請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101379完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曹承礎 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Seng-Cho Chou | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳弈帆 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | YI FAN CHEN | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-01-27T16:22:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2026-01-28 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2026-01-27 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2026 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2026-01-21 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | [1] Global Value Chains in the 21st Century. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade13_e.pdf
[2] The End of Globalization or a New World Order? Available at:https://btuai.ge/en/the-end-of-globalization-or-the-beginning-of-a-new-world-order/ [3] Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 [4] The Return of Economic Nationalism. Available at: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2009/02/05/the-return-of-economic-nationalism [5] Semiconductors: The New Oil. Available at: Are Semiconductors the New Oil? - Microchip USA [6] SIA Factbook. Available at: https://www.semiconductors.org/resources/2025-sia-factbook/ [7] The CHIPS and Science Act: Overview and Key Provisions. Available at: https://www.nsf.gov/chips [8] The Fabless-Foundry Model. Available at: https://digitalvital.org/semiconductor-business-models-fabless-and-fearless/ [9] TSMC's Market Share. Available at: TSMC Dominates Semiconductor Market with Record 70% Share in Q2 2025 [10] Martin, C. (2011). *Logistics and Supply Chain Management*. Pearson UK. [11] Oliver, R. K., & Webber, M. D. (1982). Supply-chain management: Logistics catches up with strategy. Outlook, 5(1), 42–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27922-5_15 [12] Meixell, M. J., & Gargeya, V. B. (2005). Global supply chain design: A literature review and critique. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 41(6), 531–550. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2005.06.003 [13] Christopher, M., & Peck, H. (2004). Building the resilient supply chain. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 15(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1108/09574090410700275 [14] Ponomarov, S. Y., & Holcomb, M. C. (2009). Understanding the concept of supply chain resilience. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 20(1), 124–143. https://doi.org/10.1108/09574090910954873 [15] Tang, C. S. (2006). Robust strategies for mitigating supply chain disruptions. *International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications*, 9(1), 33–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/13675560500405584 [16] Um, J., & Han, N. (2021). Understanding the relationships among supply chain risk, resilience, and performance: A meta-analytic approach. International Journal of Logistics Management, 32(3), 899–923.https://doi.org/10.1108/SCM-06-2020-0248 [17] Jüttner, U., & Maklan, S. (2011). Supply chain resilience during the global financial crisis: An empirical investigation. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 16(4), 246–259. https://doi.org/10.1108/13598541111139062 [18] Brandon-Jones, E., Squire, B., Autry, C. W., & Petersen, K. J. (2014). A contingent resource-based perspective on supply chain resilience and robustness. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 50(3), 55–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/jscm.12050 [19] Ellram, L. M., Tate, W. L., & Petersen, K. J. (2013). Offshoring and reshoring: An update on the manufacturing location decision. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 49(2), 14–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/jscm.12019 [20] Ancarani, A., Di Mauro, C., & Mascali, F. (2019). Back-reshoring and near-reshoring: A conceptual framework and content analysis of the literature. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 25(3), 235–252. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2019.04.003 [21] Yellen, J. L. (2022, April 13). *Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Way Forward for the Global Economy*. U.S. Department of the Treasury. Available at: Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Way Forward for the Global Economy | U.S. Department of the Treasury [22] Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. The Geographical Journal, 23(4), 421-437. https://doi.org/10.2307/1775498 [23] Luttwak, E. N. (1990). From geopolitics to geo-economics: Logic of conflict, grammar of commerce. The National Interest, (20), 17-23. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42894676 [24] Blackwill, R. D., & Harris, J. M. (2016). *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1c84cr7 [25] Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 [26] Fang, T., & Hwang, T. (2023). The Rise of Techno-Nationalism. New America. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep54891 [27] Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958 [28] BCG & SIA. (2021). *Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era*. Boston Consulting Group & Semiconductor Industry Association. Available at: Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era - Semiconductor Industry Association [29] Sturgeon, T. J. (2002). Modular production networks: a new American model of industrial organization. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(3), 451-496. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/11.3.451 [30] The White House. (2022). FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China. Retrieved from FACT Available at: SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China | The White House [31] Janjeva, Ardi, et al. China's Quest for Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency: The Impact on UK and Korean Industries. Centre for Emerging Technology and Security (CETaS), The Alan Turing Institute, 4 Dec. 2024, Available at: https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/chinas-quest-semiconductor-self-sufficiency. [32] Saaty, T. L. (1996). Decision Making with Dependence and Feedback: The Analytic Network Process. RWS Publications. Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4614-7279-7 [33] Saaty, T. L. (2004). Decision making the analytic hierarchy and network processes (AHP/ANP). Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, 13(1), 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-006-0151-5 [34] Gencer, C., & Gürpinar, D. (2007). Analytic network process for supplier selection: A case study in an electronics firm. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 31(11), 2475–2486. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apm.2006.10.002 [35] Kahraman, C., Ertay, T., & Büyüközkan, G. (2006). A fuzzy optimization model for the QFD planning process using the analytic network approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 171(2), 390–411. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.09.016 [36] Golshan, A., Sardar, S., Mahdavi Ardestani, S. F., & Sadeghian, P. (2024). A fuzzy analytical network process framework for prioritizing competitive intelligence in startups. Administrative Sciences, 14(3), 51. https://doi.org/10.3390/analytics4010003 [37] Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2017). Designing and conducting mixed methods research. Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.1177/1937586719832223 [38] Yin, R. K. (2017). Case study research and applications: Design and methods. Sage Publications. Available at: https://study.sagepub.com/yin6e [39] KPMG & GSA. (2025). 2025 Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook. KPMG LLP & Global Semiconductor Alliance. Available at: https://kpmg.com/kpmg-us/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2025/global-semiconductor-industry-outlook-2025.pdf [40] Boston Consulting Group & Semiconductor Industry Association. (2024). Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply Chain. Available at: https://www.bcg.com/publications/2024/emerging-resilience-in-semiconductor-supply-chain [41] Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (2022, September). 2022 Chicago Council Survey - Supply Chain Results. Available at: https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Supply%20Chain%202022%20Topline_0.pdf [42] Semiconductor Industry Association. (2025). Made in China 2025: Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency Goals. Available at: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/notice-of-the-state-council-on-the-publication-of-made-in-china-2025/ [43] Reuters. (2025, December 30). China mandates 50% domestic equipment rule for chipmakers, sources say. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-mandates-50-domestic-equipment-rule-chipmakers-sources-say-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com [44] Chang, W. (2025, December 4). Domestic substitution in AI chips: China’s big gamble. Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Available at: https://merics.org/en/comment/domestic-substitution-ai-chips-chinas-big-gamble | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101379 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究旨在探討在地緣政治重構的背景下，全球半導體供應鏈所面臨的戰略選擇，並特別聚焦於無廠半導體（Fabless）企業的路徑選擇與政策影響。隨著全球化趨勢逆轉，以及大國間的戰略競爭加劇，半導體產業已從過去以「經濟效益」為優先的邏輯，轉變為以「國家安全」為核心的戰略佈局。本研究採用「政策擴展型分析網路程序法」（Policy-Extended Analytic Network Process, PE-ANP），透過對產業專家的深度問卷調查，量化分析各地緣政治與經濟因素對企業供應鏈戰略決策的影響。
研究的核心發現可歸納為三點： 第一，本研究證實半導體產業的戰略典範已發生轉移。研究結果顯示，「地緣政治風險」（權重 43.71%）已明確超越傳統的「經濟績效」（25.33%），成為影響供應鏈戰略的首要決定因素。此量化數據證實了產業邏輯已從「經濟優先」轉向「安全優先」的假設。在地緣政治風險叢集中，「捲入風險」（Entrapment Risk，權重 22.67%）與「政策不確定性」（Policy Uncertainty，權重 13.11%）被視為最關鍵的驅動因子，凸顯了企業在中美科技競爭下所面臨的嚴峻壓力。 第二，研究結果揭示了美國與中國無廠半導體企業之間顯著的戰略兩極化現象。雖然「友岸外包」（Friend-shoring，權重 45.80%）在總體評估中為最佳策略，但此數據背後隱藏著深刻的分歧。對美國領導企業而言，「友岸外包」是一種戰略共識，旨在平衡中國市場的「捲入風險」與持續的「政策不確定性」。相對地，如華為等中國企業則被迫選擇「在地化」（Localization，權重 54.60%），這並非出於戰略偏好，而是在美國制裁下為求生存的必要手段，旨在實現技術自主。 第三，本研究論證了此番戰略重組並非暫時或邊緣性的調整，而是一個穩定的新均衡。美中企業所選擇的迥異路徑，反映了其對根本上不對稱的地緣政治現實的理性適應。「友岸外包」在美國企業中的主導地位，以及中國企業被迫走向「在地化」的趨勢，標誌著全球半導體供應鏈已發生結構性且可能持久的碎裂。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study presents the core findings of a Policy-Extended Analytic Network Process (PE-ANP) analysis, which can be distilled into three principal conclusions:
First, the analysis confirms a paradigm shift in the semiconductor industry. Geopolitical Risk, with a commanding weight of 43.71%, has unequivocally surpassed traditional Economic Performance (25.33%) as the primary determinant shaping supply chain strategies. This quantitative result substantiates the hypothesis that the industry’s strategic logic has pivoted from an “economic priority” to a “security priority.” Within the geopolitical cluster, Entrapment Risk (22.67%) and Policy Uncertainty (13.11%) were identified as the most critical drivers, highlighting the acute pressures of navigating the U.S.-China rivalry. Second, the results reveal a pronounced strategic polarization between U.S. and Chinese fabless firms. While Friend-shoring (45.80%) emerged as the top-ranked strategy overall, this aggregate figure masks a deep divergence. For leading U.S. fabless firms, Friend-shoring represents a strategic consensus—a rational hedge to balance the immense threat of Entrapment Risk in China with ongoing Policy Uncertainty. In stark contrast, Chinese fabless firms such as Huawei are unequivocally compelled toward Localization (54.60%). This is not a strategic preference but an existential necessity, driven by realized sanctions and the immense domestic pressure to achieve technological self-sufficiency. Third, the analysis demonstrates that this strategic realignment is not a temporary or marginal adjustment but a stable new equilibrium. The starkly different paths chosen by U.S. and Chinese fabless firms reflect rational adaptations to fundamentally asymmetric geopolitical realities. The preference for Friend-shoring among U.S. fabless firms and the forced march toward Localization for Chinese fabless firms represent a structural and likely enduring fragmentation of the global semiconductor supply chain. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2026-01-27T16:22:05Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2026-01-27T16:22:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝 (Acknowledgements) i
摘要 ii Abstract iii List of Contents iv List of Table viii List of Figure ix Chapter 1: Introduction 1 1.1 Research Background 1 1.1.1 The Reversal of Globalization and the Geopolitical Restructuring 1 1.1.2 The Strategic Significance of the Semiconductor Industry 2 1.1.3 The Rise and Challenges of the Fabless Model 4 1.2 Research Motivation 6 1.2.1 Academic Motivation 6 1.2.2 Practical Motivation 7 1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 9 1.3.1 Core Research Question 9 1.3.2 Sub-Research Questions 9 1.3.3 Research Objectives 10 1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Study 11 1.4.1 Scope of the Study 11 1.4.2 Limitations of the Study 12 Chapter 2: Literature Review 13 2.1 Introduction 13 2.2 Supply Chain Strategy 13 2.2.1 Evolution of Supply Chain Management: From Efficiency to Resilience 13 2.2.2 Supply Chain Resilience Strategy 14 2.2.3 Supply Chain Restructuring Strategy 15 2.3 Geopolitical Economy 16 2.3.1 Geopolitics and Geo-economics 16 2.3.2 Weaponized Interdependence 17 2.3.3 Techno-nationalism[26] 18 2.3.4 Corporate Security Dilemma: A Study of Firm Behavior under Geopolitical Risk 19 2.3.5 Applicability in Semiconductor Supply Chain Research 21 2.4 Semiconductor Industry Research 23 2.4.1 Global Semiconductor Value Chain 23 2.4.2 Fabless-Foundry Business Model 24 2.4.3 U.S.-China Technological Competition and Industrial Policy 25 2.5 Exploration of ANP and PE-ANP Methods 26 2.5.1 Theoretical Foundations and Applications of the ANP Method 26 2.5.2 Innovations and Research Value of PE-ANP 27 2.6 Literature Review and Research Gaps 30 2.7 Chapter Summary 31 Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Design 32 3.1 Introduction 32 3.2 Mixed-Methods Research Design 32 3.3 Policy-Extended Analytic Network Process (PE-ANP) Model 33 3.3.1 PE-ANP Model Construction Steps 34 3.3.2 Design of PE-ANP Criteria System 36 3.3.3 Definition of Alternative Scenarios 39 3.3.4 Selection and Composition of the Expert Panel 40 3.4 Case Study Design 40 3.4.1 Case Selection 40 3.4.2 Data Collection 41 3.4.3 Data Analysis 42 3.5 Reliability and Validity of the Study 42 3.6 Chapter Summary 43 Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 44 4.1 Introduction 44 4.1.1 Expert Panel Composition and Demographics 44 4.2 PE-ANP Model Weight Analysis 46 4.2.1 Criterion Cluster Weight Analysis 46 4.2.2 Specific Criterion Weights Within Clusters 48 Notes: 49 4.3 Comprehensive Evaluation of Supply Chain Strategies 50 4.3.1 Strategic Polarization: U.S. vs. Chinese fabless firms 51 4.3.2 Root Causes of Strategic Differences 51 4.4 Chapter Summary 53 Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 56 5.1 Research Conclusions 56 5.2 Recommendations 57 5.2.1 Implications for Semiconductor Firms 57 5.2.2 Implications for Semiconductor Industry Policy 59 5.3 Alignment with Friend-shoring Strategy 61 5.4 Validation of China's Localization Strategy 62 5.5 Research Limitations and Future Directions 64 5.5.1 Research Limitations 64 5.5.2 Future Research Directions 65 References 67 Appendix1 PE-ANP Questionnaire 72 Appendix 2: ANP Questionnaire Results 95 Criterion Cluster Weights by Group 95 Strategic Alternative Weights by Group 95 Top 10 Subcriteria by Global Weight (ALL Group) 96 Individual Expert Strategic Preferences 96 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 半導體產業 | - |
| dc.subject | 供應鏈管理 | - |
| dc.subject | 地緣政治 | - |
| dc.subject | 無廠半導體模式 | - |
| dc.subject | 分析網路程序法（ANP） | - |
| dc.subject | 戰略決策 | - |
| dc.subject | 企業安全困境 | - |
| dc.subject | 友岸外包 | - |
| dc.subject | Semiconductor Industry | - |
| dc.subject | Supply Chain Management | - |
| dc.subject | Geopolitics | - |
| dc.subject | Fabless Model | - |
| dc.subject | Analytic Network Process (ANP) | - |
| dc.subject | Strategic Decision-Making | - |
| dc.subject | Corporate Security Dilemma | - |
| dc.subject | Friend-shoring | - |
| dc.title | 地緣政治重構下的全球半導體供應鏈戰略： Fabless企業的路徑選擇與政策影響分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Global Semiconductor Supply Chain Strategies under Geopolitical Restructuring: Path Selection and Policy Analysis for Fabless Enterprises | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 114-1 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 謝冠雄 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | Kuan-Hsiung Hsieh | en |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳建錦;林俊叡 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chien Chin Chen;Raymund Lin | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 半導體產業,供應鏈管理地緣政治無廠半導體模式分析網路程序法（ANP）戰略決策企業安全困境友岸外包 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Semiconductor Industry,Supply Chain ManagementGeopoliticsFabless ModelAnalytic Network Process (ANP)Strategic Decision-MakingCorporate Security DilemmaFriend-shoring | en |
| dc.relation.page | 97 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202600186 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2026-01-21 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 企業管理碩士專班 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | N/A | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 管理學院企業管理專班(Global MBA) | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-114-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 4.65 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。