cases involving incomplete or deficient existing norms. Specifically, it is often unclear whether the legislature has violated the prohibition against insufficiency (Untermaßverbot), the prohibition against excess (Übermaßverbot), or some other constitutional requirement. In instances where the incompleteness of existing norms results in unconstitutionality, it is frequently necessary for the Constitutional Court (Justices of the Constitutional Court) to indicate the institutional content that ought to be provided. This, in turn, raises debates concerning the separation of powers—specifically, whether the exercise of constitutional review authority by the judiciary encroaches upon the legislative power. This article aims to argue that the constitutional mandates requiring the existence of certain norms—such as fundamental national policies, the right to benefit, the protective function of fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality, the principle of equality, and the principle of separation of powers—collectively constitute the “constitutional order.” When legislative actions—be they legislative acts or omissions—result in the absence or insufficiency of required norms and thereby fail to conform to this constitutional order, such situations amount to a state of unconstitutional “normative insufficiency.”Normative insufficiency is not limited to cases of legislative omission or under-protection of rights; it may also manifest in instances where the state excessively interferes with fundamental rights. From the perspective of the separation of powers, the essence of judicial constitutional review inherently involves a degree of legislative authority, in that it bears part of the state’s lawmaking function. Legislative acts by the Constitutional Court do not violate the principle of separation of powers; rather, such authority derives from the imperatives of the constitutional order and the inherent nature of constitutional interpretation. Through the mechanism of constitutional review, the enforcement of such judicially articulated legislative content may be mandatory, rather than merely declaratory. Lastly, this article proposes the “counter-transfer” model to explain the power dynamic between the judiciary’s constitutional review authority and the legislature’s lawmaking function. This model affirms that the Constitutional Court, which has increasingly exhibited legislative functions, can coexist and operate harmoniously with the legislature, without resulting in a usurpation of legislative power.