中共政治繼承對兩岸關係之影響：1989-2012

Abstract

本研究以江澤民、胡錦濤執政的二十三年為主要的研究範圍，並選出十九個影響兩岸關係變化的重要事件，從中探討中共領導人繼承制度化後，其權力地位是否會對兩岸關係造成影響，以及造成影響的原因。研究架構上將中共領導人的權力地位設為自變項，並設為「繼承轉型」與「繼承鞏固」二期。而中共對臺灣的回應則為應變項，設定了互動指數表以分類事件的性質，分為「積極呼應」、「消極呼應」、「有限反制」與「強烈反制」四個範圍。準此，本文假設：當領導人位處繼承轉型期時，他對臺回應會採「消極呼應」與「強烈反制」；當他邁入繼承鞏固期後，對臺回應則轉為「積極呼應」和「有限反制」。研究發現，當中共領導人處於繼承轉型期時，因未握有最終決策權，又亟需取得軍方效忠，故當他接收到臺灣的善意時，只能消極地呼應；接收到臺灣的敵意時，他又必須以強烈動作反制之，以換取軍方的信任。而步入繼承鞏固期的領導人，因大權在握，故當接收到臺灣傳遞的善意時，他會相當積極地呼應，並在對臺政策上有創新的論述以取得歷史定位；而接收到臺灣的敵意時，因為他已取得軍方的效忠，無須再討好軍方並已有能力可整合黨內意見，就會採相對有限的反制。本文除了讓中國研究與兩岸關係研究對話，充實了兩岸關係研究的知識體系外，更可為臺灣在盱衡兩岸關係有更深度的戰略思考。

Although there has been plenty studies to discuss the impact of Taiwan presidential elections on cross-Strait relations, fewer studies concentrate on the effect of the domestic political factors of the mainland China on cross-Strait relations, especially the impact of political succession in the CCP. Therefore, to explore the impact of political succession in the CCP on cross-Strait relations, this master thesis focuses on the power position of two CCP general secretaries, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and their responses to Taiwan’s stimuli. In the research structure, the CCP leader’s power position is the independent variable, which is divided into two periods: succession transition and succession consolidation. There are several indexes to evaluate the succession periods. The dependent variable is the intensity of the CCP leader’s responses to Taiwan’s stimuli. The author selects nineteen major events on cross-Strait relations during the period between 1989-2012, and also gives the grades to every events to speculate the intensity. The hypotheses are as follows: (1) the CCP leader in the transition period will reciprocate limitedly to Taiwan authority’s positive signals, and retaliate aggressively to Taiwan authority’s negative signals; (2) the CCP leader in the consolidation period will reciprocate actively to Taiwan authority’s positive signals, and retaliate limitedly to Taiwan authority’s negative signals.The study shows that the hypotheses are verified. The CCP leader in the transition period reciprocates limitedly to Taiwan’s positive signals due to lack of resource, and retaliates aggressively to Taiwan’s negative signals for lack of loyalty from the military. On the other side, the CCP leader in the consolidation period reciprocates actively because of full authority in the party, and retaliates limitedly because he already gets the loyalty from the military, not need to appease the military anymore. This article is a first systematic approach to study the impact between political succession in the CCP and its Taiwan policy, hoping to inspire further studies and to enrich the researches on cross-Strait relations in the future.