實力原則下的經營權爭議三角

Abstract

經營權爭議是公司長期運作中難以避免的問題，使經營權爭議正常化、合法化，並對紛爭提供有效解決方案，是公司治理中最重要的問題之一。基於我國實力派股東主導經營權的現實，本文以「實力原則」為基礎，對現有制度進行分析，並嘗試提出建議。 首先，公司法採取強制累積投票制，其不僅是對少數股東的保障機制，更是實力派股東參與經營權分配的正當性基礎，因此，於公司法各項制度的解釋與適用，亦應與「保障實力派股東參與經營權分配之合理期待」相互呼應，才能使制度的適用具備一致性，避免法律適用的結果彼此矛盾。 於此前提下，本文認為「累積投票制」、「股東會召集權」、「表決權拘束契約」三者可以在「實力原則」的命題下和諧運作。本文主張，公司法賦與監督機關與少數股東的股東會召集權，其真正的目的，乃是使公司內部的實力派股東，有機會透過召集權的行使，改變現有經營結構，並使逸脫股權比例的經營結構，有機會依照累積投票制重組，使經營權分配重新回歸股東的真實意願，如過度壓制召集權行使，不僅將違背對實力派股東應有之保障，更將阻礙控制權市場的有效運作，不利於公司利益。同時，將實力原則導入表決權拘束契約後，可以解決其與累積投票制間產生的衝突，應允許實力派股東之間締結表決權拘束契約，依其持股比例分配經營權，從而降低董事選任的衝突與不確定性，並解決因股權變動導致的經營權爭議。

Control contests are an unavoidable issue in the long-term operation of companies. Normalizing and legitimizing control contests, and providing effective solutions for disputes, are among the most crucial issues in corporate governance. Based on the reality of blockholders dominating corporate control in Taiwan, this article, building on the "Blockholder-Centric principle," analyzes the existing system and attempts to offer suggestions. First, the Company Law adopts mandatory cumulative voting. This is not only a protection mechanism for minority shareholders but also the legitimate basis for blockholders to participate in the allocation of corporate control. Therefore, the interpretation and application of various systems in Company Law should align with the "reasonable expectation of safeguarding blockholders' participation in the allocation of corporate control" to ensure consistency in the application of the system and prevent contradictory legal outcomes. Under this premise, this article believes that cumulative voting, the right to convene shareholder meetings, and voting agreements can operate harmoniously under the "Blockholder-Centric principle." This article argues that the true purpose of the Company Law granting the right to convene shareholder meetings to supervisory bodies and minority shareholders is to allow blockholders within the company an opportunity to change the existing management structure through the exercise of this right. This enables management structures that deviate from the shareholding proportion to be reorganized according to cumulative voting, thereby realigning the allocation of corporate control with the true will of the shareholders. Overly suppressing the exercise of the right to convene shareholder meetings would not only violate the proper protection of blockholders but also hinder the effective operation of the market for control, which is detrimental to the company's interests. Concurrently, by incorporating the Blockholder-Centric principle into voting agreements, conflicts between these agreements and cumulative voting can be resolved. Blockholders should be permitted to enter into voting agreements among themselves to allocate corporate control based on their shareholding proportion, thereby reducing conflicts and uncertainties in director elections and resolving control contests arising from changes in shareholding.