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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 洪一薰 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chia-Chun Ma | en |
dc.contributor.author | 馬嘉駿 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T09:59:40Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-08 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2017-02-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-11-26 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Albon, R., & York, R. (2008). Should mobile subscription be subsidized in mature markets? Telecommunications Policy, 32(5), 294-306.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/60154 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 近年來電信商採用手機綁約策略吸引消費者並且擴展市場需求,消費者透過補貼合約可以較低的前置成本來取得高價的智慧型手機,相對地必須支付較高的月租費回饋給電信商。隨著手機市場逐漸成熟飽和,且電信商之間具有高度的價格競爭,補貼對於電信商所帶來的邊際效益逐漸遞減,導致電信商的補貼成本上升影響其獲利能力。本研究主要探討補貼對於整體電信產業的影響,包括上游的手機製造商、下游的電信商與終端消費者,為了改善現行補貼策略的缺點,本研究提出收益分享策略,藉由兩個策略的比較,期望歸納出管理上的意函幫助製造商與電信商制定決策。本研究以Stackelberg模型為基礎,建構兩階層之供應鏈模型,並且假設市場中存在一家獨佔的手機製造商與雙頭寡佔的電信商,電信商間可能存在Cournot競爭。透過求得成員間的均衡解,本研究發現消費者的補貼偏好程度與電信商的補貼成本對於整體電信產業有高度的影響,過高的補貼對於製造商、電信商與消費者皆有不利的影響。此外,在不同市場環境下存在著可行區域能讓收益分享策略的效益優於補貼策略,顯示補貼策略對於電信產業可能是影響成員間利益的雙面刃。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | To expand the market shares of telecom operators, the subsidy strategy is frequently used as a competitive mechanism in the telecommunication industry recent years. Consumers can obtain the smartphone at a low upfront cost and repay the price of the handset monthly throughout the contract. As the markets become more mature, subsidies might either force operators to spend excessively on marketing costs or compel operators to increase contract prices which may have negative impact on the benefits of entire supply chain. In this research, we investigate the influence of subsidy strategy and attempt to generate managerial insights for the manufacturer and operators. To improve the efficacy of the telecommunication supply chain, we provide a revenue sharing strategy compared to the existing subsidy strategy. We define and analyze the two-tier conceptual models by the Stackelberg-type game with Cournot competition. Through the equilibrium decisions of the manufacturer and operators, we find out the consumer preferences toward subsidies and the subsidy increment costs have a great impact on the interests of the manufacturer, operators and the end customers. There also exists feasible regions that the participants in the telecommunication supply chain can obtain higher profits in the revenue sharing strategy than subsidy strategy under different scenarios. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T09:59:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R03546023-1.pdf: 2459095 bytes, checksum: b90c2e60c1085a6bd4d9b51fa05c9eb2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 I
中文摘要 II ABSTRACT III CONTENTS IV LIST OF FIGURES VI LIST OF TABLES VII CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 5 2.1 Telecommunication supply chain 5 2.2 Consumer utility function 6 2.3 Subsidy strategy 7 2.4 Revenue sharing strategy 7 CHAPTER 3 THE MODEL 9 3.1 Consumer utility function 11 3.2 Subsidy model 12 3.2.1 Contract demand 13 3.2.2 Value-added service demand 15 3.2.3 Solution approach 16 3.2.4 Identical telecom operators 20 3.3 Revenue sharing model 26 3.3.1 Contract demand 27 3.3.2 Value-added service demand 28 3.3.3 Solution approach 29 3.3.4 Identical telecom operators 33 CHAPTER 4 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 39 4.1 Parameter settings 39 4.2 Identical telecom operators 40 4.2.1 The impact of increment subsidy cost and subsidy sensitivity coefficients on customer payment 40 4.2.2 The impact of contract fee on different models 42 4.2.3 Feasible regions between subsidy and revenue sharing model 43 4.3 Heterogeneous telecom operators 46 4.3.1 The impact of wholesale price on heterogeneous telecom operators in the subsidy model 46 4.3.2 The impact of the subsidy increment cost coefficients on heterogeneous telecom operators in the subsidy model 48 4.3.3 The impact of the subsidy sensitivity coefficients on heterogeneous telecom operators in the subsidy model 49 4.3.4 The competition between telecom operators in the subsidy model 50 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 52 APPENDIX 54 REFERENCES 55 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 電信產業之單次補貼與收益分享銷售策略研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Pricing Strategy between Subsidy and Revenue Sharing Mechanisms in the Telecommunication Supply Chain | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 105-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王逸琳,吳政鴻,張時中 | |
dc.subject.keyword | Stackelberg模型,手機綁約,定價,電信產業,補貼,收益分享, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Stackelberg model,bundled product,pricing,mobile supply chain,subsidy,revenue sharing, | en |
dc.relation.page | 57 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201603766 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2016-11-28 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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