競爭法下互利共生之競爭—自我國民營電廠可互相運作性再出發

Abstract

我國民營電廠聯合行為案，法院與律師不斷面對著主管機關倡導競爭完全脫逸甚至牴觸購售電契約與臺電調度運作，最高行政法院最後判決鼓勵修約以促競爭，宣告「競爭始終凌駕於契約」。本論文有意解決該行政訴訟落幕後諸項未決問題，試圖建構出理論基礎驗證最高行政法院判決應商榷處。 本文直視「競爭法下競爭是否始終凌駕於契約」。以前述發電業為例，特殊產業係架構內全體成員訂定契約人為營造供需秩序，可否繼續透過抽象競爭來介入改變該秩序。為加強研究可觀察性，本文套入「必先合作才能競爭」互利共生條件框架，讓合作成激發甚至促進競爭前提進行觀察。該特殊情狀下限制合作等同限制競爭，競爭法不應介入該合作(契約)框架反自傷競爭。經初步驗證民營電廠聯合行為案廣義可互相運作性(interoperability)，參考他國執法經驗，繼續透過此條件找尋其他範例，實施歸納演繹、主觀驗證與自我省思等理論建構過程，特此提出互利共生競爭理論，並嘗試藉此理論詮釋競爭法現今重要議題，亦盼緩和產業寒蟬效應失衡現狀，最後提出對公平法規範與公平會執法之具體建議。 本文提作者親自經歷處理個案資料，透過17個互利共生競爭範例歸納論證並初探其特徵。研究方法包括法律實證研究方法、文獻研究法、歸納法及比較研究法。除歐美德日執法經驗外，搜得資料時間軸逾百年歷史，產業不限傳統或科技業，也透過蒐集範例歸納演繹，希望驗證競爭合作，不僅非必排斥，甚至會互利共生。本文將此特殊競爭取名「互利共生競爭」。 研究過程發現，競爭法身為經濟法，須具調整彈性，隨時代產業發展不斷形塑具體內涵。今科技讓產業劇變，公平法聯合規範廣義詮釋協議範圍若對合作續表疑慮。過度剛性嚴格詮釋競爭，競爭理念僵化，整部公平法面對新科技挑戰，也就難以轉身。 合作與競爭非涇渭分明，彼此非必排斥。剛性嚴格詮釋競爭，忽略且趕走所有高價值合作，反可能自損競爭。抹殺「好的合作」，甚至驅逐身處灰色地帶之合作，寒蟬效應(chilling effect)難免。經蒐集美國歐盟德國日本等國執法經驗，參考國內外判決與實務資料，挖掘產業合作會出現特殊競爭，觀察橫跨百年執法之合作競爭互動，蒐集多個範例盼論證互利共生競爭，建構互利共生競爭理論。 本文先藉由民營電廠聯合案特殊訴訟過程與我國極度特殊發電架構作為出發點，驗證廣義可互相運作性且解析特殊產業契約可激發競爭，且對該核心議題，競爭合作互動，繼續挖掘並驗證其他產業「好的合作」確實存在。 其次，本文蒐集美國歐盟德國日本等國執法經驗，觀察該等國家橫跨百年執法歷史之合作競爭互動與經驗。建議掌握互利共競爭動態發展所具時間變化因素特性，主張公私協力模式，發現美國不分司法系統或學術主張百年來始終解決1890年休曼法過嚴規範(新政期間羅斯福總統倡導regulatory monopoly)，競爭合作可融合；歐洲德國1930年甚至強制成立卡特爾來因應產業變遷，今德國透過概括條款反向準用歐盟集體豁免機制(block exemption)；歐盟更不斷檢討透過業者事前申報、放寬集體豁免機制、兼採法定例外制度，均顯示多年來均努力平衡競爭合作互動。日本強調與業者對話(相談)機制，甚至日本學術界也出現如廖義男教授所提動態發展卓越觀察。作者尊崇Easterbrook(1984)主張，Easterbrook呼籲注意合作與競爭互動「整合」架構。競爭法百年來掃除限制競爭之「壞的合作」，如今面對不斷產業快速變遷，已到回頭保護「好的合作」時刻。我國公平法立法30多年，可同步吸取歐美德等國執法經驗，不足者尚可修補。公法醇化私法自治，私法自治也反向醇化公法，兩方實均可助公法任務達成。 基此，本文蒐集範例驗證理論普遍性，說明架構意涵，盼建構出互利共生競爭理論，最後將此出自實務觀察結果，與學術進行對話，並對執法考量提出具體流程建議，最後藉此適用個案運作來呈現實用性。 研究結果顯示，競爭可來自人為設計調控，應區分宏觀與微觀執法視野，宏觀執法倚重經濟分析，微觀執法首重經驗法則與個案主客觀情狀。發展到極端人為競爭環境，幾乎須倚靠人類高度自決調控甚至互通開放之相互可運作性等工具共促競爭法目標。共生架構內成員契約共識或自治規則，便係該產業交易秩序，須先合作才能激發該競爭，此破除所謂競爭始終凌駕於契約傳統迷思。也發現公平法早有金融業處理原則，2025年更有永續事業指引等成果。 本文依據研究發現，嘗試提出互利共生競爭理論，詮釋競爭法熱議問題，希望緩和產業寒蟬效應失衡扭曲現象，發掘出聯合與結合互通共用與安全港因時制宜等議題。為驗證此理論實用性，本文自民營電廠擴及整體發電業進行市場界定與競爭分析；探討相對優勢地位理論；觀察文曄大聯大敵意收購案所涉聯合結合規範關聯；解析商圈夜市甚至混凝土業受罰案；預測產業永續ESG規則繼續努力處；甚至反轉公平法第19條至20條機制。另因我國政經倚重國際貿易，競爭法漸成非關稅貿易障礙，特進行國際法可能趨勢解析，探索契約與合作所蘊商業理性與商業考量(commercial consideration)，希望依WTO規則甚至國際私法對契約普世效力，各國競爭法與他國彼此導正，降低執法差異，化解或避免貿易障礙。 基此研究成果，本文提出整體公平法與公平法執法政策具體建議，主張應檢討我國安全港解釋令並修改建立適當篩選器，利用合作架構價值變化與動態發展等特徵，提出聯合結合互通共用機制且合併於聯合行為簡易審查程序草案加以處理，希望適當建立退場機制，強調廖義男教授草擬公平法當初所倡導競爭規則理念，包括主管機關主動產業調查與公私專業輔導，最後建議法院與公平會建立時代當下妥適篩選器過濾巨量案件，降低寒蟬效應，並試圖提出具體流程建議。 本文提出結論，競爭反義詞並非合作。合作同義詞也非聯合，確有「好的合作」，僅求寇讎般相殘原子型競爭恐不符產業訊息變化快速挑戰，最後呼籲者便係，立法從寬，執法從嚴。

This Doctoral Disertation dicsusses the Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial Competition, a refreshed perspectives from the interoperability of the Independent Power Plants( hereunder refered as “IPPs”) and their related cartel cases in Taiwan. In the case of concerted action( hereunder also referred as cartel case) by IPPs in Taiwan, courts and lawyers continually faced situations in which the regulatory authority promoted competition to an extreme degree, sometimes even conflicting with Power Purchase Agreements ( hereunder refered as PPA), and Taipower’s dispatch operations. Ultimately, the Supreme Administrative Court encouraged contract amendments to foster competition, declaring that “competition always prevails over contracts(PPA)” This paper seeks to address unresolved issues following the final and confirmed judicial conclusion of the above mentioned administrative litigations and attempts to construct a theoretical framework to critically examine the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgement. This study directly engages the question: “Under competition law, does competition always override contracts/agreement?” Using the aforementioned power generation industry as a restarting example, in this special sector, all members collectively design contracts to maintain supply-demand order in IPPs industries. The key question is whether abstract competition can intervene to alter this man-made order of the very special power-generation industry in Taiwan. To enhance research observability, this paper adopts a “cooperate first, compete later” framework of mutually beneficial symbiosis, allowing observation of competition emerging as a premise of cooperation. Under these special conditions, restricting cooperation is equivalent to restricting competition; therefore, competition law should not interfere with such cooperative (contractual) arrangements, as doing so would harm competition itself. Preliminary analysis suggests that the concerted action by IPPs demonstrates the conception of a broad interoperability. Drawing on international enforcement experiences, then, the study seeks additional examples and applies inductive-deductive reasoning, subjective verification, and self-reflection to construct a theoretical foundation. The resulting framework is termed as the Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial Competition Theory, which is then used to interpret current issues in competition law and tries to mitigate the chilling effect within the industries in Taiwan. Concrete recommendations are proposed for regulatory rules and Taiwan Fair Trade Commission enforcement. The author personally handled case data, analyzing 17 examples of Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial competition to identify characteristics. Research methods include legal empirical research, literature review, inductive reasoning, and comparative study. In addition to examining enforcement experiences in the U.S., Europe, Germany, and Japan, the collected data spans over a century, encompassing both traditional and technological industries. Through these examples, the study aims to verify that cooperative competition is not only compatible but can be mutually beneficial. This particular type of competition is defined as “Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial Competition.” The study finds that, as economic law, competition law requires regulatory flexibility and must continually adapt to industrial evolution. Rapid technological development has transformed industries, and if the scope of concerted action is interpreted too rigidly under Taiwan Fair Trade law, doubts about continued cooperation may arise. Excessive rigidity and strict interpretation of competition may freeze the competitive mindset, rendering the law ill-equipped to address technological challenges. Cooperation and competition are not mutually exclusive. Strict, inflexible enforcement can eliminate high-value cooperative arrangements and ultimately undermine competition, producing a seriours chilling effect in Taiwan. Drawing on enforcement experience from the U.S., EU, Germany, and Japan, as well as domestic judgments and case studies, this paper uncovers special forms of competitive behavior emerging from industrial cooperation. Observing cooperative-competitive interactions over a century, multiple examples are collected to support the argument for Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial competition and to construct the corresponding theory. This paper begins with the unique litigation of the said IPPs cartel cases and Taiwan’s extremely special power generation framework. It validates broad interoperability, analyzes how industry-specific contracts stimulate competition, and investigates the interaction between competition and cooperation to uncover additional instances of “beneficial cooperation” across industries. Next, the study examines U.S., EU, German, and Japanese experiences in enforcing the competition law over a century, observing cooperative-competitive interactions. It highlights the dynamic nature of Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial competition and advocates for public-private collaboration models. For example, U.S. legal and academic practices over a century have continually moderated the overly strict Sherman Act rules (particularly during Roosevelt’s New Deal regulatory monopolies in 1930s), showing that cooperative competition can be integrated. Germany, in response to industrial changes, even mandated cartel formation in the 1930s, while today using general clauses and block exemption mechanisms to accommodate cooperation. The EU continuously reviews pre-notification, relaxed block exemptions, and statutory exceptions to balance competition and cooperation. Japan emphasizes dialogue with enterprises and dynamic regulatory observation, as noted in academic discussions by Professor Yinan Liao. Easterbrook (1984) is particularly respected for calling attention to integrating framework of cooperation and competition. Competition law historically eliminates “bad cooperation,” but in rapidly evolving industries, it is now time to protect “Good Cooperation.”(nearly a conception as Good Cartel) under the Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act, enacted over 30 years ago, can draw on these international experiences and be further refined where necessary. Public law can strengthen private autonomy, and vice versa, the private law can mitigate and/or soften the harshness of public law , aiding the fulfillment of Taiwan Fair Trade Law’s regulatory objectives. Based on these observations, this paper collects examples to verify the universality of the theory, explaining its structural implications and constructing Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial Competition Theory. It then engages in dialogue with academic literature and provides practical procedural suggestions for enforcement. Research findings indicate that competition can be human-designed and regulated. Enforcement must distinguish between macro and micro perspectives: macro enforcement relies on economic analysis, while micro enforcement emphasizes heuristics and case-specific factual conditions. In highly controlled competitive environments, human decision-making, coordinated regulation, and interoperability tools are essential to achieving competition law objectives. Within a Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial framework, contractual consensus or self-governing rules constitute the industry’s transactional order, requiring cooperation to stimulate competition. This challenges the traditional assumption that “competition always prevails over contracts.” The study also notes that Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission( hereunder referred as TFTC) has long applied principles to the financial sector, and the 2025 TFTC’s Sustainable Enterprise Guidelines reflect these principles. Drawing on these findings, the paper proposes Symbiotic and Mutually Beneficial Competition Theory to interpret pressing competition law issues, mitigate chilling effects, and address joint ventures, shared use, and safe harbor mechanisms. To validate practical applicability, the study extends from private power plants to the entire power generation sector, analyzing market definition, competition, relative dominance, hostile takeover regulations, commercial districts, and penal cases in various industries, as well as ESG regulations for sustainability. It also considers potential revisions of Articles 19–20 of the Taiwan Fair Trade Act. Given Taiwan’s reliance on international trade, competition law increasingly intersects with non-tariff barriers. The paper further analyzes international trends, commercial reasoning in contracts, and aligns domestic law with WTO/GATT rules and international private law to reduce enforcement discrepancies and avoid trade barriers. Based on these results, the paper proposes comprehensive policy recommendations for Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act and enforcement practices. It advocates reviewing safe harbor interpretations, establishing appropriate screening mechanisms, leveraging cooperative framework dynamics, implementing joint-use and interoperable mechanism of M&A and cartel review rules in Taiwan by establishing a new Simplified Review Procedures for the cartel cases, and ensuring exit strategies. It emphasizes principles originally advocated by Taiwan Professor of Law, Yinan Liao, including proactive industry investigation and public-private professional guidance. Taiwan Courts and the TFTC are encouraged to develop timely screening mechanisms to filter excessive cases and reduce chilling effects. In conclusion, competition is not the opposite of cooperation, and cooperation is not synonymous with concerted action. “Good cooperation” (as above, nearly a conception as “ Good Cartel“ ) exists, and purely adversarial, atomistic competition is very probably ill-suited to the rapid pace of industry change. Ultimately, legislative interpretation should be flexible while enforcement should remain rigorous.