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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101193
標題: 地方政府性別主流化的績效管理
Performance Management of Gender Mainstreaming in Local Governments
作者: 陽庭妮
Ting-Ni Yang
指導教授: 郭乃菱
Nai-Ling Kuo
共同指導教授: 黃長玲
Chang-Ling Huang
關鍵字: 性別主流化,績效評估績效悖理政策環境
gender mainstreaming,performance evaluationperformance paradoxpolicy environment
出版年 : 2025
學位: 碩士
摘要:   本研究以我國自2016年以來行政院性平處所實施的「直轄市與縣(市)政府推動性別平等業務輔導獎勵計畫」(輔導獎勵計畫)為案例,探討績效管理機制的運作效果會如何受到政治支持、官僚感知、組織資源與外部因素等不同政策環境條件之影響,具體而言關注何種條件有助於績效管理機制發揮預期作用,何種條件則增加績效悖理之問題。
  經由訪談我國地方政府文官、婦權會和性平會民間委員、行政院性別平等處文官,並參照次級資料進行分析,本研究發現評核機制功能發揮受政策環境條件影響。政治首長積極態度有助機制建立;高階文官若重視評核能促成跨局處合作,承辦人投入意願、組織資源充裕程度,以及重大社會事件都影響地方政府全面投入推動之程度。以激發創新策略而言,政治首長與幕僚單位的積極態度、財務資源充裕、與民間委員良好協力關係都有助於創新發展。以民間倡議而言,民間委員若能掌握評核要求,能透過指標敦促政府採納倡議。
  本研究也發現輔導獎勵計畫的引導使地方政府的推動產生績效悖理現象,且受政策環境調節。高階文官要求隱藏資料、承辦人流動率高或知能不足、民間委員過度協助優化呈現,以及重大事件導致指標簡陋,都會加劇衡量不精確之問題。目標錯置可以透過官僚釐清長期策略或是累積在地知識改善,但承辦人知能不足或民間委員過度關注指標則加劇問題。策略性行為包括高階文官捨難取易、政治首長重視表面成績導致粉飾、財務資源缺乏導致重新包裝、資源豐富或高階文官要求導致隱藏資料,以及民間委員缺乏督促誘因協助壓低成效。人力資源不足時機關將缺乏創新餘力,加劇評核機制阻礙創新之情形。
To explore how policy environments influence the effectiveness of performance management mechanisms, this study examines the “Guidance Program for Promoting Gender Equality by Municipal and County (City) Governments” implemented by the Executive Yuan's Department of Gender Equality since 2016. Specifically, this study investigates which conditions enable performance management mechanisms to achieve their intended effects and which conditions exacerbate performance paradoxes. These conditions include political support, bureaucrats’ perceptions, organizational resources, and external factors.
Through interviews with local government civil servants, civil society representatives of women’s rights and gender equality committees, and civil servants from the Executive Yuan’s Department of Gender Equality, supplemented by analysis of secondary data, this study finds that the functioning of evaluation mechanisms is moderated by policy environments. The support of political figures facilitates mechanism establishment; when high-level civil servants value the policy goals the performance management promoting, it promotes cross-departmental collaboration. The willingness of civil servants to engage, the adequacy of organizational resources, and major social incidents all affect the extent of local governments’ comprehensive commitment to implementation. Regarding innovation stimulation strategies, proactive attitudes of political figures and staff units, adequate financial resources, and good collaborative relationships with the civil society all contribute to innovative development. Regarding civil advocacy, if civil society representatives are well versed with the performance evaluation requirements, they can guide governments to adopt advocacy initiatives through performance indicators.
This study also finds that the Guidance Program induces performance paradoxes in local government implementation, which are also moderated by policy environments. First, measurement inaccuracy problems are aggravated by high-level civil servants demanding data concealment, high turnover or insufficient competence of staff, civil society representatives excessively assisting in optimizing presentations, and major incidents leading to sloppy indicator designs. Secondly, goal displacement can be mitigated through bureaucrats adopting strategies for long-term goals or accumulating local knowledge, but insufficient competence of responsible personnel or civil society representatives’ excessive focus on indicators can worsen the problem. Third, strategic behaviors include senior civil servants cream skimming by avoiding harder tasks, political figures prioritizing superficial achievements leading to window- dressing, lack of financial resources leading to repackaging, abundant resources or high-level civil servant demands leading to data concealment, and civil members lacking incentives to supervise or assisting in gaming. Insufficient human resources leave agencies without capacity for innovation, thereby exacerbating the hinderance of performance management systems on innovation.
URI: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101193
DOI: 10.6342/NTU202504747
全文授權: 同意授權(限校園內公開)
電子全文公開日期: 2026-01-01
顯示於系所單位:公共事務研究所

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