http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/55 Mon, 09 Mar 2026 03:02:57 GMT 2026-03-09T03:02:57Z http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/84792 標題: 黨國體制下的廣播事業：以中國廣播公司為中心（1928-1976）; Broadcasting Enterprise under the Party-State System: The Story of the Broadcasting Corporation of China（1928-1976） 作者: Pei-Lun Hung; 洪珮倫 摘要: 　　中廣公司以黨營事業之姿，長久以來獲配有大量廣播頻率，在肩負「反共抗俄」政治任務的同時，也是執政者進行特定意識形態灌輸的重要傳播媒體。本文將追溯至黨營廣播事業創立之時，依照時序逐步描繪出在黨國體制下中廣公司透過什麼樣的法律手段或方法來確立其特權地位。 1929年，由國民政府所公布的《電信條例》，明定交通部為廣播事業之主管機關。然而，在「黨高於國」的訓政體制下，憑藉著國家資源所逐漸擴展的黨營電台，實際上是由黨所自行管理、經營。1936年，國民黨於黨內成立中央廣播事業指導委員會，由同屬黨機關的中央廣播事業管理處主導廣播節目的事前審查，並透過交通部公布一系列法規，一步步將公、民營廣播電台直接納入黨的管制之下。 戰時，黨政關係產生重大改變。從中央廣播事業指導委員會的會議紀錄，可以瞭解此時期該委員會的組織變動和具體運作，以及交通部逐漸被黨機關侵奪職權，使廣播事業形成全面「黨管化」的過程。戰後，國民黨依循戰時的運作模式，由中央廣播事業管理處接管絕大部分的廣播電台。為了因應憲政，維持中央廣播事業管理處獨占廣播事業的現狀，國民黨最終選擇將其改組為中廣公司，以民營之姿與政府簽約，由黨牢牢掌控廣播這項傳播媒體。 在1976年《廣播電視法》公布之前，廣播事業的管制機構歷經多次變動，但一直是由立於國家體制之外的國民黨中央第四組控制著相關宣傳、管制事務。而中廣公司，就是前者最有力的執行工具。換言之，行憲後，為了鞏固威權統治，國民黨仍然訴諸訓政經驗，持續透過中廣公司獲取「不當」政治利益。在適用轉型正義法律之前，若能先確實掌握過去，將有助於釐清未來需要進一步推動的方向。; 　　Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC), as a party-owned enterprise, has been obtained control of numerous radio frequencies for a long time. While BCC carrying out a mission of 'Opposing Communism and Fighting Soviet Russia', it is also an important mass media to indoctrinate loyalty to the KMT and Chinese patriotism. This thesis will date back to the establishment of the party-owned broadcasting enterprise, and gradually describe the legal means or methods through which the BCC establishes its privileged status under the party-state system. In 1929, the Telecommunications Act promulgated by the National Government clearly defined the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC) as the competitive authority of broadcasting enterprises. However, under the political tutelage system, the party-owned broadcasting stations gradually expanded with national resources are actually managed and operated by the KMT itself. In 1936, the KMT established the Central Broadcasting Steering Committee (CBSC) within the party. The priority restraint of the radio programs led by the Central Broadcasting Administration (CBA), which is also a party organ. After that, CBSC published a series of regulations through MOTC, and gradually brought other public and private broadcasting stations directly under the control of the KMT. 　　During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the party-government relationship underwent major changes. From the meeting minutes of CBSC, we can find the organizational changes and specific operations of the committee during this period, as well as the MOTC's gradual encroachment of power by the CBSC, and the process of comprehensive 'party control' of the broadcasting enterprises. In 1945, the KMT followed the mode of operation during the war, allowing the CBA to take over most of the broadcasting stations. In order to respond to the constitution and maintain the status quo of CBA's exclusive broadcasting enterprise, the KMT finally chose to reorganize CBA into BCC. After that, the BCC has contracted with the government to keep the KMT firmly control the broadcasting media. 　　Before the Radio and Television Act was promulgated in 1976, the competent authority of the broadcasting enterprises had undergone many changes. However, the KMT Central Fourth Division, which was established outside the national system, had always been in control of broadcasting publicity and regulatory affairs, and the BCC is the most favorable execution tool for the former. In other words, after the day the constitution was ratified, the KMT still obtains unfair political benefits through BCC to consolidate its authoritarian regime. Before applying the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, get hold of the past first, it will help clarify the direction that needs to be further promoted in the future. Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/84792 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/7136 標題: 「黨」人財路——台灣的黨產處理脈絡及實質法治國原則之實踐; Settling the Ill-gotten Party Assets and the Application of “Materieller Rechtsstaat” in Taiwan 作者: Yih-Shiou Song; 宋易修 摘要: 作為第三波民主化中的一員，台灣歷經無數血淚才終於走過威權統治，進入民主政治。然而，過往的威權統治陰霾卻未隨著台灣步入民主而徹底消散，肇因於過往施行威權統治之手段以及由威權政黨所主導的民主化進程，在台灣民主政治外觀之下的，是政黨間天差地遠的財力差距，此種差距為過往的威權政黨——中國國民黨——提供了相當有利的競爭優勢。如何處理此種可說是威權遺緒的政黨間財力差距，即為黨產處理一路以來所面對的難題。 本文之研究重點為黨產處理的論理演變，以及現今黨產處理論理的正當性。在第一章介紹完本文的研究動機、問題意識及文章架構後，於第一章的最後本文擬先行介紹黨產處理背後的理論基礎，即德國法上的實質法治國原則。接著本文於第二章探討台灣過往的威權統治態樣、民主化進程、以及國民黨不當黨產的形成，為後續的黨產處理討論提供黨產問題複雜性來源的前提認知。本文認為，中國國民黨過往所採取的統治方式，為以列寧主義傾向的政黨為主體，遂行對國家的控制，並以排他式國家統合主義為方針遂行對社會的控制。在此種統治方式下，中國國民黨藉由接收日產、佔用國有財產、國庫通黨庫、黨營事業、強徵人民財產等5種方式累積了大量的不義資產。 接著本文以政黨及其附隨組織不當取得財產處理條例（下稱黨產條例）的施行為界，於第三章探討黨產條例施行前的黨產處理經驗，此處之重點為以相關判決為重心，歸納過往進行黨產處理時所遭遇的論理上障礙。本文認為黨產處理的呼聲雖始終存在，但直至第1次政黨輪替後，才出現較為具體的成果。即便如此，成果仍十分有限，主要以司法訴訟途徑的追討黨產為主，而透過觀察相關判決，本文發現以既有的一般法律架構評價、處理不當黨產，會遭遇物權移轉合法性的限制、形式法律關係上的限制、法院尊重行政機關的判斷、機關同一性的限制等4種法律論理上的限制。第四章整理黨產條例施行後，黨產處理的論理路徑，以不當黨產處理委員會召開的聽證、做出的處分為重心，歸納黨產條例通過後黨產處理的論理路徑。本文透過整理前述資料，發現上開第三章所整理出來的法律論理上限制，仍持續出現在現今黨產處理相對人一方的辯護說詞中。而黨產會在面對此等困境時，則以「將過往威權統治的脈絡納入考量因素」為基礎進行黨產處理的論理，此種路徑有效突破了前述種種法律論理上的限制。 第五章回歸台灣的脈絡，討論以實質法治國原則作為黨產處理的理論基礎，在我國是否具備憲法正當性，並從憲法規範意旨、台灣的現實脈絡兩個角度分別觀察。本文認為我國除憲法上確寓有對政黨間競爭機會均等的保障外，更重要的是肇因於過往威權統治的中國國民黨黨產，確實造成了台灣各政黨競爭機會上的不均等。從而，黨產會以「實質法治國原則」為基礎，在黨產處理上所發展出來的法律論理，確實具備憲法上的正當性。最後以第六章作結。; Despite of the democratization, the legacy of unjust past never fade away with the authoritarian regime including the ill-gotten party assets. Due to the ill-gotten party assets, there’s still a huge gap of party assets between KMT—the ruling party of the authoritarian in the past—and others, which provides the enormous advantage to KMT. It’s a serious problem we the Taiwanese nowadays must face and confront. Doubtless, it won’t be a easy task. This thesis focuses on the numerous methods for settling the ill-gotten party assets by the time. And also, this thesis focuses on the method used to settle the ill-gotten party assets now and its constitutionality. First of all, I’ll introduce the basic theory in settling the ill-gotten party assets. It’s a theory from Germany called “Materieller Rechtsstaat”. Then in chapter 2, I bring out the discussion about the authoritarian regime in the past in Taiwan. The main idea of chapter 2 is to clarify how did KMT ruling the island by controlling both the R.O.C government and Taiwanese society. Besides that, i also discuss about the process of democratization in Taiwan. It’s the first step to figure out the appearance of ill-gotten party assets. I claim that KMT is the kind of party so called “quasi-leninist party”. It controls the R.O.C government through this feature. Furthermore, it controls the Taiwanese society in the direction of “exclusionary and preemptive corporatism”. By doing so, KMT is able to accumulate the astonishing rich, which is also known as ill-gotten party assets. In chapter 3, I introduce the method used in settling ill-gotten party assets before the implementation of “The Act Governing the Settlement of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations”. In that period, the main method was to sue through the civil procedural. Unfortunately, it confronted some obstructions. In that case, the point in this chapter is to clarify what kind of obstruction we will confront if we only settle the ill-gotten party assets by the normal regulations which already exist like past. For that purpose, I review all the judgments of that civil procedurals and induct four kind of obstructions from that cases. In chapter 4, I introduce the method used in present, which is based on the special regulation for settling ill-gotten party assets called ”The Act Governing the Settlement of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations”. To induct the feature of present method, I review all the hearing records and the administrative disciplinary measures made by “Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee”. By doing so, I find that in order to overcome the obstructions presented in old period, “Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee” takes the substantial recognition method and it do resolve the problems. In chapter 5, I ‘ll discuss about the constitutionality of the application of “Materieller Rechtsstaat”, I try to clarify the origin of this theory and compare the background of Germany to Taiwan’s. I find that Taiwan face the same problem as in Germany, which is to embrace the authoritarian ruling party in the past into democracy. To protect the equal competition between parties, some measures must be adopted, like settling the ill-gotten party assets. Based on the goal above, I strongly claim that the protection of equal competition between parties is one of the idea contained in our Constitution. Besides that, there is already an unfair competition between parties in Taiwan now. In conclusion, I claim that the present method in settling the ill-gotten party assets is constitutional in Taiwan. In the last, I conclude all the statements in chapter 6. Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/7136 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/79584 標題: 默示分管契約之研究; A Research on Implied Separate-Management Contract 作者: Tsan-Hung Hsieh; 謝璨鴻 摘要: 　　實務上涉及分管契約之案件數量繁多，處理上亦存有諸多爭議，而就現今學說之討論觀之，其探討者多聚焦於分管契約之效力。惟近來30年，實務上亦發展出「默示分管契約」之概念，就此概念之要件設定以及適用情形，至今仍未形成統一之判定標準，其概念本身之妥適性與必要性亦有可待討論之處，然學說上少見就此部分之詳細探討，實有整理說明之必要。故本文主要以「默示分管契約」為探討主軸，並以我國實務判決作為討論核心，透過蒐集最高法院針對默示分管契約所為之相關判決，進行整理分析研究，並從中歸納出最高法院對此概念之建構過程，就相關理論基礎進行討論分析。 　　本文於第二章中，先就共有之概念為前置性介紹，並整體說明我國現今就共有所採之「分別共有」與「公同共有」之法律規範制度。第三章則進入分管契約基本理論之介紹，首先就分管契約之意義予以檢討，學說、實務上對分管契約之定義要件各有偏重，依本文所見，應以「共有人間約定各自分別就共有物之特定部分而為管理之契約」作為定義較為恰當。接續為成立與性質之討論，分管契約之成立首重於全體共有人之合意，其成立方法並無要式性要求，亦不以占有為其成立要件，且以明示或默示方法成立均無不可；而性質上，本文認為分管契約為一債權契約，屬於共有物管理契約子類型之其一，且同時兼有用益歸屬分配契約與不分割協議之特性。在分管契約之效力檢討上，歷來判決實務與司法解釋均肯認其於特定情形中，得對第三人發揮效力，於民國98年更修訂民法第826條之1規定，將分管契約之效力規定明文化；惟本文認為現行法就動產之規定仍以第三人是否知悉或可得而知作為對第三人發生效力之對抗要件，欠缺一明確公示方法，該要件並不足以作為效力突破相對性之依據，現今規範模式實有不妥；此外，除卻民法規定外，公寓大廈管理條例之修訂亦對其效力產生影響，實務因應標的不同區分其適用，亦致使分管契約於適用範圍上有所分流。在分管契約與專用權約定概念之比較討論中，本文認為功能上雖存有相似之處，惟自適用主體、客體、成立方式、生效要件與用途等面向觀察，兩者均存有差異，實應將其視為各自獨立之法律概念，而非將專用權約定歸類於分管契約之下位類型。 　　本文第四章則對於默示分管契約之發展概況與其理論基礎進行整理分析。就默示分管契約之實務發展概況，本文分別自發展時序與類型建立兩面向切入，時序發展上，本文爬梳整理最高法院歷來就默示分管契約所為之判決，將其依實務上發展歷程時序，區分為否定階段、濫觴、猶豫階段、發展階段、擴充階段以及現今實務所處之限縮階段。而在類型建立上，本文認為可將其分為區分所有建物案件與土地案件，兩者不僅在適用標的不同，在實務歷程上之出現時點、發展趨勢，亦或是實務認定成立之標準寬嚴，其間亦存在差異。而在默示分管契約之理論基礎分析上，實務就此概念之建構是將其定性為契約，並認定相關事實構成默示方法予以適用。惟本文自「默示方法」、「契約」概念予以分析探討，認為在學理上分管契約並無法由默示方法所成立；且在實際適用上，實務本即可透過既有明示分管契約之概念妥適處理相關案件；故實務上額外創設默示分管契約之概念，依本文所見，實欠缺學理上妥適性與適用上必要性。 Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/79584 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71936 標題: 高齡者財產監護制度—以美國法為借鏡; Property Custody for the Elderly from the Perspective of Legal Regimes in the United States 作者: Nien-Leng Hsu; 徐念稜 摘要: 現今醫療與科技不斷的進步，人類的平均壽命逐年增加，我國已於2018年正式邁入「高齡社會」（aged society），並預計於2026年轉為「超高齡社會」（hyper-aged society）。協助判斷能力減弱或喪失之高齡者進行財產管理，顯然已成為一項非常重要之課題。 我國目前對判斷能力減弱或喪失之高齡者的保護措施僅有法定監護一種方式。高齡者經法院監護宣告後，由法院選定之監護人，代本人為意思表示，處理本人身上及財產上事務。惟目前實務上，法院多以本人之家屬擔任監護人，且選任監護人時很少詢問本人之意見，此一作法不夠尊重高齡者之自主決定權，且被選任之家屬監護人未必熟悉及善於管理財產事務。基於尊重本人自主決定權之觀點，我國立法院於2015年提出意定監護制度之草案，法務部亦於2016年作成意定監護制度之草案。希冀藉由意定監護之導入，讓高齡者為將來判斷能力減弱或喪失時，能夠依照自己之意願及期待來安排身上照護及財產管理。另一方面，信託具有意思凍結之功能，當高齡者將財產交付信託後，信託財產理論上不會受委託人意思能力喪失或死亡等情勢所影響而有所影響，受託人將繼續依照信託目的管理或處分信託財產，故信託也是高齡者規劃能力喪失後的財產管理事務之良好工具。 本文考察了美國持續性代理權授與制度（Durable Power of Attorney），此為民眾廣泛使用之監護替代制度。其優點在於手續簡便且費用低廉，高齡者可於喪失能力前與代理人簽訂持續性代理權授與契約，並約定立即生效或當高齡者喪失能力時始生效，並由代理人代理本人管理本人之財產。此外，另一種監護替代方式為監護信託（Custodial Trust）。以信託制度作為監護之替代，能讓高齡委託人之意思，延伸至高齡者日後喪失能力或死亡後繼續管理財產。亦即，高齡者在喪失能力前保有對信託財產之實質控制權，待其喪失能力時，轉為裁量信託，由受託人為其利益管理信託財產。 我國法現行法中，高齡者一旦有判斷能力減弱或喪失之情況，僅有受法定監護或輔助宣告一途，未來預計引進之意定監護，亦是以受監護宣告為前提。綜觀美國成年監護制度，若高齡者在喪失能力前已預先規劃好監護替代措施，則不得開啟法定監護程序，此作法更能尊重高齡者本人之意思決定權，值得贊同。若要防止親屬監護人濫權，並有效地保護受監護宣告人之財產，可望採取監護與信託結合之方式。此外，也應加強對法院及一般（無論是法定或意定）監護人的成年監護相關培訓課程，藉由設立教育課程，以提升監護人倫理意識。; With the improvement of medical and scientific technology, the average life expectancy of human beings has increased year by year. Taiwan has officially entered the 'aged society' in 2018, and is expected to become a 'hyper-aged society' in 2026. Therefore, the management of property for elderly people with incapacity has become an important issue. At present, legal custody is the only way for the protection for elderly people with incapacity. After the elderly has declared by the court, the guardian selected by the court will act as the person to handle all the affairs of the person, including the person’s property. However, in practice, the court often appoints the family member of the person as the guardian, and rarely asks for the person’s opinion when appointing the guardian but this practice does not respect the elderly’s decision, and the appointed guardian may not be familiar with and good at managing property affairs. Based on the respect of the right of the elderly’s decision, the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan proposed a draft of the voluntary custody in 2015; the Ministry of Justice also made a draft of the voluntary custody in 2016. It is hoped that the introduction of the voluntary custody will enable the elderly to arrange care and property management according to their own wishes and expectations when incapacity. On the other hand, the trust has the function of maintain one’s decision. In theory, when the elderly person delivers the property to the trust, the trust property will not be affected by the death or incapacity of the settlor. The trustee will continue to manage the trust property according to the purpose of the trust. Therefore, the trust is also a good tool for property management affairs for the elderly who is incapacity. This paper examines the US Durable Power of Attorney, which is an alternative to guardianship that is widely used by the public. The procedure is simple and inexpensive. The elderly person can make a Durable Power of Attorney with the agent before incapacity, appointing the agreement is effective immediately or when the elderly person is incapacitated, and let the agent act as the person himself to manage the person’s property. Furthermore, another alternative to guardianship is the Custodial Trust. The use of the trust system as an alternative to custody can extend the meaning of the senior settlor who wish to continue to manage the property after being incapacitated or dying in the future. That is, the elderly person retains the substantive control over the trust property before the incapacity, and when he is incapacitated, it will convert into a discretionary trust, and the trustee manages the trust property for the elderly person’s benefit. In the current status of Taiwan's law, once the elderly is incapacity, they are only subject to legal custody or commencement of assistantship. The voluntary custody which will be introduced in the future is also premised on the commencement of guardianship. Looking at the adult guardianship system in the United States, if the elderly has pre-planned the alternatives to guardianship before they are incapacity, the legal guardianship procedure would not be open. Hence, it is more respectful to the self-determination of the elderly. In order to prevent the guardian from abusing the power, and effectively protect the person’s property, it is expected to adopt a combination of custody and trust. In addition, adult-related training courses for courts and general (whether legal or voluntary) guardians should be strengthened to enhance the ethical awareness of guardians by setting up educational courses. In the United States, whether it is a Durable Power of Attorney or a Custodial Trust, it has the function of circumventing legal custody. However, as the current status of Taiwan’s law, once the elderly becomes incapacity, in any case requires the involvement of public authority. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the strength of the public authority intervention in Taiwan's voluntary custody system from the perspective of comparative law, by observing the US Durable Power of Attorney and Custodial Trust system, and to explore the future difficulties and challenges in Taiwan if we want to combine the guardianship system with the trust system. Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71936 2018-01-01T00:00:00Z