論競爭政策之當代挑戰與變革：資料經濟、永續發展與非經濟利益之保護

Abstract

本研究析述競爭政策與競爭法在當代所面對之挑戰，以及在保護利益、適用範圍、分析方法乃至制度功能等層面應如何變革以資因應。其中，透過消費者福利作為競爭法之目的、執法標準以及相關分析方法之檢討，本研究對於競爭法考量及保護非經濟因素或公共利益時，關於「目的」與「範圍界定」之理論困難或疑點，加以釐清。 本研究採取比較法、文獻分析及案例分析之研究方法。首先，進行競爭法發展歷史與制度演進之探討。芝加哥學派影響各國競爭法之基本思維，使競爭法之目的、分析方法乃至規範功能環繞「消費者福利」發展及運作，而不符多數法制仍然兼及保障競爭過程、消費者以及公共利益之意旨。從競爭法的歷史發展與各國競爭規範的內涵觀之，「消費者」與「競爭」無疑是二個最重要的共通概念，二者之意義、互動關係以及加以保護之方式與面向，皆是競爭法的重要課題，但為僅關注競爭結果面向之消費者福利標準所忽略。歐美面對新世紀之經濟環境變遷時，競爭法制本身皆未能彈性調整以資因應，關鍵原因之一在於二者均先後擁抱消費者福利作為競爭法核心目標之思維。競爭法面對法制內部數十年來分析方法的偏狹發展，以及數位經濟與永續發展等本世紀以來漸形迫切之外部挑戰，若非進行保護利益、適用範圍、分析方法乃至制度功能等層面近乎全盤之變革，實難使市場經濟之功能與運作符合社會之期待。 本研究從資料經濟與永續發展二個領域，觀察「競爭過程」與「競爭結果」（包含消費者利益）之互動關係。該二領域的共同點，係存在影響市場功能之「外部性」以及一定程度的「管制失靈」問題──市場之運作在現行管制之下，仍未符社會之期待。在與管制不相衝突之前提下（例如管制規範不適用或未受違反），透過維護「競爭過程」而改善「競爭結果」並促進市場功能，應符合競爭法之規範功能。在此，無論是數位經濟之「資料外部性」，抑或永續發展所涉「環境外部性」，相關市場競爭所影響之利益通常涉及公益，且具有所謂「相關市場外」（out-of-market）以及「非經濟」之特性，而非屬學理上「消費者福利」之內涵。是以，在「外部成本」與「管制失靈」同時存在之情形，競爭法即有考量「消費者福利以外」之因素或利益，以促進市場功能之餘地。 就競爭規範之解釋而言，本研究依據競爭法上對於「消費者」所賦予之意義以及其與「競爭過程」之互動關係，將競爭法之保護法益從經濟學上消費者福利之內涵加以「校正」及「擴張」（即本研究所稱消費者利益），以符合相關競爭法制之目的及其促進市場功能之意旨。為達此目的，本研究回顧文獻上對於消費者福利方法論之批評，指出其評估方法之偏誤與缺陷，實來自對於「市場機制」之假設脫離現實，其中「消費者」僅具有工具性之內涵，不僅忽略競爭作為「過程」對於市場功能的意義，亦過度簡化並形同掏空「消費者」之概念內涵以及其所能促進之價值，導致消費者福利標準難以衡量、遑論調和不同群體之利益衝突，且實際操作上過於偏重市場競爭在相關市場之「經濟結果」。 在相關市場存在外部成本之情形，市場競爭過程對於競爭結果之影響層面超越相關市場，可能涉及與相關市場相關聯之領域，例如相關聯之市場、其他地理市場或潛在、未來之市場等，並超越經濟利益之範疇。準此，在涉及外部性（例如資料外部性或環境外部性）之市場脈絡下，「消費者」基於可能重疊之各種「身分」所考量之利益，實際上可能近似於公民之關懷、公民相關之利益或公共利益。此時，競爭法對於「品質」、「技術」乃至「效率」等競爭要素之考量，應包括其如何加重或減輕相關外部性問題（例如對於永續發展或資料治理之效應），作為競爭評估之一環，競爭法上之「消費者利益」則應包括受外部性所影響「廣義消費者」之利益，始能進行完整的競爭評估，從而促進市場功能。 於存在外部性等市場失靈情形，競爭法在與管制規範不相衝突之前提下，得透過維護「競爭過程」以促進市場功能。競爭法對於經濟或非經濟利益之考量，均以涉及「競爭過程之維護」為前提（即「競爭相關性」），其考量範圍則取決於「競爭過程」與「消費者利益」之互動關係。 最後，本研究檢視並回應文獻中對於競爭法對於非經濟利益之考量可能不具正當性、逾越制度功能，以及危及競爭評估與法律適用之客觀性與可預測性等相關質疑。誠然，現行競爭法制在前述芝加哥學派經年之影響下，必須加強與相關公務機關、管制機關乃至學術機構與國際組織之合作、協調與相互諮詢，以補足其在競爭規範之既有框架下，擴張執法上對於非經濟因素之考量時所涉及、欠缺之專業。然而，競爭法制考量非經濟利益所面對真正的「障礙」，既非規範上限制，亦非專業性或評估方法上之限制，而是主流競爭政策擁抱新古典經濟學之理論與方法論預設，基於「市場係隔離於政治且不涉及價值判斷」之假設或信念，所發展之競爭分析方法，以及對於競爭法制度功能以及運作範疇之畫地自限。競爭法主管機關本於對市場競爭之專業判斷，靈活運用且並重量化與質性方法，以評估「競爭過程」及其所影響之「消費者利益」乃至相關規範要件，相較於逕以貨幣化方法評估消費者福利，不但更為符合競爭規範之意旨，亦可能減輕對福利效果分析之過度依賴，而減輕評估上困難。

This study analyses the contemporary challenges facing competition policy and competition law and proposes reforms concerning protected interests, scope of application, analytical methodologies, and institutional functions. By critically examining the role of consumer welfare as the principal objective, enforcement benchmark, and analytical framework of competition law, the research clarifies the conceptual difficulties that arise when competition law seeks to consider or protect non-economic or public interests, particularly with respect to its objectives and boundaries. Methodologically, the study adopts a comparative-law approach, combining literature review and case analysis. It first traces the historical development and institutional evolution of competition law. The influence of the Chicago School has shaped the intellectual foundations of competition law worldwide, steering its objectives, analytical methods, and regulatory functions around consumer welfare as a central theme. This orientation contrasts with the purposes of many competition law regimes, which continue to encompass the protection of the competitive process, consumers, and the public interest. From the perspective of both legal history and the substantive content of national competition regimes, “consumer” and “competition” are the two most fundamental and shared concepts. Their meanings, interactions, and modes of protection are central to competition law—yet they have been largely neglected under a consumer-welfare standard that focuses narrowly on market outcomes. As Europe and the United States have faced profound economic transformations in the twenty-first century, their competition regimes have proved unable to adjust flexibly. A key reason lies in their continued embrace of consumer welfare as the core goal of competition law. Given decades of analytical skewness and the external challenges posed by the digital economy and sustainable development, competition law can no longer fulfil societal expectations of the market economy without undertaking a near-systemic transformation. Focusing on the data economy and sustainability, this study examines the interaction between the “competitive process” and “competitive outcomes” (including consumer interests). Both fields exhibit externalities that distort market functioning and a degree of regulatory failure—markets continue to fall short of societal expectations even under existing regulation. Where competition law does not conflict with sectoral regulation (for instance, where regulatory rules are inapplicable or not breached), enhancing the competitive process to improve outcomes and restore market functionality accords with the normative purpose of competition law. In this regard, whether the issue concerns “data externalities” in the digital economy or “environmental externalities” in sustainability, the interests affected by market competition often involve public goods and extend beyond the relevant market, possessing “out-of-market” and “non-economic” characteristics. These fall outside the traditional conception of consumer welfare. Hence, where both external costs and regulatory failure exist, competition law has legitimate scope to consider factors or interests beyond consumer welfare in order to promote market functionality. In interpreting competition rules, this study recalibrates and broadens the protected interests of competition law—moving beyond the economics concept of consumer welfare to what it terms consumer interest. This reconceptualisation is grounded in the meaning assigned to the “consumer” within competition law and in the interaction between “consumers” and the competitive process, in order to align with the normative purpose of competition law and its institutional function of promoting market performance. To this end, the study reviews academic critiques of the consumer-welfare methodology, highlighting that its biases and flaws in competition assessment stem from unrealistic assumptions about market mechanisms. Within such an approach, the “consumer” is treated merely as an instrumental construct. It disregards the significance of competition as a process for ensuring market functionality and, by oversimplifying the notion of the consumer, effectively strips it of substantive meaning and normative value. Accordingly, the consumer-welfare standard is difficult to measure, let alone reconcile with the conflicting interests of different groups, and in practice it places excessive emphasis on the economic consequences of market competition within the relevant market. Where external costs exist in the relevant market, the effects of the competitive process on competitive outcomes extend beyond that market, potentially influencing adjacent sectors, other geographic markets, and even potential or future markets—thus reaching beyond purely economic interests. In certain contexts—such as markets characterised by data or environmental externalities—the interests of consumers, who may simultaneously hold overlapping identities, may in practice resemble civic concerns, citizen-related interests, or broader public interests. In such cases, the concept of consumer interest under competition law should encompass the interests of consumers in a broad sense, in order to enable a comprehensive competition assessment and thereby enhance market functionality. Where market failures such as externalities arise, competition law—provided it does not conflict with sectoral regulation—may promote market functionality by safeguarding the competitive process. Any consideration of economic or non-economic interests within competition law must therefore be premised on the preservation of the competitive process—what this study refers to as competition relevance. The scope of such considerations ultimately depends on the interaction between the competitive process and consumer interests. Finally, the study engages with scholarly objections that considering non-economic interests may lack legitimacy, exceed the institutional mandate of competition law, or undermine objectivity and predictability in competition assessments and the application of law. While it is true that, under the enduring influence of the Chicago School, current regimes must strengthen cooperation and coordination with other public authorities, regulatory agencies, academia, and international organizations to compensate for expertise gaps when expanding enforcement to non-economic factors, the true obstacle is not normative or methodological. Rather, it lies in the methodological presuppositions of mainstream competition policy, which remains grounded in neoclassical economics and its belief that markets are insulated from politics and value judgments. This assumption has constrained the analytical methods, institutional functions, and scope of competition law. Compared with monetisation-based assessments of consumer welfare, competition authorities that flexibly employ both quantitative and qualitative analyses—based on their professional judgment—to evaluate the competitive process, its impact on consumer interests, and other legal criteria, act in a way that better aligns with the spirit of competition law, mitigates excessive reliance on welfare-effect analysis, and reduces evaluative difficulties.