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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/10142
標題: | 台灣立法委員選舉制度改變對補助款分配之影響 The Impact of the Legislative Electoral System Change on Grant Distribution in Taiwan |
作者: | Ying-Chieh Lai 賴映潔 |
指導教授: | 王宏文(Hong-Wung Wang) |
關鍵字: | 分配政策,補助款,立委選制改革,創造城鄉新風貌計畫,選票集中度,賀芬達爾指數, distributive policy,distributive theory,pork barrel,grant,electoral system,Herfindahl index, |
出版年 : | 2011 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 2005 年我國將立法委員選舉制度由「複數選區單記非讓渡選票制」改為「單一選區制兩票制」,同時重新劃分選區,並確定於第七屆立委選舉時開始實施。第六屆立委在面臨新選制及新選區,並為了最大化其連任機率,他們會如何改變其分配行為是本研究的主要研究目的。
本研究比較第五屆及第六屆立委之分配行為,並以「創造城鄉新風貌計畫」分配至各選區的補助金額為分析對象,研究發現選區政治勢力集中度越高者,該選區所獲得的人均補助款也較多,這可能是因為選區政治勢力集中度越高,代表有立委在該選區較具優勢,因此選民對立委有較高的期待、監督、與課責,使立委之肉桶立法動機較強。此外,本研究也發現政治勢力集中度較高的選區,第六屆會比第五屆獲得更多的補助款,特別是政黨勢力集中度對補助款分配的影響力在第六屆大增,甚至超越個人政治勢力集中度的影響,這可能是因為政治人物已預期到政黨競爭將是第七屆立委選舉的主要面向,且希望以補助款的分配來鞏固政黨既有的地盤。 In 2005, Taiwan Legislative Electoral System, SNTV, was replaced by single-district, two vote system. Based on distributive policy theory, this paper aims to explore how 6th legislators reacted and changed their pork barrel behaviors in order to maximize the probabilities to be reelected when facing the coming electoral rule. By comparing 5th and 6th Legislators’ pork barrel behaviors, using “Creating Townscape Model Plan” as data, this paper has two findings. First, the analysis shows that the more the political power in an electoral district concentrates the more grants it gets. The reasonable explanation might be that when the political power in an electoral district is oligopolistic or even monopolistic, there exist a dominant representative, who has to take on more anticipation and accountability from the electorate than other electoral district, where political power are less concentrative, and thus the representatives in the higher concentrative electoral district has stronger motives to bring the pork home. Also, this paper finds that the higher concentrative electoral districts receive more grants in the term of 6th legislators than in 5th; especially the party political power in an electoral district has more influence on grant distribution in 6th than in 5th. The reasonable explanation might be that the political behaviors had anticipated that party competition would be the core divergence in the following electoral campaign, and thus grants were distributed based on part domain so as to consolidate their own electoral bases. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/10142 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
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