國立臺灣大學社會科學院新聞研究所

碩士論文

Graduate Institute of Journalism

National Taiwan University

Master Thesis

民粹主義與政治傳播：分析 2020 年總統大選候選人臉書

Populism and Political Communication on Facebook:

2020 Taiwan Presidential Election

江玟

Wen Chiang

指導教授：劉好迪 博士

Advisor: Adrian Rauchfleisch, Ph.D.

中華民國 111 年 01 月

January 2022

摘要

　　本研究關注到 2020 年台灣總統大選下，中國國民黨候選人韓國瑜掀起的「韓流」時常被媒體、與論拿來與民粹主義相提議論，然而民粹主義的定義在學術界仍是一個具爭議的概念，西方國家下的民粹主義是否適合套用到台灣的政治語境？以此為問題意識，此研究旨在以 2020 年台灣總統大選為背景，從政治人物在社群媒體上的發文內容去爬梳且重新審視台灣的民粹主義。本研究蒐集四位總統候選人及三個參選政黨從 2019 年 12 月 10 日到 2020 年 1 月 10 日的臉書發文，各自共 266 篇及 407 篇內容，以量化研究結合內容分析法進行探討，驗證出韓國瑜的確是所有候選人當中，民粹傾向最高的政治候選人；本研究也比較其他候選人在競選期間如何採用類似的民粹主義傳播策略，最後研究也發現相較於西方國家的民粹主義討論，台灣在自身政治歷史前提下，確實發展出不太相同的民粹主義定義。


關鍵字：民粹主義、與論理論、網路政治傳播、社群媒體、內容分析

Abstract

The 2020 presidential election in Taiwan brought us to revisit the discussion of populism. Through mass media's report on politician's speeches, debates, or talks during the election, Han Kuo-yu was described as a populist with high support from his diehard supporters. However, populism is still a contested concept with ongoing debate of its definition in the academic. In this study, we combined quantitative research with content analysis to examine populism in Taiwan with a careful and deductive approach along with the inclusion of the use of social media. Collecting from prior empirical studies, we adapted and proposed a codebook and measurement for populism. From the research result, we came to the conclusion that Han is proven to be a populist politician among all the candidates. The findings also gave a closer look on how the other candidates applied similar populist communication strategies during the election campaign. The finding also indicates that the difference in political mechanisms might be the reason why the dimension of popular sovereignty is almost absent in our analysis.

Keyword: populism; discourse theory; online political communication; social media; content analysis

目錄 Index

表目錄 Table Index

I. Introduction

The role of social media has become more and more important during elections in recent years. Nowadays, many politicians realize the power of social media and are using platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter, as election campaign tools. In Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, each of the three candidates created their own Facebook page. The blooming landscape of social media has changed the traditional political communication for politicians as they now can communicate directly with their audiences. According to Tang's (2013) study of politicians' Facebook management during the 2012 election, he noticed that politicians often exchange and discuss policies through the social media platform in order to strengthen their relationship with their constituency. They would also adjust their policies based on suggestions from their Facebook page as response and interaction. However, according to prior research (Ernst et al., 2017, 2019), scholars find social media are also a good place to foster potential populist communication.

Populism, as a political phenomenon, has become a global topic. In an article published by Foreign Policy, Nachman (2020) pointed out that the rise of populism around the world could be observed from "the continued support for Donald Trump in the U.S. and the growth and success of Brexit and the election of Boris Johnson." Political scientists began to wonder if democracy was defeated and populism was rising. However, with all the chameleon-like characteristics of populism, the definition can be quite ambiguous and different in different political contexts. In the ongoing debate about populism, it is still an 'essentially contested concept' as scholars diverge on its specific attributes and primary domain (Weyland, 2001). Populism is conceived in many different conceptualizations, for example, as a thin-ideology, discourse, a political communication style, a strategy, or a mode of mobilization (Bonikowski, 2016;

1

Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019).

During Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, the television policy debates circled around two themes: the cross-Strait relations and ethics and integrity (嚴, 2019). From the policy perspective, the election was polarized and the agenda was in confusion. According to an interview in *The Reporter* (嚴, 2019), political science Professor Shen commented on the debates as "lacking of International political views and future governance vision." Shen considered the Kuomintang candidate, Han Kuo-yu, an inspiring speaker who yet failed to give direct answers about his policies in the cross-examination session.

From the fact-checking perspective, one commentary (陳, 2020) criticized that Han talked through his hat and neglected what the truth was. For example, in the media question session, the deputy chief editor from China Times asked candidates to address their policies on national defense. Han, instead of answering the question, took the chance to accuse Tsai Ing-wen's administration of being corrupt, and criticized that "without clean politics, there is no honest governance" (Taiwan Fact Check Center, 2019). However, the fact-check report (Taiwan Fact Check Center, 2019) conducted by Taiwan Fact Check Center later showed that Han made baseless claims and false analogies more than other candidates.

During this election, many media described Han as a populist who is followed by his diehard supporters - known as "Han Wave" (Campbell, 2020). Nathan Batto (2019), an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, wrote about his observation of the election on his blog. Batto explained why he thought Han fit the quality of a populist by giving a definition of populism from political theorist Jans-Werner Mueller who said "populism is an exclusionary form of identity politics

that tends to threaten the very notion of democracy" (Müller, 2017, pp. 50-60). In his blog, Batto (2019) explained the concept of populism as "a way of framing political competition as a moral question."

By using text mining analysis, *The Reporter* (柯 & 許, 2020) covered a story comparing both DPP and KMT candidates' political rhetoric. They analyzed four strategies of Han's rhetoric. First, Han frequently blamed the opponent as unvirtuous, incompetent and obsessed with power. Second, Han laid emphasis on how he was falsely slandered and by self-mocking, raised empathy from his voters. Third, from his speech, Han tried to build his self-image as someone who is compassionate and understanding because he had been through tough times and could relate to the hard-working people. Last, the article pointed out that Han used a lot of catchy and rhyming metaphors that are easy to understand and remember. The result revealed the characteristics of Han Kuo-yu's political language and was related to Batto's conclusion.

By questioning the opponent's ethics and accusing the opponent of being a corrupt elite, Han shaped the politics into a moral investigation. Moreover, Han's colloquial language that tried to get closer to the voters created an antithesis among society. From Batto's point of view, the result of the analysis came to a similar conclusion.

With the advance of social media platforms such as Facebook that have changed the political communication during elections (Bobba, 2019; Bronstein, 2013; Ernst et al., 2017; Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015), it's necessary to see how the Taiwanese politicians and parties use and manage their Facebook pages as one of their campaign tools. In the emerging hybrid media environment, social media provides politicians with a new communication approach to promote themselves. These new communication possibilities and characteristics of social media also tangle with populism.

Since the American presidential elections in 2008, Barack Obama set a precedent

by successfully taking social media platforms, such as Facebook and Myspace, as 2008 election campaign tools (Bimber, 2014). In Taiwan, prior research showed that Taiwanese politicians began to use social media as digital campaign tools in 2010 during the municipal elections (Chang & Wang, 2014). Scholars also looked into the Facebook management strategies of candidates' fan pages in order to observe whether adopting social media into campaign strategy has impact on the election outcomes (Lin, 2017; 王 et al., 2019; 高, 2011; 莊 & 金, 2019).

Wang (2013) pointed out in her research that the degree to which candidates use social media is not related to the possibility of voting. Instead, a positive correlation between befriending behavior and voting has been observed, which indicates that the more netizens befriend or join candidates' Facebook pages, the more likely they will go to vote. The results also explained why politicians now are eager to engage in Facebook in order to get closer to their potential voters (Wang, 2013, p. 32).

In the emerging hybrid media environment, social media provide politicians a new communication approach to promote themselves, especially as Facebook and Twitter have now become popular and mainstream media platforms that challenge traditional news media in reach and influence (Ernst et al., 2019). These new communication possibilities and characteristics of social media also wrestle with populism, a relevant but contested concept in political communication research (Weyland, 2001).

According to prior research, scholars identified characteristics of social media that foster the potential populist communication. Social media provide political actors direct access to communicate with their voters actively and personally without the journalistic gatekeepers (Bobba, 2019; Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2019). In addition to direct access to their voters, politicians are able to build close connections to the people and create a feeling of community and recognition. In this sense, political actors

through social media are more capable of expressing their ideology and messages (Engesser et al., 2017).

With the rising phenomenon of populism around the world, the discussion of populism became necessary. Looking back at the history of Taiwanese politics, Han is not the first and only politician to be. From the democratization time of Lee Teng-hui to his successor Chen Shui-bian, both were once criticized as populist. In this essay, we will inspect the history of populism in Taiwan before examining the recent election. In this research, we believe populism should be examined as a discourse and be understood in the Taiwanese social and political context. By properly defining what populism stands for, it's also important to analyze the political communication on Facebook during Taiwan's 2020 election under the concept of populism. Through content analysis, this essay hopes to:

1. Identify and measure populist communication in the 2020 presidential election.

2. Analyze whether social media encourage such populist communication during the 2020 presidential election.

3. Explore how politicians adopt populist communication strategy on their social media platform.

4. Is social media such as Facebook encouraging populism.

This essay also seeks to contribute a refined conceptualization and measurement of populism in future studies.

II. Literature Review

For the structure of the literature review, we will first discuss the misconception of populism by explaining how easily the concept of populism could be mistaken as an essentially contested concept and the problem leading to conceptual confusions. Second, we will introduce different conceptualizations of populism that are carried out in theory and empirical research. Third, we will further elaborate the ambiguity of populism that we brought up at the end of the first chapter. In order to answer the question from the previous chapter, we will introduce the methodological debate on how to conceptualize populism as an essentially contested concept and why researchers should pay attention to the conceptual overlap. Following this, we will then talk about the history of populism. In the end, we will introduce the relationship between social media and populism by presenting the empirical studies.

1. Fallacy of Populism

The phenomenon of populism is not new to politics in liberal democracies (Mudde, 2004). Populism is a disputed social science concept with an unsettled and ongoing debate about its definition (Wuttke et al., 2020; Taggart, 2000; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). For such a commonly used term, it is surprising how populism as a concept has found little agreement surrounding it (Taggart, 2000, p. 10). Weyland (2001) also pointed out that populism is an essentially contested concept. In social science, an essentially contested concept is introduced as a framework that consists of a set of interrelated criteria to illuminate important problems (Rauchfleisch, 2017). Scholars have argued not only over the specific and different attributes to populism, but also over its primary domain.

According to Mudde (2004), there are two dominant and instinctive interpretations of populism in public debate: demagogy and opportunism. In the first interpretation, populism implies "a highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the 'gut feelings' of the people" (Mudde, 2004, p. 542) In the second interpretation, populism refers to the opportunistic policies that intended to please the people/voters rather than look rationally for the 'best option.' (Mudde, 2004)

Despite the ongoing academic disagreement on its origin, content, and consequences, populism is a highly discussed political phenomenon in recent years around the world, and the term is widely used among the public, politicians, and the academic scholars. To illustrate the fallacy of populism, the term - 'Cinderella complex' was used by Allock (1971) who argued that:

There exists a shoe - the word 'populism' - for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering with the shoes; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism, its essence. (p. 385)

However, the casual use of the term 'populism' in analytical research might confuse what populism really is. According to Bonikowski's definition, contemporary radical politics consists of three elements: populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism (Bonikowski, 2017). However, the three concepts share certain qualities with each other that blur the boundaries, such as identity and expectations for governing style. Bonikowski explained that each of these concepts has its own logic of definition. The misinterpreting or overinterpreting of populism leads to the failure to recognize the phenomenon's causes and effects, and therefore to "downplaying the other co-

7

constitutive elements of radical right politics, particularly ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism" (Bonikowski, 2017, p. 182). Therefore, Bonikowski argued that it is important to draw analytical distinction between the three components. We will have a more comprehensive discussion in the later chapters.

2.　Different Ways of Conceptualizing Populism

In this chapter, according to Bonikowski's (2016) classification, we will explain and focus on the three dominant approaches to examine or measure populism in empirical researches: **(i) an ideology, (ii)a form of political discourse, and (iii) a strategy of political mobilization.**

Populism has been conceived in different ways in theory and empirical research when scholars take different positions to interpret, operationalize, and elaborate it (Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019). Some consider populism as thin ideology (Mudde, 2004), a discourse or discursive framework (Bonikowski, 2017; Hawkins, 2009; Aslanidis, 2016), a political communication style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), a strategy seeking to gain or maintain power (Pappas, 2012; Weyland, 2001), and a form of political mobilization (Jansen, 2011; Roberts, 2006).

Among many studies on populism, scholars find it difficult to illustrate all facets of populism through various examples in different spaces and time (Taggart, 2000). However, scholars find one feature in populism that explains the reason - its 'chameleonic' nature to "change face according to context and attach itself to full ideologies" (Aslanidis, 2016; Taggart, 2000).

Based on the conceptual variation, Bonikowski (2016) classified three dominant approaches to examine or measure populism in empirical research: (i) a strategy of political mobilization, (ii) an ideology, and (iii) a form of political discourse. However,

these research traditions are not mutually exclusive, but suggest different strategies of analysis for the study of populism. For instance, according to Jagers and Walgrave (2007), populism is a neutral political style adopted by all kinds of politicians. It is a strategy to mobilize political support as well as a communication approach formulating political claims to reach out to the voters (Bonikowski, 2017).

Since methods and theory are often closely related, the three approaches adopt different analytical strategies that prioritize different levels of analysis. If populism is an ideology, researchers should take the ideological approaches that tend to focus on party systems, "examining the changing configuration of electoral coalitions" (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 9). If populism is a mode of political mobilization, researchers should consider the relationship between political actors and their constituents within the patterns of power relations and look into the ability of populism to appeal to exclude 'the other' from the so called 'the people.' In the end, if populism is a mode of discourse, researchers should focus on the speech acts where "micro-level mechanisms that account for within-actor heterogeneity in populist rhetoric" should be investigated (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 9).

2.1 Populism as Thin Ideology

In this part, we introduce the current dominant theoretical paradigm in empirical studies that defines populism as a thin-centered ideology. Under this framework, scholars point out that populism as a thin ideology can be easily attached to other 'full' ideologies such as nationalism or socialism. However, the conceptual overlap might mislead the understanding of the essence of populism. According to Bonikowski (2016), the tradition of seeing populism as thin ideology has become the mainstream literature in Europe in the last decade. Many studies followed Mudde's (2004) framework with the well-known definition of populism as:

9

an (thin) ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. (p. 543)

In the case of populism, ideology here means a string of interrelated ideas that attach to the core - 'the people'. These ideas revolve around "the Manichean contrast between the corrupt elite and the morally pure people" (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 8).

Research on populism as an ideology often reads the textual materials closely, such as the party manifestos, to examine how political actors engage in populist appeal (Bonikowski, 2016). However, in many different case studies, populism, lacking "the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency as socialism or liberalism" (Mudde, 2004, p. 544), is not a complete ideology but a thin-centred ideology. In this case, scholars emphasize that "populism is not a complete worldview that offers consistent answers to a wide range of important political questions" (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 8).

The framework of thin-centred ideology - the current dominant theoretical paradigm in empirical studies (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017; Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Hameleers et al., 2017) - proposed by Canovan (2004) and Mudde (2004) draw from Michael Freeden's (1998) "morphological approach" on ideology (as cited in Aslanidis, 2016). According to Aslanidis, Freeden described a thin-centered ideology as "one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts", exhibiting "a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 89).

Aslanidis pointed out that Mudde (2004) further set forth the flexibility of populism. Aslanidis explained that populism has a "tendency to attach itself to other 'thick' or 'thin' host ideologies such as liberalism, communism, ecologism, nationalism, and socialism" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 89).

Just like Mudde stated in the analysis, the definition of populism is broad and open to many usages. Bonikowski, from the sociology perspective, addresses the problem of lacking analytical clarity between populism, nationalism and authoritarianism (Bonikowski, 2017). When populism and nationalism both share characteristics calling for a certain identity, and when populism and authoritarianism share similar appeals to governing styles, populism as a thin ideology fails to accurately answer these questions.

Bonikowski also criticizes Mudde's party-driven approach as it "ends up prioritizing the demand side of radical-right politics that treats the populist radical right as a passive consequence of macro-level socioeconomic developments" (Bonikowski, 2017, p. 183). To understand how populism, nationalism and authoritarianism intertwine and might foster each other into radical-right politics, Bonikowski specifies the importance of contextual factors that "increases the resonance between perennial discursive and frames and pre-existing attitudes" (Bonikowski, 2017, p. 182).

More discussion on the ambiguity of populism and how populism conflates with nationalism and authoritarianism will be explained in the later chapters.

2.2 Populism as Discourse: Features of Populism

In this section, we present another perspective of understanding populism as discourse. To illustrate the populist discourse, in the subchapter we will explore the three main dimensions that most scholars agree upon in populist attitude: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty (Blassnig et al., 2019; Ernst et al., 2019; Mény & Surel, 2002).

The discursive approach sees populism as a discursive style implying the fundamental conflict between a unified will of the good people and the evil corrupt elite. Hawkins (2009) thinks populism is a Manichaean discourse as it assigns a moral dimension to everything and interprets it as part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil.

Bonikowski (2017) suggested populism should be conceptualized as a form of political discourse and a rhetorical style used by political actors during persuasions. Aslanidis (2016) also argued that "formal elements of populist discourse are better conceptualized as a discursive frame, rather than an ideology" (p.98).

Scholars who define populism discursively use a variety of labels, such as referring to a political style, a discourse, a language, a way of communication, and an appeal. The discursive tradition views populism as an attribute of the message and not the speaker, which means populist actors are able to use different degrees of populism under different circumstances.

2.2.1 The People

In populist rhetoric, the term 'the people' is frequently applied. Political actors talk about "the people" all the time by using terms in first-person plural like "(the) public", "(the) working people", "(the) voter(s)", "(the) taxpayer(s)" during the campaign. By referring to "the people", a political actor displays closeness to his or her audience (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

But who are "the people" exactly? As Paul Taggart (2002) wrote, "the people" are populist objects because of who they are, who they are not, how they are, and how many they are" (p.92). "The people" is an idea that is as flexible as populism needs it to be. Taggart even brought up a new term 'the heartland', a territory of the populist's imagination where 'the people' reside and where the populist invocation of 'the people'

12

takes place (Taggart, 2000, pp. 95-98).

The populist conception of "the people" is fundamentally monolithic. "The people" are usually portrayed as a unity. "The people" is "a corporate body that is capable of having common interests, common desires, and common will" (Blassnig et al., 2019). A key aspect of 'the people' is their number, indicating that 'the people' are numerous and in the majority therefore justifying their sole legitimacy in political power (Bonikowski, 2017; Taggart, 2000).

The populist logic also implies that whoever does not support populist parties might not be a proper part of the people. For Müller (2017), populism is an exclusionary form of identity politics. Populist are always anti-pluralist. Populists claim that only they represent the people, sometimes also known as "the silent majority" (Taggart, 2000, p. 93). Mudde (2004) also believed that "populism will be a more regular feature of future democratic politics, erupting whenever significant sections of the silent majority feels that the elite no longer represents them" (p. 563).

Carrying on the populist logic, "the people" is a group of entities with characteristics, values, and opinions that the populist approved or agreed. However, whoever failed to fall into the populist's criteria of 'the people' would be perceived as "out-groups' or as 'dangerous others" (Blassnig et al., 2019) In this sense of "us" against "others", a populist may pick or target these out groups and see them as the burden of society (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Drawing on the monolithic notion of 'the people', Kornhauser (as cited in Taggart, 2000) suggested that populism is "the denial of plurality and the assertion of uniformity in the face of social differentiation" (p. 12).

2.2.2 Anti-Elitism

For populists, the language of the people is a powerful tool with great symbolic resonance, "playing on the tension in democracy between the power of popular

sovereignty and the possibility of a tyranny of the majority" (Taggart, 2000, p. 98). It is from this position that populism derives its anti-elitism.

In populist discourse, anti-elitist or anti-establishment is fundamental because populists emphasize the distance and antagonization between the people and the elites. In populist perception, according to Jan Jagers and Steffan Walgrave, the power structure is vertical; "the enemy is external to the people, up there' and high above ordinary citizens" (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 324). In populists "argument, populists always eagerly root for the 'hard-working people" in order to protect or restore the people's sovereignty. At the same time, populists denounced the privileged elites for exploiting their position of power or pursuing their self-interests (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Elites are tagged with negative attributes such as being "corrupt", "exploitative" or "arrogant."

According to Jagers and Walgrave (2007), in their empirical study, they classified and operationalized the concept of anti-elitism and anti-establishment into three main categories: "criticism of the political establishment, criticism of the state as an institution, criticism of the political system, and criticism of the media" (Blassnig et al., 2019). In their classification, elites can be found in many aspects, such as politics where political elites are parties or government, the media where media elites are media tycoons or journalists, the intellectuals such as professors or universities, or economic leaders such as capitalists. Despite the specific elite perhaps varying depending on populists" "ideological predilections", Bonikowski (2017) pointed out that elected politicians are often the 'immediate targets".

2.2.3 Popular Sovereignty

To understand the last dimension of populism - popular sovereignty - we have to first explain the relationship between populism and liberal democracy. In a liberal

14   doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

democracy, ideally, it is generally believed that the roots of political power come from the sovereign people. According to Canovan (1999), notions of popular power and popular decision are central to democracy. Canovan believed that from the pragmatic aspect, democratic politics is a political mechanism that adopts a form of negotiation to avoid civil wars and to resolve internal conflicts. From the redemptive aspect, democratic politics promises a better world by realizing the idea of 'the sovereign people'.

Canovan pointed out that today's democratic politics overemphasize its pragmatic aspects and builds a huge bureaucratic system that excludes people's participation, resulting in people's alienation and powerlessness. Therefore, when a charismatic leader tries to reclaim the redemptive aspect of democracy by "claiming power for the people and calling on those people to redeem the polity", he or she can easily appeal to the masses and thus form a populist movement (Canovan, 1999, pp. 9-14; 2005, pp. 83-85). In similar respect, Matthijs Rooduijn argues that "populism can be a force of good as it may serve as a democratic corrective by bringing issues ignored by the mainstream to the fore of the political agenda" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 2).

In this respect, however, scholars diverge on whether populism has a positive role to play in democratic politics. When the people cannot fully experience that they have hold of sovereignty in the democratic system, populism gets the chance to develop. On the one hand, populism criticizes the democratic system as failing to entitle the common people with their sovereign rights. On the other hand, populism may also become another justification for political action based on the majority of public opinion.

In populist logic, they assume "the ultimate source of authority is the sovereign people; (and) all legitimate political power is based on the consent of the people" (Canovan, 2005, p. 84). As Mény and Surel also wrote, "All populist movements speak

and behave as if democracy meant the power of the people and only the power of the people" (Mény & Surel, 2002, p. 9).

2.3 Populism as Strategy: Political Mobilization

In this section, we introduce another perspective of conceiving populism as a political mobilization strategy. In this case, scholars focus on the power pattern and the unmediated relationship between political leaders and their supporters. In the perspective of mobilization strategy, studies focus on the determinants of populist mobilization, and sometimes the three dimensions of populism are detectable.

As Weyland (2001) defined, "populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers (p.14)." In their research of multiple traditions in populism, Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) analyzed different factors of populist mobilization. One of which is the role that political leaders play. According to their research, one of the scholar they cited, Pappas (2012) depicted a scenario that explains populism "as a strategic power game when a certain political entrepreneur is able to polarize politics by creating a cleavage based on the interaction between 'the people' versus some establishment, thus forging a mass political movement (p.2)."

Jansen (2011) also defined populist mobilization as a large-scale political project that "mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people" (p.82). According to Jansen's definition, populist mobilization combines popular mobilization and populist rhetoric, indicating that 'populist mobilization requires definition elaboration across two domains: mobilization and discursive (Jansen, 2011, p. 82).' Jansen also explained the term rhetoric in its

broadest sense as to imply symbolic actions, styles of expression, public statements, and ways of elaborating ideas that broadly invoke or reinforce a populist principle.

On the other hand, Barr (2009) tried to clarify the relationships in populism by examining three key factors: "the appeals designed to build support, the location of political actors with respect to the party system, and the linkages between citizens and politicians (p. 30)." In his analysis, he made a point that many political actors use anti-establishment appeals - which populists are especially known for doing - but "such rhetoric is but one aspect of the populist phenomenon and is not the exclusive domain of populist leaders" (Barr, 2009, p. 31). To be more precise on describing populism as a political mobilization, Barr suggested studies focus on "conceptualizing outsiders in terms of the politician's (or party's) experience with the party system" (Barr, 2009, p. 33). Barr explained an outsider is someone "who gains political prominence as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties" (Barr, 2009, p. 33). Populist mobilization can be a reasonable strategy for both current state leaders in power and challengers of political competition that seek to gain control (Barr, 2009).

Studies of populism as a strategy of political mobilization often took examples from Latin America. To understand populism as a mobilization strategy, it is necessary to apprehend the history in a Latin American context in the 1990's. During the rise of new populism in the 1990s, scholars advocated abandoning the past view that populism was only integrated with the left, and that it should be considered with the interaction between foreign pressure, domestic economic environment, and the support of the masses (Weyland, 1998, 2001).

Weyland (2001) explained the rise of new populism. He believed that Latin American and Eastern European countries were liberated by the overall social forces

after the 1980s, which overthrew the original military authoritarian regime. However, under the system of free elections, the new regime faces a serious challenge. After democratization, many capitalists and new political elites have joined together to form a new economy through improper rent-seeking and privilege. Therefore, the people gradually became dissatisfied with the phenomenon of unfair distribution of economic resources after the transition to democracy, which projected strong dissatisfaction with the current system and political elite, and finally led to the emergence of populist parties or politicians under the neo-liberal constitutional system.

Also, according to Hawkins' study (2009), the other three approaches - structural, economic, and political-institutional - are common in the study of populism in developing countries, especially in Latin America. The structuralist approach to populism emphasizes the cross-class coalition and popular mobilization to support import-substituting industrialization. The economic approach to populism examines it with policy outputs. According to Hawkins, "the political approach focuses on institutional or material aspects of populism such as the degree of institutionalization of the organization embodying populism, its low esteem for existing institutions of representative democracy, its emphasis on support from large numbers of voters, and the presence of a charismatic leader" (Hawkins, 2009, p. 1042).

Populism, understood by the mobilization tradition, is also presented in the manner in which political actors interact with the voters, including features like "personalistic political style of charismatic leaders, priority placed on voters' direct access to political candidates, and attempts to include under-represented groups in the political process" (Bonikowski, 2017, p. 186). In a sense, populism as discourse can also be used as a strategy to call for political mobilization or persuasion.

As Bonikowski suggested to understand populism with contextual factors,

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

"populist mobilization consists of a set of practices that are leader-driven and organizationally maintained, while remaining spatially and temporally bounded" (Jansen, 2011, p. 86). When other approaches to populism fail to account for the fact that populist regimes or movements vary over time, populist mobilization as strategy is "undertaken at specific historical moments, is sustained for limited durations, and is subject to fluctuation in its character and intensity over time" (Jansen, 2011, p. 86).

3.   The Ambiguity of Populism

Conceptual overlap is where the ambiguity of populism appears. In public opinion, the anti-elitist attitude might come across with political cynicism. In this chapter, we will further explain how scholars distinguish and argue the conflation between populism, nationalism (ethnocentrism), and authoritarianism.

Bonikowski et al. (2019) discussed the debates in the study of populism and nationalism. From diverse perspectives and exchanging views, scholars in this article agree that populism is hostile to liberal democracy. Bonikowski further pointed out that the hostility has been "particularly marked in the politics of the radical right that combine populism, nationalism and authoritarianism" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 2). One of the prominent features of populism, popular sovereignty, is easily intertwined with the concepts of national identity and ethnocentrism or nationalism. Scholars agree that populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are not necessarily the same, but they share certain elective affinities in many cases (Bonikowski et al., 2019).

According to Bonikowski, nationalism and populism are both components to the radical right. The coalition of the two concepts provide radical-right party narratives "particular potency by channeling diffuse grievances into powerful out-group resentments" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 3). The two ideas are so frequently associated

that Bonikowski concludes that populism itself can "serve as dog-whistle for ethno-nationalism" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 3). The idea of a dog-whistle can be understood as political language that has normal meanings to the majority, but can at the same time be implied or loaded to mean very specific things to intended recipients. However, Halikiopoulou argued that in Western European far right parties, they are adopting "a civic nationalist narrative in order to augment their electoral appeal" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 3).

Last, Rooduijn (Bonikowski et al., 2019) determines the left and right-wing populism by applying the ethnic-civic distinction. While misleading conclusion of how populism collides with nationalism - that many think populists are necessarily nativists, Rooduijn pointed out that "left-wing populists tend to combine their populism with the inclusive, civic variant of nationalism whereas right-wing populists are more inclined to link their populist discourse to an exclusionary version of nationalism" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 4).

On the other hand, taking one of the features from populism - its dubiousness toward representative institutions - for instance, this tendency encompasses the potential seeds of authoritarianism. Bonikowski (2017) explained that the skepticism suggests that "power should be concentrated in the executive, which is seen as the most direct embodiment of the political will of a homogeneous polity" (p. 185). In this regard, populism seen by Müller (2017) is connected to anti-pluralist politics.

Halikiopoulou also had a similar opinion. She argued populism "justifies authoritarianism by invoking an anti-pluralist and illiberal form of democracy" (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 7).

Halikiopoulou (Bonikowski et al., 2019) explained that populism illustrates an antithetical society where decisions are legitimate and morally superior "only if they are

made from below, in other words, if they reflect the general will of the people (Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 7)". The implementation of the popular will translates into a denial of the institutions. In this sense, Halikiopoulou inferred populism undermines constitutionalism. Elite-level decisions, which involve liberal democratic institutional paths, are thus seen lacking legitimacy because they do not represent the popular will (Bonikowski et al., 2019, pp. 7-8). In this logic, populism and authoritarianism share the common trait that denies the horizontal accountability.

4.   When to Call it Populism?

There are several conditions that characterize a concept as essentially contested, such as internal complexity and diverse describability, openness and so on (Rauchfleisch, 2017). Populism, explained in the previous chapters, is an essentially contested concept as Weyland (2001) stated. Since populism is under conceptual confusion, it is not easy to translate the theoretical sense of the concept into practical and operational terms. This chapter will try to answer the problem by introducing Weyland's integrated analysis frameworks. In addition, this chapter will also explain the possible consequences of overlooking the conceptual overlaps.

In recent literature, the concept of populism was clarified systematically, and an integrated analytical framework was proposed by Kurt Weyland. From the methodology respect, Weyland (2001) sorted out three strategies for defining populism: **cumulative type, radial type (addition), and classical type (redefinition)**. The cumulative strategy is the overlapping and intersection of different academic fields or various populist theories. This can be said to be the core part of the concept of populism and the most commonly used method in the past.

Weyland pointed out that the advantages of this method of definition can prevent

the occurrence of false correlations between different domains, "by setting high standards for logical inclusion and further clarity by minimizing the danger of false positives" (Weyland, 2001, p. 2). But its disadvantage is that the logically related qualities in different fields cannot be discussed together. Secondly, if there are too few overlapping areas in related fields, it will greatly limit the empirical application (Weyland, 2001).

In response to the significant change in the meaning of populism after the 1990's, many scholars proposed a radial definition of the concept. Weyland believed that this method is to synthesize and aggregate the definitions of different academic fields. Weyland pointed out that the advantage of this kind of definition is that it can absorb all the relevant empirical meanings of relevant references, and at the same time provide conceptual compromise between different fields. However, its shortcoming is that it contains too much theoretical basis and multiple conceptual diversities, leading to the so-called pseudo-consensus and making the concept even more vague and unclear.

The last strategy is the so-called classical definition strategy. The method is to capture and redefine the most important aspects of the concept of populism. The advantage of this method is that it can resolve the logical conflicts between the definitions of the cumulative type and the radial type. It also highlights the features and connotations of individual theoretical categories. Secondly, this strategy can improve and adjust the definition of populism that is too vague (radiation type) or too narrow (cumulative type). However, the difficulty lies in how to define a conceptual characteristic in a particular field. More importantly, it is difficult for scholars to define what significance in populism is really necessary and what is not (Weyland, 2001).

Wuttke (2020) also brought up the attention that conceptual overlap might determine the operationalization of the populism studies therefore causing different

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

results. In the study, Wutteke analyzed the populist attitude of citizens from survey data. Moreover, the operationalization he proposed "is applicable to various social science concepts, especially those at the intersection of the concept components" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 51). Wuttke explained the causal and the essential perspectives on the relationship between concept and concept attributes. The different perspectives determine different measurements of populism.

According to Wuttke's analysis, the causal perspective, also known as Bollen approach in his research, is the most common approach in the literature on populist attitudes "where it is applied to the indicator level as well as to describe the relationship between the concept and the concept components" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 10). The logic behind the operationalization is that it "considers populist attitudes as the common cause of the concept components, such as anti-elitist orientations and support for popular sovereignty" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 10). However, Wuttke pointed out that there are logical and methodological flaws in the casual approach which failed to characterize the relationship between the concept and its component. Wuttke explained that "even though the causal perspective prescribes a correlation between the concept components, no theoretical argument implies such a correlation between the subdimensions in the case of populist attitudes" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 11). Instead, Wuttke suggests a more deliberate understanding of the concept which is seeing populist attitudes as the combination of all the components. In conclusion, Wuttke thinks that to illustrate the connection between concept and concept component, one should begin with the core essence of the concept before falsely linking the cause and effect of the concept and its concept attributions.

5. Populism in Taiwan

In this chapter, we will talk about the history of populism in Taiwan. Drawing from different conceptualizations of populism and the discussion of its conceptual overlap with other ideologies or concepts, we will examine the populist politicians from the Taiwan's history, hoping to bring out new perspectives and understandings of populism in Taiwan.

5.1 History Background

Populism in Taiwanese society actually appeared during the political transformation in the 1990s and played a crucial role in the democratization process (Huang, 2014b).

In early Taiwanese society, the Kuomintang regime still maintained the party-state system. The conservative forces were not interested in democratic issues such as the comprehensive re-election of the Congress or judicial reform. In the long run, society was filled with political dissatisfaction (Huang & Tsay, 2015, pp. 144-147). Finally, the largest student movement after the lifting of martial law - March student movement - took place.

In 1990, during the election of the eighth presidential election of the Republic of China by the first National Assembly, thousands of college students from all over the country sat in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The March student movement, also known as Wild Lily student movement, was initiated by students who called for four demands: the dissolution of the National Assembly, the abolition of Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, convening a national meeting, and proposing democratic reform timetables (Huang, 2014; Huang & Tsay, 2015). The then elected President of the Kuomintang by the National Assembly,

Lee Teng-hui, met with the student representatives and accepted the demands. Lee promised to hold a national meeting and proposed a timetable for political reform in the inaugural report (Huang, 2014a, 2014b; Huang & Tsay, 2015). In his term as president, Lee Teng-hui also pushed forward the direct elections of the national president and vice president.

5.2 Lee Teng-hui's Era: Populism as Strategy

In the past, the study of populism in Taiwan contrasted with the strongman politics in Latin America, and developed the theoretical viewpoint of "populist authoritarianism" to explain the formation of populism in Taiwan. However, from the previous chapter, political strategy as one of the different approaches to populism might be another explanation.

In 1996, Lee was again elected as president, but it was the first democratic presidential election in Taiwan's history. Lee also led the constitutional amendment six times based on the grounds of fulfilling political commitments. These constitutional amendment processes are both populist and authoritarian (Huang, 2014b, pp. 53-54; Huang & Tsay, 2015, p. 148). On the one hand, the people's strong support for reform has become a legitimate source of Lee's suppression of the opposition of the conservatives within the Kuomintang. On the other hand, Lee also took advantage of the majority of the Kuomintang seats in the National Assembly to block the constitutional amendment plans proposed by the opposition parties and the people. Lee's approach raised considerable doubts, and also caused the scholars at that time to criticize populism (Huang, 2014b, pp. 53-54; Yang, 2004, pp. 32-36).

The situation in Taiwan before and after the lifting of martial law is quite similar to politics in Latin America in the 1980s (Huang, 2014a, 2014b). In his article on the political history of Taiwan, Huang (2014b) explained that under the Kuomintang regime,

25

society was denied the right to freedom of association. From the mobilization perspective, Huang argued that the protests or political movement manifested populism.

When analyzing the case of neo-populism in Latin America, Weyland (1998) believed that there are two main conditions for the rise of new populism: first, the mechanisms of clientelism and corporatism established by the old regime began to loosen, and the ruling elite gradually lost control of society. Society ('unorganised masses of people') therefore was able to mobilize and employ the power of the people. Secondly, the ruling regime encountered a severe economic crisis and was unable to cope with it. The result of the weakening the legitimacy of the ruling elite caused the leader of the Karisma character to rise up and called on the masses to launch a populist movement (Weyland, 1998, pp. 112-114).

Huang (2014) mentioned in the article that many researchers have noticed that the economic crisis and major changes in social structure are the main conditions for stirring populism. He believes that Taiwan's populism is a typical example. Lee Teng-hui did not take the initiative to summon the imagination of the people and become a populist leader. On the contrary, it was through the Wild Lily student movement that Taiwanese society 'summoned' Lee Teng-hui.

Jenn-Hwan Wang and Y. S. Chien (1995) pointed out that politicians summoned the 'people' to construct the basis for their own consent. During the process, the masses, however, were not given the opportunity to actually participate in political expression - let alone forming the will through the system - which is authoritarian, not democratic. Wang and Chien described it as 'populist authoritarianism'.

In Wang and Chien's research, it is concluded that first, the people were summoned by politicians from top to bottom, and did not get to form their common will through rational discussion and institutional processes. They pointed out that the populist

"people" are not "citizens" of democratic politics. They criticized the "people" under populism as collective and anonymous, which is contrary to the assumption of the individuality of the people under democratic pluralism. As in the Western tradition, the concept of "the people" is also perceived sometimes as the "silent majority (Taggart, 2000, p. 93)."

Second, Lee actually still used the past party-state machinery to promote political reform and exclude the participation of most citizens. Therefore, to many scholars, Lee Teng-hui's populism is actually a continuation of the authoritarian system, not a model of democratic politics, which in the academic discourse was once seen as an obstacle to Taiwan's democratization. K.-K. Huang (2003) in his book even used strong expressions such as 'populism ending Taiwan' to criticize the negative impact of populism on Taiwan's democracy.

However, if we now look into the three dimensions of populism mentioned earlier, the populist strategy Lee employed in order to push forward the revisions of the constitution only checked two out of three dimensions: the people and popular sovereignty. According to Wuttke's analysis, to build logic between concepts and examine populist attitudes, it is best to consider all the components. Therefore, here we raise a question whether Lee really fits a complete populist profile.

In today's view, these criticisms, while recognizing the shadow of populism in the revision of the constitution in the 1990s, sort of exaggerated the threat of populism to democracy. The most important part of Lee Teng-hui's six constitutional amendments was the revision of the electoral methods. In 1996, Lee, for the first time in Taiwan's political history, was elected as the president of the Republic of China through direct democratic election. The consequences of Lee Teng-hui adopting populism did not turn him into a dictator but actually accelerated the process of democratization in Taiwan

(Huang & Tsay, 2015).

In Lee's term of presidency, the revisions of the constitution he advocated for not only changed the presidential election but also the governor of Taiwan Province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung all into direct elections. In the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan's political party was replaced for the first time, and DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won with a relatively majority of votes.

5.3 Chen Shui-bian Era: Populism as Election Mobilization

After the shift in political parties, the Kuomintang handed over the government smoothly, and Lee resigned as the chairman of the party. Though many scholars (Yang, 2004; 周, 1993, 2004) worried about Taiwan going down the path of strongman politics as in South American populism, the populist authoritarianism in Taiwan seemed to come to an end.

The first president from the opposition party, Chen Shui-bian, was also a populist who sophisticatedly applied election language to the concept of populism (as cited in Huang, 2014b). During Chen's run in the 1994 Taipei mayoral election, Chen demonstrated his energetic charisma in his campaigns and television debates. In the hustings, Huang summed up Chen's populist strategy as emphasizing and promising the direct participation of citizens in municipal reform. Through this, Chen created an image that he was close to the people and willing to challenge the privileged for the people (Huang, 2014a, pp. 185-187). Chen adopted the "anti- privileged populism" as his election appeal and strategy (Huang, 2014b, p. 64). Lin (2005) also pointed out that populism makes people pay attention to investing in important issues and therefore has positive significance for democracy.

Compared to Lee, Chen took a very different path. Lee promoted the constitutional

amendments by employing the Kuomintang's party-government apparatus and pressured the conservatives within his party based on the people's support. Unlike Lee, Chen Shui-bian directly appealed to the people and through this took the legitimacy to take political actions against the opposition's dominant congress. As the party chairman, Chen Shui-bian also took populism as an election strategy to intensify various issues for political mobilization. Chang (2009) therefore believes that today's populism in Taiwan tends to be 'electoral populism', a subtype of populist mobilization proposed by Kenneth M. Roberts (Roberts, 2006).

5.4 Populism in Elections: a political mobilization

After compiling history in his article, Huang (2014b) analyzed that Taiwan's electoral populism was the radicalization of the opposition movement after the Formosa Incident in 1979. The aftermath of the Formosa Incident damaged the image - of Chiang Ching-kuo's love and care for the people - that the Kuomintang regime had built. The incident made the Taiwanese people come to the judgment it was a dictatorial regime that cracked down on its own people. Therefore, it encouraged Taiwanese society to support the opposition movement and established a populist mobilization model of the people against the Kuomintang. From there, it gradually formed the imagination of Taiwan's "people" versus the Kuomintang as the "other" (Huang, 2014b, p. 63).

Huang (2014b) pointed out that there is a great difference between "the formation of people's imagination' and 'calling from top to bottom". He believes that what politicians do is not defining and summoning the "people" from top to bottom, but: 1. By shaping him or herself into the representation of the people, politicians get to strengthen the legitimacy of political action based on the ground of public opinion; 2. By redefining who is the 'others', politicians are able to lead the public opinion against institutional norms, and to reject important principles in democratic politics such as the

rule of law and horizontal accountability (Chang, 2009; Huang, 2003; Huang, 2014b).

From the perspective of democratic politics, elections are a tool for peacefully resolving political conflicts. The election elects representatives, thereby affecting the political landscape and policy formulation, which in turn changes the rotation of the regime. From a populism perspective, the election can be understood as a manifestation of the strength and will of the people, and the results of the election should be used against the injustices of the Kuomintang authoritarian system (Chang, 2009; Huang, 2014b).

For Taiwanese society, elections are more than just random democratic exercises under institutional norms. Populism transforms ballots into a weapon for the people to counter conspiracy and invasion by the 'others'. People believe that by the votes they have in their hands, they can beat the 'others'. In Huang Yu-ting's defense, when populism resisted the process of institutionalization and refused to resolve conflicts with the democratic system, Huang argued that:

'electoral populism ultimately caused the duality of the Taiwanese people who generally hated the electoral culture but enthusiastically invested in electoral politics: because of such imagination under the framework, the votes are almost the only political weapon possessed by the people (Huang, 2014b, p. 63).'

5.5 Populism in Taiwan as Discourse

Based on the studies mentioned above, we can tell that in Taiwan's politics, political individuals such as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian had greater powers and impact over the party itself. Chen particularly with his overwhelming charisma and populist strategy put himself at a more important position than the DPP. According to

Van Kessel (2015), Western studies such as Mudde's work are more party-centric, "speaking of populist parties is primarily useful in the European context, where parties are still key actors in political systems" (p.15). This may also explain many Western studies defining populism as thin-ideology which from a sense that a party's manifesto reflects their certain worldview. Therefore, to properly discuss populism in a Taiwanese political context, it is necessary to recognize the different focus of party politics and individual (personal) politics on populism. Also, with the understanding of Taiwan's democratization process, we notice populism tangled with nationalism (forming the imagination of the people's identity) and authoritarianism at different times, and populism manifests itself under different circumstances.

Drawing from this respect, this essay tends to define populism as a discourse that is applied as strategy during campaigns. From the discourse perspective, the three dimensions of populism give the analysis a clear guidance to look into what politicians say and how they express themselves. Also, with respect to the strategy as political mobilization during election, it gives the analysis a more comprehensive way to read the contextual factors that Bonikowski (2017) suggested.

6. Social Media and Populism

In this chapter, by the brief introduction on how social media applied to election campaigns, we intend to explain the relationship between social media and populism. We will look into how populist communication takes place in the hybrid social media environment.

Since the American presidential elections (Bimber, 2014) in 2008, Barack Obama set a precedent by successfully taking social media platforms, such as Facebook and Myspace, as 2008 election campaign tools.

In Taiwan, prior research showed that Taiwanese politicians began to use social media as digital campaign tools in 2010 during the municipal elections (Chang & Wang, n.d.). Scholars looked into the Facebook management strategies of candidates' fan pages in order to observe the relationship between the political use of social media and candidates' election outcomes (Lin, 2017; 王 et al., 2019; 高, 2011; 莊 & 金, 2019). According to Lin's (2017) study, she found that whether candidates have an online social media account makes a difference in the result of election. Candidates with social media presence are more likely to have greater votes to win elections than candidates who do not use social media. Her result also showed there is a positive relationship between the number of fans that candidates have and their election outcomes.

In recent Western studies, political communication researchers have grown interest of the successful engagement that populist parties built with their followers on social media. Many therefore began investigating how the factors inherent in social media foster populist communication.

In Mazzoleni and Bracciale study (2018), they summed up four implications of the links between populist communication and social media. Based on the 'network media logic,' the domain of social media could be understood from three perspectives: the logic of production, the logic of distribution, and the logic of usage. From a production aspect, social media platforms provide a more individualized form of media content in contrast to traditional and editorial mass media with professional journalistic gatekeeping. From the distribution aspect, it goes with the logic of virality, "popularity among like-minded users, not professional gatekeepers, decides whether information is relevant and passed on (i.e., goes viral) or not" (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018, p. 3). Last, from the usage aspect, social media platforms bring together the like-minded community of peers.

In populist communication, the network media logic implies the disintermediated link between populist leaders and their constituencies, leading to "one step flow communication" (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017, p. 1283). Also, with the horizontality of social media, populist content gets to vastly circulate in the "echo-chamber environment where political attitudes are confirmed and amplified" (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018, p. 3).

In the study by Sven Engesser, Nayla Fawzi and Anders Olof Larsson (2017), they argued that the online opportunity structure in social media systems fosters the populist communication. Behind that, the populist communication logic consists of four main elements: content (ideology), messenger (actor), form (style), and motives and aims (strategy).

As mentioned in the chapters earlier, populism as a thin ideology could be understood as a struggle over political sovereignty where the 'pure people' represent the ultimate sovereignty and the 'corrupt elite' is assumed to deprive their right to exercise power. In Table 1, we organized the connections between populist communication logic and the online opportunity structure based on Engesser et al.'s argument.

According to Engesser et al. (2017), looking into the content by populist ideological principles, the fast, direct, unmediated online communication on social media provides the populists with more direct connections to the people, which is the very central concept - people centrism - in populism. Second, some scholars see in the Internet the potential to democratize the political system. From Engesser et al point of view, the notion of popular sovereignty and the Internet share a common which they are both regarded as correctives of democracy. Third, the Internet lowers the threshold for populists - aiming to present themselves as non-elite actors - to enter the arenas of communication.

Last, the homophily of the Internet suits the exclusion aspect of populism well. In populist logic, in addition to the enemy of the elite, 'the others' are also another enemy that they see as the dangerous out-group. The homophily of the Internet manifests in two phenomena: the echo chamber where 'political attitudes are confirmed and amplified' and the filter bubble 'which pre-selects consonant media content.' In this regard, the Internet provides a useful environment for populist communication (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017, pp. 1282-1284).

Table 1 How populist communication applies to online opportunity structures

Populist communication logic			Online opportunity structures
Content	Ideology	people-centrism	Direct connections to the audiences
		popular sovereignty	Democratizing potential democracy
		anti-elitism	Non-elite actors
		exclusion of 'the others'	Homophily
Messenger	Actors	(Charismatic) leaders	Personal connections to the audiences
Form	Style	Simplification Emotionalization Negativity	Attention economy

Also, through personalized online connections built upon social media, populist actors have a chance to display and utilize their charisma.

From the perspective of 'attention economy' on social media, Engesser et al. pointed out that "the populist style of simplification, emotionalization, and negativity

34

increases our attention by addressing fundamental perceptual patterns and news values" (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017, pp. 1285-1286).

In conclusion, to explore the multi-dimensional aspects of populism, it is necessary to include the communication on social media nowadays into study.

6.1 Populist Communication: Empirical Studies

In this section, we will introduce the important empirical research on populist communication that this essay tends to refer to.

In empirical studies on populist communication, nine populist communication strategies have been developed and assigned to each of the three core ideological dimensions of populism: the people-centrism, the anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty (Engesser et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2017, 2019).

In the study by Engesser et al (2017), they proposed five key elements in populism from literature: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the 'heartland.' Drawing from the core aspect of populism from thin-ideological perspectives, Engesser et al. summarized the key elements: popular sovereignty, pure people, corrupt elite, and dangerous others (Engesser et al., 2017).

Developed from this classification, Ernst et al. (2019) proposed a more thorough operationalization to capture these ideological dimensions: people centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty. In each dimension, Ernst et al. described the populist key messages in detail.

In people centrism, the key messages are strategies to advocate for the people. In this aspect, populist actor can "demonstrate his closeness to the people, stress their virtues, praise their achievements, or describe them as a monolithic group" (Ernst et al., 2019). In anti-elitism, the communication strategies that populists adopt are to discredit

and blame the elite as well as deepen the estrangement between elites and the people. As for strategies to restore sovereignty, populist actors demand popular sovereignty by advocating for the people's sovereignty. Meanwhile, populist actors deny elite sovereignty through a negative and conflictive approach. The complete populist key messages strategy can be found in the codebook section.

However, in the research, Ernst et al. (2019) reminded us that we should be careful not to jump to conclusions too soon and claim that the political actors are populist. As they explained "sometimes it could be considered expressions of the same communication strategy that can also lead to the use of populist key messages" (Ernst et al., 2019, p. 3).

Also, according to Engesser et al. (2017) findings, populism on social media manifests itself in a fragmented form as "the elements were generally isolated from each other or clustered in pairs, at the most" (2017, pp. 1121-1122). They explained the fragmentation could be "an expression of populism's thin nature and inherent incompleteness".

In other research, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) categorized four types of populism: complete populism; excluding populism; anti-elitist populism, and empty populism by giving operational definition to thin and thick populism.

They defined populism as "a master frame wrapping up all kinds of issues and a communication frame that appeals to and identifies with the people, and pretends to speak in their name" (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). Among all the elements of political style, such as colloquial language or informal dress code to display the closeness to the people, they considered the content of the discourse the most important element.

According to Jagers and Walgrave (2007), they developed a way to measure

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

populism in political communication. First, they defined populism as thin and thick. Thin populism covers the most fundamental feature in populism: 'the people', which they put it as the people-index. The people-index refers to the amount of reference to the people, for example the proportion and intensity.

Second, thick populism has two dimensions: the anti-establishment index and the exclusivity-index. The anti-establishment index consists of three kinds of degrees of hostility against the elite (the politics, the state, and the media). The exclusivity-index refers to whether the political actor excludes specific population categories. To determine whether the political actor excludes a certain population, they examined the tone of their statement that mentions population categories: positive, negative, or neutral. According to their study, they adopted the "J-scores: the subtraction of the positive minus the negative evaluations divided by the total number of mentions" (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 331). They pointed out that only explicit positive references would be encoded as positive references since "it is the only way to guarantee that border line cases are judged consistently" (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 340).

Jagers and Walgrave categorized a fourfold typology of populism in political communication. However, in their Belgium case study, the result only showed two types of populism: empty populism and complete populism, which raises the question of the multidimensionality of populism.

III. Research Question and Hypothesis

In this chapter, we will explain my research questions based on the literature review and then develop my general hypothesis. As this essay tried to illustrate earlier, populism as a concept is ambiguous even in the academic discourse, let alone the easy fallacy of populism in ordinary daily conversation. In this research, we believe populism should be examined as discourse so that it could take more contextual factors into consideration. From this perspective, this essay will examine the political communication from all presidential candidates with the populist communication measurement.

In addition, we take on the two different methodology of operationalization frameworks proposed by Wuttke in his study (Wuttke et al., 2020); the Bollen approach and the Goertzian approach. From there, we establish our measurement framework of populism. We will explain the measurement in more detail in the method chapter.

Based on the literature review, we can understand populism as a concept with three dimensions. According to Wuttke's study, he proposed two different methods of operationalization framework: the Bollen approach and the Goertzian approach. While the Bollen approach is the most common operationalization method in populist attitude, Wuttke argued Goertzian approach captures better nuances of the concept confusion by distinguishing necessary conditions among the concept components.

1. Research Question One (RQ1)

Which candidate/party shows higher strength of populism? Which dimension of populism is most prominent or more specific? During the 2020 presidential election, Han Kuo-yu was marked as a populist politician by not only Taiwanese media but also

international media (Chen, 2019; Jansen, 2019; Horton, 2019). In *The Reporter* 柯 and 許(2020)'s analysis, they summed up Han's rhetoric into several features, such as blaming and attacking the opponent's morals, showing empathy by relating to his self-struggle, or using colloquial language with vivid and catchy metaphors. While these indicators might not fully overlap with the academic definition of populism and the typical operationalization of the concept in empirical studies, the analysis is still a good starting point. Also, in Wang (2011)'s study, she mentioned the different role of the incumbents and the challengers is the key to different campaign strategy as well as their discourse style. Comparing to the incumbents, the challengers tend to adopt negative discourse to persuade the voters the need of the change in politics, such as attacking the opponent's political stand, policies, or the party they represent. (Wang, 2011; Druckman et al., 2009) Therefore, we raised two sets of hypotheses. We expect in this analysis to identify higher populist communication from Han than other candidates. We also expect to find higher populist communication from the KMT, which Han represented during this election.

H1a: In Han's discourse, the dimension of 'people-centrism' is more prominent than the other two candidates.

H1b: In Han's discourse, the dimension of 'anti-elitism' is more prominent than the other two candidates.

H1c: In Han's discourse, the dimension of 'popular sovereignty' is more prominent than the other two candidates.

H2a: In the KMT's discourse on their Facebook fan page, the dimension of 'people-centrism' is more prominent than the other two parties.

H2b: In the KMT's discourse on their Facebook fan page, the dimension of 'anti-elitism' is more prominent than the other two parties.

H2c: In the KMT's discourse on their Facebook fan page, the dimension of 'popular sovereignty' is more prominent than the other two parties.

2. Research Question Two (RQ2)

According to the literature review on social media and populist communication, we understand that certain qualities of social media fit the populist logic for politicians to employ and spread their messages. In this sense, we expect there to be a positive correlation between populist elements and the engagement on Facebook such as the Share, Likes, and Comment of a given post. We would also like to explore which kind of populist style is more effective on social media.

H3a: The discursive framework of populist communication is presented in a negative rather than a positive emotion.

H3a-1: Negative and positive emotionality increases user engagement, such as Likes, Share, and Comment.

H3b: Populist communication leads to more user engagement, such as Likes, Share, and Comment, than non-populist communication.

3. Research Question Three (RQ3)

Last but not least, according to the literature review, the research hopes to find out whether there are different results when we take the different approaches discussed by Wuttke et al. (2020) to measure the strength of populism.

IV. Research Design and Methods

1. Research Design

In this research, we believe populism should be examined as a discourse and be understood within the Taiwanese social and political context. Based on the empirical research we collected, we implemented a quantitative content analysis, covering political Facebook posts of the three presidential candidates for the 2020 presidential election.

The research questions hope to identify and measure populist communication in the 2020 presidential election and to analyze whether social media encouraged such populist communication during the 2020 presidential election. The research also wants to explore how politicians adopt populist communication strategies on their social media platforms.

2. Method

The measurement of populism in this research is based on Wuttke et al. (2020) who provided a very thorough comparison of operationalization frameworks by different methodological concept structures, such as the Bollen approach and Goertzian approach. To carefully define and measure populism, as we discussed in the earlier chapter, it is important to focus on the very essence of the concept components.

First, we measured the dimension score by identifying and calculating the proportion of the posts with variable we intended to measure. In that sense, the higher the score meant the higher scale of the post to be qualified with the populist dimension.

The Bollen approach is commonly used in the literature to measure populist

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

attitudes "as it is applied to the indicator level which considers populist attitudes as the common cause of the concept components" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 10). The general idea underlying the Bollen approach views the concept components as partly interchangeable. The populist score measurement of the Bollen approach is we sum up all scores from three dimensions and divide them by three. The strategy of the aggregation method in the Bollen approach is "that higher values on one concept component can compensate for low values on other subdimensions" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 8). However, as we realize concepts in populism are usually overlapped in the previous discussed chapters, Wuttke argued that the Bollen approach fails to depict and explain the casual relationship between the concept and its components. Especially, when populist attitudes consist of "multi-dimensional concepts with non-substitutable concept components (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 11-12)," Bollen operationalization is criticized for failing to capture the unique theoretical proposition of populist attitudes.

On the contrary, the concept structure of Goertzian approach "employs Fuzzy Logic to combine the conceptual rigorousness of necessary attributes with the operational flexibility of continuous outcomes" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 14). Unlike the Bollen approach that considers concept components interchangeable and be compensated, the Goertzian approach identifies the one core component and requires all essential concept attributes to make the case of defining populist attitudes. Therefore, in terms of finding the populist score, we identify the lowest dimension score and call it the final score. Wuttke et al. (2020) suggested to use the minimum value of the concept subdimensions because the minimum represents the mathematical equivalent of the theoretical proposition that the lowest attribute determines the overall concept. They conclude that the Goertzian concept structure "accounts for necessary conditions among the concept components while distinguishing varying degrees of accepting populist

attitudes" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 15).

While the Bollen approach, the most common measurement, could be seen as the typical operationalization in the populist attitude measurement, Goertzian approach offers more operational flexibility and a more cautious reasoning between concept components. To sum up briefly, Wuttke et al. (2020) discuss the different concepts and operationalizations of populist attitude measurement in the research of survey data. They also pointed out the importance of operationalizing populism measurement with the appropriate concept structure, otherwise "the mathematical structure of measures of populism and the concept's theoretical structure would fall apart" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 37).

Based on the arguments from Wuttke et al., we adapted the ideas into our research of populist content analysis. In short, in this essay we want to measure populism in both concept structures to see if there is any difference in the result. If so, would the different result contribute to the explanation of further debate about populism in Taiwan?

3. Data and Measurement

3.1 Sample

First, we collected the data from an online tool for social media analytics and monitoring called *Fanpage Karma*. We collected the Facebook posts from each three presidential candidates ranging from September 10th, 2019 to March 10th 2020, in total for six months. In order to make the analysis less dependent on single events but also intensely focused on the election itself, we chose a time frame from December 10th, 2019 to January 10th 2020, in total for one month before the day of voting. In the end, there are 266 posts in total (see Table 2). In addition, we also collect posts from each three parties with the amount of 407 posts (see Table 3). We took each post as an unit of

analysis to conduct content analysis but only focused on the written part.

Table 2 The number of posts from three presidential candidates

CANDIDATE	PAGE	PARTY	POST NUMBER
HAN KUO-YU	韓國瑜	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	74
TSAI ING-WEN	蔡英文 Tsai Ing-wen	Kuomintang (KMT)	114
SONG CHU-YU	宋楚瑜找朋友	People First Party (PFP)	78
TOTAL			266

Table 3 The number of posts from three parties

PARTY	PAGE	POST NUMBER
國民黨	國民黨 KMT	89
民進黨	民主進步黨	160
親民黨	親民黨 People First Party	158
TOTAL		407

3.2 Coding Procedure

To conduct the content analysis of populist communication and populist style, we relied on the existing codebooks from Ernst et al. and Engesser et al.'s studies (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2019) of populist communication on social media. From there, we adopted the ideas and made adjustments to increase the accuracy of the codebook for Taiwanese political context. In their research, ideological dimensions of populism are broken down by political actors into nine key messages: stressing the

44

people's virtue, praising the people's achievement, stating a monolithic people, demonstrating closeness to the people, discrediting the elite, blaming the elite, detaching the elite from the people, demanding popular sovereignty, and denying elite sovereignty. These key messages were translated into empirically measurable categories of quantitative content analysis in their studies (see Table 4). In addition, we gave more details in definition of the 'anti-elitism.' Therefore, we added three addition variables: hostility against the state, hostility against the politics, and hostility against the media (see Table 5).

Table 4 Codebook from Ernst et al. and Engesser et al.

Dimension	Message
People-centrism	stressing the people's virtue
	praising the people's achievement
	stating a monolithic people
	demonstrating closeness to the people
Anti-elitism	discrediting the elite
	blaming the elite
	detaching the elite from the people
Restoring sovereignty	demanding popular sovereignty
	denying elite sovereignty

From the overview of the data and posts, we realized the concept of stressing the people's virtue and praising the people's achievement are very close, therefore we decided to merge the two variables into one. Also, to capture the style of populist

communication evoking the people-centrism dimension, it means we need to investigate a political actor's claims. Therefore, we also added two extra variables, people-advocacy and people-accountability, to decide if "a political actor speaks in the name of the people and claims to defend its will, or claims to be accountable to the people and refers to the importance of responding to what is portrayed as the people's will" (Blassnig et al., 2019, p. 116).

According to the research from Fahey (2021) of the U.S. presidential election, he pointed out that candidates would try to convince the audience that the two groups, elites and the people, are engaged in zero-sum competition. If we take this idea and interpret it in a Taiwanese political context, it could capture the frustration from the people who think two-party politics has failed them. Fahey also concluded that candidates tend to advocate for the dreadful consequences that would result if their candidacy fails. Therefore, we added one extra variable, zero-sum, to the anti-elitism dimension and another variable, apocalyptic politics, to the popular sovereignty dimension.

For the campaign communication, according to prior studies (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015; Heiss et al., 2019), we coded 'call for interaction' and 'call for mobilization.' The difference between the two variables was call for interaction focused on the Facebook interaction, such as like, share, and comment. We also included the invitation to participate in the online streaming campaigns or any Facebook Page activities. As for the call for mobilization, it focused on offline campaigns, such as participating in candidates' speeches, television debates, or going to vote. We also coded the emotion of a post, whether it is negative or positive. To identify the emotions, we used certain keywords for negative emotions, such as anger, fear, disappointment and so on. For positive emotions, we used terms like hope, happiness, satisfaction, and more.

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

Last, there are some structural elements coded as well. We coded the post if it had information on parties' campaigns so that we had a better understanding of the purpose of the post. Since this research mainly focuses on the written content analysis, we coded different types of posts to filter out posts with Facebook live stream videos or videos that are longer than five minutes.

In terms of the coding procedure, we took each paragraph from the post as analysis unit. As long as the key messages were detected by both coders, we counted them in.

Table 5 Codebook of this research

Dimension	Key Message	Description
People-centrism	Stressing the people's virtue or praising the people's achievement	The people are virtuous. The people are bestowed with morality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, and so on. The people are beneficial. The people are described as being enriched or responsible for a positive development or situation.
	Stating a monolithic people	The people are homogeneous. Political actors portray 'the people' or traditions and values related to 'the people' as being attacked.
	Demonstrating closeness to the people	The populist represents the people. The speaker describes himself as belonging to the people, being close to the people, knowing the people, speaking for the people, caring for the people, agreeing with the people, or performing everyday actions.
	People-advocacy	Political actor talks in the name of 'the people,' referring primarily to its will / advocative toward the people.
	People-accountability	Political actors refer to the importance of responding to what is portrayed as 'the people's' will.
Anti-elitism	Discrediting the elite	Smearing the elite with the moral ground.
	Blaming the elite	Accusing the elite's incompetence, failure, incapability.

	Detaching the elite from the people	Elite do not represent the people.
	Accusing the elite of betraying the people	Elite act against the people's interest.
	Zero-sum	Language framing politics as a competition between two groups, one moral and one immoral, whose fortunes are inversely related.
	Hostility against the state	Criticism of the state as an institution.
	Hostility against the politics	Criticism of the political system and establishment
	Hostility against the media	Criticism of the media
Popular sovereignty	Demanding popular sovereignty	The people are the ultimate sovereignty.
	Denying elite sovereignty	The elites deprive the people of their sovereignty.
	Apocalyptic politics	Language expressing the dire, cataclysmic consequences of political decisions, in particular the election at hand.
Campaign	Information on parties'	Information on campaign organization, communication tools, strategies, development and

communication	election campaigns	support. Information on poll numbers or vote registration, etc.
	Call for interaction	Call to like/comment/share a post or participate in a live stream on Facebook.
	Call for mobilization	Call to participate in a supporter campaign or to take action. Call to go to vote or to vote for a party.
	Negative emotions	communicant's use of negative emotions
	Positive emotions	communicant's use of positive emotions
Structural elements	Irrelevant posts	The post does not include information about the election or the campaign.
	Facebook Video Post	We code only when the post contains a video that is on Facebook and is shorter than 5 minutes.
	Irrelevant video posts	If the post contains a video that's not on Facebook, we code which type of the video it is. We also code when the video is on Facebook but it's longer than 5 minutes.

3.3 Pretest and Intercoder Reliability

Two coders including the author, ran a series of reliability tests using the same random samples of n = 50 posts each, and each time we used a new set of random sample. During the four times of pretests, we spent the most time clarifying the definition of each variable in the codebook not only because the idea of each populist concept could still be vague even with descriptions but also because of the different types of Facebook posts we had encountered, such as posts with pictures, posts with Facebook videos, posts with YouTube videos, or posts with Facebook live streams.

For the first pretest, we realized the performance of each variable was not good enough (See Table 6). We also discovered that the data might be distributed differently with low Krippendorff's alpha but a high percentage of agreement, meaning some of the variables rarely appeared.

Table 6 1st Pretest

Variable	Krippendorff's alpha	Percentage agreement
Stressing the people's virtue ...	-0.07	84%
Stating a monolithic people	-0.06	86%
Demonstrating closeness to the people	0.64	84%
People-advocacy	0.36	82%
People-accountability	0.54	94%
Discrediting the elite	0.23	90%
Blaming the elite	0.49	90%
Detaching the elite from the people	0.46	92%

Accusing the elite of betraying the people	0.65	98%
Zero-sum	1	100%
Hostility against the state	0	98%
Hostility against the politics	0.46	92%
Hostility against the media	1	100%
Demanding popular sovereignty	0.39	90%
Denying elite sovereignty	1	100%
Apocalyptic politics	0.48	96%
Information on parties' election campaigns	0.17	60%
Call for interaction	0.42	82%
Call for mobilization	0.52	76%
Negative emotions	0.85	96%
Positive emotions	0.78	94%

After the first pretest, we decided to merge all sub-category variables for the three populism dimensions for a more comprehensive interpretation of the data. The reliability result showed all three dimension variables with a high percentage of agreement but only the people-centrism variable passed the Krippendorff's alpha of .71 (See Table 7).

Table 7 1st Pretest with merged variables of three populism dimensions

Merged Variable	K alpha	Percentage agreement
pop_people	0.71	86%
pop_elite	0.56	82%
pop_sov	0.49	90%

After the first pretest, we received low results of 'information on election campaign,' 'call for interaction,' and 'call for mobilization.' We realized the diverse types of Facebook posts meant that we needed to filter and separate written content and visual content. We also clarified in further detail the difference between call for interaction and call for mobilization by distinguishing the latter one the offline campaign in real life. We then conducted the second pretest with the purpose to better define the variable definition, especially with the anti-elitism dimension and popular sovereignty dimension.

The second pretest showed we did improve the three variables related to campaign communication in large with 'call for interaction' Krippendorff's alpha reached .83 and 'call for mobilization' Krippendorff's alpha of .76. After merging variables into three populism dimensions, anti-elitism dimension and popular sovereignty dimension received fine Krippendorff's alpha. However, the people-centrism dimension failed to reach the standard (See Table 8).

Table 8 2nd Pretest with merged variables of three populism dimensions

Merged Variable	K alpha	Percentage agreement
pop_people	0.52	82%
pop_elite	0.85	96%
pop_sov	0.65	98%

In this case, we ran the third pretest. Meanwhile, we noticed there was confusion between the variable 'people-advocacy' and 'people-accountability'; therefore; causing the back and forth disturbance of people-centrism dimension. We then clarified the difference in detail. In a post, we coded people-advocacy only if the political actor proposed concrete policies in the name of the people. However, we coded people-accountability when a political actor emphasized the importance of serving the people as well as responding to the people's will. After the clarification, the third pretest result (See Table 9) showed the people-centrism variable reached the near standard score with .69. However, the popular sovereignty variable failed to reach the standard with Krippendorff's alpha of .15 in this round. We noticed the unequal distribution of this variable so we decided to conduct another round of pretest.

Table 9 3rd Pretest with merged variables of three populism dimensions

Merged Variable	K alpha	Percentage agreement
pop_people	0.69	94%
pop_elite	0.83	96%
pop_sov	0.15	86%

After the fourth pretest, we came to the conclusion that posts with the popular sovereignty variable were interestingly low, causing problematic distribution. But we

also realized sometimes there was difficulty for two coders to come to the same interpretation of posts because of different political stands one took or preferred. Sometimes the gap appeared because of the obscurity of the Chinese language. The reason we tried again and again to run the pretest was to specify and define each variable with clear definitions through empirical experiences. Since there was only one coder to conduct the final coding procedure, we in this round attained the acceptable results from all three populism dimensions and other sub-category variables (See Table 10).

Table 10 4th Pretest with merged variables of three populism dimensions

Variable	Krippendorff's alpha	Percentage agreement
Stressing the people's virtue ...	0	96%
Stating a monolithic people	0.65	98%
Demonstrating closeness to the people	0.33	88%
People-advocacy	0.39	90%
People-accountability	0	94%
Discrediting the elite	0.78	98%
Blaming the elite	0.81	96%
Detaching the elite from the people	0	98%
Accusing the elite of betraying the people	0	98%
Zero-sum	1	100%
Hostility against the state	1	100%
Hostility against the politics	0	94%

	Krippendorff's alpha	Percentage agreement
Hostility against the media	1	100%
Demanding popular sovereignty	1	100%
Denying elite sovereignty	1	100%
Apocalyptic politics	1	100%
Merged Variables	**Krippendorff's alpha**	**Percentage agreement**
pop_people	0.54	86%
pop_elite	0.91	98%
pop_sov	1	100%
Information on parties' election campaigns	0.73	90%
Call for interaction	0.72	96%
Call for mobilization	0.95	98%
Negative emotions	0.36	94%
Positive emotions	0.76	88%

V. Result

In this chapter, we would present the findings according to each hypothesis and research questions in order. In the first part, by carrying out a chi-square test, we compared candidates with each populism dimension as well as political parties with each populism dimension. We then explained the results to see if our hypotheses were supported. Second, we conducted regression analysis to examine the relation between populist communication and user engagement on Facebook. Last, we compared the different approaches to measure populism: the Bollen approach and the Goertzian approach. We organized the results into a table for further comparison.

1. Single Dimension Comparison

1.1 Candidates: H1a People centrism

To test hypothesis 1a, we conducted a chi-square test of independence to examine the relation between three candidates and the variable of people centrism. The result showed that there was significant association between candidates and people centrism, $x2$ (2, N = 266) = 21.634, $p < .001$.

Table 11 Proportion of the posts with variable 'people centrism'

Candidates	宋楚瑜找朋友	蔡英文	韓國瑜
Posts with people centrism (%)	0.2564103	0.0877193	0.3648649
Posts without people centrism(%)	0.7435897	0.9122807	0.6351351
Total	78	114	74

From the distribution of the posts (see Table 11), we discovered Han's posts consist of the highest percentage of people centrism dimension. On the other hand, Tsai's posts

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

consist of the lowest percentage of people centrism, and for Song's proportion remains the second highest.

To see each candidates' actual contributions to the chi-square statistic, we also ran a test for standardized residual. First, from the chi-square contribution test, we discovered that Tsai ranked the top and Han the second highest, but the disparity is small. Next, we ran the standardized residual test. The result gave us further interpretation to tell the difference between observed and expected values (see Table 12). If the standardized residual is larger than 2, then the variable can be considered a major contributor. On the contrary, if the residual is less than -2, the variable can be considered a weak contributor to the overall chi-square value. In the visualization below, positive residuals are in blue and negative residuals are in red. The positive values specify an attraction -positive association between the corresponding row and column variable which here is 'people centrism'. On the other hand, the negative values imply a repulsion - negative association between the corresponding variables.

Table 12 Contribution and residual analysis of variable 'people centrism'

Candidates	Contribution	Standardized residual
宋楚瑜找朋友	2.986	0.8036850
蔡英文	39.392	-2.9192702
韓國瑜	36.194	2.7982344

In Table 12, it's evident that there is a positive association between the 'people centrism' and the row Han. There is a negative association between the 'people centrism' and the row Tsai. Although Tsai and Han contributed almost the same, Tsai contributed by having a lower observed score than what is expected for her. Yet, Han contributed by being way over the expected value.

In this dimension, people-centrism includes five variables (subdimensions): 'Stressing the people's virtue/Praising the people's achievement,' 'Stating a monolithic people,' 'Demonstrating closeness to the people,' 'People-advocacy, 'and 'People-accountability.' To have a better understanding of people-centrism communication in a post, the following example is excerpted from one of Han's Facebook posts. Besides, to fully capture the idea, we need to read between the lines, therefore the full post is extracted.

Date	Excerpted Content *(post id 325)*
2019/12/31 Facebook Page 韓國瑜	今年 7/28，我發出第一支穿雲箭，號召 5000 萬海外僑胞和 2300 萬台灣人民一起終結民進黨的吃香喝辣、腐敗自肥，讓中華民國的青天白日重新現。 今年 9/2，我發出第二支穿雲箭，**讓所有厭惡台灣選舉歪風的好朋友們一起作伙到新北**，用千軍萬馬的歡笑、歌聲與正能量，大聲擊退、改變翻轉一切烏煙瘴氣的負能量。 今天，我要發出我的第三支穿雲箭，呼籲台灣所有軍公教警消以及情治人員，回到公職人員的最美初衷：「余誓以至誠，恪遵國家法令，盡忠職守，報效國家，不妄費公帑，不濫用人員，不營私舞弊，不受授賄賂。」 我相信各位可以清楚感受到，**這幾年您們已經被包圍在重重利益試探與權力威脅之中，進一步，就是同流合汙；退一步，就是有志難伸**，因此我懇請各位在這最後的黑暗時刻，繼續堅守崗位，嚴守中立；向國家盡責、不向特定政黨盡責，為人民服務，不為邪惡勢力服務。 **各位都是中華民國的優秀人才，也是中華民國與台灣價值的第一道防線**，如同豢養卡神楊蕙如一樣的鬥爭共犯或是製作國防部宣傳片一樣的政治馬屁，犧牲的不只是這些涉事人員的節操與良知，更是重創整個中華民國與台灣價值的民主精神與自由意志，因為這些共犯與馬屁讓台灣的民主與自由變成了一場極其諷刺的政治騙局！...

From the bold quotes, Han not only stressed the people's virtue, but also emphasized the importance of the people's achievement. Han praised the people by describing how the people kept their integrity in difficult times. By stressing the people's virtue, Han also stated a monolithic people creating a sense of feeling of 'us.'

We also noticed the frequent use of 'us' in the politician's language to show their closeness toward the people. Therefore, Han fits the profile of a populist more than the other two candidates. Similar examples are also shown in Tsai's posts, such as "這幾年，我走過市場、學校、工廠，看見我們台灣人的精神，就是腳踏實地、認真做事，也因為台灣人的實實在在，在世界的每一個角落打拚、努力，贏得了世界對我們的尊敬，讓世界看得起我們。" (Tsai Ing-wen, 2019).

Here is another example from Song. This post shows perfect examples of the subdimensions of how politicians demonstrate closeness to the people, speak in people-advocacy and people-accountability. From the bold quotes, Song made a point of the importance of responding to what is portrayed as the people's will. By showing his concern for the traffic options for people who live on offshore islands, Song also expressed his closeness to the people.

Date	Excerpted Content (*post id 732*)
2019/12/13 Facebook Page 宋楚瑜找朋友	【總統心裡面應時時刻刻掛念人民】 今天我和同仁到基隆八斗子漁港廣場經國先生生銅像前致敬，心裡有無限感慨。我們現在正在進行總統選舉，我們到底要選出怎麼樣典範的總統？**從蔣經國先生離開之後，中華民國的總統顯然忘了做什麼事。總統心裡面就是要掛念人民，為人民的事情盡心盡責。** 當年我跟著經國先生，和立法委員黃澤清，走在泥巴地上，一起來關心八斗子漁民的加油的問題。當時八斗子漁民必須要到基隆很遠的地方去加油，蔣經國先生對這個問題念念不忘。**「人民的小事，就是總統的大事」，但我們現在的這些總統，不管是國民黨的，民進黨的，都沒有把人民的事情當一回事！懷念蔣經國先生不是只用嘴巴講講！**

	昨天遠航突然停飛了，馬上要過年了耶！請問，離島的交通怎麼解決呢？馬上就要投票了，離島的鄉親怎麼回家鄉去投票？像這樣子不負責任的政府，每天只是在那邊叫口號、不做做事。如果我們不要讓台灣繼續沉淪下去，就別再選一些只會說大話的人。…

1.2 Candidates: H1b Anti-elitism

To test hypothesis 1b, a chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the three candidates and the variable of anti-elitism. The relation between these variables was significant, $x2(2, N = 266) = 14.041$, $p = .0008$.

Table 13 Proportion of the posts with variable 'anti-elitism'

candidates	宋楚瑜找朋友	蔡英文	韓國瑜
Posts with anti-elitism (%)	0.1410256	0.1052632	0.3108108
Posts without anti-elitism (%)	0.8589744	0.8947368	0.6891892
Total	78	114	74

From the proportion (see Table 13), Han outranked the other two candidates by taking up 31% of the posts with anti-elitism. The results of contribution and residuals analysis also show the similar finding that Han's posts contain the most element of anti-elitism (see Table 14).

Table 14 Contribution and residual analysis of variable 'anti-elitism'

Candidates	Contribution	Standardized residual
宋楚瑜找朋友	3.270	-0.6776274
蔡英文	21.499	-1.7374215
韓國瑜	57.937	2.8521624

In this dimension, anti-elitism includes eight sub-dimension with different strategies to draw a clearer picture of what anti-elitism is. Take the post below for instance, Han firstly denounced his opponent for not being able to govern the country well because of the pork barrel appointment. He then accused the opponent of being arrogant about having power in hands. Along with the previous post, Han (韓國瑜, 2019) wrote "終結民進黨的吃香喝辣、腐敗自肥." All these characters fall into the sub-dimension of discrediting and blaming the elite. In this post, Han also accused the opponent of ignoring the referendum result from the people. In one of the sub-dimension, populist often accuse the elite of betraying the people or acting against people's will. This is the exact example.

Date	Excerpted Content *(post id 457)*
2019/12/25 Facebook Page 韓國瑜	…我認為民進黨已經不配稱做民主進步黨，連創黨前輩和一路走來支持你們的先進都批評黨的價值已不復存在，**人民給了民進黨立院過半、手握資源的完全執政，這些總統任命的酬庸肥貓、派系要角正在掏空國家、清算政敵、罔顧人民公投結果**，還把手伸進司法系統，引起 1700 名法官的連署抗議。 …我再次強調，這不是民主社會的常態，選輸就發動罷免對手，且**極盡一切抹黑、造謠、影射手段**，真的令人憂心。一句高雄人要跟臺灣說對不起、又說台中人要跟林佳龍道歉，**權力傲慢令人不敢恭維**。現又傳出派系已在分贓準備推出新的高雄市長人選。一個連馬路都鋪不好、負債都說不清的團隊，現在就坐在總統府內掏空國家，這些都是蔡英文總統任命的派系黑幫，做為執政者架起拒馬及發動網軍打擊異己，在**民進黨雙標執政之下，放任假新聞挑起世代對立，把中華民國撕裂成兩個世界**。...

Normally, politicians debate about policies with solid proof or statistical numbers. But in the case of smearing the opponent, populists phrase their arguments with strong emotions but weak evidence. In Han's posts, he not only often discredits or blames the elite, but also holds hostility towards politics by criticizing the political system and the establishments. However, among the eight sub-dimensions of anti-elitism, hostility against the state and the media are rarely observed.

Date	Excerpted Content *(post id 49)*
2020/1/9 Facebook Page 韓國瑜	…身為一個領導者，我相信最重要的責任與義務就是敬天愛人、為民服務，**絕對不能像民進黨政府為了權力和選票而鴨霸執政、草率改革**，例如，年金改革與一例一休都是打鴨子上架式的倉促行事，缺乏完善溝通、也**背棄當初對人民的承諾**，造成兩敗俱傷的世代對立與勞資爭議；蔡總統的一句「減空污，那是下一代的事」讓全台灣肺病飆升，**未來大家還要為錯誤政策承擔高昂的電費**；人民行使言論自由批評政府施政本來天經地義，現在卻要被約談和查水表；最挺民進黨的中南部鄉親，換來的卻是**農漁庶民欲哭無淚、一堆淹水、蚊子館和豆腐渣工程；更不要說雪崩式的斷交、被所有的國際貿易組織拒於門外的孤立**，台灣的出路被民進黨帶進了一個「奧運可以中華台北、衛生不能中華台北」的鬼打牆裡面。...

As for the sub-dimension 'zero-sum,' the idea and language of zero-sum is that politics is framed as a competition between two groups, and in the Taiwanese case, this zero-sum game is between the KMT and the DPP. This sub-dimension is often seen in Song's posts, where he criticized the confrontation between the KMT and the DPP as having stalled progress for Taiwan. For example, in one of Song's post, he wrote "我認為台灣人民長期被藍綠兩黨綁架、情緒勒索，兩黨存在的目的似乎就是讓對方下架！台灣第三種聲音總是被抹紅或是直接忽略！期待 1 月 11 日第三勢力可以抬頭、讓台灣走出藍綠的長期霸凌！" (宋楚瑜找朋友, 2020). From such examples, we also noticed different candidates adopt different sub-dimensions of anti-elitism. Han uses more strategies of attacking the elite whereas Song often criticizes the deadlock of politics caused by the elite.

1.3 Candidates: H1c Popular sovereignty

A chi-square test of independence showed that there was no significant association between the three candidates and the variable of popular sovereignty, $x2$ (2, N = 266) = 0.9281, p= 0.6287. From the proportion, 'popular sovereignty' shows up in posts averagely low (see Table 15). Therefore, the result shows failing to reject the null hypothesis, meaning the test has not identified a consequential relationship between candidates and 'popular sovereignty.'

Table 15 Proportion of the posts with variable 'popular sovereignty'

candidates	宋楚瑜找朋友	蔡英文	韓國瑜
Posts with anti-elite (%)	0.02564103	0.01754386	0.04054054
Posts without anti-elite (%)	0.97435897	0.98245614	0.95945946
Total	78	114	74

The analysis of why there is no significant relation between popular sovereignty and the candidates will be explained in the following discussion section. However, there are still some examples to manifest the idea of popular sovereignty in these posts. First of all, there are three sub-dimensions in popular sovereignty- demanding popular sovereignty, denying elite sovereignty and the language of apocalyptic politics. Throughout the content analysis, it is discovered that denying sovereignty is the most frequently-used strategy. For example, in the first example post of Han, he accused the opponent (elite) "重創整個中華民國與台灣價值的民主精神與自由意志，因為這些共犯與馬屁讓台灣的民主與自由變成了一場極其諷刺的政治騙局！"(韓國瑜, 2019). Similar accusations also appeared in Song's post. In one video post, Song said to the camera that "這位次長（陳宗彥） 我嚴格來講，是不稱職，而且讓台灣的民

主蒙羞。民進黨說他是民主進步黨，講這個話就是民主退步！"（宋楚瑜找朋友,
2019). In both candidates arguments, they blamed the elites for impeding Taiwanese
people from pursuing progress for democracy and freedom. Therefore, it made sense for
politicians to also demand popular sovereignty. For instance, Song also wrote a post
stressing the importance of the people having the right to supervise the government,
"我們不必再仰視、害怕權力，監督執政者權力的行使，才是公民社會進步的象
徵！"（宋楚瑜找朋友, 2019). On the other hand, politicians also frame the coming
election in apocalyptic language to highlight popular sovereignty. By expressing the dire
and cataclysmic consequences of political decisions, these examples are often observed
from Tsai's posts, such as "1 月 11 日，全世界的媒體都會來到台灣，全世界都在
看，看台灣人民的選擇。我們如果讓國民黨班師回朝，誰最高興？"（蔡英文,
2020).

1.4 Party: H2a People centrism

To test hypothesis 2a, a chi-square test of independence showed that there was no
significant association between the three parties and the dimension of people centrism,
$x2$ (2, N = 407) = 2.4999, $p = 0.2865$. From the proportion of the posts, all three parties
are low, leading to few posts. Further analysis will be saved to the discussion section
(see Table 16).

Table 16 Proportion of the posts with variable 'people centrism'

Facebook Page	中國國民黨 **(KMT)**	民主進步黨 **(DPP)**	親民黨 **(PFP)**
Posts with people centrism (%)	0.02247191	0.05625000	0.06962025
Posts without people centrism (%)	0.97752809	0.94375000	0.93037975
Total	89	160	158

1.5 Party: H2b Anti-elitism

To test hypothesis 2b, a chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the three parties and the dimension of anti-elitism. The relation between these variables was significant, $x2$ (2, N = 407) = 7.174, p = .02768.

Table 17 Proportion of the posts with variable 'anti-elitism'

Facebook Page	中國國民黨 (KMT)	民主進步黨 (DPP)	親民黨 (PFP)
Posts with anti-elite (%)	0.17977528	0.10625000	0.06962025
Posts without anti-elite (%)	0.82022472	0.89375000	0.93037975
Total	89	160	158

From the proportion of the posts, the percentage of the KMT's posts and the DPP's posts are close (see Table 17). However, with the residual analysis, the KMT contributed the most with a high expected value (see Table 18). On the other hand, the DPP contributed the least. Interestingly, the PFP contributed the second highest by under expected value.

Table 18 Contribution and residual analysis of variable 'anti-elitism'

Candidates	Contribution	Standardized residual
中國國民黨(KMT)	58.940	2.05629842
民主進步黨(DPP)	0.071	-0.07148285
親民黨(PFP)	30.178	-1.47137413

From the content analysis, we noticed the DPP mostly accused the KMT for detaching from the people and betraying the people's will when the KMT tried to nominate a disputed lawmaker for congress. For instance, the DPP posted a paragraph attacking the KMT's political stand, "曾經高喊反共的中國國民黨，無視民意反彈，在不分區立委名單裡篤定保送親中爭議人選如吳斯懷、葉毓蘭等人，國民黨已經毫不掩飾他們親中急統的立場。" (民主進步黨, 2019).

Date	Excerpted Content *(post id 388)*
2019/12/22 Facebook Page 中國國民黨 KMT	【下架民進黨！民眾心聲篇】 民進黨鴨霸蠻橫，通過多項惡法，這是一黨正義，還是全民正義？ 民進黨高唱經濟 20 年來最好，卻無視小老百姓的苦，與人民的距離真遠！ 從洗車業、貨運業到農漁業，百工百業的心聲是：要下架民進黨，找一個真正照顧百姓的人執政！ #下架民進黨 #上架中華民國派 #政黨票支持 9 號國民黨 #總統票支持 2 號國政配 #區域立委支持國民黨提名候選人

However, the KMT's attack on the DPP could be seen as more comprehensive, from discrediting, blaming the elite, to accusing the elite's ignorance of the people's will. The above post is a good example with several sub-dimensions of anti-elitism, such as discrediting the ruling party as arrogant, blaming the ruling party for failing to promote the economy, accusing the ruling party of ignoring the people's wishes, and not hearing the people's voice. Another example of the KMT accusing the DPP of betraying the people's will is when the DPP passed the revision of Referendum Act. "民進黨政府不僅無視多數民意的公投結果，拒絕執行全民意志，嘴巴說支持民主、關心香港民主人權，卻以國會多數暴力針對性修法，沒收應該給人民的公投權利，重傷中華民國民主及人權的基本價值！" (中國國民黨, 2019) This argument also links to another dimension- popular sovereignty, which we will discuss in the next part. In short, from the statistical result, the KMT fits the profile of a populist party. The dimension of

anti-elitism is more prominent from the other two parties. From the content analysis, even though all parties might fall into this dimension, there are differences of which sub-dimensions each party chooses to adopt.

1.6 Party: H2c Popular sovereignty

To test hypothesis 2c, a chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the three parties and the dimension of anti-elitism. The relation between these variables was significant, x2 (2, N = 407) = 14.038, p = .0008.

Table 19 Proportion of the posts with variable 'popular sovereignty'

Facebook Page	中國國民黨	民主進步黨	親民黨
Posts with popular sovereignty (%)	0.07865169	0.00625000	0.01265823
Posts without popular sovereignty (%)	0.92134831	0.99375000	0.98734177
Total	89	160	158

From the proportion of the posts, all three parties are low with percentage but still the KMT ranked at the top (see Table 19). This logic falls in line with the contribution and residual analysis. The KMT contributed the most with much higher expected value (see Table 20).

71

Table 20 Contribution and residual analysis of 'popular sovereignty'

Candidates	Contribution	Standardized residual
中國國民黨	75.473	3.2549343
民主進步黨	15.570	-1.4783704
親民黨	6.500	-0.9552192

As we have mentioned earlier, this dimension includes three sub-dimensions. From the content analysis, we found that among the KMT's posts, most of the strategy they adopted is pointing fingers at the elites for denying the people popular sovereignty. Take the below post for example. The post itself was linked to the news of the then passed revised referendum act. The KMT not only criticized the policy but also took it as the sword to accuse the DPP of eroding democracy. As for the third sub-dimension 'apocalyptic politics,' it might be easily confused with the idea of what KMT often phrased "操作芒果乾" (韓國瑜, 2019). But by codebook definition, apocalyptic politics implies serious, catastrophic consequences from political decisions such as elections. Throughout the content analysis, we found DPP's posts might convey the sense of an urgency, but the language is usually encouraging instead of threatening. However, KMT played the card differently by sometimes indicating to the readers that

harsh consequences will come if they don't choose wisely, such as "如果你不在意

台灣的民主自由被民進黨侵蝕，無妄之災哪天可能就降臨到你身上！"（中國國

民黨, 2020).

Date	Excerpted Content *(post id 685)*
2019/12/16 Facebook Page 中國國民黨 KMT	【民主倒退！2019 公投法修惡】 民進黨政府於 2019 年 6 月 17 日在立法院臨時會強行推動公投法修法，將公投與大選脫鉤，而且全民未來只能二年行使一次公民投票權。**這種做法，閹割直接民權，沒收全民的公投**，將公投法從「鳥籠」變成「鐵籠」，作為民主法治國家，**這是嚴重的民主倒退，更是民主的悲哀！** **民進黨政府不僅無視多數民意的公投結果，拒絕執行全民意志**，嘴巴說支持民主、關心香港民主人權，卻以國會多數暴力針對性修法，沒收應該給人民的公投權利，重傷中華民國民主及人權的基本價值！ 當年力推蔡同榮公投草案的民進黨立委諸公們，「公投死了，民主還在嗎？」**當年民進黨奉行所謂的民主價值**，然而，時至今日，蔡政府卻暴力且強勢地讓公投法修惡。民進黨的袞袞諸公竟悶不吭聲？民進黨如何還能自稱是「民主進步黨」？根本就是「獨裁、退步」黨！ 作為民主法治國家，卻閹割人民的直接民權，是民主的笑話、悲哀，也是一大恥辱！ #反對鐵籠公投 #拒絕民主倒退 #讓民進黨下架

2. Populism and User Interaction

In this section, we tested three hypotheses we raised earlier to discover further relations between populism and Facebook engagement from six Facebook pages we collected. Due to the multilevel structure of the data from six Facebook pages, we used random intercepts in our multilevel model to reduce bias from different subgroups. First, to test hypothesis 3a, we ran a binary logistic regression of each variable - negative emotions and positive emotions - with populist communication. The results are shown in Table 21 and Table 22. We found posts with the dimension of anti-elitism (the variable pop elite) are more likely to include negative emotions, 95% CI [78.73, 507.66], $p < .001$. Since the odd ratio is less than 1, indicating the decreased occurrence, we found posts with the dimension of anti-elitism are less likely to include positive emotions, 95% CI [0.04, 0.17], $p < .001$. In addition, the results also show posts with the dimension of people centrism (the variable pop people) are more likely to include positive emotions, 95% CI [3.99, 17.42], $p < .001$. Therefore, we could conclude that our hypothesis is partly supported by the findings.

To sum up, the results picture two situations. When posts are about anti-elitism, we would be more likely to find negative emotions. On the other hand, when posts are about people centrism, we would be more likely to find positive emotions. This could also be explained by how populism operates when people are mentioned positively and praised. Yet, elites are attacked with negativity.

Table 21 Regression result of 'negative emotions' and populist communication

Negative emotions			
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*95% CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	0.01	0.00 – 0.02	**< 0.001**
pop people	1.07	0.45 – 2.54	0.878
pop elite	199.92	78.73 – 507.66	**< 0.001**
pop sov	3.38	0.76 – 14.97	0.109
call for mobilization	0.99	0.40 – 2.49	0.989
call for interaction	3.21	0.84 – 12.28	0.089
Random Effects			
ICC	0.11		
N $_{page}$	6		
Observations	813		
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.503 / 0.560		

Table 22 Regression result of 'positive emotions' and populist communication

Positive emotions			
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*95% CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	0.16	0.08 – 0.31	**< 0.001**
pop people	8.34	3.99 – 17.42	**< 0.001**
pop elite	0.08	0.04 – 0.17	**< 0.001**
pop sov	1.04	0.24 – 4.57	0.957
call for mobilization	63.15	34.26 – 116.42	**< 0.001**
call for interaction	2.16	0.85 – 5.49	0.105
Random Effects			
ICC	0.14		
N $_{page}$	6		
Observations	813		
Marginal R$_2$ / Conditional R^2	0.607 / 0.662		

To test hypothesis 3a-1, we ran a regression model with varying intercepts for the six different FB pages. We analyzed the predictors of the number of likes, shares, and comments to see whether positive or negative emotions affect user engagement. We observed the estimates, a unit that increases in dependent variables and then expected change in predictor variables. The result showed positive estimates for positive emotions in the predictor variable of likes and shares (see Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25). On the other hand, negative estimates are presented in all the predictor variables. The result shows that positive emotions do encourage user engagement more than negative emotions. Negative emotions do not prove the same. Therefore, the results only partially support our hypothesis.

To test hypothesis 3b, we ran the same regression analysis as the above. We examined the relationship between populist communication with user engagement. In

this case, we found there is a significant relation between likes and the dimension of people centrism (b = 4011.33, 95% CI [32.53, 7990.13], p= .04). The relation between likes and the dimension of anti-elitism is near the standard with p-value of .06. As for the case in shares, we found there are significant relations between shares and the dimensions of people centrism (b = 528.02, 95% CI [216.47, 839.57], p = .001) and popular sovereignty (b = 1350.92, 95% CI [701.51, 2000.33], $p < .001$). However, the regression model of comments indicates that there is no significant relations between comments and populist communication. To sum up, these findings partially support our hypothesis that populist communication leads to more user engagement than non-populist communication.

Table 23 Regression result of 'likes' and other variables

likes			
Predictors	*Estimates*	*95% CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	17094.33	-2013.59 – 36202.25	0.079
pop people	4011.33	32.53 – 7990.13	**0.048**
pop elite	5808.49	-236.18 – 11853.15	0.060
pop sov	4363.97	-3927.58 – 12655.52	0.302
call for mobilization	1006.35	-3286.07 – 5298.77	0.645
call for interaction	-3084.56	-7767.26 – 1598.13	0.196
Negative emotions	-617.27	-8305.24 – 7070.70	0.875
Positive emotions	1081.52	-3347.85 – 5510.90	0.632
Random Effects			
ICC	0.62		
N $_{page}$	6		
Observations	813		
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.011 / 0.628		

Table 24 Regression result of 'shares' and other variables

shares			
Predictors	*Estimates*	*95% CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	523.46	-174.15 – 1221.07	0.141
pop people	528.02	216.47 – 839.57	**0.001**
pop elite	165.94	-307.57 – 639.45	0.492
pop sov	1350.92	701.51 – 2000.33	**< 0.001**
call for mobilization	-256.36	-592.34 – 79.63	0.135
call for interaction	-192.46	-559.13 – 174.20	0.303
Negative emotions	-36.01	-638.02 – 565.99	0.907
Positive emotions	280.71	-66.08 – 627.49	0.112
Random Effects			
ICC	0.26		
N_{page}	6		
Observations	813		
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.041 / 0.288		

Table 25 Regression result of 'comments' and other variables

comments			
Predictors	*Estimates*	*95% CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	2351.16	658.21 – 4044.11	**0.007**
pop people	-330.66	-1285.13 – 623.82	0.497
pop elite	707.82	-743.32 – 2158.96	0.339
pop sov	333.28	-1656.68 – 2323.23	0.742
call for mobilization	86.80	-942.25 – 1115.85	0.869
call for interaction	118.03	-1005.30 – 1241.35	0.837
Negative emotions	-1125.76	-2970.16 – 718.63	0.231
Positive emotions	-1418.14	-2480.46 – -355.81	**0.009**
Random Effects			
ICC	0.17		
N $_{page}$	6		
Observations	813		
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.018 / 0.190		

3.   Two Different Operationalization for Populism

To answer the last research question, we conducted the comparison of the Bollen approach and the Goertzian approach among two sets of data, the candidates and the parties. By the proportion of the posts from each dimension, we got the dimension score. Based on each dimension score, we calculated the Bollen score by summing up all three dimension scores and got the average final score. As for the Goertzian score, according to minimum function, it is the score that is the lowest score from all dimensions.

The results show Han got the highest scores in both the Bollen approach and the Goertzian approach with the score of 0.2387 and 0.0405 (see Table 26). The second

highest score goes to Song with both approaches, and the last is Tsai. We also found that there is a huge disparity between the two approaches among all candidates. The difference indicated that the Bollen approach and the Goertzian approach at some point captured populism differently. But in what ways? Therefore, we looked into the disparity among three candidates. The biggest gap appears in Han's category with the discrepancy of 0.19 followed by Song's 0.12 and Tsai's 0.06. Besides, the lowest scores all come from the same dimension - popular sovereignty. Since it is not significantly related- proven from the previous hypothesis, we decided to drop it in the calculation. The second result shows the same order. Han still outranked the others with the highest score in both approaches. But this time, we discovered the lowest score of each candidate comes from different dimensions. Both Han and Song got the Goertzian score – the minimum score – from the dimension of anti-elitism. From this finding, it is aligned with Trent and Friedenberg's (1991) idea that challengers tend to attack opponent's political stand or policies with negative allegation. For Tsai, the Goertzian score came from the dimension of people centrism. According to Wang (2011), the incumbents usually the campaign strategy that emphasize the familiarity with the people, which helped highlighting the incumbents' advantage.

Table 26 Different approaches to populism: candidates comparison

Song Dimension score		Tsai Dimension score		Han Dimension score	
People:0.2564 Anti-elitism: 0.14102 sov: 0.0256		People:0.0877 Anti-elitism: 0.1052 sov: 0.0175		People: 0.3648 Anti-elitism: 0.3108 sov: 0.0405	
Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score
0.141	0.0256	0.0701	0.0175	0.2387	0.0405
Drop sovereignty					
Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score
0.1987	0.1410	0.0964	0.0877	0.3378	0.3108

Here we did the same calculation with the dataset focused on the three parties (see Table 27). The results show the KMT with the highest scores from both approaches-similar to the result of Han. However, there is a mixed competition between the DPP and the PFP. For the Bollen scores, the DPP ranked above the PFP with a tiny difference of the score from 0.0562 to 0.0506. As for the Goertzian scores, the PFP ranked above the DPP with a score of 0.0126 and the DPP 0.0062. The gaps between two approaches are relatively small compared with the candidates data result. However, among parties, the biggest disparity appears in the KMT category. Due to the same reason, we dropped the dimension score of popular sovereignty. But here we noticed the KMT's Goertzian score didn't come from the dimension score of popular sovereignty, but actually people centrism. The second result shows the DPP ranked second in both approaches. The KMT ranked first in Bollen scores while the PFP the last. However, in the Goertzian

approach, the PFP ranked first and the KMT remained third. Both the KMT and the DPP got the lowest Goertzian scores from the dimension of people centrism. As for the PFP, the dimension score of people centrism and anti-elitism is the same. We are unable to identify which dimension the Goertzian score came from. But from the observation through content analysis, it is more likely that score goes to people centrism.

Table 27 Different approaches to populism: parties comparison

KMT Dimension score		DPP Dimension score		PFP Dimension score	
People: 0.0224 Anti-elitism: 0.1797 sov: 0.0786		People: 0.0562 Anti-elitism: 0.1062 sov: 0.0062		People: 0.0696 Anti-elitism: 0.0696 sov:0.0126	
Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score
0.0935	0.0224	0.0562	0.0062	0.0506	0.0126
Drop sovereignty					
Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score	Bollen score	Goertzian score
0.10105	0.0224	0.0812	0.0562	0.0696	0.0696

VI. Discussion

The 2020 presidential election in Taiwan led us to revisit the discussion of populism. Through mass media's report on politicians' speeches, debates, or talks during the election, Han was described as a populist with high support from his diehard supporters - the so-called "Han Wave." However, the idea and the proof of populism only seemed intuitive and vague with descriptions, such as emotional tones, attacking the opponents or the media. Therefore, based on two reasons, we proposed to examine populism in Taiwan with a careful and deductive approach along with the inclusion of the use of social media. First, as we mentioned earlier in the literature review, discussing populism from an inductive point of view might easily fall into the fallacy of populism. Populism is still a contested concept with ongoing debate of its definition in the academic field. Second, according to prior research on populism in Taiwan (Hong-yi, 2011; Huang, 2014a, 2014b), most of the discussions focused on the period of time before 2008. In addition, most of these studies measured the populist attitude from survey data. In a most recent study of populist attitude in Taiwan, Tsai and Pan (2021) indicated that Taiwan academics still lacked direct measurement of populist attitudes. They also mentioned that using survey data sometimes causes the limitation of the research exploration. The missing data in the survey might cause a failure for scholars to explain certain important dimensions of populism.

Therefore, in this study we combined quantitative research with content analysis. We also collected from prior empirical studies, adapted and proposed a codebook for measuring populism. From our research results, we came to the conclusion that Han, at least among all the candidates in the 2020 presidential election, is demonstrably a populist politician with high scores in all three dimensions of populism. The result also correspond to what the media had repeatedly described him, as Han tending to attack his

opponents and use slang language to assert his closeness to the people. The findings also give a closer look on whether and how the other candidates applied similar populist communication strategies during the election campaign.

However, among the results from candidates to parties, we noticed one difference: the proportion of dimension of popular sovereignty is relatively lower than other dimensions. According to the previous literature review, in Western studies, the consensus of populism consists of all three dimensions. The finding indicates that what works for Western countries might not be the same answer to in Taiwan's case. In a recent Taiwan study on populism, Yen (2021) also pointed out it was necessary to make a difference on measuring populism in the Asian context. According to her study and the previous literature review, most of the discussion of populism focused on the Western world, such as Europe, America, or Latin America. Yen proposed that populism in Taiwan is conceptualized through income insecurity and the China factor. Yen suggested the China factor creates a dimension for populist candidates to mobilize voters. "It is the relationship with China - whether closer or further away economically and politically- that defines the political divide in Taiwan," (Yen, 2021, p. 165) Yen wrote, but also pointed out that the China factor has impact on the 'form and shape of Taiwan's populism.' In her study, Yen used the survey data trying to link the connection between China factor and the income insecurity. However, without the clear implication of the China factor mentioned above – whether it is Chinese cultural sentiment or nationalism- this is what Bonikowski warned in his study. According to Bonikowski (2017), populism's ambiguity often overlaps with other ideologies, such as far-right politics, nationalism, ethno-nationalism, or authoritarianism. The so-called China factor and economic insecurity might just be the tools for populist discourse but not populism itself. From the previous example, the DPP posted a paragraph accusing the KMT's political

stand with China, "曾經高喊反共的中國國民黨，無視民意反彈，在不分區立委名單裡篤定保送親中爭議人選如吳斯懷、葉毓蘭等人，國民黨已經毫不掩飾他們親中急統的立場。" (民主進步黨, 2019). From this example, DPP used the China factor as an anti-elitism tool to prove that the KMT betrayed the people's will. In addition to another previous example, the KMT posted a paragraph as well blaming the DPP for the downturn of the economy, "民進黨高唱經濟 20 年來最好，卻無視小老百姓的苦，與人民的距離真遠！" (中國國民黨, 2019). The income insecurity mentioned by Yen could be seen as the anti-elitism discourse tool for the KMT to discredit the DPP. Therefore, it is indeed important to include as much as factors, such as cross-Strait relations and the economic labor market, to analyze Taiwan's populism in Taiwanese political context. But it is more important to establish a proper conceptualization of populism that does not confuse the essence of populism with other ideologies.

In this discussion, we interpret the absence of the dimension of popular sovereignty with Taiwan's political and historical context. In the literature review, we learned how populism once played out in the process of democratization in Taiwan. Since then, direct democracy has been common in Taiwan. We regularly hold democratic presidential elections every four years, and other elections are also democratic. Therefore, during election campaigns, demanding popular sovereignty would not be a strategy for Taiwanese politicians. However, criticizing the elite for denying or corrupting democracy is often observed in our content analysis. On the other hand, in Western countries such as European countries and America, democracy works through parliamentary politics where normal people think it is far away from their daily lives. This difference in political mechanisms might be the reason why the dimension of popular sovereignty is almost absent in our research findings.

From the above, we enhanced the measurement of populism with a comprehensive codebook. We also explained the absence of the dimension of sovereignty. We then further raised another conceptual question from the structure of operationalizing measurement. Based on Wuttke et al. (2020), most of the studies apply the Bollen approach which views the concept components as partly interchangeable and compensatory. On the other hand, in their argument, the Goertzian approach captures the essence of populism by applying minimum function. Here, we raised the question whether there is a difference between these two approaches. From the candidates results, before we dropped the dimension of sovereignty, the score disparity between the two approaches are large, indicating that the Bollen approach fails to capture the essence of populism. The Bollen approach might explain the level of populist attitude, but to capture the essence of populism, the Goertzian approach provides more accuracy. Drawing from this perspective, we notice Han is the only candidate whose two scores are closer than the other two candidates. This finding further demonstrates that from both approaches, Han fits the profile of a populist politician. As for the party's results, we took the results after we dropped the dimension of sovereignty. The KMT is demonstrated to be a more populist party than the others by the Bollen approach. By the Goertzian approach, the PFP is demonstrated to be the more populist party by scoring high in the dimension of people centrism. However, scores from both approaches are very low, indicating that they might not use any strong populist discourse in their communication. After dropping the dimension of sovereignty, the different Goertzian scores from candidates and parties show the different communication strategies from candidates to parties. Candidates focus more on the dimension of people-centrism, especially showing closeness toward the people. This also fits the logic of election campaigns where candidates want to advocate to their voters. However, in parties

doi:10.6342/NTU202201053

results, communication strategies focus more on attacking the opponents and accusing the zero-sum from politics.

Last, in this research we discussed the relation between populist communication and user engagement on social media such as Facebook. From the result, we realized that populist communication is presented in both negative and positive emotions under different circumstances. When posts are about anti-elitism, we would be more likely to find negative emotions. On the other hand, when posts are about people centrism, we would be more likely to find positive emotions. This is also corresponding to how populism operates. When populists mention people in a post, it is usually in a positive scenario according to our sub-dimensions of people centrism. On the other hand, it also makes sense when posts are about anti-elitism, it is usually where populists are discrediting, blaming or accusing the elite (the opponent). In addition, our findings show that positive emotions do encourage user engagement more than negative emotions. This result echoes the finding from the study from Heiss et al. (2019). In their argument, "positive emotional expressions had a stronger effect on user engagement than negative emotions" (Heiss et al., 2019, p. 1497). The reason might be the nature of social media, which is used for entertainment purposes. Therefore, it provides more motivation for users to click likes, share, or comment for engagement on social media. In the end, we also tried to examine whether populist communication leads to more user engagement than non-populist communication. We found that the dimension of people centrism attracts higher engagement of 'likes' and 'shares.' This could be explained by the usage of social media "that tends to take the form of a communication among the like-minded" (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018, p. 3). This finding answers the previous hypothesis. When posts are about people centrism, we are more likely to find positive emotions which encourage more engagement.

VII. Research Limitations and Future Research

First of all, in this research, we conducted a series of pretests of the codebook with another coder. However, the variables of sub-dimensions did not work well at the beginning. The Krippendorff's alpha were very low, however the percentage of agreement was relatively high. This indicated the expected disagreement observed in the variables was very low. The irregular distribution of the variables also causes the problem. With a variable showing up only one or two times, it is rather difficult for both coders to measure it at the same time. To solve this problem, we merged variables with each sub-dimension accordingly.

Second, in this research, the coverage of the content analysis only focused on the written context. However, with the fast growing Facebook marketing skills, there are different types of Facebook posts in the data, such as video posts and posts with pictures. Besides, during the analysis, we noticed verbal content, such as speeches given by the populist on the stage during the election campaign, would be another resourceful data to examine populism. However, due to coder resources, we could not include video contents into the data for further analysis. Last, this research narrowed down the time frame of analysis to the 2020 presidential election. However, populism as a phenomenon should also be examined through a longer time frame throughout history. With the measurement proposed by this research, future study should consider conducting analysis comparing populism measurement with each political era in Taiwan. Therefore, the research could offer a more comprehensive and diachronic analysis of populism.

Reference

Allcock, J. B. (1971). Populism: A Brief Biography. *Sociology*, *5*(3), 371-387. https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857100500305

Aslanidis, P. (2016). Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective. *Political Studies*, *64*(1_suppl), 88-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12224

Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics: *Party Politics, 15*(1), 29-48. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808097890

Batto, N. (2019, December 27). *Populism and Han Kuo-yu*. *Frozen Garlic*. https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2019/12/27/populism-and-han-kuo-yu/

Bimber, B. (2014). Digital Media in the Obama Campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the Personalized Political Communication Environment. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *11*(2), 130-150. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2014.895691

Blassnig, S., Büchel, F., Ernst, N., & Engesser, S. (2019). Populism and Informal Fallacies: An Analysis of Right-Wing Populist Rhetoric in Election Campaigns. *Argumentation*, *33*(1), 107-136. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9461-2

Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2019). Populism in Online Election Coverage: Analyzing populist statements by politicians, journalists, and readers in three countries. *Journalism Studies*, *20*(8), 1110-1129. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2018.1487802

Bobba, G. (2019). Social media populism: Features and 'likeability' of Lega Nord communication on Facebook. *European Political Science*, *18*(1), 11-23. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0141-8

Bonikowski, B. (2017). Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment. *The British Journal of Sociology* 68(1), 181-213.

https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12325

Bonikowski, B., & Gidron, N. (2016). Multiple Traditions in Populism Research: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter,26* (12), 7-14. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2875372

Bonikowski, B., Halikiopoulou, D., Kaufmann, E., & Rooduijn, M. (2019). Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: A scholarly exchange. *Nations and Nationalism*, *25*(1), 58-81. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12480

Bronstein, J. (2013). Like me! Analyzing the 2012 presidential candidates' Facebook pages. *Online Information Review*, *37*(2), 173-192. https://doi.org/10.1108/OIR-01-2013-0002

Campbell, C. (2020, January 6). *Here's What's at Stake in Taiwan's Presidential Election*. Time. https://time.com/5759394/taiwan-election-2020/

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, *47*(1), 2-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184

Canovan, M. (2004). Populism for political theorists? *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *9*(3), 241-252. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263500

Canovan, M. (2005). *The people*. Wiley.

Chang, Y.-F., & Wang, T.-L. (2014). *Framing in Newspaper Coverage and Candidates' Facebook: Intermedia Agenda Setting in Taipei Mayoral Election of 2014* (p. 142) [Unpublished master's thesis]. National Taiwan University.

Chang, Y.-T. (2009)。搜尋台灣民粹式民主的群眾基礎。*台灣社會研究季刊*，75, 85-113. https://doi.org/10.29816/TARQSS.200909.0003

Chen, Jefery C. J. (2019, April 27). *Han Kuo-Yu: Taiwan's Populist President? Han is wildly popular, but his policy positions — or lack thereof — should be cause for concern, given Taiwan's delicate situation.* THE DIPLOMAT.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/han-kuo-yu-taiwans-populist-president/

Chien Y. S. & Wang, Jenn-Hwan (1995)。邁向新國家？民粹威權主義的形成與民主

問題。*台灣社會研究季刊*，20，17-55。

https://doi.org/10.29816/TARQSS.199508.0002

Cranmer, M. (2011). Populist Communication and Publicity: An Empirical Study of

Contextual Differences in Switzerland. *Swiss Political Science Review*, *17*(3), 286-

307. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02019.x

Druckman, J. N., Kifer, M. J., & Parkin, M. (2009). Campaign communications in U.S.

congressional elections. *American Political Science Review, 103*(03), 343-366.

https://doi.10.1017/S0003055409990037

Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How

politicians spread a fragmented ideology. *Information, Communication & Society*,

20(8), 1109-1126. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697

Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication:

Introduction to the special issue. *Information, Communication & Society*, *20*(9),

1279-1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525

Ernst, N., Blassnig, S., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., & Esser, F. (2019). Populists Prefer

Social Media Over Talk Shows: An Analysis of Populist Messages and Stylistic

Elements Across Six Countries. *Social Media and Society*, *5*(1), 1-14.

https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118823358

Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Extreme parties and

populism: An analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. *Information,

Communication & Society*, *20*(9), 1347-1364.

https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1329333

Fahey, J. J. (2021). Building Populist Discourse: An Analysis of Populist

Communication in American Presidential Elections, 1896-2016. *Social Science Quarterly*, *102*(4), 1268-1288. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12951

Freeden, M. (1998). Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? *Political Studies, 46*(4), 748-65. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00165

Gerodimos, R., & Justinussen, J. (2015). Obama's 2012 Facebook Campaign: Political Communication in the Age of the Like Button. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *12*(2), 113-132. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2014.982266

Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). They Did It: The Effects of Emotionalized Blame Attribution in Populist Communication. *Communication Research*, *44*(6), 870-900. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650216644026

Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez Populist?: Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, *42*(8), 1040-1067. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721

Heiss, R., Schmuck, D., & Matthes, J. (2019). What drives interaction in political actors' Facebook posts? Profile and content predictors of user engagement and political actors' reactions. *Information, Communication & Society*, *22*(10), 1497-1513. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1445273

Horton, C. (2019, April 16). *The Taiwanese Populist Advancing China's Interests.* The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/taiwanese-populist-han-kuo-yu-china/587146/

Huang, Hong-Yi (2011). *The Sources and The Intention of The Taiwan Populism: From The E.A.B. 2010 Taiwan Survey* [Unpublished master's thesis]. National Taiwan University. https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.02753

Huang, K.-K. (2003). *民粹亡台論*(三版)。商周。

Huang, Yu-Ting & Tsay, Ruei-Ming (2015)。晚近臺灣民粹主義的發展:「人民」與

92

「他者」想像的形成。*人文與社會科學期刊*，*53*(3)，127-163.

Huang, Yu-Ting (2014a). *The Paradox of Democracy in Taiwan: Revisiting Nationalism and Populism*. (Unpublished master's thesis). Tunghai University.

Huang, Yu-Ting (2014b)。台灣民粹主義轉變的探討：選舉民粹主義的形成。*弘光人文社會學報*，*17*，52-73.

Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, *46*(3), 319-345. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x

Jansen, Chiu-Ti (2019, July 12). *Who is Han Kuo-yu: Could Kaohsiung's populist mayor be Taiwan's next president?* South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/3018052/who-han-kuo-yu-could-kaohsiungs-populist-mayor

Jansen, Robert S. (2011). Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism: *Sociological Theory,* *29*(2), 75-96. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2011.01388.x

Lin, H.-C. (2017). How political candidates' use of Facebook relates to the election outcomes. *International Journal of Market Research*, *59*(1), 77-96. https://doi.org/10.2501/IJMR-2017-004

Lin, Shu-Fen (2005)。"人民"做主？民粹主義、民主與人民。*政治與社會哲學評論*，*12*，141-182。https://doi.org/10.6523/168451532005030012004

Mazzoleni, G., & Bracciale, R. (2018). Socially mediated populism: The communicative strategies of political leaders on Facebook. *Palgrave Communications*, *4*(1), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0104-x

Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). *Democracies and the populist challenge*. Palgrave.

Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, *39*(4), 541-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Müller, J.-W. (2017). *What is populism?* University of Pennsylvania Press.

Nachman, L. (2020, January 13*). Taiwan's Voters Show How to Beat Populism-Mobilization and national identity proved key to Han Kuo-yu's defeat.* Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/13/china-tsai-han-trump-boris-taiwans-voters-show-how-to-beat-populism/

Pappas, T. S. (2012). *Populism emergent: A framework for analyzing its contexts, mechanics, and outcomes. EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2012/01*, 1-31. https://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/20114

Rauchfleisch, A. (2017). The public sphere as an essentially contested concept: A co-citation analysis of the last 20 years of public sphere research. *Communication and the Public*, *2*(1), 3-18. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057047317691054

Roberts, K. M. (2006). Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, *38*(2), 127-148. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/20433986

Schmuck, D., & Hameleers, M. (2019). Closer to the people: A comparative content analysis of populist communication on social networking sites in pre- and post-Election periods. *Information, Communication & Society*, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1588909

Taggart, P. A. (2000). *Populism*. Open University Press.

Taiwan Fact Check Center (2019, December 29). *2020 總統大選電視辯論會查核報告。* https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/articles/1718

Trent, J. S., & Friedenburg, R. V. (1991). *Political campaign communication: Principles*

and practices. Praeger.

Van Kessel, S. (2015). *Populist Parties in Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137414113

Wang, T. L. (2011). 2 Comparing Communication Strategies of Incumbents and Challengers in Blogs: The Case Study of Taiwan's 2009 Municipal Election. *The Journal of Advertising & Public Relations*, 36, 31-69. https://doi.org/10.30412/TJAPR.201107_(36).0002

Wang, T. L. (2013)。「臉書選舉」？2012 年台灣總統大選社群媒體對政治參與行為的影響。*東吳政治學報*，*31*(1)，1-52。

Weyland, K. (1998). The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. *Journal of Democracy*, *9*(2), 108-121. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0034

Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. *Comparative Politics*, *34*(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/422412

Wuttke, A., Schimpf, C., & Schoen, H. (2020). When the Whole Is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Populist Attitudes and Other Multidimensional Constructs. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 356-374. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000807

Yang, Hui-Ting (2004). *台灣政治民主化民粹批判論述之歷史形構* [Unpublished master's thesis]. National Taiwan University. https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.00659

Yen, W. (2021). Labor Market, Economic Insecurity, and Populism in Taiwan. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*. *17*(1), 161-189.

中國國民黨 KMT (2020, January 4)。【*反滲透法人人自危！百工百業給問嗎#1*】*蔡英文政府以《社維法》法辦人民* [Facebook status update]。Facebook。

https://www.facebook.com/131181017972/posts/10157998521362973

中國國民黨 KMT (2019, December 16)。【*民主倒退！2019 公投法修惡*】*民進黨政*

府於 2019 年 6 月 17 日在立法院臨時會 [Facebook status update]。Facebook。

https://www.facebook.com/131181017972/posts/10157936299387973

王光旭、蔡子弘、陳薇丞 (2019)。政治人物經營臉書策略之研究：以第九屆不分

區立法委員為例。*民主與治理*，*6*(2)，1-45。

https://doi.org/10.3966/2311505X2019080602001

民主進步黨 (2019, December 29)。*中國對台灣以各種手段進行滲透、併吞台灣的*

意圖昭然若揭 [Facebook status update]。Facebook。

https://www.facebook.com/150336441057/posts/10156394419356058

宋楚瑜找朋友 (2019a, December 17)。【*政治麻辣鍋~宋主席來掀鍋*】「*我們的領*

導人叫總統，請問不叫他叫總統叫他叫什麼？」 [Facebook status update]。

Facebook。

https://www.facebook.com/491399324358361/posts/1528035587361391

宋楚瑜找朋友 (2019b, December 26)。*權力使人腐化；絕對的權力，絕對的腐化。*

我們不必再仰視、害怕權力 [Facebook status update]。Facebook。

https://www.facebook.com/491399324358361/posts/1537691986395751

宋楚瑜找朋友 (2019c, December 31)。【*總統心裡面應時時刻刻掛念人民*】*今天我*

和同仁到基隆八斗子漁港廣場經國先生生銅像前致敬 [Facebook status update]。

Facebook。

https://www.facebook.com/491399324358361/posts/1524220507742899

宋楚瑜找朋友 (2020, January)。*您曾經有過被霸凌的經驗嗎？諸如：校園霸凌、*

職場霸凌與網路霸凌都會讓人留下一輩子不愉快的陰影 [Facebook status

update]。Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2545048532421330

周陽山 (1993)。*自由憲政與民主轉型*(初版)。東大發行。

周陽山 (2004)。*民粹台灣*。時英。

柯皓翔、許家瑜 (2020, January 8)。*選舉語言的祕密：解析韓國瑜、蔡英文圈粉術*。
報導者 The Reporter。https://www.twreporter.org/a/2020-election-politician-art-of-speech

胡正光、江素慧 (2020)。民粹主義在台灣─韓國瑜及其支持者。*臺灣國際研究季刊，16*(3)，155-183。

唐偉峻 (2013)。*粉絲專頁經營方式之探討—以歌手、政治人物、通路為例*[未出版碩士論文]。國立臺灣大學。http://doi:10.6342/NTU.2013.01880

高閔琳 (2011)。*社群網站與台灣地方選舉之關係—以 2010 年高雄市長候選人陳菊 Facebook 經營個案為例* [未出版碩士論文]。國立臺灣大學。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.01664

莊伯仲、金志聿 (2019)。候選人臉書經營和選舉結果之關聯分析：以 2016 年區域立法委員選舉為例。*選舉研究*，89-121。

陳方隅(2020, January 4)。*陳方隅／總統辯論會後：事實查核興起，與台灣民粹主義危機*。思想坦克 Voicettank。https://www.voicettank.org/single-post/2020/01/04/010401

蔡明璋、潘欣欣 (2021)。臺灣民粹主義者與反菁英情緒：世界價值觀調查臺灣資料的分析。*臺灣社會學刊，69*，101-140。

蔡英文 Tsai Ing-wen (2019, December 30)。*守護下一代、守護我們的未來！這幾年，我走過市場、學校、工廠，看見我們台灣人的精神* [Facebook status update]。
Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/46251501064/posts/10156333735386065

蔡英文 Tsai Ing-wen (2020, January 9)。*後天就要投票了，1月11日，全世界的媒體都會來到台灣，全世界都在看* [Facebook status update]。Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/46251501064/posts/10156359639206065

韓國瑜 (2019a, December 12)。*【芒果乾吃完了，《難民法》怎麼還不上桌？！】反對民進黨以現行法規和行政措施* [Facebook status update]。Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/1863023523934803/posts/2632792903624524

韓國瑜 (2019b, December 25)。*【我們有能力讓下一代翱翔四海，現在不做，何時要做？】我在政見會上再次強調，國家要強大* [Facebook status update]。Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/1863023523934803/posts/2648313318739149

韓國瑜 (2020, January 9)。*【謝謝今天晚上的每一個你】我曾經見證過，政治家們如何運用他們的遠見與魄力* [Facebook status update]。Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/1863023523934803/posts/2667443060159508

韓國瑜(2019c, December 31)。*今年7/28，我發出第一支穿雲箭，號召5000萬海外僑胞*[Facebook status update]。Facebook。https://www.facebook.com/twherohan/posts/2655305234706624

嚴文廷 (2019, December 29)。*【評總統候選人電視辯論會】沈有忠：兩個小孩吵架、長輩談豐功偉業，韓國瑜批媒體讓人大開眼界─報導者*。*The Reporter*。https://www.twreporter.org/a/2020-election-president-television-debate-review