國立臺灣大學文學院外國語文學系暨研究所

博士論文

Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures

College of Liberal Arts

National Taiwan University

Doctoral Dissertation

影像的房間：維吉尼亞・吳爾芙的時間主體性

A Room of Images: The Subjectivity of Time in Virginia Woolf

郭家珍

Chia-chen Kuo

指導教授：張小虹 博士

Advisor: Hsiao-hung Chang, Ph.D.

中華民國 100 年 6 月

June 2011

致謝

這本論文之所以能完成，必須謝謝我的指導教授 張小虹老師。不管是在修課還是撰寫論文的期間，老師總是耐心而溫和的指導我；而當我遇到挫折和困難時，又不厭其煩地開導我、鼓勵我。老師的想像力、創造力以及面對學術的嚴謹與熱忱，都是我要效法與學習的對象。而我也要藉此特別謝謝 馮品佳老師，除了幫助我釐清論文中許多重要的概念之外，老師更在教學與編輯這兩塊領域，提攜、指導並督促我進步；老師對我的關心，我都點滴在心頭。當然還要向其他辛苦的口試委員們表達我的謝意，蔡秀枝老師、謝莉莉老師與涂銘宏老師，他們專業與精闢的問題與見解更是讓我對學問有更深一層的理解與體悟。

最要感謝的，當然還是我的家人。謝謝爸媽的全力支持，讓我能在轉換人生跑道時心無旁騖。謝謝姊姊不論是在生活或教學上，都一直給予我中肯而溫暖的鼓勵。謝謝明軒會適時給予我不同的意見，提醒我尊重其他看法的重要性。當然還有陪在我身邊的偉豪，除了隨時充當我的智囊團與嚴格督促的教練，這麼多年來，謝謝他一直堅強、穩定而溫暖的守護著我。雖然親愛的毛毛已經離開了，但牠那傻呼呼的樣子卻始終在我心裡，陪伴著我。

五年的博士班生涯一眨眼就過去了。這之間的歡笑、淚水、汗水伴隨著做研究與念書的龐大壓力，讓我一輩子難忘。我很高興，同時很期待以全新的身分所要展開的全新生活。人生有這樣的結束、這樣的開始，真的很美好。

謹把這本博士論文，獻給我最重要、也最親愛的家人。

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been accomplished without numerous supports and encouragement. I am truly grateful to Prof. Hsiao-hung Chang who scrupulously studies my dissertation and her revision has resulted in many substantial improvements. Prof. Chang also encourages and comforts me when I confront obstacles in writing my dissertation. I cannot express all that the present work owes to her. I am also indebted to Prof. Pin-chia Feng who is not only an insightful and constructive reader of my dissertation but also an important mentor in my personal life. She teaches, urges and encourages me to progress in the fields of teaching and editing. I also wish to thank Prof. Hsiu-chih Tsai, Prof. Lili Hsieh and Prof. Ming-hung Tu for their careful readings and constructive suggestions. Their comments and advice direct me toward a more mature and self-reflective academic route.

During the years of composing my dissertation and obtaining the doctoral degree, I am obliged to receive invaluable assistances and instructions from all the professors who inspire me in their lectures and to receive warm and kind supports from my friends and classmates. Above all, I must express my acknowledgement to my family who unconditionally support me in these years: my parents, my siblings, my pet and my dear husband. I would like to dedicate my doctoral dissertation to my beloved family.

中文摘要

目前的吳爾芙研究都把她住過的房子／房間以及她所創造的虛構房子／房間讀成具體、固定且可辨識的地方。但在本論文中，我將利用吉列斯・德勒茲的時間理論，來論證當時間展開自身的主體性時，空間如何流變為時間。而這邊所謂的時間，不是我們日常生活中習以為常的線性時間，而是過去、現在、未來並存的真實時間。作為一生命之力，當時間展開自身時，人會流變成非主體或是不可感知的無器官身體，而空間則會去畛域化而流變成任意空間。另外，由於吳爾芙和德勒茲皆對電影作為一新興藝術有所著墨，我會使用他們各自的著作加以說明觀眾如何在觀看電影時被迫和時間的主體性相遇。

論文第一章處理《達洛威夫人》。我將深入說明時間如何是一流變之力且無法被任何形式所區分與定義。除了把賽特姆斯的死亡讀成啟發克萊麗莎知曉生命意義的契機之外，我更把他的死亡讀成一德勒茲式的事件：死亡如何打開生命之力，而它的開展則使克萊麗莎的主體性與語言破碎，同時她所身處的小房間也流變為任意空間。第二章則討論「自由間接言談技巧」如何在電影與文學中創造了第四人稱的敘事者，而它所創造出的不可區分空間則呈現了時間的主體性。我將論證，在撰寫《燈塔行》中〈時光流逝〉這一節時，吳爾芙如何利用此書寫技巧逼近第四人稱敘事者的說話位子以便呈現時間的主體性；而阮賽家族的夏季度假小屋與其說是具體地方，不如說，因為它是被第四人稱敘事者所描述而流變為任意空間。第三章討論《歐蘭朵》並說明歐蘭朵的身體如何可以被閱讀成無器官身體。我舉了歐蘭朵所身處的百貨公司、她的畫廊與宅邸，說明時間主體性之開展就在於當實際影像和其自身的虛擬影像交換時。最後一章則討論〈一間鬧鬼的屋子〉，在此我論證，這間房子其實有時候是從第四人稱敘事者的角度描寫且此短篇小說是由（時間）影像的語言所撰寫，以至於文內會出現許多裂縫、缺口而語言在此篇中短路、結巴。

總結來說，當我們已習慣於線性時間時，吳爾芙與德勒茲則在各自的著作中論述時間的主體性：當時間展開自身時，人流變為非主體，而空間則流變為任意空間。

關鍵字：德勒茲、吳爾芙、柏格森、電影、時間影像、流變、任意空間

Abstract

The present Woolfian scholarship reads the real houses and rooms lived by Woolf and the textual ones created by Woolf as places and spatial locations. Nevertheless, in my dissertation, I will use Gilles Deleuze's theory of time to argue that space is transformed by time and into time when time discloses itself. The time is not the chronological time but the coexistence of the past, the present and the future. As life force, it is encompassing while transforming beings and nonbeings perpetually. Therefore, when time discloses its subjectivity, humans are transformed into non-subjects while space is deterritorialized as any-space-whatever. Although there are numerous ways to perceive the subjectivity of time in different terrains of art, I exemplify cinema and maintain that it provides moments of affect at which spectators are forced to confront time when they are transfixed by and immersed into time.

Apart from elaborating on Bergson's and Deleuze's theoretical concepts of time in Introduction, I focus on *Mrs. Dalloway* in Chapter One and demonstrate that real time is a force of becoming which defies any proportional and conventional divisions. I single out the death of Septimus and read it not only as an important illumination of instructing Clarissa the meaning of life but also as a Deleuzian event which unleashes life force. It is disclosed to the degree that Clarissa's subjectivity and language are

disintegrated while the little room where she is situated is transformed into any-space-whatever. Chapter Two is devoted to discussing how free indirect discourse renders time visible by creating a fourth-person speaker both in cinema and in writing. The indiscernible zone created by such a technique makes us perceive the subjectivity of time. I argue that Woolf uses this writing technique to compose "Time Passes" in *To the Lighthouse* to the extent that this inter-text is narrated *almost* from the perspective of time. In this light, the summerhouse of the Ramsays is transformed into time and it is because if free indirect discourse is an approach to simulate a perspective ensuing almost from time by creating a fourth-person speaker, this textual house narrated by this mysterious speaker is merely a facet of time as a zone of indiscernibility. Chapter Three focuses on *Orlando* in which I demonstrate how Orlando's body can be read as a body without organs. According to Deleuze, time discloses itself when the actual image is exchanging its own virtual image. In this respect, I maintain that time discloses itself when Orlando is situated in a department store, in her gallery and in her mansion. When Orlando is forced to be transformed into a BwO by involuntarily confronting the exchange process, these spaces where she is located are becoming any-spaces-whatever. Chapter Four tackles "A Haunted House." I aver that the house is *haunted* by time when time as the fourth-person speaker lurking inside the house/text articulates itself. By having recourse to Deleuze's discussion on Samuel

Beckett's language types, I argue that this short story is composed by the language of (time) image in which there are so many irremediable gaps and holes that language stutters. In other words, consonant with the Deleuzian free indirect discourse argued in Chapter Two, the subject matter of Chapter Four also unravels how this textual house is transformed into time when the speaking position is emanating *almost* from the perspective of time and how language is short circuited by means of it.

To sum up, when we are accustomed to the chronological time, Woolf and Deleuze direct our attention to the disclosure of time in each of their corpuses. They unanimously demonstrate that when time discloses its subjectivity, humans are becoming non-subjects while space is becoming any-space-whatever.

Keywords: Gilles Deleuze, Virginia Woolf, cinema, time-image, becoming, any-space-whatever

Table of Contents

Introduction

> In my experience what cuts the deepest channels in our lives are the different houses in which we live—deeper even than "marriage and death and division," so that perhaps the chapters of one's autobiography should be determined by the different periods in which one has lived in different houses . . .
>
> —Leonard Woolf, *Beginning Again*

Even though Woolf in "Haworth, November, 1904" confesses her worry that "whether pilgrimages to the shrines of famous men ought not to be condemned as sentimental journeys" (5), in her lifetime, she undertook literary pilgrimages many times. According to Katherine Hill-Miller, "She visited the Carlyle's home in Cheyne Row, Keats's house in Hampstead, the Brontë parsonage at Haworth. She saw Swift's epitaph at St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin, and concluded that Young Street, Kensington, expressed Thackeray's spirit perfectly" (1). It is because for Woolf "The curiosity is only legitimate when the house of a great writer or the country in which it is

set adds something to our understanding of his books" ("Haworth, November, 1904" 5). Even though Woolf suspects whether it is better to read their books rather than to visit their houses (5), she still justifies her motivation because "the dominion which writers have over us is immensely personal; it is their actual voice that we hear in the rise and fall of the sentence; their shape and color that we see in the page, so that even their old shoes have a way of being worn on this side rather than on that, which seems not gossip but revelation" ("Flumina Amem Silvasque" 161). For better understanding of writers and their works, Woolf suggests that readers should visit their houses. From this perspective, we can further inquire into, what is the relation between Woolf and houses/rooms? Are there any other houses/rooms created and possessed by Woolf and how do other critics interpret them? How does Woolf regard and observe other people's houses, both fictional and real ones? And if her rooms and houses are generally read as specific and enclosed locales, are there other possibilities to read them not as *places* but as something else? Therefore, in this section, I will provide literature reviews firstly of Woolf's houses and secondly of Woolf and houses.

I. Woolf and Houses

A. Houses of Woolf

Woolf and her houses have become icons or the "must go" scenic spots in London. For example, 22 Hyde Park Gate and Talland House where Woolf spent her merry childhood till she was 13 years old, 46 Gordon Square where she, Vanessa, Thoby and Adrian had their intellectual debates with Thoby's college friends on every Thursday night and it is also the place for the genesis of the famous Bloomsbury period and Monk's House where she and Leonard established the Hogarth Press and introduced many important modernist writers and European thinkers to the British readership. The houses Woolf lived become as famous as she is.

Just as Ernest Hemingway's memoir *A Moveable Feast* has become an important tour guide to lead his fanatic readers to trace his footsteps in Paris, Jean Moorcroft Wilson in *Virginia Woolf: Life and London* also lists every single house that Woolf or her family has owned or stayed, including her summerhouses. For Wilson, each house emblematizes a unique image of Woolf in her life and at the end of every introduction to Woolf's houses Wilson conspicuously lists the information of how to visit that particular house.[1] Hill-Miller in *From the Lighthouse to Monk's House* also proceeds as a Woolfian enthusiast. She not only relates every real house to the fictional one in Woolf's works (like Talland House at St. Ives to the Ramsays' summerhouse of *To the*

[1] For example, Monk's house where the Woolfs spent over three decades "is the last house on the right and has a National Trust sign outside. It is open to the public on Wednesdays and Saturdays from 2-6 p.m. from April to October inclusive. There is an entrance fee" (239).

Lighthouse and Vita Sackville-West's Knole to Orlando's mansion) but also provides the information of "how to get there" and deliberately connects the local buildings and places with those in Woolf's texts. Nevertheless, fetishized literary pilgrimages as such are criticized by Anna Snaith and Michael H. Whitworth. For them, the enthusiasm "to retrace the author's steps or those of her characters" resembles a "quasi-religious idea that the author's presence has sanctified particular locations" (8). They even argue, "Not only does the genre fetishize authorial presence, but it very often assumes a static conception of place, as distinct from the idea of space as something produced through social practice" (8). For Snaith and Whitworth, Wilson's and Hill-Miller's analyses correlating Woolf's real houses with fictional ones are sanctifying Woolf and the locations.

Other critics proceed in an archeological/historical way to see how Woolf's life in different places incarnates different meanings for her. According to Susan M. Squier, Talland House at St. Ives is full of Woolf's memories of her mother and her happy childhood: "St. Ives's with childhood union with her mother" (19) and "If childhood is a great cathedral, the object of worship in this memory seems to be Julia Stephen herself" (20). By contrast, London, or to be more precise, 22 Hyde Park Gate, is the embodiment of patriarchy, related to her father's extortionate, petulant and importunate demand for love and attention and later the manipulation of her step-brothers. London

is a city of patriarchy in the light of the Stephen girls' tea-table training: both Virginia and Vanessa are required to have proper tea-table training. As Hermione Lee claims in *Virginia Woolf* that "Making an anthropological survey, in her memoir, of her family as a specimen Victorian tribe, Virginia Woolf calls the tea-table the sacred spot in the house, the centre of life, much as 'savages, I suppose, have some tree, or fire place, round which they congregate'" (42). 22 Hyde Park Gate, according to Lee, "was a return which haunted her. When Virginia Woolf turned Hyde Park Gate into fiction, she embodied the 'spirit of the age'—patriarchal, Victorian—in the solid objects which filled it and without which it looked so strange" (44). When the four Stephens finally leave 22 Hyde Park Gate, it signifies "rebirth." As Squier argues, "Not merely a change of house but a rebirth, this shift in spatial surroundings was electrifying: light, air, roaring traffic, strange prowling people and an 'extraordinary increase of space' all made 46 Gordon Square a significant new environment" (34). London is thus incarnated with female autonomy and spatial independence when Woolf finally can dedicate herself to writing. 46 Gordon Square becomes a birthplace for the newborn Woolf as an artist: "Woolf's intense interest in the city was very much a reaction to the tragedy of her mother's death, which left her struggling alone to define herself as a woman and a writer in what she called the 'circus' of patriarchal London" (13). As I

have argued, Wilson and Hill-Miller have very similar readings to connect Woolf's life with every house she dwelled.

Of particular note is critics all proceed in an archeological way and they see the house/room as solid platforms intertwined with Woolf's memories and life. Their reading strategy is exactly what an autobiography should be for Leonard: it is eligible to cut Virginia Woolf into several pieces and each piece has a relevant memory as well as a house to match. If one can put these pieces back together, one can have an intact and complete Virginia Woolf. Such a reading is prevailing for her readers, for critics and even for Woolf herself.[2] Yet dividing a person into several pieces and matching each of them with a house is a spatialized thinking and it means that everything can be divided with equal sections and it signifies the possibility of uniting them back together. In other words, the final goal of the Woolfian critics is to piece up an intact Virginia Woolf and in their analyses, Woolf's houses are read as *places*.

[2] In her autobiographical memoir, *Moments of Being*, Woolf roughly separates her life into several stages according to the house in which she resided. "A Sketch of the Past" and "Reminiscences" are about her life with her family in Talland House and 22 Hyde Park Gate. "22 Hyde Park Gate" and "Old Bloomsbury" use the name or the area of the house to record the life there. Woolf further subdivides 22 Hyde Park Gate into two spaces: the domestic space occupied by her mother and the intellectual one occupied by her father. Her own room is also divided into two. The one is with "the long Chippendale (imitation) looking glass, given me by George in the hope that I should look into it and learn to do my hair and take general care for my appearance" ("A Sketch of the Past" 122). The other half is for Woolf to proceed her intellectual pursuit and artistic creation, where there are "my Greek lexicon; some Greek play or other; many little bottles of ink, pens innumerable; and probably hidden under blotting paper, sheets of foolscap covered with private writing in a hand so small and twisted as to be a family joke" (122). These divisions are meant to be put together in order for Woolf to remember her past life as integrity and for readers to envisage Woolf as integrity.

B. Houses in Woolf

Besides the real houses of Woolf, on the other hand, Woolf has also created numerous famous houses in which her view about rooms/houses is implicated. In addition to the famous "a room of one's own," other rooms/houses in Woolf are intertwined with mentality, physicality, historicity, creativity and domesticity. I will exemplify them from Woolf's essays, short stories and her comments on other writers' texts.

In "Haworth, November, 1904," Woolf visits the Brontës' house. Even though the Brontë sisters live in the secluded Yorkshire moors, their talent and creativity are outstanding. The small and impoverished parsonage cannot conceal or diminish their incandescence. According to Woolf, the parsonage explains the idiosyncratic and gloomy mentality of the Brontës since the sun seldom shone on their household ("Haworth, November, 1904" 6). Woolf even argues, in *Jane Eyre*, Jane Eyre's drawing room and furniture embodies her emotions and personality: "Think of the drawing-room, even, those 'white carpets on which seemed laid brilliant garlands of flowers', that 'pale Parian mantelpiece' with its Bohemia glass of 'ruby red' and the 'general blending of snow and fire'—what is all that except Jane Eyre?" ("*Jane Eyre* and *Wuthering Heights*" 1329). This fictional room as well as the real one in Charlotte Brontë's life convey the mentality of their owners: "Haworth expresses the Brontës; the

Brontës express Haworth; they fit like a snail to its shell" ("Haworth, November, 1904" 5).

In "The London Scene" houses present the physicality and domesticity of their owners: the Carlyles and John Keats. Woolf in Carlyle's house at 5 Cheyne Row imagines how inconvenient their life was without any piped water: "Every drop that the Carlyles used . . . had to be pumped by hand from a well in the kitchen" (118) and "The stairs, carved as they are and wide and dignified, seem worn by the feet of harassed women carrying the tin cans. . . . The voice of the house . . . is the voice of pumping and scrubbing, of coughing and groaning" (118). By leading such an exhausting and demanding life, Mrs. Carlyle's "cheeks are hollow; bitterness and suffering mingle in the half-tender, half-tortured expression of the eyes. Such is the effect of a pump in the basement and a yellow tin bath up three pairs of stairs" (119). On the contrary, for Woolf, Keats's house is of silence and his physicality leaves very thin trace in the house: "Two chairs turned together are close to the window as if someone had set there reading and had just got up and left the room. . . . The room is empty save for the two chairs, for Keats had few possessions, little furniture and not more . . . than one hundred and fifty books" (121). In contrast to Carlyle's house satiated with domesticity and noises, Keats's house seems occupied by no one by air and silence.

The historicity of the house can also be singled out. In her review of Lady Newton's "'The House of Lyme,'" from Woolf's perspective, the house owned by the Legh family conveys historicity and physicality: "Their house was not only a house in every room of which traditions of their race had accumulated, but a law court, a theatre, a public building, and an hotel all in one; a self-sufficient community highly organized in each of its departments, and the centre of civilization in that district" (99). Woolf shows her respect to old houses by claiming "In a world which seems bent on ruin and oblivion we cannot refuse a feeling of affectionate respect for the courage with which such old houses still confront life, cherish its traditions, and are a sanctuary for the lovely wreckage of the past" (100).

A room is also intertwined with creativity. In "The Elizabeth Lumber Room," Woolf compares a lumber room in which rare objects collected from all over the world are scattered around with idiosyncratic but erudite Sir Thomas Browne. As Woolf says, "Now we are in the presence of sublime imagination; now rambling through one of the finest lumber rooms in the world—a chamber stuffed from floor to ceiling with ivory, old iron, broken pots, urns, unicorns' horns, and magic glasses full of emerald lights and blue mystery" (47). This lumber room portrays the vigorous creativity of Sir Thomas Browne. In addition, in "The Schoolroom Floor," a review of Mary MacCarthy's book, Woolf compares the talent of the author with the house in her text.

MacCarthy's talent is to lead the reader to visit every part of the house: "it is Mrs. MacCarthy's achievement to throw open the whole house and not merely the sanctuaries of the eminent and grown-up; to make us free of the rambling Victorian dwelling-place with its profusion of coal fires, its legions of starched housemaids, its trays, its cans, its lamps, its candles, its warbling aunts, its scrimmaging schoolboys, and above all its strange mistress, odd, speculative, absent-minded; brilliant, disconcerting, unaccountable, its Mrs. Kestell, in short" (444). The house described in details by MacCarthy fully demonstrates her creativity.

Obviously, the most eminent room of all which designates creativity is the one in Woolf's feminist manifesto *A Room of One's Own* in which a feminist axiom goes "a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction . . ." (3). Women do not have rooms of their own for centuries, let alone to have undisturbed time to write. Women writers, like Jane Austen, have to write in the common sitting-room and "hid [their] manuscripts or covered them with a piece of blotting-paper" (61). Kathleen Gregory Klein thus comments, "The rooms which symbolize the activities of women writers in the essays were the same, as were each woman's reactions to writing in the room. The space for women was undifferentiated through the centuries, never unique or individualized" (235). Or as Tracy Seeley in "Virginia Woolf's Poetics of Space" argues, "A woman's 'place' can only be understood in relation to the masculine

culture writ large. Even ensconced in a room of one's own, a writer's solitude and autonomy are offset, threatened by, other locales and spaces" (94). Throughout *A Room of One's Own*, feminist anger, illuminating women's striving for spatial independence and empowerments, is underlined in Woolf's argument and critics' analyses.

Apart from declaring that famous axiom, the good fiction for Woolf is fragile, sensitive but glowing. Houses are paralleled with creativity:

> Fiction is like a spider's web, attached ever so lightly perhaps, but still attached to life at all four corners. . . . But when the web is pulled askew, hooked up at the edge, torn in the middle, one remembers that these webs are not spun in mid-air by incorporeal creatures, but are the work of suffering human beings, and are attached to grossly material things, like health and money and the houses we live in. (38)

The first-rate writer can convey the meaning of life to readers imperceptibly, like Shakespeare: "Often the attachment is scarcely perceptible; Shakespeare's plays, for instance, seem to hang there complete by themselves" (38). The second-rate writing dissociates readers from full absorption and reminds them that fiction is inseparable from life and the material world. The material world, like the house, is the platform upon which fiction stands. For Woolf, what matters is always the life within the house

rather than the house itself. Thus, it is no coincidence that in "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown," Woolf criticizes Arnold Bennett the most for he depicts nothing but the façade of the house rather than the character in the house, let alone human nature.[3] According to Woolf, "Hilda [one of Bennett's character] not only looked at houses, and thought of houses; Hilda lived in a house. . . . But we cannot hear her mother's voice, or Hilda's voice; we only hear Mr. Bennett's voice telling us facts about rents and freeholds and copyholds and fines. . . . [Mr. Bennett] is trying to hypnotize us into the belief that, because he has made a house, there must be a person living there" (204-05). If Mrs. Brown, the avatar of human nature, stays in the same carriage with Mr. Bennett, Woolf concludes, she would definitely be neglected by him. Once again, the houses and rooms created by Woolf are read as nothing else but spatial locations. In this respect, after demonstrating literature reviews of the houses lived by Woolf and created by Woolf, we can discover that on the one hand, houses lived and created by Woolf are read as concrete and enclosed spatial locales. On the other hand, spatialized thinking dominates our commonsensical world: we can cut the people up with equal sections

[3] In this text, Woolf classifies Arnold Bennett, H. G. Wells and John Galsworthy as materialists. But we should read "materialist" in a good sense as Woolf does to Defoe. In other words, Woolf does not show animosity to *all* of realistic novels. Her position seems implicated so but according to Herta Newman, what Woolf reprimands is not so much the materialism/realism *per se* because "Defoe is unstintingly praised for the accuracy of his observations, and the solidity of his world [by Woolf]" (5) as "the dependency of the traditional novel upon a reconstructive process which . . . adheres stubbornly 'to the respectable outside'" (5).

(with multiple houses) and also cut *time* up equally (in seconds, moments, days, months and years).

Broadly construed, in our common sense, time is chronological and the chronological time is in effect formulated by two concepts: Chronos and logic, whose collaboration creates a static, linear and rational world on the ground of the present. As Deleuze says, in Chronos "only the present exists; that it absorbs or contracts in itself the past and the future, and that, from contraction to contraction, with ever greater depth, it reaches the limits of the entire Universe and becomes a living cosmic present" (Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* 61). In our logical thinking, time is Chronos in which the present is the anchoring point: the thing which does not happen yet is the future while that which happened is the past; time is moving toward the future and the past is the bygone forever. Although on Deleuze's reading, our quotidian life is maneuvered by Chronos, yet there is another temporality, the Aeon. "*Sometimes, on the other hand*" Deleuze argues, "only the past and future subsist, that they subdivide each present, ad infinitum, however small it may be, stretching it out over their empty line. The complementarity of past and future, ad infinitum. Or rather, such time is not infinite, since it never comes back upon itself; it is unlimited, a pure straight line the two extremities of which endlessly distance themselves from each other and become deferred into the past and the future" (*The Logic of Sense* 61-62). In other words, in

the Aeon, we do not have the present; rather, it is subdivided by the past and the future. The present disappears for it is indiscernible from and contemporaneous with the past and the future. For Deleuze, the Aeon, the coexistence of the past, the present and the future is the subjectivity of time. Then, here comes the question: when, where and how can we perceive the Aeon? In what condition, can the subjectivity of time disclose itself in which the spatialized thinking is no longer valid? What will happen when it does? And after reviewing the houses/rooms in and of Woolf, can they no longer be read as places but as being transformed by time when time's subjectivity discloses itself? These are the questions that I want to tackle in this dissertation and some critics have already provided us with the clue when they use Deleuze's theories to read Woolf.

John Hughes in *Lines of Flight* argues that as an empiricist, Deleuze is focusing on the capricious movement and exchange between self and the outside and Rachel Vinrace in *The Voyage Out* does not merely have a (failed) journey from girlhood to womanhood but also experiences herself as a go-between. In *Machinic Modernism*, Beatrice Monaco focuses on the scenarios in *To the Lighthouse*, *Orlando* and *The Waves* in which Woolf's characters are disintegrated into multiplicities and on the form of the texts which disrupts itself. In "Intensive Genre and the Demise of Gender," Rosi Braidotti contends that in writing, Woolf experiences becoming, which is

"emptying out the self, opening it out to possible encounters with the 'outside'" (46) and *Orlando* is the becoming-imperceptible, the embodiment of the mutually affective and generative desire between Vita[4] and Virginia. Jessica Berman in "Ethical Folds" uses Deleuze's notion of the fold, an inter-personal relation between self and other to expound the ethics in Woolf's aesthetics. In Berman's view, Woolf's ethics is different from the ethic theory developed by Emmanuel Levinas (to annihilate the threatening other) and the aesthetics by Roger Fry (to separate aesthetics from ethics). In other words, on these critical readings, when time discloses itself, Woolf's characters are becoming-imperceptible for being affected by time. Put another way, it is at *moments of being* that her characters are experiencing becoming-imperceptible.

Woolf maintains moments of being and moments of non-being in "A Sketch of the Past." As compared with moments of being endowed with positive meanings, critical attentions paying to moments of non-being seem deficient. The general approach to it is negative and it is probably because Woolf says, "A great part of every day is not lived consciously. One walks, eats, sees things, deals with what has to be done; the broken vacuum cleaner; ordering dinner; writing orders to Mabel; washing; cooking dinner; bookbinding. When it is a bad day the proportion of non-being is much larger" (70).

---

[4] Vita Sackville-West is a famous woman writer in the early twentieth century. There are mutual affections and admirations between Vita and Virginia and Virginia openly dedicates *Orlando* to Vita. Part of *Orlando* is based on the history of the Sackville family and the main character, Orlando, is the personification of Vita.

However, I would like to argue, Woolf is not so much distinguishing these two moments as concerning the mutually encompassing relation between them: "These separate moments of being were however *embedded* in many more moments of non-being. . . . [A]lthough it was a good day the goodness was *embedded* in a kind of nondescript cotton wool" (emphases added, 70). Therefore, regardless of moments of non-being used to describe the life unconsciously lived, we should not conflate it with Chronos but with the hidden meaning which fails to reveal itself to Woolf. It is because, as argued earlier, Chronos refers to rational and logical thinking, tending to differentiate life and time with equal immobile sections. However, from moments of non-being as a cotton wool and the contemporaneous existence of moments of being as the hidden pattern, Woolf indicates both moments of being and non-being are the constituents of the Aeon, the subjectivity of time. Meg Jensen also puts her focus on the intricately interweaving relation between these two moments: "Her works [of Woolf] highlight the interplay between these different discourses through what she termed 'moments of being,' moments in which the 'cotton wool' is lifted, and repetitive, wordless rhythms are revealed" (112). Hsiao-hung Chang in "Snapshocking Virginia Woolf" also argues that "They [moments of being and nonbeing] are different only in the degree of sensual intensity: 'moments of non-being' are regular and generic while

‘moments of being’ are singular and specific; as if one is ‘snapshot’ while the other is ‘snapshocking’ which exposes the limits of our senses” (my translation, 16).

In addition, Woolf also claims that the moment when she is made aware of the subjectivity of time, of the hidden pattern behind the cotton wool is also the moment when she is transfixed by it: “I only know that many of these exceptional moments brought with them a peculiar horror and a physical collapse; they seemed dominant; myself passive” (“A Sketch of the Past” 72). At these moments of being, Woolf is affected as becoming a non-subject but she negotiates these shocking moments by transforming them into fertile germs for her writing. Thus Woolf would claim “the shock-receiving capacity is what makes me a writer. . . . I feel that I have had a blow; but it is not . . . simply a blow from an enemy hidden behind the cotton wool of daily life; it is or will become a revelation of some order; it is a token of some real thing behind appearances; and I make it real by putting it into words” (72). Apart from the mutually encompassing and “embedding” relation between moments of being and non-being, Woolf further emphasizes that the artistic force she receives from the hidden pattern makes a writer of her, enabling her “to put the severed parts together” (72). As we can see, writing, with such a captivating yet healing force, plays a very important role in Woolf’s life and when time discloses itself, it always forces humans to

acknowledge its existence (and their non-existence) as a shock, as a force and as an affect.

Therefore, taking the traditional Woolfian critics who read her houses as spatial locations, the Deleuzian critics who read Woolf's characters as becoming-imperceptible and even Woolf herself who perceives time as force as points of departure, my Deleuzian reading will focus chiefly on the "de-spatialization" of houses, rooms and interior spaces in Woolf. As argued earlier, despite of using different Deleuzian terms and conceptions, critics unanimously and successfully unravel the de-subjectification of Woolf's characters. Conversely, the temporalization of space in Woolf has not been tackled, not even with the famous Deleuzian concept of deterritorialization. In this light, along with the disintegration of Woolf's characters, I will be arguing that spaces where characters' are situated are also involuted within time to the extent that not only characters' subjectivity is disintegrated but also the generic spatial coordinates of places are "deterritorialized." Simply put, both characters and spaces are "temporalized" when time discloses itself. In order to support this argument, my methodology has two parts. Firstly, I will detour through the significant influence of cinema on Woolf. As a contemporary of cinema, Woolf is inspired by it to read time in an entirely new perspective. As argued earlier, it happens at the moment of affect. From this perspective, secondly, I will have recourse to Deleuze's concept of time-image in his

two books on cinema. For numerous critics, Deleuze's philosophy is a philosophy of time and his two cinema books are regarded not only as the homage paying to Bergson but also to Bergsonian theorization of time. In these two books, Deleuze underlines that the subjectivity of time discloses itself in cinema during which everything forms an indivisible relation with time.

In this regard, we can observe an interesting convergence between Woolf and Deleuze. Even though there seems no overlap in their real life and even though Woolf ends her life at the dawn of World War II, what Deleuze observes and ardently argues as the trait of time at the end of the prewar cinema (known as the crisis of movement-image) and in the postwar cinema (the advent of time-image) has already been explored by Woolf. The aesthetic convergence between Woolf and Deleuze indicates they respectively perceive the sensible mode of being, characteristic of and prevalent at that time (1910s~1940s). According to Jacques Rancière, despite of different locations and the course of time, the distribution of the sensible consists in the sensible mode of being which is unanimously perceived by the participants of the community at that time: "A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in common lends

itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution" (12).[5] Most important of all, among three artistic paradigms, the ethical regime of images, the representative regime of art and the aesthetic regime of art, Rancière singles out the aesthetic regime in which there is neither hierarchy among genres nor barriers among arts. The singularity of art is always changed as soon as it is defined for the underlying force is foreign even to the artwork itself. As Rancière says, "artistic phenomena are identified by their adherence to a specific regime of the sensible, which is extricated from its ordinary connections and is inhabited by a heterogeneous power, the power of a form of thought that has become foreign to itself: a product identical with something not produced, knowledge transformed into non-knowledge, *logos* identical with pathos, the intention of the unintentional, etc" (22-23). Thus to say, Woolf and Deleuze notice the same distribution of the sensible by means of cinema as the artistic product in the 1910s~1940s because "The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in what is common to the

[5] For Rancière, he distinguishes three modes of the sensible: the ethical regime of images, the poetic/representative regime of art and the aesthetic regime of art. The first one is developed by Plato which refers to the education of citizens in accordance with their various occupations by means of distinguishing the origin from simulacra. For Plato, art does not exist for there are only "ways of doing and making." In this paradigm, its ultimate goal is to implant appropriate knowledge to the citizenry. The second paradigm dissociates art from teleological aims. Art has nothing to do either with moral and religious criteria or with productive mode. Art exists in and by itself and it establishes hierarchy among genres and the appropriateness. The third paradigm rather abolishes the hierarchy established in the second paradigm and focuses on the political and revolutionary power inherent in the artistic product. By redistributing the sensible mode, equality is re-established for the previously excluded part of the community may be included this time. For Rancière, aesthetics is always political, in contrast to the police (hegemony).

community based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is performed" (12). For Woolf and Deleuze, cinema is not merely a medium that transmits *ethos* (implicated in the ethical regime of images) or establishes hierarchy or genre in arts (as in the representative regime of art). Rather, cinema, for them, has a revolutionary power to dismantle the present and exclusive distribution of the sensible. When perceiving the sensible mode of being in 1910s~1940s by means of cinema, Woolf and Deleuze note its singularity resides in providing a new possibility to glimpse the essence of time and its power is boundary-breaking: the sensible mode of being is not delimited in the realm of cinema; it also exists in writing.

In this light, when traditional Woolfian critics focus on the intact and enclosed subjectivity of Woolf's characters, my Deleuzian reading of Woolf will demonstrate the (Cartesian) subjectivity is never enclosed and uncontaminated. Rather, it is transformed by forming horizontal and contiguous assemblages with the world. In this respect, it becomes the reason why I choose the enclosed space (rooms/houses) instead of open space (streets/parks). Just as the becoming-imperceptible of Woolf's characters, the enclosed space will not be enclosed any more. It will be disclosed by time. And as mentioned earlier, I will exemplify cinema and demonstrate how there is moments of affect when the subjectivity of time discloses itself. Indeed, it is possible to perceive the disclosure of time in numerous terrains of art, but I will single out

cinema and demonstrate how it provides sparkling moments through which spectators are suddenly affected by time. Despite that cinema and cinematic terms have their own history and context, it is still applicable to use the major concepts that Deleuze argues in his two cinema books to read Woolf. It is because on the one hand, as the distribution of the sensible argued earlier, the intellectual convergence between Deleuze and Woolf rests on the same issue: how time discloses itself. On the other hand, in Deleuze's own view, there is no boundary among philosophy, art and science, even though philosophers, artists and scientists use different terms in their own expertise. But what is common among them is that they provide each of their own explanations to interpret the world. In addition, we should not forget that Deleuze himself is famous for forming artistic assemblages or "inter-art relations." When elaborating on philosophical concepts, he always likes to exemplify music and painting. For him, "inter-art relations" always provide him with myriads of imagination and possibility. In this light, I will start to explore the relation between Woolf and cinema, between Deleuze and cinema, and finally between Woolf and Deleuze.

II. Woolf and Cinema

As a contemporary of cinema (cinema being born around 1888, six years later than Woolf), it serves as a very regular entertainment for Woolf. In her diary entry, Woolf

mentioned she went to the cinema to celebrate her birthday or simply went there with their friends after dining (*D* 2:185n15). She and Leonard attended several film forums and at least Leonard participated in the activities held by the Film Society Program (Hankins, 1993: 148-49n2). This society was founded in 1925. Woolf's closet friend Clive Bell shared his film review of *Entr'acte* (1924) with them (153-54) and the writing of "The Cinema" was composed after her seeing of *The Cabinet of Dr Caligari* (Humm 185-86).

In her lifetime, there are two articles in which Woolf inserts the term "movie" in the titles: the first one is "The 'Movie' Novel" (1919) and the second one is "The Cinema" (1926). "The 'Movie' Novel" is a book review of Compton Mackenzie's fiction *The Early Life and Adventures of Sylvia Scarlett* (1918). As compared with the slow motions of Tom Jones and Moll Flanders, whom we can contemplate even when we no longer read the book, Woolf clearly manifests her preference of them over cinema: "Compared with Mr. Mackenzie's characters they are a slow-moving race—awkward, ungainly and simple minded. But consider how many things we know about them, how much we guess, what scenes of beauty and romance we set them in, how much of England is their background—without a word of description perhaps, but merely because they are themselves. We can think about them when we are no

longer reading the book" (84). By contrast, with the accelerating moving images of Scarlett, readers hardly have a second chance to see what happened:

> But we cannot do this with Mr. Mackenzie's characters; and the reason is, we fancy, that though Mr. Mackenzie can see them once he can never see them twice, and, as in a cinema, one picture must follow another without stopping, for if it stopped and we had to look at it we should be bored. . . . So it is with Sylvia Scarlett and her troupe. Up they get and off they go, and as for minding what becomes of them, all we hope is that they will, if possible, do something funnier next time. No, it is not a book of adventures; it is a book of cinema. (84)

In this article, Woolf conveys her suspicions about cinema and cinematic writing: they are too fast to be understood and it is in complete contrast to the static reading experience. As a consequence, Steven G. Kellman claims that Woolf's relation to cinematic fiction/"books of cinema" is inimical (467). From his perspective, Woolf's aversion to books of cinema "seems based on a mistrust of eidetic literature . . ." (469). Laura Marcus also has a similar reading: Woolf doubts whether cinema can transmit human nature and emotions when its pace is so fast: "For Woolf, at this stage, cinema was thus perceived as motion without emotion, and as a surface vision incapable of suggesting interiority. . . . Moving images . . . were perceived to have only the

instantaneous life of their immediate projection and brief reception, each image being replaced by the one that succeeds it" (2007a: 103). In contrast to reading, for critics along with Woolf, the fast-paced cinema cannot render visible the invisible (human nature and emotions).

Nevertheless, I would rather argue, right in this passage, Woolf is aware that the singularity of cinema is akin to the fast-paced modern life. As a common cinemagoer, Woolf is made aware that the inchoate medium can grasp the transient emotions which words fail to capture, even though she still has some doubts about it. Provided that we contextualize Woolf's suspicion about cinema in the history of her writing, we can note that it is also the sheer moment that she starts to envision a new writing. As I said, if one can only have a glimpse of Mrs. Brown, the avatar of life, and if one uses a realist way to capture her, one will fail because as atom showers, life can never be captured. So in order to catch up with the evanescent life, Woolf suggests writing should evolve along with time and the stream of consciousness technique is thus engendered. By coincidence, cinema, the newly born art, can also capture life for sharing the same singularity, so Woolf would claim "Mr. Mackenzie can see them once he can never see them twice, and, as in a cinema, one picture must follow another without stopping" ("The 'Movie' Novel" 84). My interpretation of the relation between Woolf and cinema at this stage tends to focus on how the latter provides Woolf with the moment of

leaking through which the non-speech and non-knowledge bodily sensations can be sensed. Along with "The Cinema" published in 1926, Woolf's favor of cinema is incremental. In other words, on my reading, Woolf has glimpsed the cardinal possibility that cinema illuminates but as a champion of writing, she is still very ambivalent about it. From this perspective, Woolf is not so much "inimical" as "dubious" about cinema. And if what worries Woolf in "The 'Movie' Novel" is that readers do not have adequate time to think because the pace of narration in such cinematic writings is too accelerating, perhaps the question we can further probe becomes can such a reading of "no time to think" expose the limits of thinking and force us to think beyond thinking or to think the unthought. If so, what does "thinking the unthought" have anything to do with writing since Woolf is eventually defending the superiority of writing to cinema?

What I mean here is when Woolf claims "Is there any characteristic which thought possesses that can be rendered visible without the help of words? . . . The likeness of the thought is for some reason more beautiful, more comprehensible, more available, than the thought itself" ("The Cinema" 184), what is this "thought" that appears in cinema or in Woolf's mind, especially when she says "we should be able to see thought in its wildness, in its beauty, in its oddity, pouring from men with their elbows on a table; from women with their little handbags slipping to the floor. We should see these

emotions mingling together and affecting each other" (185)? What is this thought when it is not the result of rational and static contemplation but more like emotions, bumping into each other without any logic or sense? Or let me quote Deleuze because he asks exactly the same question as Woolf: "Is it possible that cinema achieves a truly mathematical rigor in this way, a rigor which no longer simply concerns the image . . . but the thought of the image, the thought in the image?" (*Cinema 2* 168). If image is the interface between the spectator and the story on the screen, what is this thought that is completely excess of image? And after being made aware of this "more comprehensible" yet less tangible thought, or unthought, how and in what way is Woolf inspired by this unthought? Woolf provides her answer in "The Cinema" published eight years later.

"The Cinema" is the only essay that announces Woolf's relation as a writer to cinema. Analogous to my previous argument, my reading strategy is also prone to read Woolf's essay on cinema not as a diversion or simply an entertainment but as an important inspiration for her to revolutionize writing. Throughout "The Cinema" Woolf's relation to cinema is very contentious. On the one hand, she does not deny the fact that cinema possesses certain power whose access has been denied to writing ever since (183); on the other hand, she is anxious to declare that any art resorting to visual stimulus is nothing but taking a short cut because "the visual is only the most

obvious or the uppermost" (184). Thus for Paul Tissen and Maggie Humm, they read out the potential force inherent in cinema which can answer to what Woolf envisioned yet failed to achieve in her early writing while for Leslie Kathleen Hankins, despite that Woolf learns the rhythm, movement and speed of spatial discourse in cinema, "Woolf's essay exerted its considerable power to deflect cinema's power, to save space for her literary art" because "film and literature [are] rival art forms" (1993: 173; 176). Then, as the question that I left behind in the above argument, where is the possibility of "thinking the unthought" intrinsic to cinema? In order to answer this question, we need to explore "The Cinema."

In the later part of "The Cinema," when watching the film *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* Woolf is shocked to see a tadpole image appear on the screen: "It swelled to an immense size, quivered, bulged, and sank back again into nonentity" (183). At that flash of moment, it suddenly dawns on Woolf that image can transmit emotions more effectively and straightforwardly than words. As she says, "For a moment it seemed to embody some monstrous diseased imagination of the lunatic's brain. For a moment it seemed thought could be conveyed by shape more effectively than by words. The monstrous quivering tadpole seemed to be fear itself, and not the statement 'I am afraid'" (183). The violent and dynamic emotion has a more direct and instantaneous impact on audiences by images than by words and Woolf seems unable to respond

properly to that shock. By means of twice repetitions of "for a moment it seemed . . ." and the uncertain tone beneath the qualifying vocabulary of "seemed" Woolf's bewilderment about the strong yet inexplicable impact of this image is implicated. Humm also notices cinema renders visible not just the faithful recording and mimetic representation but also the surfacing of some repressed emotions buried deep in the unconscious: "Woolf wants film to trigger spectator's unconscious optics by moving away from a mimetic representation of emotions" (188). However, for Humm, cinema produces a subject-centered and cognition-reformulating effect on Woolf: "if memory is figured iconically through a montage of filmic objects representing emotions, then such objects can provide just as convincing a unifying cognitive principle as any linear narrative . . ." (188). However, I want to argue, the awakening unconscious emotion in cinema is rather indicative of the non-thinking stage in which the subject's consciousness has not wakened yet. In this example, Woolf is not the thinking thing that contemplates this tadpole image properly; she is only capable of instinctively correlating it with fear but she does not have any adequate time to initiate any thinking. In other words, what she perceives on the screen is "emotions mingling together and affecting each other" (185) and the moment at which she is affected and transfixed by that intangible emotion of fear by means of the tadpole image is the very moment that she confronts the limits of her thinking *for she is not thinking at all*.

Deleuze in *Cinema 2* paraphrases Antonin Artaud's words to argue that "if it is true that thought depends on a shock which gives birth to it . . . it can only think one thing, *the fact that we are not yet thinking*, the powerlessness to think the whole and to think oneself, thought which is always fossilized, dislocated, collapsed" (162). It is not "subject" who is thinking in the Cartesian *cogito* "*I think, therefore I am*" to verify the existence of subject. Instead, it is the moment when the concept of subject no longer stands for "'I is another' [*'Je est un autre'*] has replaced Ego=Ego" (129). When Woolf is shocked by that tadpole image, the moment of crack forces her to plunge into the chaos of unthought and to confront the very limit of thinking. As argued earlier, right at this moment, Woolf is disintegrated into becoming a non-subject and in Deleuze's view, what generates "emotions mingling together and affecting each other" is the subjectivity of time which discloses itself as the (un)thought in image. Woolf's "no time to think" or "not to think at all" is the starting point to think the unthought and it is also the moment when she comes to terms with something which has been ignored before, i.e., the subjectivity of time. But after experiencing this shocking moment, her protective umbrella is re-activated. So later when Woolf composes "The Cinema," she rather calmly and rationally comments, "In fact, the shadow was accidental and the effect unintentional" (183).

In this light, if cinema illuminates the possibility of thinking the unthought and for Woolf this rare moment "sometimes visits us in sleep or shapes itself in half-darkened rooms" (185), what is this space, how does it appear and how can we conceive of it, where "these emotions [are] mingling together and affecting each other" (185)? Woolf fails to mention the theatre when the shocking experience takes place and we can further ask: can these "half-darkened rooms" still be understood as places with concrete spatial coordinates when the subjectivity of time discloses itself and when "the writer can only toil after in vain" (185). Can we perceive them in other writings of Woolf besides the aforesaid rooms and houses visited religiously and recorded conscientiously by her? What are the differences between them and how the writing of spaces (rooms, houses, chambers and interior spaces) is thereby changed in Woolf's writing or more precisely, in her "cinematic writing"? Therefore, in the following chapter, I will introduce the concept of real time as the conceptual nucleus in Deleuze's philosophical thinking and argue how these rooms in Woolf are transformed into "any-spaces-whatever" which have been explicated in Deleuze's two books on cinema. By detouring through Deleuze, I will once again demonstrate that the convergence between Woolf and Deleuze rests on providing numerous examples to read out the subjectivity of time and to read space as time.

III. Deleuze and Bergson

Before we discuss Deleuze's theory on time and how it is further explicated in his two cinema books, we should make a necessary detour to discuss Bergson who inspires Deleuze on cinema and movement. In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson overtly announces his loathing of cinema and it is simply because cinema is nothing but a combination of continuous snapshots/still photographs. From Bergson's perspective, if one wants to portray the marching of a regiment, the easiest way is "to take a series of snapshots of the passing regiment and to throw these instantaneous views on the screen, so that they replace each other very rapidly. This is what the cinematograph does" (305). But for him, if one divides cinema into still photographs and puts them back together, the time one perceives is abstract. It is not the real time insomuch as it is divided and it is subordinate to movement. Yet for Bergson, however incorrect this concept is, our knowledge, language and intelligence have been thus formulated to take cognizance of movement and the world: "knowledge bears on a state rather than on a change. . . . Whether the movement be qualitative or evolutionary or extensive, the mind manages to take stable views of the instability" (303). Movement, in the traditional conception, is also understood as being divided into immobile sections and can be separated from the moving body, just as the ideal pose of a person posed to represent the respective period of infancy, adolescence, adulthood and old age in the ancient time. Bergson reiterates

that dividing life into several sections by means of these "stops" is as paradoxical as Zeno's sophistical arguments (the flying arrow, the contest between Achilles and the tortoise) because life, as a transition, can never be "stopped" *at* and *by* these points. So there is no saying of "The child becomes the man" but only "There is becoming from the child to the man" (313).[6]

To clarify the misconception of separating movement from the moving body, we can further exemplify the eminent photographer Eadweard Muybridge and his series of still photographs (among which the most eminent one is the galloping of a horse) become the predecessor of cinema. Every moment in this series is "any instant whatever." It is singular and regular. It is singular because it emblematizes the moment at which the precise movement takes place; it is regular because each moment is neither superior nor inferior to any other moment. They are equal in this movement. As Bogue says,

---

[6] In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson even argues the Greek philosophy, the philosophy of Form, of Ideal, is a philosophy of immobility. Plato's concept of Ideal as the transcendent truth defies any transformation (becoming in life) and any simulacra (creative evolution deviating from the origin). As Bergson says, "Beneath the qualitative becoming, beneath the evolutionary becoming, beneath the extensive becoming, the mind must seek that which defies change, the definable quality, the form or essence, the end. Such was the fundamental principle of the philosophy which developed throughout the classic age, the philosophy of Forms, or, to use a term more akin to the Greek, the philosophy of Ideas" (314). Bergson even radically abandons the concept of form because there will be no form that can be concretized: "in reality the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no form, since form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual *change of* form: *form is only a snapshot view of a transition.* Therefore, here again, our perception manages to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real" (302).

> photography and cinema make possible a new means of understanding privileged moments, one that relies not on idealizing poses but on the very discovery of the *instant quelconque* [any-instant-whatever]. . . . Instead of the ancient series of ideal poses, we have a sequence of instants, no one of which is privileged over any other, each selected through an indifferent, impartial and uniform mechanism, yet any one of which may prove to be singular or regular. (23)

Even though Muybridge can grasp the very instant when movement takes place, time is still subordinate to movement and becomes unperceivable. When subordinated to movement which can be cut and re-linked together again, time is conceived as being spatialized. As I said, it is chronological and linear, as if it were running on a straight line, rushing toward the future. It is not concrete duration but abstract time.

In this respect, Bergson proposes that the way for us to perceive concrete duration is to change our understanding of time and movement. In the (wrongly) conceived arguments, movement can be separated from the moving body. Nevertheless, for Bergson, real movement should be understood in terms of how movement can change the quality and the whole: once a body moves, the quality of the whole will be changed

as well.[7] Movement is a combination of mobile sections; once a section moves, it will transform the whole quality: "Since it [the whole] is always open, it does not have any parts, moments, or instances, it cannot be divided without changing its quality at each stage of a possible division . . ." (Poell 5). And Deleuze uses two formulas to conclude Bergson's conception of time and movement: "'real movement → concrete duration', and 'immobile sections + abstract time'" (*Cinema 1* 1).

Following Bergson's argument on movement, Deleuze develops his concept of cinema. If Bergson thinks object in images is dead and the way to put them together is simply to reproduce the misconception of dividing the movement from the body, Deleuze instead argues that object shot in the frame has to be understood as mobile section and the movement of object can bring forth real movement and concrete duration. He provides two ways to capture movement: montage and the mobility of camera (*Cinema 1* 24). The previous way to re-*present* movement is to chase a moving body (a person running, a cat scuttling); it is "image in movement" rather than "movement-image" (24). Nevertheless, through montage and camera's mobility, each movement in shots is mobile and thus the whole constituted by mobile sections is

[7] One of Woolf's contemporary film critics Iris Barry observes almost exactly the same phenomenon in cinema as Bergson in his theory of movement. As Barry says, "The objects, seen in the round in a sense, move not only on their own axes but also in free orbit, and the line of their motion describes the depth of the scene. . . . The emphasis and description of receding planes by the motion of the objects goes on at the same time as the changing of their relative positions, and their changed positions in regard to the whole composition" (*Let's Go to the Movies* 42-43, qtd in Hankins, 1993: 170).

changed as well. As Deleuze argues, “the whole must renounce its ideality, and become the synthetic whole of the film which is realized in the montage of the parts; and, conversely, the parts must be selected, coordinated, enter into connections and liaisons which, through montage, reconstitute the virtual sequence shot or the analytic whole of the cinema” (27). This is the concept of movement-image by which we can perceive time in images. However, although we can perceive time in movement-image, it is still not real time. Even though the way to conceive of movement is altered, Deleuze still assumes that time is subordinate to movement: “this whole which changes, this time or duration, only seems to be capable of being apprehended indirectly, in relation to the movement-images which express it. Montage is the operation which bears on the movement-images to release the whole from them, that is, the image *of* time. . . . What amounts to montage . . . is the indirect image of time, of duration” (29). In Deleuze’s analysis, it is because in movement-image, characters, plots and objects are heading toward and moving around a center. Movement-image blooming in the prewar cinemas moves around a center and action-image becomes the climax when the whole story circulates around the leading character and the whole film is just another *bildungsroman*. As Thomas Poell says, “Deleuze argues that movement subordinates time in cinema, when the movements of characters and objects are connected through montage to a center, which acts, perceives, and is affected” (7-8).

Movement-image whose subcategories include perception-image, affection-image and action-image features classical cinemas. According to Deleuze, perception-image refers to the inceptive stage when subject/audience is stimulated. After subject receives perception, the brain functions as a sieve, rendering the selected images and data to pass through; unnecessary or irrelevant data will be unnoticed and forgotten. So when perception-image passes through the funnel-like brain, subject can initiate affection-image and later action-image. As Deleuze says,

> We perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs. By need or interest we mean the lines and points that we retain from the thing as a function of our receptive facet, and the actions that we select as a function of the delayed reactions of which we are capable. Which is a way of defining the first material moment of subjectivity: it is subtractive. It subtracts from the thing whatever does not interest it. (*Cinema 1* 63)

Affection-image generally designates subject's initial response and emotion when being stimulated by perception-image; it occupies the interval of time between perception-image and action-image (65). Affection-image is a temporal gap or the initial moment as rendezvous in which subject confronts his/her object before s/he is able to take any action. In Deleuze's own words, it is a moment when "we 'absorb' [external movements], that we refract, and which does not transform itself into either

objects of perception or acts of the subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality" (65). The last one is action-image which characterizes the mainstream films before the war in which actions have taken over the major part in diegesis and by reaching the success of the main character, the film is propagating a belief: an action can always be taken. In this respect, movement-image is sensory-motor oriented and Deleuze even proclaims that Hollywood films are laden with nothing but action-images: "The action-image is the relation between the two [milieux and modes of behavior] and all the varieties of this relation. It is this model which produced the universal triumph of the American cinema, to the point of acting as a passport for foreign directors who contributed to its formation" (141). Hollywood films become the paradigm for other films to duplicate.

Among numerous cinematic techniques of movement-image, I want to single out affection-image and Deleuze explicates that in affection-image, the cinematic technique to capture the tension and affection of the character includes the close-up of the character's face (87-88) and to shoot any-space-whatever (111-22). As we know, the face is always the generic and immediate coordinate for recognition. As Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* say, "the form of subjectivity, whether consciousness or passion, would remain absolutely empty if faces did not form loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant

reality" (168). On the one hand, to put the lens entirely on the face of the character and not to forfeit any of his/her facial expression is for the audience to recognize and identify the character. The face is for "facialization." By the same token, we can easily identify any-space-whatever as a spatial location. Along with the close up of the face, it is used as a mandatory background to convey the character's subjective affection. According to Deleuze, "We must always distinguish power-qualities in themselves, as expressed by a face, faces or their equivalents . . . and these same power-qualities as actualized in a state of things, in a determinate space-time . . ." (*Cinema 2* 106). A face is a face; a space is a space because they are identifiable and re*cognizable*; yet a face is no more a face than a space is a space because what is significant is their encoded meanings implicated in the identification system.

On the other hand, Deleuze proposes that when the affection and emotion that the close-up and any-space-whatever attempt to transmit are tremendous to the extent that the face and any-space-whatever are no longer identifiable. It is when the intensity that they transmit dismantles the identification system and without it, becoming and deterritorialization can thereby be inaugurated. Thus to say, the face escapes from being a referent: "if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 171). As the faceless or face-off face, space turns to be submerged into the affect in

which the character plunges: “Now the face has a correlate of great importance: the landscape, which is not just a milieu but a deterritorialized world” (172). The original spatial and clear characteristics of any-space-whatever disappear to the extent that “The situation no longer extends into action through the intermediary of affections. It is cut off from all its extensions, it is now important only for itself, having absorbed all its affective intensities, all its active extensions” (*Cinema 2* 261). Any-space-whatever in this sense is not a neutral setting but is satiated with nonhuman tension and affection; it is now deterritorialized.

Nevertheless, when such a faith in sensory-motor schema of movement-image encounters a crisis, a new type of cinema, time-image in which time appears right in the image, comes into existence after the Second World War. According to Deleuze, one way to present time-image is, once again, to shoot any-space-whatever. In the postwar cinema, there are many emptied, disused and deserted spaces created by directors of the Italian neo-realism and the French new wave to portray the empty state of mind of modern people. When the whole world is left nothing but emptiness and bareness, there is no center and humans can only wander around and exhaust themselves without being able to take any action. From Deleuze’s perspective, “In this new kind of image the sensory-motor links tend to disappear, a whole sensory-motor continuity which forms the essential nature of the action-image vanishes” (*Cinema 1* 213). Humans are

facing a crisis of action-image for living in an optical and sound situation (*Cinema 2* 5). However, for Deleuze, it is where time-image appears. As I said, if the climax of movement-image is action-image, in time-image, we rather see an irreparable rupture between affection-image and action-image on the horizontal axis in the below coordinate:



In the above coordinate, the horizontal axis contains the process of a subject from receiving (subtracted) perception-image to taking a (determined) action-image and in the postwar world (both in the real world and in cinemas) what the subject should have been, but now is unable, is to take actions. But according to Deleuze, it is also the

moment when the identification system is no longer valid because now the great extent of intensity collected in affection-image is tremendous and overwhelming to the extent that the subject is experiencing the de-subjectification or de-facialization while space is deterritorialized into any-space-whatever.

On the vertical axis, Deleuze turns to explicate time-image in *Cinema 2* which can be roughly divided into four parts: perception-image, recollection-image, crystal-image and pure recollection. Perception-image is still the inception point for subject to be stimulated and pure recollection is a virtual entity *out there*. Once subject is stimulated, present perception/actual image will evoke past memory/virtual image inhabiting in pure recollection and these virtual images will be actualized in the present. The actualized image is recollection-image: it is future purpose oriented for being connected back to movement-image in which an action can be taken (like one remembers what one had in lunch in order not to have it for dinner). Time, in this sense, is still chrono(logical) because the past is the present bygone while the future is the present not yet. According to Deleuze, "the recollection-image is not virtual, it actualizes a virtuality (which Bergson calls 'pure recollection') on its own account. This is why the recollection-image does not deliver the past to us, but only represents the former present that the past 'was'. The recollection-image is an image which is actualized or in process of being made actual, which does not form with the actual,

present image a circuit of indiscernibility" (*Cinema 2* 52). It is not the time-image that we want to discuss here but according to Deleuze, we can perceive it in crystal-image. It is the middle zone between pure recollection and recollection-image but it is neither a virtual entity nor an actualized image. It is more like an *ongoing* process in which actual image forms the smallest circuit with its *own* virtual image, just as an object standing in front of a mirror (the actual image) and whose reflection in the mirror (the virtual image) forms an indiscernible and inseparable relation with each other. For Deleuze, right in this exchanging process, time discloses itself: "the point of indiscernibility of the two distinct images, the actual and the virtual, while what we see in the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the very distinction between the two things which keeps on reconstituting itself" (79).

From the above coordinate, there is a convergence between time-image and movement-image, right at any-space-whatever and right at crystal-image. What happens at this convergence? I want to argue, it is where the subjectivity of time is disclosed, where the actual and its virtual images are exchanging each other and where the great extent of intensity dismantles the subjectivity of subject and the spatial traits of a space. In time-image, we should not regard any-space-whatever as the setting or the perquisite of time's disclosure; rather, it is devoid of any spatial traits when being washed over by multiple forces. Any-space-whatever is thus transformed into

time-image. In movement-image, it is designed to present characters' subjective affection while in time-image, it is enveloped by nonhuman and non-subjective forces and intensities of time. As Deleuze says, "It [any-space-whatever] is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. What in fact manifests the instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is a richness in potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all actualization, all determination" (*Cinema 1* 109). Any-space-whatever can now be regarded as a "de-spatialized" space which collects the intensive power-qualities and affect at the edge of explosion: "The any-space-whatever retains one and the same nature: it no longer has co-ordinates, it is a pure potential, it shows only pure Powers and Qualities, independently of the states of things or milieux which actualize them (have actualized them or will actualize them, or neither the one nor the other—it hardly matters)" (120). In other words, any-space-whatever has two traits: one is concrete and determinate for action-image; the other is vague and indeterminate in which potentials and possibles are surging. Time involutes any-space-whatever and its power is intense and intensive so much so that this space is simply and purely a facet of it: the great intensity is not headed toward action/future but toward inwardness/pure past which encompasses everything within.

In this light, subject would be temporarily perplexed by the exchange process between present perception/actual image and past memory/virtual image which *is about to* get actualized as recollection-image. By virtue of his/her perplexity, one is made aware that there is an interstice severing the thinking world that s/he once deeply believed. Just as Woolf's shocking experience in "The Cinema," real time as life force carves out "a fissure, a crack" (*Cinema 2* 162) in Woolf's consciousness and she is made to confront the inexplicable bodily sensations allured by the tadpole image before her consciousness starts to function. It is because at this sheer moment, one is only capable of receiving stimulus aroused by images but is not ready to have any proper thinking, let alone to take any succeeding action. In other words, just as any-space-whatever, subject in this space is captured and thought of by time as being enveloped into time as a zone of indiscernibility. As argued earlier, the disintegration of the character's and audience's subjectivity directs us toward the disclosure of time's subjectivity. In the core of Deleuze's philosophy,

> the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way around. . . . Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we experience in time; then time itself, pure virtuality which

> divides itself in two as affector and affected, "the affection of self by self" as definition of time. (*Cinema 2* 80)[8]

Only when the commonsensical world consists of division and differentiation is held in suspension and only when there is an interstice severing the rational world on which we relied, is it the moment to think the unthought and to bear witness to time's subjectivity as a beyond. For Deleuze, in time-image, time as the force of life discloses itself as a zone of indiscernibility; everything, including space and humans, are enclosed within. However, we have to bear in mind that notwithstanding time-image and its constituents are drawn in a diagram, it does not mean they can be spatialized. In addition, by indiscernibility, I mean not only the relation of the world with time is indiscernible, but also time itself is indiscernible: the past, the present and the future are simultaneously coexistent. Their relation is virtual and brings us back to the conceptual nucleus of Deleuze's philosophy: the subjectivity of time. Therefore, in the below section, I will demonstrate that the subjectivity of time consists of splitting itself up and synthesizing itself.

---

[8] Subjectivity in any-space-whatever is never of characters or audiences. Thus my reading strategy will be different from that of Lia M. Hotchkiss. The main argument of her "Writing the Jump-Cut: *Mrs. Dalloway* in the Context of Cinema" lies in discovering a center and unified subjectivity of characters with the help of cinematic techniques (like jump-cut and montage): "Discontinuity editing in both cinema and Woolf's fiction achieves the same paradoxical unity through the associative cutting that implies a governing subjectivity able to coalesce individual characters' experience into a faceted whole" (139). However, my point is right in this moment characters are temporarily losing their subjectivity when being enclosed within time. What they perceive is the subjectivity of time.

IV. The Splitting-up and Synthesis of Time's Subjectivity

In Bergson, everything in the world is made up of by matter. It differentiates itself because of the relaxation and contraction of duration. With the relaxation of duration, there is brute matter; with the contraction of duration, there are rather complicated living beings. With the complexion of the nervous system, living beings are capable of more than stimulus and response; they have the freedom to choose among multiple motor-paths. But in either case, beings and nonbeings form indivisible relations with time. As Ronald Bogue says, "matter is relaxed *durée*, and that the apparent differences between quantities and qualities, the extended and the unextended, bodies and minds, are ultimately only differences in the relative contraction or relaxation of *durée*" (*Deleuze on Cinema* 17). Insomuch as real time is involved, life is not a static and predictable progression toward its destiny but is a creative transformation allowing and expecting all kinds of accidents: "Deleuzian duration needs to be constructed as the flow of time; it is intensive as much as it is creative in so far as it is the movement of time that marks the force of life" (*A Deleuzian Dictionary* 58).

In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson further explicates his concept of time by using an inverted cone:



According to Bergson, the point S is the present at which actual images (perception, sensation and action) take place and at which subject's consciousness is situated. Everyday life takes place at this point. AB is the pure memory or the general past in which memories dwell and the A'B' and A"B" are sheets or strata of this virtual entity. In this diagram, present perception and past memory are indivisible but they are different in kind since memory is not the weaker perception but a virtual being. For Bergson, even though it arises after perception, unlike the former, memory is virtual (2002a: 102; 146): "Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and memory on the other" (147). So when a perception is formed at S, relevant recollection-images will be evoked, transpose themselves and get actualized in the plane of experience. P is the plane of experience where the interchange between the present perception and past memory takes place. As the diagram shows, there is no perception without the by-product of memory and every present is always-already a memory: "it [recollection] does not present to us

something which has been, but simply something which is; it advances *pari passu* with the perception which it reproduces. It is a recollection of the present moment in that actual moment itself. . . . It is *a memory of the present*" (148). For Bergson, memory should not be understood as being collected in some warehouse or database. However mysterious the pure past is, these descriptive terms are spatial in contrast to the virtual entity in which memories dwell. It is because memories dwell in time, not in space. As Keith Ansell Pearson argues, "If perception and memory are not in the head but distributed across an assemblage of body and movement-images unfolded in time, then it makes no sense to ask after the 'where' of perception and memory . . . . There is no actual physical place of perception and memory since they are not spatialized entities or things" (2002: 160).

Such an evocation is involuntary and it is not involved with subject's will or thinking. As argued previously, when time discloses itself in crystal-image, subject will feel confused for not being able to distinguish the actual from the virtual and it is the false recognition or déjà vu that Bergson argues in "Memory of the Present and False Recognition." From Bergson's perspective, the reason why subject feels confused and even terrified is because what one encounters is the confusion between perception and memory. Ideally, there are some mechanism determining the actualization and virtualization of perception and memory (Bergson, 2002a: 141-42) but

on some rare occasions, this mechanism fails and subject is consternated by confronting the subjectivity of time. Real time appears right in this strange and formless form and such an experience overturns our perspective about and relation with time: "Time is never ours, it is always our other, even though it provides the ground of subjectivity and is the only form that does. It is the ground of an *abyss* and the form of the *formless*" (Ansell Pearson, 2002: 169). In this light, the Cartesian *cogito* of subjectivity prioritizes humans does not come into existence *yet*, let alone to initiate any rational thinking. According to Bergson, subject will be so stunned even to become an automaton, a dreamer or seems to be split up into a character who seems to perform on the stage and *simultaneously* an audience who watches this performance while seated. The one performing on stage is taken over by the present consciousness and perception while the one who is sitting on the chair is by the past memory. According to Bergson,

> It is rather an oscillation between two standpoints from which one views oneself, a going and coming of the mind between perception which is only perception and perception duplicated with memory. The first implies the habitual feeling we have of our freedom and quite naturally inserts itself into the real world. The second makes us believe we are repeating a part we have learned, converts us into automata, transports us into a stage-world or a world of dream. (2002: 149)

In other words, in addition to subject's bewilderment, agony or even trepidation coming from the (con)fusion between perception and memory (that which happens frequently to the patients with mental problems), the whole point about the *present* does not refer to the current present only; the past as the former present is also involuted *simultaneously*. Name the past as the *former* present does not refer to its position in chronological sense but refer to the truth that the past as the having-been-through present can always-already repeat itself with difference in the present. Time is not linear and chronological but splitting itself up and synthesizing itself. In *Mind and Energy* Bergson introduces his concept of the split-up time. For him, time is always-already split up into two directions: the present which jets toward the future and the past which preserves itself in the general past. Following Bergson, Deleuze also argues, "since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the other falls into the past" (*Cinema 2* 79). The past is neither the present that it was nor the present in relation to which is the past; rather, it is a virtual being devoid of any actualization. It is always contemporaneous with the present, just as the relation of contraction and expansion between the past and the present which we can see in the above Bergsonian diagram.

The past is involuted not in terms of its being as a *before* of the present but in terms of its being as a virtual entity with respect to the present.

In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze further uses a diagram which Bergson thought there was no need to draw to contend how time is constituted by the present, rushing toward the future and the past, preserving in and by itself:



(This diagram is footnote 23 on page 285 in *Cinema 2*.)

When we (mis)recognize that time is moving forward to the future, Bergson as well as Deleuze remind us that the past does not vanish but preserves itself as virtuality (a process of virtualization). In the above diagram, this dotted line will, on some occasions, intersect the solid line (a process of actualization). Such a coming and going, actualization and virtualization process will continue eternally. Of particular note is Deleuze terms the movement of real time, the actualization-virtualization process as "event." In Deleuze's own words, on one side, the actualization of an event happens right in the present: "With every event, there is indeed the present moment of

its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person, the moment we designate by saying '*here*, the moment has come'" while on the other side, time encompassing pure virtualities is underlying as well: "It has no other present than that of the mobile instant which represents it, always divided into past-future, and forming what must be called the counter-actualization" (*The Logic of Sense* 151). But by counter-actualization, Deleuze does not mean to dismantle actualization as a state of affairs or to reverse the actualizing process but indicates pure virtualities which have not got actualized are intrinsic to the event as well.

Deleuze further exemplifies the imagery of a crystal to demonstrate how the limpid side of a crystal signifies actualization while the opaque side signifies virtualization. As he says, "When the virtual image becomes actual, it is then visible and limpid, as in the mirror or the solidity of finished crystal. But the actual image becomes virtual in its turn, referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque and shadowy, like a crystal barely dislodged from the earth" (*Cinema 2* 68). Dwelling in the dark side does not mean it does not exist; rather, it is just imperceptible and invisible to yet indiscernible from the actual. Furthermore, such a back and forth, actualization-virtualization event is moving toward an open future (the arrowed line in the above Deleuzian diagram) in which hope and possibility have always-already been encompassed. Yet by "hope and

possibility," in my dissertation, I will read them not *merely* in a subject-centered and humanitarian perspective (how the subject learns something afterwards) but also from a Deleuzian perspective to argue how our enclosed world "is kept half open as if by a pair of pliers" (Deleuze, *The Fold* 137) because as I said, when real time discloses itself, future becomes indeterminate because its trajectory might be changed when the pure virtualities intrinsic to it get actualized. As Ansell Pearson says, "In life we never simply re-live the past, that is, it is not a question of rendering actual what is simply virtual and making the two identical. Being is always of the order of difference, which explains why Bergson insists that our memory is always, in the element or dimension of its virtuality, and on the plane of action, a memory of the present and a function of the future" (2002: 176).

In this light, however rarely real time discloses itself, Deleuze, the counter-Cartesian thinker, stresses the significant moment of its flash appearance: "Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we *see in the crystal*. . . . We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time, Cronos and not Chronos" (79). In Deleuze, real time, Cronos and the Aeon replace Chronos as the subjectivity of time. Yet neither does Deleuze deny the important role that abstract time plays in our daily life nor does he overstress the significance of concrete duration. Rather, he elucidates the importance of this fusion and tries to eliminate the confusion.

Like the above inverted cone demonstrated by Bergson, in Deleuze, we simply cannot have a clear-cut relation of the present to the past and it is because the pure past as virtuality can always get actualized as recollection-images in the present and it does so not in terms of recomposition or reconstitution but in terms of involution. Being evoked by the present, the resurfacing of the past in the present is not exactly the past that it was, but "a representation of its representability" (*Difference and Repetition* 80). Just as the above diagram of crystal-image demonstrates, the past always repeats itself in the present and such a representation, which is evoked by the present, must carry difference with it. Ansell Pearson thus argues, "if the past in general is the element in which each former present preserves itself, then any former present can find itself represented in the present present. . . . This time of representation is the time in which memory is always 'of' the present . . ." (2002: 187). The concept of involution which features the indiscernibility of the present from the past can also be understood in terms of their synthesis as Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*. As I said, the point resides not in how we can re-live the past but in to know how the pure past can always be represented (repeated) in the current present yet already with difference.

Thus to say, there is no pre-formed future that is *destined* to happen for future as one of multiple possibilities is indeterminate. Deleuze's philosophy of time is epigenesis. And if we broaden our scope, these conceptions of time further direct us to

the position of Deleuze in the history of philosophy in the face of the (disputable) existence of God. In Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz's Baroque thinking,[9] God is known as the sufficient reason to determine the direction and order of worlds: "The rule is that possible worlds cannot pass into existence if they are incompossible with what God chooses" (*The Fold* 63). But for Deleuze, the post-Baroque philosopher, with respect to the Baroque labyrinth thinking of which the compossible and incompossible are contemporaneous, it is not God as the ultimate and ubiquitous existence, but the subjectivity of time, the Aeon as the ultimate Event. The subjectivity of time as a zone of indiscernibility is encompassing myriads of events as possibilities and they are in a chaosmos without the endorsement of God: "It [event as the manifestation of the Aeon] does not tolerate the subsistence of God as an original individuality, nor the self as a Person, nor the world as an element of the self and as God's product. . . . It is the decentered center which traces between the series, and for all disjunctions, the merciless straight line of the Aion, that is, the distance whereupon the castoffs of the self, the

[9] For example, the "fold" of Baroque monad which is visualized by Deleuze as separated into two floors is best expressive of the labyrinth thinking prevalent at that time. The below one of a monad is "the pleats of matter" while the above one is "the folds in the soul" (*The Fold* 3). Each floor is envisaged as furling itself to infinity and for Deleuze, the monad as the mold of the organic and inorganic explains to what extent, the Baroque thinking is labyrinthian and curvilinear in contrast to René Descartes' rectilinear thinking (3). The other Deleuze's oft-used example is Jorge Luis Borges and his story "The Garden of the Forking Paths." According to Deleuze, "Borges, one of Leibniz's disciples, invoked the Chinese philosopher-architect Ts'ui Pên, the inventor of the 'garden with bifurcating paths,' a baroque labyrinth whose infinite series converge or diverge, forming a webbing of time embracing all possibilities" (62).

world, and God are lined up: the Grand Canyon of the world, the 'crack' of the self, and the dismembering of God" (*The Logic of Sense* 176).

Therefore, in this dissertation, in the next four chapters, I will demonstrate in Woolf's texts how houses/rooms undergo such temporal transformations. The first three chapters are arranged in the order of their publications, *Mrs. Dalloway* (1924), *To the Lighthouse* (1927) and *Orlando* (1931) while the fourth chapter is on Woolf's short story "A Haunted House" (1919) by virtue of its different genre. Choosing these texts does not mean other texts of Woolf are irrelevant or unimportant; it is merely because these chosen ones are suitable examples to demonstrate Woolf's perception of time and they fit the subject matter of my dissertation: to read the temporalization of houses/rooms in Woolf. Furthermore, by sharing the main theme, each chapter has its own sub-focus. Chapter One is on *Mrs. Dalloway* and it is in a small room where Clarissa Dalloway is made to realize that it is life/time as an indiscernible zone astraddle over the boundary of class and gender that aligns herself with Septimus Warren Smith to fight against proportion and conversion set forth by Sir William Bradshaw and Dr. Holmes, who are the embodiments of humans' devouring desire to dissect and differentiae life. Real time as life force is disclosed in the dismantling of Clarissa's subjectivity and language. Chapter Two is to read *To the Lighthouse* and the emphasis is put on the free indirect discourse that Woolf uses to compose this fiction and argues

to what degree, can the summerhouse of the Ramsay family be read as a time-image. The focus of the third chapter rests on the main character, Orlando, in *Orlando* who is proverbial for his/her sexual transformation. Nevertheless, this chapter will instead focus on her non-aging body: how an organic body is transformed into a body without organs when she is respectively situated in a department store, her gallery and her mansion. And if the first three chapters discuss the works created in Woolf's mature phase, the final chapter retrospectively concerns the literary experiment with form and language in Woolf's short stories. I will argue to read "A Haunted House" merely as a ghost story is unseemly underestimating its importance in the writing of Woolf and after detouring through Deleuze's discussion on Samuel Beckett's language types, I will demonstrate, this story is composed entirely by the language of image, which is the language of time and this house is *haunted* not so much by the ghostly couple as by time. All in all, when we are accustomed to the spatialized time in our quotidian life, Woolf provides a new path to read the temporalized space in her texts.

Chapter One

Death-Life in *Mrs. Dalloway*

A love of life . . . can say yes to death.

—Deleuze, *Dialogues*

As Woolf's most famous text of all, *Mrs. Dalloway* (whose original title is *The Hours*) bears on the importance of time. On the one hand, for contemporary writers who pay homage to *Mrs. Dalloway*, like Michael Cunningham and Ian McEwan, their texts (*The Hours* and *Saturday*) also stress the important role that time plays in one's life and the story settings are designed just within one day. On the other hand, for literary critics, when analyzing *Mrs. Dalloway*, their emphases are mostly put on the issue of time. Susan Dick contends that we can conceive of Woolf's sensitivity to time by means of the precise day, year, hours and even ages of her characters and the Big Ben's chiming also reminds the character (and the reader) of time while reading the text. Dick even speculates that the exact date of Clarissa's city roaming is on "20 June" (2000: 52). Although Maria DiBattista mainly discusses the intricate collaboration between Woolf's language and the issue she attempts to explore, she notices besides a series of semicolons used in the text to emphasize the intensive emotion of Clarissa,

"the heroine's ominous premonition that something awful was about to happen" is consonant with "the 'leaden' tolling of the bells" (142-43). As Anne Fernihough, Shiv. K Kumar and Ann Banfield (2007) develop each of their Bergsonian readings of "now is memory." They argue the clock's chiming and the bell's tolling which remind the character of the public and objective time are confluent with the private, subjective and psychological time of the character. For Kumar, the tyranny of Sir William and Dr. Holmes is further analogous to the regular and exact chiming of the clocks in Harley Street (76). Yet as compared with the well-explored issue of time, space is an often neglected issue. Critics tend to argue that there is less space reserved between two buildings in the pre-modern and early modern architecture so Clarissa can easily observe the old lady living in the opposite building (Lee 40).

As we can see, the spatialized time (calendar, clock, bell) noticed by critics formulates *Mrs. Dalloway*. Nevertheless, as argued in Introduction, when time's subjectivity is disclosed, subjectivity never belongs to humans but to time. Then *in what way* is real time disclosed and to be more precise, *in what way* or *to what extent*, is our subjectivity dismantled by means of it? Therefore, this chapter will answer these questions and it will be divided into two parts in order to explore the theorization of real time and the temporalization of space in *Mrs. Dalloway*. Part I detours through the philosophical thinking of Deleuze for discussing real time as life force, or in Deleuze

and Guattari's words, as movement and becoming. Part II exemplifies *Mrs. Dalloway* in which proportion and conversion worshipped by Sir William and Dr. Holmes embody humans' desire to divide and manipulate life while real time perceived by Clarissa and Septimus as life force defies any division. Under this circumstance, Septimus's death is encoded with sanguine meanings. I will provide a Deleuzian reading of event-thinking but not to read his death as a tragedy or cowardice but as an event which is not just death and elimination of nihility (Septimus is dead) but also an important declaration of the advent of new life (that Septimus dies discloses the intrinsic life force). Right by means of its disclosure, I will argue, life force is disclosed in the way of dismantling Clarissa's subjectivity and her language. And only thinking not in terms of division and differentiation, can we understand the radical meaning of Clarissa's little room where she, along with the room, are imbued with life force. I will argue that the room is transformed into a space of time.

I. Real Time as Becoming

As I argued in Introduction, in Deleuze and Guattari, real time is a very important concept in their thinking. For them, real time is a rhizomatic force which forms indivisible relations with objects in the milieu and objects thus become deterritorialized when being encompassed within real time. For Deleuze and Guattari, real time is

becoming: “a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself; but also that it has no term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first. This is the principle according to which there is a reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian idea of coexistence of very different ‘durations’ superior or inferior to ‘ours,’ all of them in communication)” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 238). When it comes to the difference between abstract time and real time, they contend that abstract time and real time are not different in forms; they are different in constituents: “This is in no way an individuality of the instant, as opposed to the individuality of permanences or durations. A tear-off calendar has just as much time as a perpetual calendar, although the time in question is not the same. . . . Even when times are abstractly equal, the individuation of a life is not the same as the individuation of the subject that leads it or serves as its support” (261). As argued earlier, abstract time is constituted by division and immobile sections, by “forms, substances, and subjects” (262) and it is termed as *Chronos*: “the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject” (262). By contrast, real time, which is constituted by movement and rest, by “speeds and affects” (262) is the *Aeon*: “the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early,

a something that is both going to happen and has just happened" (262). In other words, our life is constituted by these two times. Chronos determines the present as the anchoring point while Aeon is a zone of indiscernibility, pointing out not only the coexistence of the past, the present and the future but also the indivisible relation of everything with time because as life force, it is acting on beings and nonbeings all the time.

Therefore, in their de-subjective and de-Cartesian theorization, Deleuze and Guattari do not pronounce any superiority or exception of human beings concerning the issue of becoming. Although most of the time, we live consciously and rationally in *Chronos*, real time (the *Aeon*) as life force still has always-already encompassed us. When real time permeates our brains and makes them temporally go blank, it is the moment when the subjectivity of time discloses itself while we are de-faced and de-subjectified. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the moment of becoming and in their corpus, there are myriads of becomings, like becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible but we can simply name multiple becomings of humans as "becoming-woman." But by becoming-woman, Deleuze and Guattari do not mean it is a static and biological phenomenon: a girl grows up to be a woman just as a boy grows up to be a man. Rather, becoming-woman is a haecceity, a de-subjective movement when the subject is

affected by forces to the extent that his/her body's capacity to act is inaugurated or diminished. As Deleuze and Guattari say,

> Becoming-woman is not imitating this entity or even transforming oneself into it. . . . All we are saying is that these indissociable aspects of becoming-woman must first be understood as a function of something else: not imitating or assuming the female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, create the molecular woman. (275)

In other words, the *being* of every human being is *becoming*: he or she is experiencing becoming-woman every moment and it has nothing to do with sex and gender. However, we need to keep in mind that "becoming-woman" is still indiscernible from "being a woman." Despite that life force acts on the subject by means of unexpectedly creeping into the brain and it dismantles his/her rational thinking by inaugurating or diminishing the subject's capacity to act, the subject would not stay in this condition forever (which would be diagnosed as psychopathology). Instead, the dilative force of becoming-woman is entangled with the contractive force of being in the light that their confluence and convergence are topologically mapping the speeds and affects on the subject's body.

Apart from arguing life force engenders becoming-woman, Deleuze and Guattari further connect this becoming-woman not to the growth of a girl into a mature/molar woman but to the universal girl: “It is not the girl who becomes a woman; it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl” (277). As I said, the girl is not a molar girl who will grow up to be a woman; rather, she is a molecular girl, indicative of life as non-division. The girl is “a larger reality in which there is no ‘I’” (Low 264). But for Deleuze and Guattari, the body of the girl has been stolen yet by which is not meant the privation of virginity (still thinking the body in terms of organism) but the differentiation which stresses “difference from the same” and it has, in varying ways and to varying degrees, undermined the indiscernibility *in* and *of* life. As they argue,

> The question is not, or not only, that of the organism, history, and subject of enunciation that oppose masculine to feminine in the great dualism machines. The question is fundamentally that of the body—the body they *steal* from us in order to fabricate opposable organisms. This body is stolen first from the girl: Stop behaving like that, you’re not a little girl anymore, you’re not a tomboy, etc. The girl’s becoming is stolen first, in order to impose a history, or prehistory, upon her. (*A Thousand Plateaus* 276)

In other words, the moment when division categorizes life is also the moment when the universal girl is annihilated and only the molar women remain. It becomes no

coincidence that neither do the females in Woolf's oeuvre possess their bodies, like Rachel Vinrace in *The Voyage Out* and the intelligent females, like Elizabeth Barrett, Charlotte Brontë and Sophia Jex-Blake in *Three Guineas* because they have been domesticated inside the house of patriarchy. For Deleuze and Guattari, these women's lines of flight and becomings have been blocked since they are harnessed to the yoke of patriarchy.

Thus, in their view on Woolf, writing is conferred with an epochal mission. Her writing does not simply concern the issue of writing *for* and *as* a woman but of writing with an intensive energy and of conveying the particles of becoming-woman so that writing "is naturally creative, incandescent and undivided" (*A Room of One's Own* 89). As they say, "When Virginia Woolf was questioned about a specifically women's writing, she was appalled at the idea of writing 'as a woman.' Rather, writing should produce a becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing and impregnating an entire social field, and of contaminating men, of sweeping them up in that becoming" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 276). Writing should retrieve the girl's body which is an indiscernible zone before any knowledge and history dismantles life. Writing should retrieve the body of the girl, or to be more precise, the body without organs of the girl, and to write with such a body can set life force free from any kind of division:

> She [the girl] never ceases to roam upon a body without organs. She is an abstract line, or a line of flight. Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce *n* molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through. The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between, the intermezzo—that is what Virginia Woolf lived with all her energies, in all of her work, never ceasing to become. (276-77)

In other words, in Deleuze and Guattari's view, Woolf is to write with becoming-woman and to render visible this invisible force, "the force of life" ("A Sketch of the Past" 79) in her writing. And we can further understand on Deleuze's reading of Woolf, when attempting to achieve writing as becoming-woman, he would argue, "Virginia Woolf forbade herself 'to speak like a woman': she harnessed the woman-becoming of writing all the more for this" (*Dialogues* 43). In this light, on the one hand, our life is constituted by all kinds of divisions; on the other hand, Deleuze suggests only by means of writing as becoming-woman, can real time as life force discloses itself and be dissociated from the yoke of divisions.

After demonstrating real time is becoming which "mark[s] every moment of the state as a transformation" (*The Deleuzian Dictionary* 87) and the dynamic meaning of

Woolf's writing as becoming-woman, in the below section, I will exemplify *Mrs. Dalloway* as Woolf's writing as becoming-woman to argue three points. The first one is to ague how characters perceive real time and what will happen when the devouring nature of humans tries to determine it. Secondly, by noting real time as intrinsic force to the event (which makes it dynamic as becoming), I will read Septimus's death as an event and argue how and why "to die" becomes the negation of "being dead." If Septimus's death discloses the subjectivity of time as life force, I will argue, it is disclosed in the disintegration of Clarissa's subjectivity and of her language. Thirdly, such a reading can help us tackle the temporalization of Clarissa's little room when it is enfolded while dismantled by real time.

II. Clarissa and Her Indiscernible Relation with Life

In *Mrs. Dalloway*, when Clarissa comes back from buying flowers and when she is informed that Lady Bruton has invited Richard over for lunch without asking her, she returns to her attic room, feeling upset and disappointed. In this attic room, Clarissa thinks somehow she fails Richard because she cannot help but fall for women: "she could not resist sometimes yielding to the charm of a woman, not a girl, of a woman confessing, as to her they often did, some scrape, some folly. And whether it was pity, or their beauty, or that she was older, or some accident—like a faint scent, or a violin

next door . . . she did undoubtedly then feel what men felt" (26-27). What do men feel? According to Clarissa,

> Only for a moment; but it was enough. It was a sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed to the farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance, some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin and gushed and poured with an extraordinary alleviation over the cracks and sores. Then, for that moment, she had seen an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning almost expressed. (27)

Clarissa never tells us *exactly* what she feels at this moment (the inner meaning is almost but still not expressed) because such intensity is beyond the tether of words and she can only roughly describe what she feels. The intensity of falling in love with women is incandescent yet ephemeral so that it lasts only for a moment (the time for a match to burn) but right at that instant, it gushes forward and is overwhelming so much so that she can only breathlessly quiver at the edge of its intensive explosion. Clarissa is all of a sudden enclosed by a nameless intensity and she is very agitated yet confused. She starts to wonder, if her emotion for another woman is as strong as how men feel for women, then, can it be love? How is she able to define this ineffable and inexplicable

emotion for women? Right at this moment, through her stream of consciousness, Clarissa's past memory about Sally returns to the present and she starts to suspect the meaning of it: "this question of love (she thought, putting her coat away), this falling in love with women. Take Sally Seton; her relation in the old days with Sally Seton. Had not that, after all, been love?" (27). Yet provided that Clarissa senses a nonhuman and nameless intensity washing all over her, we still have the *subjective* presentation of her consciousness and her thinking is still on the ground of sexual division: to think what the other sex might think and feel (man *vs.* woman). It is neither becoming nor real time as life force that I want to discuss here. Yet, I will be arguing, the glimpse of how Clarissa regards herself and life suggests her relation with life is not based on any division because life for her is non-division.

In the very beginning of *Mrs. Dalloway*, Clarissa says, "She would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were that. . . . She sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. She had a perpetual sense . . . of being out, out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day" (5-6). Clarissa also regards herself as a knife, traversing everything but also encompassing it within herself. Unlike Lady Bruton who dislikes Clarissa claims, Clarissa is not "cutting them [people] up and sticking them together again" (91). She does not devour or destroy the thing that is

encompassed within her; instead, both of them possess their individuality and they are more like vesicles, porous to each other. In this respect, if life is an assemblage, containing other small and miscellaneous assemblages during encounters, no wonder Clarissa says, “she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of the house there, ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself” (6). For Clarissa, even death cannot eliminate this assemblage for in her view, death is not a terminal end; rather, death is just the beginning: “did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely? but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other . . .” (6). It is crucial to Clarissa’s understanding of death that a dynamic and floating force (“ebb and flow”) is acting on her so much so that the perishing of her body is endowed with positive meanings. It is not *just* that we know it is impossible to dissect life by some norms and disciplines because life is made up of by flows and ebbs but also she is “molecularized” when there is a force, higher, larger than her disclosing itself. It is for this reason that she feels absolutely calm and even joyful to believe that she still survives in this world even though her body perishes. Right in the very

beginning of *Mrs. Dalloway*, Woolf has arranged an important scene, indicating how it is possible to read death not as *nothing* but as a Deleuzian event: the becoming-imperceptible of Clarissa when life force "molecularizes" her by disclosing itself. Even though Clarissa claims that "She knew nothing; no language, no history; she scarcely read a book now, except memoirs in bed . . ." (6), she still can perceive herself being washed over or "spread over" by flows and ebbs (6). Life, for her, is not based on division and differentiation because, according to the above demonstration, her relation to life, or to be more precise, to life force, is that of indiscernibility, proximity and contingency. It is dynamic. However, life has to be stabilized, concretized and categorized for Sir William and Dr. Holmes.

In *Mrs. Dalloway*, Sir William and Dr. Holmes are the representatives that coarsely sever life with disciplines and knowledge and they punish the disobedient. Dr. Holmes seems to be a professional and friendly doctor so Rezia is confused about Septimus's animosity to Dr. Holmes: "Dr. Holmes was such a kind man. He was so interested in Septimus. He only wanted to help them" (81) and when Dr. Holmes comes to visit Septimus, he even claims, "My dear lady, I have come as a friend" (131). Yet under Dr. Holmes's treatment, Septimus has seen through the devouring nature of Dr. Holmes: "Once you stumble . . . human nature is on you. Holmes is one you. Their [of his and Rezia] only chance was to escape, without letting Holmes know; to

Italy—anywhere, anywhere, away from Dr. Holmes" (81). The famous doctor, Sir William, is also described as a sympathetic doctor in his expertise: "you invoke proportion; order rest in bed; rest in solitude; silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, without messages; six months' rest; until a man who went in weighing seven stone six comes out weighing twelve" (87). And the idea of proportion that Sir William believes is elevated as truth that should be worshipped and followed without doubts:

> Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalized despair, made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of proportion—his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw's if there were women (she embroidered, knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home with her son), so that not only did his colleagues respect him, his subordinates fear him, but the friends and relations of his patients felt for him the keenest gratitude for insisting that these prophetic Christs and Christesses, who prophesied the end of the world, or the advent of God, should drink milk in bed, as Sir William ordered; Sir William with his thirty years' experience of these kinds of cases, and his infallible instinct, this is madness, this sense; in fact, his sense of proportion. (87-88)

Proportion works in collaboration with conversion, which is another devouring power under the disguise of blessing and chastity:

> Conversion is her name and she feasts on the wills of the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own features stamped on the face of the populace. At Hyde Park Corner on a tub she stands preaching; shrouds herself in white and walks penitentially disguised as brotherly love through factories and parliaments; offers help, but desires power; smites out of her way roughly the dissentient, or dissatisfied; bestows her blessing on those who, looking upward, catch submissively from her eyes the light of their own. (88)

Lady Bradshaw thereby becomes the first disciple of Sir William when his sense of proportion and conversion has been successfully implanted into her: “Fifteen years ago she had gone under. It was nothing you could put your finger on; there had been no scene, no snap; only the slow sinking, waterlogged, of her will into his. . . . [N]ow, quick to minister to the craving which lit her husband’s eye so oilily for dominion, for power, she cramped, squeezed, pared, pruned, drew back, peeped through . . .” (88). Once again, we see how the body of Lady Bradshaw has been stolen from her since the day she obeyed her husband’s will. She *is* a woman and the possibility of becoming-woman has been destroyed. But proportion and conversion are not merely

practiced by means of marriage; it is also practiced by means of the education for the girl. From Clarissa's own articulation, we know her body was stolen from her for the life at Bourton "was protective, on her side" (29): "Sally it was who made her feel, for the first time, how sheltered the life at Bourton was. She knew nothing about sex—nothing about social problems. . . . But Aunt Helena never liked discussion of anything (when Sally gave her William Morris, it had to be wrapped in brown paper)" (28). Proportion and conversion are practiced thoroughly; Lady Bradshaw and Clarissa are the products of this reactionary machine.

Furthermore, right in these two passages, we see how Sir William's sense of proportion, his "infallible instinct" and conversion "under some plausible disguise; some venerable name; love, duty, self-sacrifice" (88) are consonant with the truthful narration that Deleuze tries so hard to revolutionize by "the powers of the false" in *Cinema 2*. When Sir William's sense of proportion and conversion becomes the indisputable truth and represses other different and heterogeneous voices ("Naked, defenceless, the exhausted, the friendless received the impress of Sir William's will. He swooped; he devoured. He shut people up" 90), life moves toward nothing but a dead end for "No matter how large it is, it is exhausted because it no longer knows how to transform itself" (*Cinema 2* 136). But the powers of the false is not the rhapsody to celebrate deception; rather it calls into question the very issue of judging: "It is not

simply a matter of pointing out the difficulty of reaching the true, taking into account the shortcomings of the investigation and of those who judge; . . . it is the very possibility of judging which is called into question" (134). It is because the powers of the false are indicative of the subjectivity of time: as life force, it can not be settled down once and for all. The truthful value system that Sir William and Dr. Holmes worship is not moving toward prosperity and fertility which they believe as their contribution to England but moving toward death and nihilism. As Kumar says, "Harley Street [where Sir William practices] cannot, obviously, lead to that inner poise which is attainable only by letting the stream of consciousness flow on unimpeded. Reality, which is a process of becoming, is a dynamic continuity that cannot be sliced into proportionate bits and can be apprehended only through intuition" (76).

Under this circumstance, we can fully understand why Septimus is saying "He did not want to die. Life was good. The sun hot" (*Mrs. Dalloway* 132) while still jumping out of the window. On the one hand, it is because he realizes Sir William and the sense of proportion which he represents are suffocating life force by ordering him to obey: "'Must', 'must', why 'must'? What power had Bradshaw over him? 'What right has Bradshaw to say "must" to me?'" (130). And if Sir William speaks and acts on behalf of proportion, Dr. Holmes becomes the very practitioner of conversion: he imposes his thoughts and wills on his patients with kindness and generosity.

Nevertheless, that is what conversion is: “disguised as brotherly love through factories and parliaments; offers help, but desires power; smites out of her way roughly the dissentient, or dissatisfied; bestows her blessing on those who, looking upward, catch submissively from her eyes the light of their own” (88). In this respect, death seems to be the only solution and a severe indictment against proportion and conversion. For Dr. Holmes, Septimus’s suicide is an act of cowardice and it is no one’s fault (132) but Septimus is fully aware that “It was their idea of tragedy, not his or Rezia’s (for she was with him). Holmes and Bradshaw liked that sort of thing” (132).

On the other hand, Septimus’s death can be interpreted as a Deleuzain event. As I said, an event is constituted by two parts: the actualized state of affairs and pure virtualities. If death is an event, there is an actualized state (Septimus is dead) and a dynamic force intrinsic to the event of dying (Septimus dies). Right on the latter point, Deleuze maintains that the open and unknown force brought forth by the infinitive verb is underlying between Septimus, the subject in this sentence, and dead as its predicate. As he says, “If the infinitives ‘to die,’ ‘to love,’ ‘to move,’ ‘to smile,’ etc. are events, it is because there is a part of them which their accomplishment is not enough to realize, a becoming in itself which constantly both awaits us and precedes us,

like a third person of the infinitive, a fourth person singular" (*Dialogues* 65).[10] In other words, if we retrospect to the above part arguing Clarissa's understanding of death, once again, Woolf is suggesting that do not take death at its face value because a dynamic force is soon to be unleashed. Despite the *fact* that Septimus is dead, the intrinsic force on the other side will be disclosed, however "invisible, opaque and shadowy, like a crystal barely dislodged from the earth" (*Cinema 2* 68) it is. For Deleuze, *that* can be considered as the advent of *life* which is underlying death. However, *in what way* is life force disclosed which is triggered by means of Septimus's death? Right on this point, we have to take Clarissa into consideration again.

As many critics interpret Septimus as Clarissa's alter ego or their relation as "double" (Jensen 116), indeed Clarissa is the only character who realizes the meaning of Septimus's death is not *nothing* but a meaningful act, directed toward life and future. In the party, Lady Bradshaw informs Clarissa that Septimus's death delays their coming to the Dalloways' party. In the beginning, Clarissa is very annoyed with the Bradshaws who talk about death in her party but soon she realizes that the devouring nature of Sir William and Dr. Holmes makes life "intolerable" and makes it wither away

[10] When defining the concept of the event in *The Deleuzian Dictionary*, Cliff Stagoll provides an example to demonstrate the dynamism underlying the infinitive verb: "we ought not to say 'the tree became green' or 'the tree is now green' (both of which imply a change in the tree's 'essence'), but rather 'the tree greens.' By using the infinitive form 'to green,' we make a dynamic attribution of the predicate, an incorporeality distinct from both the tree and green-ness which captures nonetheless the dynamism of the event's actualization" (87).

with “corruption, lies, chatter” (*Mrs. Dalloway* 163). For Clarissa, Septimus’s death is rather an act of communication; it is an act to embrace life:

> A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of reaching the center which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded; one was alone. There was an embrace in death. (163)

On the one hand, we can argue that Clarissa must perceive the rapture of life *through* the death of Septimus while in this light, Septimus’s death is not just death but an important gesture, turning over a new page in life by illuminating Clarissa the meaning of life. So when she has her epiphany, Clarissa says: “She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away while they went on living” (165). As we can see, on the actualized side of the event, such a reading is subject-centered and “life” and its positive meanings are interpreted from a humanitarian perspective. Nevertheless, with reference to the Deleuzian event, on the other hand, I argue, life does not *just* disclose itself in terms of Clarissa’s epiphany but as a pure virtual form, it discloses itself in dismantling Clarissa’s subjectivity and the syntax of her language.

When first hearing of the death of Septimus, Clarissa is incapable of calmly and rationally thinking for her body is now overwhelmingly awash with life force to the extent that "her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it" (163). Right at this moment, Clarissa is not a rational thinking subject but is completely sliced over by life force unleashed by death to experience what Septimus experienced and she is thus transformed into a body with "speeds and affects" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 262). Her subjectivity is entirely fragmented into pieces so in the end, Clarissa would try to put herself together again: "But she must go back. She must assemble. She must find Sally and Peter" (*Mrs. Dalloway* 165).

Furthermore, during the process of being dismantled by life force, Clarissa's language is also disintegrated into incoherent and inconsistent fragments but it conveys the rhythm and feelings clinging to her bodily sensations. As Clarissa says,

> The young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with the clock striking the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him, with all this going on. There! the old lady had put out her light! the whole house was dark now with this going on, she repeated, and the words came to her, Fear no more the heat

of the sun. She must go back to them. But what an extraordinary night! She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away while they went on living. (*Mrs. Dalloway* 165)

Clarissa's agitating and hasty tone conveyed through Woolf's stream of consciousness technique suggests her interior thoughts are surfacing and bumping into each other without being arranged rationally. These thoughts are like moving pictures "as in a cinema, one picture must follow another without stopping" (Woolf, "The 'Movie' Novel" 84) or like the kaleidoscopic pictures in which one picture replaces the other instantaneously. The thrice use of exclamation points also stresses Clarissa's anxious yet exciting state of mind. But on the other hand, the articulation of "She must go back to them." indicates her rationality is now in the tug of war with life force: the former tries to put her self together while the latter is still remorselessly disintegrating her subjectivity. As argued earlier, being a woman or "being a perfect hostess" (*Mrs. Dalloway* 5) is always struggling against becoming-woman. As for the syntax in this paragraph, Woolf weaves long and complex sentences with short and rapid-fire ones in consonant with this dynamic and resplendent moment. We readers can feel how chaotic Clarissa's mind is for being laden with all kinds of precipitant thoughts and bodily sensations. Yet is not this paragraph best expressive of the writing which

should record “an incessant shower of innumerable atoms” (“Modern Fiction” 160) in Woolf’s mind? However disordered and ignited the state of mind of Clarissa is, “Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external possible” (160-61)?

In this respect, the meaning of the little room where she is thinking is completely traversed and deterritorialized. In the party, this room is a site for official business: “The chairs still kept the impress of the Prime Minister and Lady Bruton, she turned deferentially, he sitting four-square, authoritatively. They had been talking about India” (*Mrs. Dalloway* 162-63). However, no sooner is Clarissa’s body transformed into a body with speeds and affects than this room is transformed into any-space-whatever because it is now satiated with life force whose intensities cannot be evaluated by geometry for it rather signifies the becoming-imperceptible as the subjectivity of time. So in the room, “The clock began striking. . . . The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air” (165). At first, in this room, Clarissa can still hear the chiming of the clock but without any indication or transition, all of a sudden, everything is molecularized for being “dissolved in the air.” In other words, not just Clarissa’s body and her language are disintegrated into fragments but also the clock and its sounds are melting into air. In this paragraph, Woolf spares

negligible descriptions of interior furniture and objects by entirely emphasizing even the clock is dissolved into the leaden color and its face into numerous circles, and even the formless sound is becoming-imperceptible. We know now Clarissa and this room are enfolded within the subjectivity of time and become confluent. This room is a temporalized space in which this room as well as Clarissa are devoid of their identifiable traits for being immersed into the vortex of real time. As Deleuze and Guattari comment, "It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a décor or backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity . . ." (*A Thousand Plateaus* 262).

Under this circumstance, we are led back to the subject matter of this chapter: real time is a life force and it discloses itself by disintegrating Clarissa's body and by dismantling her language. If we retrospect to the beginning of *Mrs. Dalloway*, we can have a better understanding of how Clarissa regards herself and life. As she says "She would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were that. She felt very young; at the same time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. She had a perpetual sense . . . of being out, out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day" (*Mrs. Dalloway* 5-6). This articulation of Clarissa

demonstrates how she is transformed into a haecceity, involved in the movement and becoming of life. So according to Deleuze, “On her stroll Virginia Woolf’s heroine penetrates like a blade through all things, and yet looks from the outside, with the impression that it is dangerous to live even a single day (‘Never again will I say: I am this or that, he is this, he is that . . .’). But the stroll is itself a hecceity” (Deleuze, *Dialogues* 92). If talking a walk is a haecceity which is an act of forming assemblages with the objects during the walk, this walker, Mrs. Dalloway, is also involuted within this assemblage. Her identity as being part of this assemblage is not prior to other objects so Clarissa would claim “she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of the house there, ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself” (*Mrs. Dalloway* 6) and “she felt herself everywhere; not ‘here, here, here;’ . . . but everywhere” (135). All these examples demonstrate to what extent Clarissa is made aware of the diminution or even demolition of her self when real time discloses its subjectivity. For Woolf, as I said, it is the task of the modernist writer to capture the dynamic disclosure of real time while in Deleuze, it is haecceity which refers to the de-subjectification of human beings when being slashed over by life force: “You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set

of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, *a life* (regardless of its duration)—a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity)" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 262). The fog that Deleuze uses here eerily recalls the mist that Clarissa describes herself.

Along with Clarissa's regarding herself as an indiscernible knife and a mist and the sanguine meaning underlying Septimus's death, we know when Clarissa is set free from the yoke of patriarchy and its division, she is experiencing becoming-woman. She is becoming the universal girl: "The girl is certainly not defined by virginity; she is defined by a relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness, by a combination of atoms, an emission of particles: haecceity" (276). Therefore, Clarissa's question about love ("Had not that, after all, been love?" *Mrs. Dalloway* 27) is not directed toward the enclosed system of gender division (to imagine what the other sex might feel, to love *as* one or the other sex) but toward an open and forever mutative future for if love is a force, it is always floating and transforming the self when encountering others. As Deleuze and Guattari aver, "Knowing how to love does not mean remaining a man or a woman; it means extracting from one's sex the particles, the speeds and slownesses, the flows, the *n* sexes that constitute the girl of *that* sexuality" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 277). In this light, on my Deleuzian reading of *Mrs. Dalloway*, the hope for new life is not embodied in whether or not Rezia can be pregnant with Septimus's child or in

Clarissa's final epiphany in which death is just the beginning of life but if we interpret Septimus's death as a Deleuzian event, it is embodied in making us realize that time, as "the powers of future" (*Francis Bacon* 52) is always intrinsic to the actualized states of affairs and it is waiting to be unleashed. The trajectory of life becomes unpredictable for now it depends on when, where and how life force discloses itself. In Deleuze own words, "this is the point at which death turns against death; where dying is the negation of death, and the impersonality of dying no longer indicates only the moment when I disappear outside of myself, but rather the moment when death loses itself in itself, and also the figure which the most singular life takes on in order to substitute itself for me" (*The Logic of Sense* 153). In his analysis, death is not an end but a starting point for future and further development-envelopment, actualization-virtualization process in life.

In this chapter, through the disintegration of Clarissa's subjectivity and of language, real time's subjectivity is disclosed. In Chapter Two, I will further use *To the Lighthouse* to argue how the writing technique, the free indirect discourse, one of the stream of consciousness techniques that Woolf uses, is to get close enough to the position of real time when she is made aware of its subjectivity while in Chapter Four, I will exemplify "A Haunted House" to demonstrate in Woolf's literary experiment with form and language, there is a life force underlying the language she uses and it can only produce incoherent thematic meaning and inconsistent logic. And the disintegration of

subjectivity will be further argued in Chapter Three. By means of Orlando's several unique bodily experiences, not only our knowledge about subjectivity but also the concept of the body need reconsidering.

Chapter Two

The Perspective of Time in *To the Lighthouse*

In Chapter One, I argued the radical meaning of Clarissa's little room in which she is made to realize the subjectivity of time inaugurated by Septimus's death. His death is not only a protest against proportion and conversion that Sir William and Dr. Holmes worship but also an important declaration indicating an unprecedented and unpredictable future is contemporaneous with the present. I also exemplified the disintegration of Clarissa's subjectivity and language to demonstrate in what way life force discloses itself. If being triggered by Septimus's death, Clarissa experiences becoming-imperceptible, then I also demonstrated this experience of Clarissa is not only consonant with life force as becoming-woman in Deleuze but also with what writing should accomplish in Woolf's mind. From Woolf's perspective, writing is not simply to record the *bildungsroman* of the character but to perspicaciously record how the dismantled subject perceives life force. In this chapter, I will be further arguing how the free indirect discourse, as one of the stream of consciousness techniques, enables Woolf to approach *closely* enough the perspective of time when real time discloses itself in *To the Lighthouse*.

I. Who Speaks in the Stream of Consciousness Technique?

Being one of Woolf's well-acclaimed publications, *To the Lighthouse* (1927) is known as her reminiscence about her parents. They have haunted her till she writes them down in this semi-autobiographical fiction. In her memoir "A Sketch of the Past," Woolf says: "the presence of my mother obsessed me. I could hear her voice, see her, imagine what she would do or say as I went about my day's doings. She was one of the invisible presences who after all play so important a part in every life" (80). In *To the Lighthouse* the characterization of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay is based on the real personality of Woolf's parents, Leslie and Julia Stephen, and the merry time that the Ramsays spend on the Isle of Skye is based on the real experience of the Stephens at St. Ives before Julia Stephen died in 1895. Writing *To the Lighthouse* becomes a catharsis to heal the agony of Woolf's bereavement. In her 1928 diary entry, Woolf says, "I used to think of him & mother daily; but writing The Lighthouse, laid them in my mind. And now he comes back sometimes, but differently. (I believe this to be true—that I was obsessed by them both, unhealthily; & writing of them was a necessary act.)" (*D* 3:208). In "A Sketch of the Past" Woolf also says, "just as I rubbed out a good deal of the force of my mother's memory by writing about her in *To the Lighthouse*, so I rubbed out much of his [of her father] memory there too. Yet he too obsessed me for years.

Until I wrote it out, I would find my lips moving; I would be arguing with him; raging against him; saying to myself all that I never said to him" (108). Writing becomes a healing process to cure Woolf's obsession about her parents.

There are numerous ways for critics to read this fiction. The first one is to relate it to the influence of painting. Due to the epochal exhibitions of the post-impressionist paintings held at the Grafton in 1910 and 1912, Woolf's friendship with Roger Fry and her famous axiom "in or around December 1910, human character changed," some critics read it as being tremendously influenced by painting, especially when one of the characters, Lily Briscoe, is a painter and so is Woolf's sister, Vanessa Bell (Gillespie, Roe). Laura Marcus (2007a), David Trotter and Leslie Kathleen Hankins (1999) provide cinematic readings of this novel and argue the cinematic trait, presence in absence, features this fiction. Other critics' arguments emanate from social and historical perspectives: through Lily Briscoe to understand the historical background of Woolf's parents, in which the First World War (Briggs), the gender issue (Whitworth) and the meaning of civilization (Bradshaw) are disputed.

On the other hand, if *To the Lighthouse* is a stream of consciousness novel, Maria DiBattista and Erich Auerbach have laid their focus on Woolf's language and on the issue of viewpoint in this novel. Yet when reading *To the Lighthouse*, DiBattista cannot identify the speaker so she simply avers that the reader should obey his/her

commend: “Who is it, after all, who commands ‘Well, look, then, feel then.’ To whom are these words directed? All we can know for certain is that the imperative to feel must be obeyed” (DiBattista 143). In “The Brown Stocking” Auerbach also notices *To the Lighthouse* is sometimes narrated from an unidentifiable position and he only speculates that some spirits may be the narrator: “the speakers no longer seem to be human beings at all but spirits between heaven and earth, nameless spirits capable of penetrating the depths of the human soul, capable too of knowing something about it, but not of attaining clarity as to what is in process there, with the result that what they report has a doubtful ring . . . ” (532). Most important of all, he holds that this speaking/seeing position is neither subjective nor objective: “we are not dealing with objective utterances on the part of the author in respect to one of the characters. No one is certain of anything here: it is all mere supposition, glances cast by one person upon another whose enigma he cannot solve” (532). Therefore, using DiBattista’s and Auerbach’s arguments as point of departure, we can start to contemplate the issue of the speaking position which conveys the characters’ consciousness. Then here comes the pressing question: if the stream of consciousness technique is to present the full scale of the character’s consciousness, why is the third person pronoun rather than the first person employed to depict the *subjective* consciousness of the character?

Therefore, this chapter attempts to answer this question and since the main focus of my dissertation is to put chiefly on Woolf's texts, in the below section, apart from elaborating on the narratologist's and literary critics' interpretations of free indirect style, which is the sheer writing technique that Woolf uses to compose her stream of consciousness novel, firstly I will contextualize this writing technique in modernism in order to correlate it with modern era and with Woolf's writing style as modernist writer. Secondly, I will have recourse to Deleuze's interpretation of free indirect discourse which he learns from several important postwar directors. When stream, continuity, change and becoming formulate Bergson's and Deleuze's theories and the relevant readings of Woolf, it is Deleuze who overtly announces the indiscernible relation between time and writing. Or to be more precise, it is Deleuze who investigates how free indirect discourse *can be* the sheer technique that renders visible the subjectivity of time. Thirdly, I will argue free indirect discourse produces a perspective closely enough to the position of time and "Time Passes" of *To the Lighthouse* is narrated from this position when the summerhouse is left empty for ten years. In this text, not just characters' consciousness but also the summerhouse form indiscernible relations with time. This summerhouse, in this light, becomes nothing but a time-image.

II. Mapping Woolf in Modernism

It has been a controversy to map modernism. It varies in different nation-states and in different terrains of art and it influences the next generations in varying ways and to varying degrees. Yet in this dissertation, my discussion of modernism focuses chiefly on the history of literature. Literary critics have very diverse perspectives on its definition, when and where it begins and the course of time it occupies and the influence it has on the writers of subsequent generations. Regardless of the routes they take and the emphases they put, critics unanimously attempt to map the grand picture of modernism by arguing in the face of unprecedented lifestyles and social transformations, "modernism" addresses the degree of writers' resistance to, fascination with and partaking of it. In Tim Armstrong's *Modernism: A Cultural History* (2005), there are two approaches to map modernism. In around 1930s, when introducing writers at that time, there is no emphatic awareness to group them, together with their works, as the representative of modernism. But in 1970s, critics intently regard the literary activity around 1930s as an innovative literary project (whose trend leader is Ezra Pound) for these writers intend to achieve the same goal in their writing concerning modern life. "Modernism" retrospectively figures writers and their works. In Lawrence Rainey's introduction to *Modernism: An Anthology* (2005), he holds that modernism is at first a resistance to the alienation and unbalance, the exclusive syndrome in modern life and through the aesthetic revolution it inaugurates, modernism provides an ethical response

to and even a solution to the predicament in modern life. For Peter Nicholls, the author of *Modernism: A Literary Guide* (1995), he is also concerned about the extent to which the transformation of social experiences influences literary trend, when the innovation of technology, the miniature of modern cityscape and new discovery of modern science come along. As we can see, critics argue modernism's beginning and its legacy in different ways: either in literary history (in which modernism is coined and defined) or in the correlation between society and literature (modernism as a salvation of society; modernism as a parallel of society). And what features the above readings is modernist writers in effect confront an urgent condition: writing must progress with time in resonance with the accelerating life. Under this circumstance, Woolf is no exception but in the trend of revolutionizing writing.

In her literary manifesto "Modern Fiction" (1925), Woolf teases sarcastically the realist writers, Arnold Bennett, H. G. Wells and John Galsworthy, by calling them materialists: "If we fasten, then, one label on all these books, on which is one word materialists, we mean by it that they write of unimportant things; that they spend immense skill and immense industry making the trivial and the transitory appear the true and the enduring" (159). For Woolf, materialists fail because their approach is not to grasp life but to describe the façade/body: "Life escapes; and perhaps without life nothing else is worth while" (159). Therefore when Woolf suspects, "Is life like this?

Must novels be like this?" (160), she does not so much have quarrels with realist writers as overtly plans for a new form of writing. And the only approach in her mind that can keep up with the flickering of life is "Let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness" (161). After her literary experiment with form through which Woolf has a further and deeper understanding of her relation with language, in a letter to Vanessa Bell in January 1920, Woolf expresses her delight of discovering a new art form:

> [I am] happier today than I was yesterday, having this afternoon arrived at some idea of a new form for a new novel. Suppose one thing should open out of another—as in an unwritten novel—only not for 10 pages but 200 or so—doesn't that give the looseness and lightness I want; doesn't that get closer and yet keep form and speed, and enclose everything, everything? . . . For I figure that the approach will be entirely different this time: no scaffolding; scarcely a brick to be seen; all crepuscular, but the heart, the passion, humor, everything as bright as fire in the mist. . . . Whether I'm sufficiently mistress of things—that's the doubt; but conceive *Mark on the Wall, K.G.,* and *Unwritten Novel* taking hands and dancing in unity. What the unity shall be I have yet to discover; the theme is a blank to me; but I see

immense possibilities in the form I hit upon more or less by chance two weeks ago. (*D* 2:13-14)

Woolf severs the legacy of realism bequeathed to her by turning down its convention and by inaugurating a new epoch in the history of literature. In the new form of writing, composed by the stream of consciousness technique, "there would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe in the accepted style, and perhaps not a single button sewn on as the Bond Street tailors would have it" ("Modern Fiction" 160) as long as its important task is to capture the evanescent life and the avatar of life. "Modern Fiction" and "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" published around the same time are generally regarded as Woolf's "independent declaration" from the realist legacy and as her foray into the mature phase in her writing. The stream of consciousness technique features most of her mature works in this period, including *Jacob's Room* (1923), *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925), *To the Lighthouse* (1927), *Orlando* (1930) and *The Waves* (1931).

"Stream of consciousness" is originally a psychological term, firstly coined by William James in *The Principles of Psychology* (1891). For James, humans' consciousness is never a state but a floating stream: "It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. *In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of*

subjective life" (sic, 239). James compares consciousness with a floating stream and this stream is not simply rushing toward the future; the past which is preserved along with the tide will surface once in a while. As he says, "*The knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with out knowledge of the present thing. . . .* These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and expectation, the retrospective and the prospective sense of time. They give that continuity to consciousness without which it could not be called a stream" (606-07). And the term, stream of consciousness, is used firstly by May Sinclair in literature. In a review of Dorothy Richardson's *Pilgrimage* in April 1918, she says: "there is no drama, no situation, no set scene. Nothing happens. It is just life going on and on. It is Miriam Henderson's stream of consciousness going on and on" (444). Even though this term is firstly coined by James, "stream of consciousness" is transferred from psychology to literature and features the contemporary writing.

Despite of its different origins and usages,[11] generally speaking, the stream of consciousness novel is to extract the essence of life from the quotidian life at the expense of irrelevant and superficial descriptions and the way to accomplish it is "to

[11] According to Kumar, the possible origins of stream of consciousness novels include (1) "the disintegration of the values," (2) "deriving from the psychoanalytical school," (3) "literary embellishment," (4) influenced by impressionist painting, (5) related to the Symbolism and its mode of expression, (6) influenced by the cinema (1-5).

immerse himself [the author] completely, with a stupendous effort of the imagination, in the stream of his character's consciousness so that he ceases to have any point of view of his own" (Kumar 19) or as Robert Humphrey in *Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel* puts his emphasis on the consciousness as the platform: "the depicted consciousness serves as a screen on which the material in these novels is presented" (2). Even Bergson anticipates the contemporary writers of the stream of consciousness novels to go directly to the core of the character's consciousness: "could reality come into direct contact with sense and consciousness, could we enter into immediate communion with things and with ourselves, probably art would be useless, or rather we should all be artists, for then our soul would continually vibrate in perfect accord with nature. Our eyes, aided by memory, would carve out in space and fix in time the most inimitable of pictures" (*Laughter*). For Bergson, consciousness becomes the only thing that is worth to be recorded and the reason why these novels dispense with irrelevant details is to attain "the absolute":

> Consider, again, a character whose adventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply the traits of his hero's character, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of that

> indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and actions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. . . . The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents which manifest it, instead of adding themselves to the idea and so enriching it, would seem to me, on the contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, exhausting it or impoverishing its essence. (*An Introduction to Metaphysics* 22)

Apart from presenting characters' subjective consciousness, for Bergsonian critics, they hold that the stream of consciousness technique also renders real time/concrete duration visible. As argued earlier, for Bergson, real time cannot be divided nor is it chronological; rather, the past is contemporaneous with the present. In other words, real time, refers to the indiscernible, psychological, "private/subjective" time of the character in contrast to the chronological, "pubic/objective" time of the outside world (Banfield 48) and the stream of consciousness technique which moves along and flows along with the consciousness of the character fitly describes such coexistence. As Anne Fernihough argues, "memory was all-important as the condition of our free will: it is though memory, he [Bergson] argued, that our actions transcend predictable mechanical responses to the extent that we bring our accumulated experiences to bear on a given situation. Consciousness or 'duration,' in which the present is swollen with

the past, is the essential feature of our humanity" (69). Or as Shiv K. Kumar says, "Time . . . enters the field of creative thought as something incapable of measurement and intractable to such symbolical representations as hours, days, months and years which are only its spatialized concepts;" in the stream of consciousness novel, "The novelist must take the reader below the neatly arranged surface of our consciousness and show there a multitude of secondary impressions impinging upon the present moment of experience" (8; 31). Therefore, in stream of consciousness novels, besides the character's subjective consciousness, we can also perceive real time, the coexistence of the past, the present and the future by way of immersing ourselves into the consciousness of the character. So Deleuze would somehow negatively claim, "Bergsonism has often reduced to the following idea: duration is subjective, and constitutes our internal life" (*Cinema 2* 80) and by virtue of using the stream of consciousness technique, "Most modernists have been called Bergsonian at one time", including William Faulkner, Marcel Proust and Virginia Woolf, to name just a few (Banfield 48-49).[12]

---

[12] Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that even though Bergson has similar conceptions about consciousness and writing as Woolf, it does not mean there is direct influence of Bergson on Woolf. For Fernihough, it is convincible to argue that Woolf might have known Bergson and his theory through her sister-in-law, Karin Stephen and her book, *The Misuse of Mind* (68). But for Kumar, it is merely because the same cultural trend conditions their thinking (64-65), especially when Leonard Woolf in a letter to Clive Bell announces, "'I doubt whether Virginia Woolf ever opened a book by Bergson'" (67). Aligned with Kumar's point, as the convergence between Woolf and Deleuze that will be argued later, I suggest it is because Bergson and Woolf perceive the same distribution of the sensible prevalent at that time as well. As Kumar argues, their relation is not of causality but "parallelism" (64): "The key to the emergence of the stream of consciousness novel lies in this new awareness of experience, this marked

However, as argued earlier, according to Deleuze, our relation with time should be reformulated. It is because on such Bergsonian readings, time is intrinsic to humans' subjectivity but from Deleuze's perspective, it is we who are encompassed in time and real time is not just a sense of time perceived through characters' stream of consciousness; rather, it should be further understood as life force which is acting on beings and nonbeings perpetually and which triggers the transformation and becoming of everything in the world. In this light, the stream of consciousness technique can be interpreted in another perspective. On the one hand, it conveys the character's subjective consciousness while on the other hand it also renders visible the transient yet sparkling moment when real time discloses its subjectivity. As John Hughes also points out the limits of consciousness at the moment of affect: "Consciousness becomes rethought . . . as a register of the identity effects that are produced by the becomings of body and soul as externally related through their encounters with other bodies and other minds, and no longer thought of as the comprehensive source of individual development, knowledge or freedom" (9-10). Although the functionality and reliability of language have been called into question, in literature, it eventually becomes the only

---

shift from a conception of personality as built round a hard and changeless core to a realization of it as a dynamic process. This reality is to be realized in immediate experience as flux, to be grasped by intuition or intellectual sympathy" (10). In other words, Woolf's fiction along with other modernist writers' is "Janus-faced" (Wallace 15) for history conditions the form of fiction while fiction reflects the historical condition: "a history internal to the novel can be isolated, alongside the novel's role *in* history" (Banfield, 2007: 48). In this light, modernist writers' endeavor and experiment with form are "not simply . . . to repudiate realism, but to achieve a more authentic engagement with the real than *realism* . . ." (Wallace 19).

paraphernalia by means of which we can perceive the subjectivity of time when it causes a crack in our consciousness and that is the reason why Deleuze would unstintingly direct his critical attention to the literary texts where time discloses its subjectivity even to the degree that language stutters. In this light, we can start to answer the question left behind in the above section: if the stream of consciousness technique is to convey the subjective consciousness of characters, why is the third person pronoun that is used and does the subjectivity of time disclosed by means of it have anything to do with it?

On the one hand, in narratology, this is simply a stream of consciousness technique and it is called "free indirect discourse." As in *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*, H. Porter Abbott defines free indirect style as "fluid adaptation of the narrator's voice in a kind of ventriloquism of different voices, all done completely without the usual signposts of punctuation and attribution, is called *free indirect style* (or free indirect discourse)" (70). It is free because it is without any quotation or attribution mark; it is indirect because "the character's voice is filtered through a 3rd person narrator" (70). On the other hand, literary critics' perspectives on the speaking position are very diverse. For some of them, in stream of consciousness novels, the author can easily identify him/herself with the character by participating in his/her consciousness without being impeded by the issue of speaking position: "The

unprecedented extent to which the stream of consciousness novelist has succeeded in representing his characters' nascent 'waves of thought', and seeking complete identification with his subject 'without any intermediary' is manifest from such characters as Molly Bloom and Miriam Henderson" (Kumar 32-33). Nevertheless, as Banfield in *Unspeakable Sentences* contends, in the stream of consciousness technique, it is "'the problem of point of view'" (1982: 68) and in "Remembrance and Tense Past" she further argues that in free indirect style or she prefers to call it "represented thought," the issue of point of view is called into notice: "there is the sentence of free indirect style or represented thought, representing third person subjectivity" (2007: 51). However, neither does Banfield identify the speaker and she only claims that it is not the narrator who enunciates: "to show or represent a character's thoughts, the natural mode is represented speech and thought. In this view, the narrator does not intervene at all to interpret the consciousness represented . . ." (1982: 69) or the speaking position is disentangled into multiple points of view: "the novelists who pushed the possibilities of this style to their limits should find analogies for the novels' disintegration into a collection of points of view . . ." (2007: 53). Although Banfield gives a deliberate analysis by noting multiple points of view which replace the single and identifiable speaking position in the stream of consciousness novels, she still leaves some questions unanswered. For example, if it is not the narrator that announces the consciousness of

the character, who "represents" these thoughts and consciousness? If it is not the narrator and certainly not the omniscient author who recount the character's consciousness, who speaks so that this speaking position is inside of the character's consciousness *yet* at the same time outside of it to the extent that it becomes a detached position that cannot be occupied? In this respect, I will be arguing that Deleuze provides his interpretation of free indirect discourse which is the sheer technique to disclose the subjectivity of time and which can assist us to read the summerhouse in "Time Passes."

III. The Deleuzian Free Indirect Discourse

This section begins by answering the question I left behind in the above section: why is the third person pronoun rather than the first person when modernist writers describe their characters' thoughts and consciousness? According to the above narratological definition, it is what characterizes "free indirect discourse" and as I said, I will provide the Deleuzian free indirect discourse in this section. But before doing so, we should firstly define indirect discourse, direct discourse in order to compare them with free indirect discourse.

In *Deleuze on Cinema*, Bogue exemplifies a sentence of "direct discourse" as "As she looked out the train window, she thought 'this loneliness is unbearable'" (72).

This sentence is narrated by the woman due to the insertion of quotation marks. The example of "indirect discourse" is "As she looked out the train window, she thought that her loneliness was unbearable" (72). This sentence is narrated by an omniscient author. As Humphrey elaborates on interior monologue by contending, "an omniscient author presents unspoken material as if it were directly from the consciousness of a character and, with commentary and description, guides the reader through it" (29). The exemplified sentence of "free indirect discourse" is "She looked out the train window, such loneliness was unbearable" (Bogue 72). In this sentence, unlike direct and indirect discourses, we do not know who is speaking "such loneliness was unbearable." It is unidentifiable but at least we can assure that it is neither the woman nor the author who speaks this sentence. So, if in free indirect discourse, it is the third person pronoun which is used to convey the *subjective* consciousness of the character, who stands at the fourth person position, "representing third person subjectivity" (Banfield, 2007: 51)? Or in some stream of consciousness novels, every speaking position of the character is somehow mixed with this fourth person voice to what extent that we cannot distinguish them absolutely?

As a narrotologist, Abbott also notices that free indirect discourse achieves an unidentifiable and non-unified condition. As he says, "When the narrative voice is so free and fluid, it makes you wonder about the status of the narrator and whether one can

even speak of *a* narrator in the case of free indirect style. Also, because it is so fluid, free indirect style can at times present quite a challenge for interpreters who are trying hard to locate a unified sensibility on which to base their interpretation" (71). Or on Deleuze's elaboration of the free indirect style in Pier Paolo Pasolini's films, D. N. Rodowick argues, "Free indirect discourse is syncretic. It appears at first glance as an indirect, though objective, narration marked by the author's time and person. However, the utterance is also permeated with subjective features, syntactic and semantic markers that can only be associated with the represented character" (61). Then, if free indirect discourse engenders a syncretic condition, what can we glimpse through free indirect discourse from which an indiscernible/syncretic zone is emanating and what possibility can we have by rendering this writing technique *free* not just because it is without any quotation mark nor *indirect* simply because a third person perspective is inserted? In other words, in free indirect discourse, who is speaking? To whom is it addressing? Whose point of *view* are we following? And I would like to argue, in *Cinema 2* Deleuze has already provided the answer: it is no *man*'s discourse and vision because we are merely following the perspective of time which designates the indiscernible prototype of life before everything is discerned and differentiated.

According to Deleuze, free indirect discourse has been put into practice by numerous famous film directors of modern cinema, for example, by Jean Rouch, Pierre

Perrault, Robert Bresson, Eric Rohmer, Jean-Luc Godard and Pasolini (*Cinema 2* 177). In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze has already announces that this technique produces a go-between, a neither subjective nor objective viewpoint: "it is a case of going beyond the subjective and the objective towards a pure Form which sets itself up as an autonomous vision of the content. We are no longer faced with subjective *or* objective images; we are caught in a correlation between a perception-image and a camera-consciousness which transforms it (the question of knowing whether the image was objective or subjective is no longer raised" (74). Camera not only shoots the character and the world from his/her perspective but also has a perspective of its own. Deleuze even has recourse to Mikhail Bakhtin's linguistic concept to aver that both in literature and in cinema, free indirect discourse in effect puts the Cartesian *cogito* into question. The humanitarian concept of "I think, therefore I am" does not verify the existence of the self by means of the act of thinking because "It is rather a case of an assemblage of enunciation, carrying out two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously, one of which constitutes a character in the first person, but the other of which is present at his birth and brings him on the scene" (73). In other words, in Deleuze's analysis, the *cogito* verifies the fact that the self, as the Bergsonian subjectivity of time, is split up into two: "It is the *Cogito*: an empirical subject cannot be born into the world without simultaneously being reflected in a transcendental subject which thinks it and in which it thinks itself. And

the *Cogito* of art: there is no subject which acts without another which watches it act, and which grasps it as acted, itself assuming the freedom of which it deprives the former" (73). The self is not a solid and enclosed entity; instead, it is always in flux and made to be transfixed and molecularized in becoming.

However, although free indirect discourse produces a viewpoint as a go-between in perception-image, it still emanates from the camera and sometimes even carries with it the intention of the director (74-75). Such a point of view is still identifiable and for Deleuze, any identifiable viewpoint is just another embodiment of the myth of movement-image: there is eventually an ultimate viewpoint around which other characters circle and from which other viewpoints emanate, whether this point is ensuing from a person or a camera. As the target purposely achieved in movement-image, free indirect discourse in the prewar cinemas conveys nothing but the discourse of truth. As Deleuze says, "the objective and the subjective were displaced, not transformed; identities were defined in a different way, but remained defined; the story remain truthful, really-truthful instead of fictionally truthful" (*Cinema 2* 145). But in *Cinema 2*, Deleuze holds that in postwar cinemas, free indirect discourse is liberated from conveying the "discourse of truth" to the "truth of discourse." In the former discourses maintain a single and indisputable truth while in the latter there is no more truth than multiple discourses, announcing each of their own truths. Most

important of all, any concrete identity (of the film-maker, of the character and of the camera) is dissolved and molecularized and becomes unidentifiable. The character disappears for becoming another while the film-maker melts along with the vanishing of the character and even the viewpoint of the camera vanishes. Every identity and viewpoint produced by free indirect discourse in time-image is becoming-imperceptible and from Deleuze's perspective, this technique creates a zone of indiscernibility. As he says,

> there is no longer the unity of the author, the characters and the world such as was guaranteed by the internal monologue.[13] There is formation of "free indirect discourse", of a *free indirect vision*, which goes from one to the other, so that either the author expresses himself through the intercession of an autonomous, independent character other than the author or any role fixed by the author, or the character acts and speaks himself as if his own gestures and his own words were already reported by a third party. (177)

In other words, by means of free indirect discourse, we have a zone of indiscernibility in time-image and we cannot clearly distinguish the seer/speaker, not to mention if there is any implicated receiver/audience out there. And if in such a zone of

[13] In contrast to unidentifiable situation in free indirect style, for Deleuze, unity is the key concept in internal monologue: "a whole of the film which encompassed the author, the world and the characters, whatever the differences or contrasts. The author's way of seeing, that of the characters, and the way in which the world was seen formed a signifying unity, working through figures which were themselves significant" (*Cinema 2* 176).

indiscernibility, every position is merged in order to present time-image, we can boldly claim that not only this indiscernible zone is time in image, but also if there is any seeing/speaking position, it can be occupied by no one else but time. The director and writer who utilize free indirect discourse are attempting to get *close* enough to this mysterious speaking position for only approaching the perspective of time and trying to articulate the story from this perspective, can time be presented in image and in writing. In contrast to internal monologue stressing the importance of having an omniscient narrator/author and the unity constructed in the text, free indirect discourse procures an indiscernible perspective of seeing and speaking and Deleuze emphasizes its importance:

> This "perspectivism" was *not* defined by variation of external points of view on a supposedly invariable object (the ideal of the true would be preserved). Here, on the contrary, the point of view was constant, but always internal to the different objects which were henceforth presented as the metamorphosis of one and the same thing in the process of becoming. (*Cinema 2* 139)

This quote from Deleuze also fully explicates why in the writing with free indirect style, it is the third person pronoun rather than the first person that is used. It is because writers are attempting to get close enough to that indiscernible position of seeing and speaking. As such it is not so much that the characters' thoughts are transmitted and

filtered by someone else as we do not even know who is seeing and speaking. Writing emanates from such a fourth person perspective is non-subjective (whether it is the character's subjective or the narrator's objective viewpoint cannot be identified) and indiscernible (who is speaking has not been differentiated *yet*). Free indirect discourse is *free* not because it is without any quotation mark but because there is no way to discern who is speaking/seeing; it is *indirect* because it is impossible to ascertain whether the voice/gaze is subjective or objective. And what can this zone of indiscernibility enlighten us? As argued earlier, in Deleuze, this indiscernible zone does not simply indicate the indiscernible relation between subject and object in writing and in image but also the subjectivity of time: both beings and nonbeings are indiscernible from real time because they are merely the contraction or dilation of concrete duration and the past, the present and the future are indiscernible from each other.

Furthermore, Deleuze clearly tells us that it is the initial point to think the unthought:

> Godard gives cinema the particular powers of the novel. He provides himself with the reflexive types as so many intercederers through whom I is always another. It is a broken line, a zig-zag line, which brings together the author, his characters and the world, and which passes between them. Thus

> modern cinema develops new relations with thought from three points of view: the obliteration of a whole or of a totalization of images, in favor of an outside which is inserted between them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the film, in favor of a free indirect discourse and vision; the erasure of the unity of man and the world, in favor of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world. (181)

As argued in Introduction, this "unthought" which "sometimes visits us in sleep or shapes itself in half-darkened rooms" (Woolf, "The Cinema" 185) can be understood as real time. It rarely discloses itself but free indirect discourse renders its disclosure possible and direct: "These three principles [in the above quote from Deleuze] define the relationship between cinema and thought in the direct time-image" (Rodowick 185). When time as the nameless and penumbral speaker is underlying free indirect discourse, no one is in charge of the writing process, including the character, the narrator, the author and the reader. Every position that we have taken for granted is just a facet directed and individuated from this zone of indiscernibility. By demonstrating the concept of free indirect discourse/vision used by numerous directors and writers, Deleuze is in effect elaborating on the subjectivity of time: time, a zone of indiscernibility prior to any differentiation and individuation, discloses itself in image and in writing, and the task for every artist is to render visible the invisible time as "the

unsummonable, the inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable" (*Cinema 2* 206).[14]

In addition, the zone of indiscernibility disclosed by free indirect discourse is also analogous to Woolf's conception of the hidden pattern behind the cotton wool that she argues in "A Sketch of the Past." In a very famous yet fathomless passage, Woolf says, "we—I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. *Hamlet* or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself" ("A Sketch of the Past" 72). Following the above demonstration, in this paragraph, Woolf suggests the indiscernibility is characteristic of the hidden pattern and as argued in Introduction the hidden pattern as moments of being is the Aeon, the subjectivity of time and the univocity of being before everything is differentiated. We are encompassed in this hidden pattern and in this zone of indiscernibility so that we can be words, music and the thing at the same time. Free

[14] In "A Splice of Reel Life in Virginia Woolf's 'Time Passes'" Hankins interprets *To the Lighthouse* cinematically. However, even though an objective perspective of seeing is emanating from a camera, Hankins still suggests the mandatory role that readers have to play as receivers/viewers. As she says, "Woolf described her project as 'this impersonal thing,' 'eyeless and featureless,' suggesting the 'objective' or detached recording of a camera. Employing the technique of a camera-like recording narrative, the narrative 'eye' which is not an 'I' records dispassionately the scene for the viewer to complete with subjective emotion. The reader, the viewer, must fill in the emotional blanks" (1999: 108). On my Deleuzian reading, however, it is not necessary to have a receiver/reader out there because every perspective is indiscernible. We are not sure whether there is a receiver/reader waiting out there to complete this text because we have not reached the zone of differentiation *yet*.

indirect discourse merely refers *directly* to the indiscernible, synthetical, syncretic ontology of time and calls into question the sheer division between subject and object. As Bogue contends "this is not a simple mingling of two fully constituted subjective voices, a narrator's and a character's, but, as Deleuze phrases it, a 'differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system itself heterogeneous,' an 'assemblage of enunciation . . . putting into effect at the same time two inseparable acts of subjectivation'" (72).

Under this circumstance, not just human beings are encompassed in time; space should also be regarded as a facet of time as a zone of indiscernibility. As argued in Introduction, in the prewar cinema dominated by movement-image, space can be concretely recognized. It is called any-space-whatever which is used to present affection-image, as one trait of movement-image. Nevertheless, after the catastrophic Second World War, in the postwar cinema, directors start to present numerous images of "deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste ground, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction" (*Cinema 2* xi) which are called any-space-whatever as well. As a space which "does not yet appear as a real setting" (31), any-space-whatever in the postwar cinema designates how time involutes everything within. As I said, through free indirect discourse, Deleuze avers that in cinema and in literature, time is a zone of indiscernibility: it is a germ before the enclosed everything is divided from it *yet*. By the same token, space becomes any-space-whatever in the

sense that it is now transformed into time because time as life force deprives space of its spatial traits and coordinates. Time encompasses space within; there is simply a temporal involution of space into time as a zone of indiscernibility.

As argued earlier, this chapter focuses on *To the Lighthouse* and this fiction has three sections. "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" respectively address the Ramsays' life before and after the war while "Time Passes" focuses on the empty summerhouse during the war. In this light, if in "The Window" and "The Lighthouse," free indirect discourse is used to emphasize the seeing and speaking perspective ensuing sometimes from the character and sometimes from nowhere,[15] I will be arguing the whole section of "Time Passes" where characters are all gone is narrated from this indiscernible perspective of time. This perspective leads us to see how the house is transformed into any-space-whatever or in this purely optical and sound situation (seen or spoken from an indiscernible position of time), the house becomes nothing but an image, a time-image.

IV. From the Perspective of Time to Read "Time Passes"

[15] Sometimes readers can easily identify the speaker due to the insertions of "he said" and "he thought" (which according to Humphrey, is another trait of interior monologue, 25) but sometimes, readers get lost and confused and a question will be raised: who speaks now? Whose thoughts are we following? As argued earlier, some Woolfian critics, like DiBattista and Auerbach on their readings of Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* raise the same question.

In *To the Lighthouse* the summerhouse owned by the Ramsays is located in the Hebrides on the Isle of Skye. From the beginning of "The Window," this summerhouse is intertwined with mentality, physicality and domesticity of the Ramsays and their guests. For example, James and Cam show their opposite emotions for the skull in the nursery or in the dining hall where Mrs. Ramsay witnesses an eternal completion among her guests or even assists to establish the matrimony between Paul and Minta which is another form of eternity in her mind. When introducing Mr. Ramsay's philosophy to Lily Briscoe, "'Think of a kitchen table then'" Andrew says, "'when you're not there'" (33). This summerhouse is filled with the mentality and intelligence of the Ramsays. As for the domesticity of the house, Mrs. Ramsay is so attending to it that she worries the belated guests would ruin the flavor of Bœuf en Daube (112), how her husband should not get furious at Mr. Carmichael for simply asking another plate of soup (129), how her children can sleep under her coaxing (154-55) and how the windows of the house should be left open while the doors should be closed (39). Mrs. Ramsay is a typical angel in the house and a proper example of domesticity. Nevertheless, besides the aforesaid traits of this summerhouse, I will focus on the mysterious "Time Passes" section and argue how Woolf's writing technique, free indirect discourse and an ensuing indiscernible perspective of time, can assist us to read this summerhouse as a time-image.

In the beginning of “Time Passes,” there is a nonhuman perspective of seeing and speaking when all the characters are in sleep. For the first time, we have a chance to see the summerhouse *in* and *by* itself rather than to take it as a necessary background in which characters and their life are far more important than it. Such a perspective looks at the object and furniture in the house and it is compared with that of airs: “Only through the rusty hinges and swollen sea-moistened woodwork certain airs, detached from the body of the wind (the house was ramshackle after all) crept round corners and ventured indoors. Almost one might imagine them [airs], as they entered the drawing-room, questioning and wondering, toying with the flap of hanging wallpaper, asking, would it hang much longer, when would it fall?” (*To the Lighthouse* 172). When everyone in the house is fast asleep except Mr. Carmichael who is concentrating on his reading, who or what sees everything in this summerhouse and narrates this section? Of all the speaking positions in correlation with the narrative techniques that I have argued, the most likely and possible speaker is time. From the very beginning of this section, no human can take up this position of seeing and speaking and with reference to what we have discussed about real time, this speaking position is the univocity of being before everything is discerned, including the concrete speaking position that we assume as either emanating from characters’ *subjective* points of view or from the *objective* perspective of the narrator.

Even though there is no one in this house, sounds along with silence as the loudest sound in the world still emerge: “Nothing it seemed could break that image, corrupt that innocence, or disturb the swaying mantle of silence which, week after week, in the empty room, wove into itself the falling cries of birds, ships hooting, the drone and hum of the fields, a dog’s bark, a man’s shout, and folded them round the house in silence” (176-77). It is a purely sound situation and even though the whole house is left empty, silence as well as other sounds still surrounds and encompasses it. In this light, to discern who makes the sounds and silence and to whom it urges to oblige to listen is not the major concern since there is no need to have any audience to receive sounds. The house of sounds as well as silence is just an autonomous orchestra in which each division plays its own tune simultaneously. The house becomes nothing but a *collage* of sounds and such a concept is also demonstrated by Deleuze:

> [i]f we suppose that the concert is divided into two sources of sound, we are positing that each hears only its own perceptions but is harmonized with those of the other even better than if it had perceived them, because of the vertical rules of harmony that happen to be enveloped in their respective spontaneity. These are the harmonies that replace horizontal connections. (*The Fold* 80)

This purely sound situation which depicts the simultaneity of sounds is also indicative of the subjectivity of time. As I argued, it is an indiscernible moment for every

division in the orchestra plays each of their own tunes yet still *in harmony*, just as everything in this world forms each of their own relations with time yet still preserves its own entity.

In this section, Woolf also tells us how rare and difficult it is to have a glimpse of the subjectivity of time: "It seemed now as if, touched by human penitence and all its toil, divine goodness had parted the curtain and displayed behind it, single, distinct, the hare erect; the wave falling; the boat rocking, which, did we deserve them, should be ours always" (*To the Lighthouse* 174). But what are "they" behind the curtain? Woolf never tells us what they are but we know they must be something precious because soon "he [the divine goodness] covers his treasures in a drench of hail . . ." (174). On my reading, Woolf does not attempt to discover "them," the treasures, behind the curtain; she simply suggests how rare we can have a glimpse of them by using the curtain as a metaphor to indicate how rarely it is parted: "But alas, divine goodness, twitching the cord, draws the curtain; it does not please him; he covers his treasures in a drench of hail, and so breaks them, so confuses them that it seems impossible that their [of treasures] calm should ever return or we should ever compose from their fragments a perfect whole or read in the littered pieces the clear words of truth. For our penitence deserves a glimpse only; our toil respite only" (174). As argued in the above section, if the ineffable "treasures" (not *simply* covered up by the

curtain but topologically out there) can be understood as the subjectivity of time, we can presume that it is an initial point not to part the curtain but to think the unthought, calling for the force from *dehors* which demolishes the barrier constructed by our rationality. We can only have a glimpse of the subjectivity of time (the treasures) when the curtain is parted (when there is a crack in our rationality).

Later in this section, Woolf indicates there is a force that is lurking in the house: "there was a force working; something not highly conscious; something that leered, something that lurched; something not inspired to go about its work with dignified ritual or solemn chanting" (189). If from Deleuze's perspective, life and time can be read as force, this paragraph is suggestive of reading this Woolfian force as time for all the information Woolf provides here (the covered up treasures, the lurking force) insinuates that we seldom have a chance to perceive this invisible yet tremendous force. It is surrounding us but cannot be grasped and concretized by us. So when Woolf says, "the stillness and the brightness of the day were as strange as the chaos and tumult of night, with the trees standing there, and the flowers standing there, looking before them, looking up, yet beholding nothing, eyeless, and thus terrible" (183), it becomes a rhetorical question to ask, who or what is looking before the trees and the flowers yet beholds nothing. It is because provided that time as the lurking force is beyond the tether of any human being or any logical thinking, a possible approach to it becomes to

imagine what one can see from the perspective of time. But this approach only gets us close enough to the position of time but will never put us *entirely* in it. So the experience of having a glimpse from the perspective of time is "eyeless and terrible" for nothing, we humans included, can ever occupy the position of time and see from the perspective of time (so we are "looking before them, looking up, yet beholding nothing").

In addition, Woolf uses her well-known imagery of the mirror to depict how the whole house is transformed into a time-image and we are made to see the exchange of the actual and the virtual, the present and the past in this image, or in "the mirror-image of time" (Alliez 298). In *To the Lighthouse*, there is an imagery of the mirror:

> In those mirrors, the minds of men, in those pools of uneasy water, in which clouds for ever turn and shadows form, dreams persisted, and it was impossible to resist the strange intimation which every gull, flower, tree, man and woman, and the white earth itself seemed to declare . . . that good triumphs, happiness prevails, order rules; or to resist the extraordinary stimulus to range hither and thither in search of some absolute good, some crystal of intensity, remote from the known pleasures and familiar virtues, something alien to the processes of domestic life, single, hard, bright, like a diamond in the sand, which would render the possessor secure. (179-80)

Contextualizing this paragraph in the theme of my dissertation, “something alien” in this paragraph is indicative of time and we can conceive of how the mirror as a metaphor suggests the deep vortex of time. As demonstrated in Introduction, the circuit or the exchange between the actual and the virtual, the present and the past is the subjectivity of time argued by Bergson and Deleuze while in Deleuze, time-image is exactly explicated in terms of a mirror: “we can say that the actual image itself has a virtual image which corresponds to it like a double or a reflection. In Bergsonian terms, the real object is reflected in a mirror-image as in the virtual object which, from its side and simultaneously, envelopes or reflects the real: there is ‘coalescence’ between the two” (*Cinema 2* 66). Such “a double movement of liberation and capture” (67) manifests the simultaneous coexistence of the present and the past, just as a mirror can both *capture* the actual image in front of it and *reflect* the virtual one. Time is “something absolute good, some *crystal* of intensity” (*To the Lighthouse* 180, emphasis added). Yet due to its rarity, it is “alien and unknown” to human beings but everything is merely a reflection on the mirror or merely the actualized image when it is perceived by humans. If certain universal values, like good, happiness and order still prevail, this paragraph of *To the Lighthouse* implies that the unfamiliar and ineffable “something alien” is simultaneously coexistent as well and this “something alien” in this paragraph is described as a diamond, whose intensity and hardness is beyond the

domain of any value system (“remote from the known pleasures and familiar virtues, something alien to the processes of domestic life”) which can be correlated with the crystal that Deleuze expounds when arguing the subjectivity of time.

In “Time Passes” not only free indirect discourse is used to designate a no-man and non-subjective position of seeing and speaking, during one to four sub-sections, there is even no human beings at all. Even though in five to ten sub-sections, Mrs. McNab and later Mrs. Bast and her son are cleaning the house, the whole narration is still ensuing from this non-subjective and no-man’s perspective. Their thoughts are merely two facets of this indiscernible position. For example,

> Rubbing the glass of the long looking-glass and leering sideways at her [of Mrs. McNab] swinging figure a sound issued from her lips—something that had been gay twenty years before on the stage perhaps, had been hummed and danced to, but now, coming from the toothless, bonneted, caretaking woman, was robbed of meaning, was like the voice of witlessness, humor, persistency itself, trodden down but springing up again, so that as she lurched, dusting, wiping, she seemed to say how it was one long sorrow and trouble, how it was getting up and going to bed again, and bringing things out and putting them away again. (177-78)

This mysterious fourth-person speaker detachedly and dispassionately describes Mrs. McNab's thoughts and the meaning of this old song to her but the suspicious tone beneath "she seemed to say" strengthens the extent of the ineffability and indetermination which characterizes this indiscernible position of seeing and speaking. Even though Mrs. McNab hums some old songs, we do not have the direct and subjective consciousness of this character. All we have is the indirect discourse freely presented by the fourth-person speaker.

When Mrs. McNab is "turning to her job again, mumbl[ing] out the old music hall song" (178), once again the song is immersed into the cacophonous entity as a virtual being: "Meanwhile the mystic, the visionary, walked the beach, stirred a puddle, looked at a stone, and asked themselves 'What am I?' 'What is this?' and suddenly an answer was vouchsafed them (what it was they could not say): so that they were warm in the frost and had comfort in the desert" (178-79). Who or what is "the mystic, the visionary" and who or what answers it yet the answer is completely incomprehensible? If we retrospect to the beginning of "Time Passes," "the mystic, the visionary" are the airs wandering in the summerhouse at midnight and they are the avatars of time. In other words, in five to ten sections where Mrs. McNab's interior thoughts are represented, we readers can *feel* her sadness but we do not have the first-hand information about the vicissitudes of the house and of characters from her. Her

thought is narrated by but also immersed into this speaking position to the extent that they are indiscernible. It is not that finally we have a human being in this summerhouse or we can know how the house has been abandoned from Mrs. McNab's (subjective) lamentation. What we have, instead, is the summerhouse as well as the character who was, who is or who will be in it is merely *one* point of view ensuing from this zone of indiscernibility. In this respect, we can understand why Deleuze puts emphases on the cinematic image/cinematic writing because directors and writers venture to render visible time as the invisible force: "this time-image puts thought into contact with an unthought, the unsummonable, the inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable" (*Cinema 2* 206). Their endeavor places us close enough to the position of time.

After my demonstration, it is quite clear that this summerhouse is only a facet of this zone of indiscernibility. As argued earlier, the Ramsays have left many living traces in the summerhouse, but during "Time Passes," time, as a nonhuman and mysterious voice, articulates itself. Time discloses itself not just in the light of decaying objects and furniture, of the death of several characters or of the fertile proliferation of dogs and butterflies in the house, but also in the light of encompassing the summerhouse within to the extent that it is transformed into a time-image. As Kumar says, "The Ramsays' summer house is not an inanimate structure in three spatial

dimensions, but like Proust's Combray church exists also in the forth dimension—*la durée*" (78). In other words, the transformation of this summerhouse by time or into time is not *just* in terms of to what extent it is decaying but in terms of realizing what Woolf tries to convey in this section is that space is also purely and simply a facet of this perspective.

Finally, if we examine the structure of *To the Lighthouse*, the mysterious position that "Time Passes" occupies can shed a new light on our understanding of Woolf's writing. As I said, what Woolf concerns is to render visible the invisible time and through the above demonstration, as I have argued, "Time Passes" is not just a transition to connect "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" but also an important section *in* and *of* itself in which real time discloses its subjectivity. Likewise, Deleuze also reminds us that the initial point of thinking the unthought or of confronting life force from *dehors* takes place at the crack of rationality, or in cinema, at the interstice, at the irrational cut: "when the whole becomes the power of the outside which passes into the interstice, then it is the direct presentation of time, or the continuity, which is reconciled with the sequence of irrational points, according to non-chronological time relationships" (*Cinema 2* 175).[16] In other words, if the whole point of evaluating the

[16] Hankins also argues that we should not regard the brackets in "Time Passes" as cuts for re-linking the whole story. They are designed to dissociate themselves from the lyric rhythm of the whole section and the function of these brackets is similar to that of the interstice/irrational cut in my argument: they construe a void. That how we are able to see something different out of it rather than simply continue

position of modern cinema is not to see how the diegesis runs smoothly but how the interstice, the irrational cut presents an *outside* force in and of itself, then this is exactly the same perspective we can evaluate the cardinal role that "Time Passes" plays in *To the Lighthouse* because "The cut, or interstice, between two series of images no longer forms part of either of the two series: it is the equivalent of an irrational cut, which determines the non-commensurable relations between images" (*Cinema 2* 205-06). Éric Alliez's argument further emphasizes my point: "As it [an interstice] neither belongs to the preceding image nor to the following image, this 'irrational cut' determines noncommensurable relations between images, which in turn cause an *Outside* to emerge out of 'an unchained depth,' an *Outside* that shows itself to be the *differentiating force* of time as becoming and the very *constitutive virtuality* of thought" (299). Just as the unchained outside can emerge in the irrational cut, "Time Passes" can also be regarded as an irrational cut where time as a zone of indiscernibility discloses itself.

Furthermore, we can read three sections, "The Window," "Time Passes" and "The Lighthouse" separately because unlike the realist fiction, there is no absolute causality among these three sections. And if they coexist simultaneously, we can simply view

---

the story becomes the key issue. As Hankins says, "Rather than attempting cutting for continuity or transitional smoothness between the text and brackets, Woolf chose the technique of cutting for *dis*continuity so the juxtaposition of the joined segments became the site for the release of energy" (1999: 109).

them as the very demonstration of the aesthetics of AND or BETWEEN. According to Deleuze, "It is the method of BETWEEN, 'between two images', which does away with all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, 'this and then that', which does away with all the cinema of Being=is" (*Cinema 2* 174). Aesthetics as such shatters the character-centered story, a popular theme prevailing also in the realist fiction and it once again intimates the importance of free indirect discourse by means of which Woolf composes her writing: there is no center or unity in the whole story; what we have is a zone of indiscernibility.

Such a zone of indiscernibility in Woolf's writing brings us back to Deleuze's philosophy: how life force enfolds two images and two moments (the present and the past) together: "we are all five o'clock in the evening, or another hour, or rather two hours simultaneously, the optimal and pessimal, noon-midnight, but distributed in a variable fashion" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 263). The point is how the force of time enfolds two images and two moments together, making them coexist simultaneously and the coexistence of midday-midnight brings us further to the conceptual core of Deleuze's philosophy: the coexistence of two distinct moments *simultaneously* is logically and rationally impossible but it is compossible when our commonsensical and chronological world is held in suspension and when we can start to think the unthought and when the subjectivity of time is disclosed at the interstice, at the irrational cut and at

the crack in our consciousness. By demonstrating his conception of cinema, Deleuze is in effect demonstrating his philosophy: "there is always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, 'What is cinema?' but 'What is philosophy?'" (*Cinema 2* 269). Thus, midday can coexist with midnight; ten years can be enfolded within one night. When "The Window" ends in midnight when Mr. Carmichael sleeps and when "The Lighthouse" ends in midday when Mr. Ramsay, James and Cam finally reach the lighthouse, between these two moments, we have an interstice of ten years condensed in one night through which we glimpse how the summerhouse and the whole world are immersed into the force of time and how time discloses itself directly. And after reading the summerhouse of the Ramsays as a time-image and considering "Time Passes" as an interstice of *To the Lighthouse*, my reading stakes out the aesthetics of collage, the aesthetics of everlasting AND in Woolf's oeuvre.

This chapter begins by demonstrating to what extent Woolf explores this uncharted area of real time by using free indirect discourse to glimpse and to imagine what an empty house *looks like* from the perspective of time. By using free indirect discourse, the narration is *free* for we are unable to identify the speaker and *indirect* for a zone of indiscernibility is encompassing the reader, the character and even the fourth-person speaker together. With this in mind, in Chapter Four, I will further retrospect to Woolf's literary experiment in the early stage of her writing and argue her radical

relation with language is *experimental* to the degree that when Woolf spares irrelevant and embellishing descriptions in her short stories, she is *in effect* testing and weighing the most adequate distance between her and language. Furthermore, if human beings entirely fade out of my discussion of "Time Passes" in this chapter, in the next chapter, I will be arguing although we have Orlando as the main character, we still lack a rational and thinking body because along with the interior spaces in which Orlando resides, her body is entirely transformed into a body without organs by the subjectivity of time.

Chapter Three

A Body without Organs in the House of Time-image in *Orlando*

In the previous two chapters on Woolf's fiction, I argue real time as life force astraddle over all kinds of boundary. In Chapter One, real time discloses itself by means of Septimus's death which results in the disintegration of Clarissa's subjectivity and language. Clarissa's little room is not only a room for discussing national affairs but also a room of time. In Chapter Two, free indirect discourse, one of the stream of consciousness techniques that Woolf uses approaches closely enough the perspective of time and by means of this writing technique, time as the mysterious fourth-person speaker lurking inside the house of the Ramsays and surrounding it creates a zone of indiscernibility in which different speaking positions are dismantled. It even temporalizes this summerhouse into becoming a time-image. As the preview that I made at the end of Chapter Two, this chapter will call particular attention to the situation in which what we have known about the organic body is no longer valid. If rational thinking (of which the well known one is the Cartesian *cogito*) establishes a caste in which the (organic) body is inferior to the brain, I will argue that Orlando's body even demolishes our conception of the body for being transformed into the Deleuzian body without organs by virtue of the disclosure of time's subjectivity. The

interior spaces in which Orlando is situated are dislocated for being deterritorialized as well.

I. A House of Love

Orlando (1928) is Woolf's fiction full of mockery and playfulness. It was composed after the publication of *To the Lighthouse* (1927), which is a memorial piece to her parents and before the publication of *A Room of One's Own* (1929). For Woolf, *Orlando* is "a writers holiday" (*D* 3:177). Nevertheless, "all a joke; & yet gay & quick reading" (177) holiday as it is, *Orlando* has aroused numerous critical disputes. The first thought that comes into every reader's mind will be it is "'the longest and most charming love-letter in literature'" (qtd. in Bowlby xviii) since Woolf overtly dedicates this book to Vita Sackville-West. Some critics argue that the ambivalence of Orlando's sex shatters the constructiveness of gender ideology (Marcus 2007b, Jouve) and ambivalence does not just pertain to Orlando's sex and gender; it also pertains to its genre. Susan Dick (2000) and Laura Marcus (2007b) argue that we (or even Woolf) cannot easily identify *Orlando* as a novel or as a biography; Woolf's caricature of adding acknowledgement, pictures and notes to the text further mocks the truth-oriented biography.

By contrast, the issue of space in *Orlando* is seldom elaborated. Some critics claim that Woolf creates Orlando's mansion according to the real interiority of Knole. Fascinated by Vita's aristocratic family history, Woolf once paid a visit to Knole under Vita's insistence. Nevertheless, Woolf does not like the old and gloomy ancient mansion at all. In her diary entry, she says, "too little conscious beauty for my taste: smallish rooms looking on to buildings: no views . . ." (*D* 3:125). Unlike her experiences of visiting other celebrities' houses, Woolf is not impressed by this Sackville mansion. In her lifetime, she never steps into this mansion again. But in *Orlando*, Woolf still conscientiously personifies Knole in her text, both from her personal observation and from Vita's description. As Hill-Miller says, "Virginia's description of Orlando's house is in many ways an accurate—or only slightly exaggerated—rendering of Knole itself. Orlando's great house has 365 bedrooms and 52 staircases; Vita tells the story in *Knole and the Sackvilles* that Knole has seven courtyards, 52 staircases and 365 rooms . . ." (147). Woolf also amends Vita's bereavement of losing her father and the right to inherit the house by arranging Orlando's possession of the house in the text. On Hill-Miller's reading, Woolf conflates Vita with the house in order to glorify the permanent existence of Knole as Vita's incandescent position in and contribution to literatures. As Hill-Miller argues,

> Woolf has transformed Knole into the living embodiment of an artistic masterpiece—a communal and anonymous expression of the human urge to create, and the human connection to place that fosters it. At the same time, Woolf transforms Vita/Orlando into the living personification of the consummate artist, vitally connected to the place in which she is rooted. . . . And the fact that she [Orlando] possesses a place of her own—a vast house whose corridors whisper of the past and the present—is the central secret of her success as a writer. (153)

Nevertheless, as I said, the house is still read as a specific locale in these critical essays and we cannot help but wonder, besides being read either as the personification of Knole or as a necessary background for Orlando, is there any other way to read Orlando's mansion and other spaces in *Orlando,* not as space intertwined with concrete spatiality, materiality and interiority but as something else? To contextualize this question in my dissertation, I would like to ask whether we can read them not in terms of space but of time. Furthermore, we should heed an important but often neglected issue: as a human being who not only crosses over the sexual boundary between male and female, Orlando is also a human being who never ages. After living over three hundred years, at the end of the book, Orlando remains still a woman of thirty-six. Then, what does her body *mean*, especially when her body seems never to age at all?

Admittedly, this is not the proper question we should ask because for Deleuze, we should never ask what a body means but what it can do. Then, what can Orlando's body do? What does it make us think? If a body which never ages stays in a house which never stops being changed, then, what is its relation to houses and rooms as time-images?

Thus in this chapter, I will provide a reading to see how spaces in *Orlando* are transformed into time-images and what a body which never grows old *can do* in such spaces. Besides the Deleuzian theory of time-image which can assist us to analyze the space in *Orlando*, in this chapter, firstly, in order to support my argument to read Orlando's ageless body as a body without organs in any-space-whatever, I will discuss Deleuze's theory of the body to see what a body can do when it is transformed. If Orlando were an ordinary character, we readers probably would not notice the particularity of the body. But right because of his/her *extra*ordinary body, it becomes a proper catalyst, intriguing us to further investigate the body in and of itself. Secondly, I will exemplify *Orlando* to argue how a department store, her gallery and her mansion are deterritorialized into time-images when Orlando encounters the disclosure of time's subjectivity. In other words, I will demonstrate, when time discloses itself, the body will be transformed into the BwO for registering time as life

force and I will also demonstrate how it no longer can be understood in terms of organic organization whose point of departure stems from division and hierarchy.

II. What is a Body?

The body is one of Deleuze's cardinal concepts and even his much more famous term "a body without organs" (BwO) is also regarding how he thinks of the body, its capacity and how such a concept can shed a different light on our knowledge and understanding of the subject. From the body discussed in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (French edition was published in 1962, English edition in 1983) to the BwO argued in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980; 1987), Deleuze is fascinated by the life force that a body registers and the great intensity it illuminates when bumping into other bodies. For Deleuze, such an experience is beyond the tether of any rational thinking. As he quotes Baruch Spinoza's concept and says, "we do not even know what a body *can do*, we talk about consciousness and spirit and chatter on about it all, but we do not know what a body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 39). Unlike Descartes who condemns the inferiority of the body to the mind, Deleuze is fully submerged into the terrain of the body and never conceals his amazement at its capacity. What exactly does Deleuze mean by the body? Throughout his oeuvre, we can use three concepts to analyze the Deleuzian body: the

body as materiality, the relations it assembles and the becoming it initiates and undergoes.

The first one is probably the most famous and familiar concept to the reader of all. As Samira Kawash argues, "This body cannot be conceived as the human body, the biological, organismic counterpart to the human subject; nor can it be attributed to something more essential: it is not *body of X* (for example, body of the subject), but simply *body* as materiality, a corporeal something that returns as resistance, refusal, singularity, radical particularity" (133). For Deleuze, a body is the material and corporeal platform to register life force; its preliminary materiality plays an important role in his corpus. And it becomes the reason why Deleuze is so obsessed with Francis Bacon's paintings because Bacon tries to grasp the transient moment at which the invisible life force is acting on the visible flesh and blood, i.e., on the materiality of the body. When commenting on a series of Bacon's "scream paintings," Deleuze says, "Bacon creates the painting of the scream because he establishes a relationship between the visibility of the scream (the open mouth as a shadowy abyss) and invisible forces, which are nothing other than the forces of the future" (*Francis Bacon* 51). In Bacon's paintings and in Deleuze's analysis, a body always preserves certain part of materiality so as to receive the impact of life force.

Secondly, Deleuze stresses the contiguous relations that a body establishes. A body does not exist in this world all by itself; it has to form multiple relations with other bodies. It is not just human's or animal's body that can be called a body; everything on earth, even a piece of artwork, is a body (*A Deleuze Dictionary* 31). And by way of encountering other bodies, the state of the body will be transformed because its relations with other bodies are changed. As Patricia Pisters says, "All we experience are infinite effects of different encounters or relations between bodies: existing bodies meet, all relations can be combined endlessly . . ." (86). The Deleuzian concept of the body reiterates the mutually influential relation between the part and the whole that I argued in Introduction and we can further exemplify Deleuze's eminent assemblage of a wasp and an orchid to demonstrate the "endless" combination of bodies and his conceptualization of the body as a process of addition. As Brian Massumi argues, "Nomad thought replaces the closed equation of representation, $x = x$ = not y (I =I =not you) with an open equation: . . . + y + z + a + . . . (. . . + arm + brick + window+ . . .)" (xiii). In other words, for Deleuze, a body forms rhizomatic relations with other bodies: "A body is not defined by either simply materiality, by its occupying space ('extension'), or by organic structure. It is defined by the relations of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speed and slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu" (*The*

Deleuze Dictionary 31). The body discussed in Deleuze's corpus is non-knowledge; it is to trigger association with and dissociation from other bodies. The Deleuzian assemblage is "a symbiosis of bodies" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 89).

In this light, we can fully understand the third meaning of the Deleuzian body: it has to be regarded as becoming and it is because as I said, when a body forms a relation with other bodies or with the milieu, once a body changes, the whole situation will be different. As in the relation between the wasp and the orchid, it is not the form of their bodies that undergoes transformation; what is transformed is the relation between them. So the wasp is becoming-orchid by transposing the pollen of the orchid while the orchid is becoming-wasp by simulating the form of a female wasp. Both of them still preserve the form of their bodies but the relation between them is altered after their encounter. Deleuze and Guattari thus argue, "A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes *between* points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localizable relation to distant or contiguous points" (293). The new possibility inaugurated by the encounter among bodies enables Deleuze and Guattari to imagine a new concept of the body: a nonhuman body as the threshold that can be crossed over. As they say, "For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants,

animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all of these; for it is not 'my' body without organs, instead the 'me' (*moi*) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds)" (161). The threshold is marked by the body and once we realize it is materiality, forming numerous relations with other bodies, from Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, we can have a glimpse of the ineffable and inexplicable outside which transforms the body into a body without organs. As Elizabeth Grosz contends, a BwO is "a becoming that resists the processes of overcoding and organization according to the three great strata or identities it opposes: the union of the *organism*, the unification of the *subject*, and the structure of *significance*. The BwO resists any equation with a notion of identity or property: 'The BwO is never yours or mine. It is always *a* body'" (201). In other words, it is not the deformation of a body that defines a BwO but the intensity from *dehors*: "A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 153).

In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze further explicates the body as pure becoming when arguing the female body in Chantal Akerman's films. For him, the female body is contiguous and rhizomatic:

> Chantal Akerman's novelty lies in showing in this way bodily attitudes as the sign of states of body particular to the female character, whilst the men speak

> for society, the environment, the part which is their due, the piece of history which they bring with them. . . . But the chain of states of female body is *not* closed: descending from the mother or going back to the mother, it serves as a revelation to men, who now talk about themselves, and on a deeper level to the environment, which now makes itself seen or heard only through the window of a room, or a train, a whole art of sound. (189)

In contrast to the genealogical and parochial oriented male body, the female body is connected to the whole environment and in Deleuze, this body is a nomadic body: "In the same place or in space, a woman's body achieves a strange nomadism which makes it cross ages, situations and places (this was Virginia Woolf's secret in literature). The states of the body secrete the slow ceremony which joins together the corresponding attitudes, and develop a female gest which overcomes the history of men and the crisis of the world" (189). Even though Deleuze does not specify the title of Orlando when mentioning Woolf's secret in literature ("a strange nomadism which makes it cross ages, situations and places"), on the one hand, Orlando is the only character who crosses ages in Woolf and on the other hand, we can parallel this female body in Akerman with Orlando's body because these two female bodies share the same secret: they do not form arborescent and lineal genealogy as male bodies do (not "descending from the mother or going back to the mother"). When Orlando is a man, he is a young

patriarch-in-training but when he becomes a woman, she sees through the unfair gendered rules imposed on women and her sexual transformation without any struggle or surgery is once again indicative of life as non-division.[17] Akerman's female body and Orlando's body form relations of proximity with other bodies in the milieu and cliché or commonsense (by which men speak for society and the environment) fails to define these female bodies. Yet gender difference is still implicated in Akerman (male vs. female) while in Woolf, Orlando is a zone of indiscernibility way before any difference servers the world (male + female).

Furthermore, from this paragraph, what we should heed first is the concept of nomadism and the second one is gest, both of which refer to the Deleuzian body. Generally speaking, there might be some misunderstandings to argue that Deleuze's cardinal concept of nomad *is* the movement of the body and to read Orlando's wandering with the gipsies as a nomadic movement. In *Orlando*, the gipsies seem to

[17] Even though Orlando is the best example of androgyny (which is not a concept but a fact), this chapter will not discuss this issue because I have discussed it in an essay (forthcoming in *Tamkang Review* in June 2011). But I can briefly indicate that in that essay, Orlando can be read as a desiring machine. Unlike psychoanalysis which domesticates desire into the yoke of daddy-mommy-me, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanaylsis instead regards desire as forever floating force. For them, every object in the world is a machine and wherever desire goes, it will assemble/dissemble other machines. Life is the biggest machine of all and everything is part of it. In this sense, sex is just the attribute that Woolf chooses to manifest Orlando as a zone of indiscernibility. Orlando is androgynous not in terms of biology (having both sexual organs) or sexual orientation (to love both sexes) but in terms of how desire as force is surging and floating in Orlando. Even though one can appear in one sex only, the possibility of being the other sex is always-already encompassed. It just needs catalysts *proper* to inaugurate it and the reason why we can regard Orlando as a desiring machine is because now her desire switches her sex into a female, but as long as her desire goes, her transformation will not stop. In other words, we should not put our emphasis on the *result* of Orlando's sexual transformation (*either* a man *or* a woman) but on the *possibility* in which life force/desire oscillates between them (*both* a man *and* a woman).

be nomads who wander around without being limited by any boundary: “The gipsies followed the grass; when it was grazed down, on they moved again” (*Orlando* 135-36). Nevertheless, for Deleuze “moving around” does not define nomads; instead, nomads are those who inaugurate “voyageur immobile” (Bryden 4). As in Deleuze and Guattari, “It is . . . false to define the nomad by movement. . . . [T]he nomad is on the contrary *he who does not move*. . . . [T]he nomad moves, but while seated, and he is only seated while moving . . .” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 381). The real nomad is experiencing the intensive movement while seating him/herself and Francis Bacon’s portraits of Pope X, homage paying to Velázquez’s Pope Innocent X, are good examples. According to Deleuze, in Velázquez’s portrait, Bacon notices that the great intensity collected inside of the seated Pope seems to burst through the canvas but is repressed:

> In Velázquez, the armchair already delineates the prison of the parallelepiped; the heavy curtain in back is already tending to move up front, and the mantelet has aspects of a side of beef; an unreadable yet clear parchment is in the hand, and the attentive, fixed eye of the Pope already sees something invisible looming up. . . . But all of this is strangely restrained, it is something that is going to happen, but has not yet acquired the ineluctable, irrepressible presence of Bacon’s newspapers, the almost animal-like

armchairs, the curtain up front, the brute meat, and the screaming mouth. (46)

Thus in Bacon's own version of the Pope, the great intensity overtly explodes and is ejected from the mouth. His Pope is also seated but the armchair and curtain can no longer restrain its energy: "Innocent X screams . . . whose only remaining function is to render visible these invisible forces that are making him scream, these powers of the future" (51-52).

In other words, if we interpret Pope Innocent X's body, it is also a nomadic body while he is seated. The point of nomadism does not lie in whether or not the body moves around but in how the surging and intensive life force transforms the whole and the relations among different bodies. As Mary Bryden says, "The Deleuzain 'voyageur immobile' . . . is not concerned with recording or archiving. Becomings are anti-historical in the sense that they are always forward-bound trajectories, spending, dissolving, and transforming rather than saving, consolidating, and preserving" (4). With respect to our previous discussion on the Deleuzian body, "voyageur immobile" alongside with nomadism, has to be understood in relation to life force. The concept of transformation here can also explain the second concept "gest." By "gest," Deleuze means "the link or knot of attitudes between themselves, their co-ordination with each other, in so far as they do not depend on a previous story, a pre-existing plot or an

action-image" (*Cinema 2* 185). "Gest" stresses composition and decomposition of the body's relations with other bodies during the process of becoming. The body of gest is not genealogical or arborescent but contiguous and rhizomatic. Every boundary disappears and the body is transformed into a body without organs.

Therefore, if in Deleuze, a body is always a limit and a threshold and some bodies in cinema (the everyday body, the ceremonial body) can plunge into the depth of unthought, we can presume that Orlando's body in literature is also a nonhuman body. His/her body does not signify that time stops for Orlando or Woolf creates a never-never land in which Orlando and her body refuse to grow old but signifies how his/her body as a go-between is indicative of the body's relation with time and it should be understood in terms of how the body becomes the material platform on which real time discloses itself as life force. And when it does, Orlando is becoming a non-subject, an automaton as argued in Introduction or simply put, a body without organs. Although abstract time still plays an important role in *Orlando,* we can only have a glimpse of time's subjectivity in this fiction when our prejudice and stereotype about the body is traversed. The Deleuzian body is not of organism but of materiality, stressing the non-knowledge and *un*conscious moment and it is also what terms the body as the threshold means. In this respect, if it is life force which transforms rooms

and houses into any-spaces-whatever, we need to further inquire into what Orlando's body can do in such spaces.

III. A Body in a House of Time

Orlando is a book crossing over three hundred years. In the previous centuries, Orlando does not perceive the concrete duration because he leads a regular life gauged by the clock time. For example, Orlando knows his plan to elope with Sasha fails because "Paul's clock struck two" and Sasha never shows up (*Orlando* 59). The jumping into the twentieth century is marked by the chiming of the clock: "the clock ticked louder and louder until there was a terrific explosion right in her ear. Orlando leapt as if she had been violently struck on the head. Ten times she was struck. In fact it was ten o'clock in the morning. It was the eleventh of October. It was 1928. It was the present moment" (284). And the narrator/biographer never stops reminding the reader of the month, the spatial markers of time: "It was now November. After November, comes December. Then January, February, March, and April. After April comes May. June, July, August follow. Next is September. Then October, and so, behold, here we are back at November again, with a whole year accomplished" (254). We can perceive abstract time in the chiming of the hour, in the change of the month and the season. The early part of this fiction is read like a realist fiction:

narration plays a major part and the whole story is circulating around the central character, Orlando. It resembles the action-image in movement-image: time is subordinate to movement.

Besides, in the above instances, Orlando is a complacent and thinking subject. Neither is she situated in a barren situation and thus becomes a pure looker and hearer nor does the spatial feature of her locations disappear. But when the setting is situated in the present, there are plenty of occasions when suddenly Orlando is (or is forced to be) aware of real time and I will be arguing, real time does not appear in the change of Orlando's age or outlook (both of which remain the same anyway) but appears when she is unable to distinguish the actual from the virtual images. In this light, we can perceive how the originally concrete space is transformed into any-space-whatever and the capacity of her body is left only with her ability to see and to hear, not to think and to act. If, as I said, Orlando is experiencing becoming BwO for confronting the subjectivity of time, I will read a department store, Orlando's gallery and her mansion as time-images in the below section.

A. A Department Store

When the story takes place in the twentieth century, Orlando once goes shopping in a department store for her newborn baby. This modern department store, Messrs

Marshall & Snelgrove, is the embodiment of the capitalist fetishism: it is laden with scents and light in order to create a dreamy, happy and satisfactory atmosphere for their customers. The abundant goods there are to satiate (or even over-satiate) their customers' needs. As the narrator says, "Shade and scent enveloped her. The present fell from her like drops of scalding water. Light swayed up and down like thin stuffs puffed out by a summer breeze. . . . So she [Orlando] stood in the ground-floor department of Messrs Marshall & Snelgrove; looked this way and that; snuffed this smell and that and thus wasted some seconds" (*Orlando* 286). With the convenience brought up by the lift, Orlando is even astonished by this magic and doubts where she is: "Now the lift gave a little jerk as it stopped at the first floor; and she had a vision of innumerable coloured stuffs flaunting in a breeze from which came distinct, strange smells; and each time the lift stopped and flung its doors open, there was another slice of the world displayed with all the smells of that world clinging to it" (286-87).

Orlando goes there to shop. Nevertheless, when the salesman brings her "the best Irish linen" (288) and when she is absentmindedly touching the sheets on the counter, Orlando is distorted by a familiar yet quite bizarre scent. Suddenly, she thinks she sees Sasha, the Russian princess who abandoned her in the seventeenth century. It happens when "one of the swing-doors between the departments opened and let through, perhaps from the fancy-goods department, a whiff of scent, waxen, tinted as if from

pink candles . . . ” (288-89). The scent is real and it emanates from somewhere in the department but Orlando is affected and stunned on the spot. Suddenly,

> all the shop seemed to pitch and toss with yellow water and far off she saw the masts of the Russian ship standing out to sea, and then, miraculously (perhaps the door opened again) the conch which the scent had made became a platform, a dais, off which stepped a fat, furred woman, marvellously well preserved, seductive, diademed, a Grand Duke’s mistress; she, who, leaning over the banks of the Volga, eating sandwiches, had watched men drown; and began walking down the shop towards her. (289)

Orlando is shocked when she sees Sasha, or to be more precise, when she *thinks* that she sees her because as argued earlier, the point is not about whether Sasha comes to England again but about how Orlando is unable to distinguish the actual from virtual images for right at this moment, past memory is intertwined with her present perception. As argued earlier, if there is a crystal-image, the point is not that whether the virtual image will be actualized as recollection-image but in this process, how the actual and its virtual image is exchanging each other to the extent that they are indivisible. So Orlando cries out “Oh Sasha!” (289) but is unable to do anything: “Really, she [Orlando] was shocked that she [Sasha] should have come to this; she had grown so fat; so lethargic; and she bowed her head over the linen so that this apparition of a grey woman

in fur, and a girl in Russian trousers, with all these smells of wax candles, white flowers, and old ships that it brought with it might pass behind her back unseen" (289). Right in this example, actual images in the present (the linen, the smells of wax candles and white flowers) are exchanging with and even indiscernible from the virtual images (Sasha in the Russian costume, the ship and the tumbling sea in the seventeenth century). The shock that Orlando has is not so much a fat woman that Sasha becomes as to be made aware that the subjectivity of time discloses itself when being triggered by the smell of scent and thus pierces her subjectivity. Right at this moment, Orlando is not the curious woman that she was when stepping into this department store, but more like an automaton or a sleepwalker, confronting her déjà vu. As I said, such indiscernibility features the subjectivity of time: time splits itself up into the present and the past and also synthesizes these two moments together. Human beings, in this respect, who are involuted within real time have no other choices than vibrate with the rhythm of life force. Just as Deleuze's reading of Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* in which the main character plunges *involuntarily* into the deep vortex of the past (the memory about Combray) by being provoked by present perception (the taste of a madeleine), Orlando here encounters a similar situation.

In addition, in the previous chapters, I argued that life force always discloses itself in dismantling the subjectivity of the subject and likewise, we can see how Orlando is

shocked by such an unusual condition. She simply stumbles out of the department store and cries out,

> "How strange it is! Nothing is any longer one thing. I take up a handbag and I think of an old bumboat woman frozen in the ice. Someone lights a pink candle and I see a girl in Russian trousers. When I step out of doors—as I do now," here she stepped on to the pavement of Oxford Street, "what is it that I taste? Little herbs. I hear goat bells. I see mountains. Turkey? India? Persia?" (290-91)

In the crowded street of London, there is no way for Orlando to smell the scent of Persia. Her virtual images as a courtier (to see "an old bumboat woman frozen in the ice," "a girl in Russian trousers") and those as an ambassador to Constantinople (to hear "goat bells," to see "mountains") are (re)surfacing and about to get actualized. We do not know whether or not these virtual images will get actualized as recollection-images; all we know is they are in the exchange process with the actual images to the extent that these images are overwhelming and almost smothering Orlando. Right at this moment, Orlando is immersed into the deep vortex of time. She is forced to witness the exchange process of actualization and virtualization between the present and the past. Time discloses itself not as a chronological process of differentiating the past as the present no longer or the future which is not the present yet, but as difference *in* and *of*

itself when the past, present and future are involuted together. As Ansell-Pearson says, "There is also the encounter with the virtual, that which is said to be 'real without being actual, ideal without being abstract'" ("The Reality of the Virtual" 1123).

Nevertheless, Orlando is not in a *barren* situation as the one characterizes postwar films. Rather, she is in a space overstuffed with the capitalist merchandise. Put another way, Orlando is not stunned by this situation but by the instantaneous confrontation of time's subjectivity. It is split up into the present and the past and the synthetical process of virtualization and actualization engenders her involuntary (re)actions. Right at this involuntary moment, the unthought or time's subjectivity permeates Orlando and this department store. Orlando cannot think but react and the department store is also disposed of its spatial features. In the beginning, we know several details regarding this spatial location from Orlando's perspective, but no sooner does real time disclose itself than this department store is devoid of its spatialization. It is transformed into a time-image. We can read this shopping/shocking experience of Orlando as a topological cartography of mapping time's subjectivity in which during this process of actualizing and virtualizing images, it from *dehors* discloses itself and engulfs Orlando from *within*.

B. Orlando's Gallery

Such an optical and sound situation does not end. When Orlando stumbles back home, in her gallery, suddenly, with the tick of the clock Woolf presents another scene in which Orlando is once again immersed into a completely optical and sound situation. She is vulnerable in the face of life force, or from the below quotation, Orlando is becoming-imperceptible for being smashed by life force. As the narrator says, "Like thunder, the stable clock struck four. *Never did any earthquake so demolish a whole town. The gallery and all its occupants fell to powder. Her own face, that had been dark and somber as she gazed, was lit as by an explosion of gunpowder*" (emphases added. *Orlando* 305). We can read this passage as an overture which precautions us that we are about to perceive a tremendous intensity of force inherent in this situation and this force is about to transform Orlando into becoming-microscope. As the narrator in *Orlando* continues, "In this same light everything near her showed with extreme distinctness. She saw two flies circling round and noticed the blue sheen on their bodies; she saw a knot in the wood where her foot was, and her dog's ear twitching. At the same time, she heard a bough creaking in the garden, a sheep coughing in the park, a swift screaming past the window" (305). Orlando's visual capacity is enlarged so much so that it is transformed into a microscope (to see flies' bodily features, a mark on the wood, her dog's twitching). The visual sense of Orlando becomes very alert and she is capable of seeing certain details which would not have been noticed from

humans' perspective. The narrator further uses Orlando's acoustic experiences to suggest that it seems as if the whole world were imbued with nothing but sounds. Under normal circumstances, a bough's creaking, a sheep's coughing and a swallow's warbling is almost unperceivable but now these sounds are perceived due to Orlando's sharp sensual ability. When later Orlando steps out to the garden, such an optical condition continues even to a stronger extent: "the shadows of the plants were miraculously distinct. She noticed the separate grains of earth in the flower beds as if she had a microscope stuck to her eye. She saw the intricacy of the twigs of every tree. Each blade of grass was distinct and the marking of veins and petals" (306). Such a visual experience is definitely not humans' and there are much more: "She saw Stubbs, the gardener, coming along the path, and every button on his gaiters was visible; she saw Betty and Prince, the cart horses, and never had she marked so clearly the white star on Betty's forehead, and the three long hairs that fell down below the rest on Prince's tail" (306). Everything that generally would have been ignored for its minimum size now becomes extremely enlarged under Orlando's visual observation. On the one hand, similar to her shocking experience in the department store, in her gallery and later in her garden, Orlando is left only with her ability to see and to hear and this ability is normally what she would not have if she stays rational and conscious. On the other hand, by further analyzing this passage, we can argue that Orlando uses not so much her

visual and acoustic *capacities* as her entire *bodily sensations* to perceive the force. It is not her eyes but her whole body becomes a microscope. What privatizes Orlando's thinking capacity is not the barren situation but life force which transforms her into a body without organs.

Such an unfamiliar experience is quite scary; thus Orlando starts to wonder: "There was something strange in the shadow that the flicker of her eyes cast, something which . . . is always absent from the present—whence its terror, its nondescript character—something one trembles to pin through the body with a name and call beauty, for it has no body, is as a shadow without substance or quality of its own, yet has the power to change whatever it adds itself to" (307). As we can see, this formless, "body-less" "something" which is "absent from the present" can be understood in terms of the subjectivity of time. As the formless form which changes everything in the world without itself being changed, it is analogous to what Deleuze defines time: "But the form of what changes does not itself change, does not pass on. This is time, time itself, 'a little time in its pure state': a direct time-image, which gives what changes the unchanging form in which the change is produced" (*Cinema 2* 16). And as argued earlier, the "time" in our discussion is not the abstract time but real time. As Patricia Pisters says, "Besides that time [the clock-time], she [Woolf] experiences what she calls 'the other clock'—immeasurable, undifferential time in which the passage of years

seems to occupy a few seconds: Aion. . . . This [experience of Orlando] is clearly an experience of Aion, an experience of pure becoming" (126). Despite of different philosophical terms, Bergson, Deleuze and Woolf notice real time, Cronos in *Cinema 2*, Aion in *The Logic of Sense* and Aeon in *A Thousand Plateaus* whose features include "labyrinthine," "pure empty form of time" and "the ground of an *abyss* and the form of the *formless*" (Ansell Pearson, 2002: 169) indicate the subjectivity of time and time, as the formless form, purges human beings of their cognitive ability when disclosing itself. So right in this circumstance, Orlando is becoming a BwO whose connectivity and assemblage to the outside world is initiated. She behaves like an automaton without any self-control and it happens at the crack of her rationality or over the boundary of thinking when her body serves as the threshold: "she was now a very indifferent witness to the truth of what was before her and might easily have mistaken a sheep for a cow, or an old man called Smith for one who was called Jones and was no relation of his whatever" (*Orlando* 307-08).

Most important of all, Woolf also expresses her conception of time. As the narrator continues,

> For the shadow of faintness which the thumb without a nail [of her gardener] had cast had deepened now, at the back of her brain (which is the part furthest from sight), into a pool where things dwell in darkness so deep that what they

> are we scarcely know. She now looked down into this pool or sea in which everything is reflected—and, indeed, some say that all our most violent passions, and art and religion, are the reflections which we see in the dark hollow at the back of the head when the visible world is obscured for the time. (*Orlando* 308)

Pure past which preserves itself is described by Woolf as a pool in which virtual images are dwelling. It is topologically out there and remains forever invisible. In Bergson, memory is also compared with the ocean. As Bogue says, "Memory is not inside the individual mind, but each mind is inside memory, like a fish in the ocean. The ocean of memory is the virtual past, which gushes forth at each present moment in a perpetual foundation of time" (119). Woolf's "pool" and Bergson's "ocean" indicate that virtual images dwelling inside the fathomless pure past wait to get actualized. Even the well-known disputes, such as "violent passions, and art and religion" are merely the result of actualization. As compared with the intangible and formless past, the present as well as humans' "thoughts" are merely reflections of the pure past.

As argued in Chapter Three, in *To the Lighthouse*, besides the pool, Woolf also uses the mirror to describe the indivisible relation between the past and the present. In *Orlando*, an indiscernible crystal-image as a mirror exists as well:

> She [Orlando] looked there [the pool collecting images] now, long, deeply, profoundly, and immediately the ferny path up the hill along which she was walking became not entirely a path, but partly the Serpentine; the hawthorn bushes were partly ladies and gentlemen sitting with card-cases and gold mounted canes; the sheep were partly tall Mayfair houses; everything was partly something else, as if her mind had become a forest with glades branching here and there; things came nearer, and further, and mingled and separated and made the strangest alliances and combinations in an incessant chequer of light and shade. (308)

Woolf delineates a situation in which actual and virtual images are indiscernible because in this crystal-image, images are intermingling. A path that Orlando is walking right now becomes a river; hawthorn bushes become humans; sheep become houses. Actual images ("a path, hawthorn bushes and sheep" that Orlando can see right now) and virtual images (they might get actualized as "the Serpentine, ladies and gentlemen sitting with card-cases and gold mounted canes and tall Mayfair houses" that dwell in the pure past or in the pool) are exchanging to the extent that "things came nearer, and further, and mingled and separated and made the strangest alliances and combinations." Nevertheless, we should not conflate this unique experience of perceiving the actual and virtual images with any literary technique for writers use their

mind's eye to depict an *imaginary* world and that world is fictional. However, what Orlando perceives is *real*. It happens in our daily life and Woolf simply conveys this universal experience shared by everyone through this fictional character, Orlando. In this scenario, we perceive the subjectivity of time when images are indiscernible and when Orlando is a purely and simply a looker, not a thinker. Her body is transformed into a body without organs.

What about Orlando's gallery? In the beginning, in her gallery, there is "Queen Elizabeth's hard armchair" and it "stretched far away to a point where the light almost failed" (304). Now this space is devoid of its materiality because it is transformed into a time-image. It becomes a space before any action can be taken or broadly construed, before it, along with Orlando's body, is differentiated from time as a zone of indiscernibility. As Deleuze argues, "This is space before action. . . . It is a pre-hodological space, like a *fluctuatio animi* which does not point to an indecision of the spirit, but to an undecidability of the body" (*Cinema 2* 196). Being encompassed within time or being penetrated by time, Orlando is becoming a BwO while her gallery becomes any-space-whatever.

C. Orlando's mansion

In this sub-section, we are about to see the childbirth scenario in Orlando's mansion. This mansion is "where she [Orlando] could see Lord Chesterfield putting his hat down here and his coat down there with an elegance of deportment which it was a pleasure to watch, was now completely littered with parcels" (276). The reason why this mansion is stuffed with parcels is because Orlando has ordered the bookseller to send her literary masterpieces published in these hundreds of years and "She carried as many of these packets as she could to her room, ordered footmen to bring the others, and, rapidly cutting innumerable strings, was soon surrounded by innumerable volumes" (276). Then, something happens but readers barely know what's taking place because the rhythm of the whole event is very fast and the narration is very confusing. Woolf arranges several memories that Orlando has into coexistence with her present, or as I argued, Orlando perceives the involution of the present and the past, the actual and virtual images.

Actual images are what Orlando can see right now: "the footman has seen coming and the maid-servant" (279). Virtual images which resided in her past are now evoked by her present because they share the same rhythm. Thus, during her present childbirth, Orlando's rapturous experience in Kew Gardens is evoked right at this moment:

> under the plum tree, a grape hyacinth, and a crocus, and a bud, too, on the almond tree; so that to walk there is to be thinking of bulbs, hairy and red, thrust into the earth in October; flowering now; and to be dreaming of more than can rightly be said, and to be taking from its case a cigarette or cigar even, and to be flinging a cloak under (as the rhyme requires) an oak, and there to sit, waiting the kingfisher, which, it is said, was seen once to cross in the evening from bank to bank. (279-80)

As we can see, the aforesaid passage comes from Orlando's past because during childbirth, she simply cannot sit under an oak tree and wait for the kingfisher. By omitting any speaker's perspective in narrative and by paralleling six present participles (thinking, flowering, dreaming, taking, flinging, waiting) and one noun ends with –ing (evening), the whole passage produces a hasty and thrilling rhythm. We readers cannot wait any longer to know what is about to take place. But what Orlando is doing remains a secret in the text and multiple virtual images are now evoked and involuted with the present. Next, Orlando sees the city of London in the nineteenth century: "Behold, meanwhile, the factory chimneys and their smoke; behold the city clerks flashing by in their outrigger" (280). The next image enfolded is her visit to Constantinople: "as once one saw blazing . . . saw blazing a fire in a field against minarets near Constantinople" (280). The final two virtual images are Orlando's

acoustic memories: “singing in a dark chapel hymns about death, and anything, anything that interrupts and confounds the tapping of typewriters and filing of letters and forging of links and chains, binding the Empire together” (280-81). Sounds (of singing, typing, filing and forging) link images together with the present. Verbs and nouns which end with “ing” create a regular and harmonious rhythm as well.

From the above instances, besides actual images that Orlando sees, there are five more virtual images enfolding and exchanging each other. How can we conceive of such a strange juxtaposition, her childbirth and her other virtual images? I want to argue, it is the moment when the past as pure virtuality is re-presented in the present. The past is not *consciously* selected but involuntarily appears and we should not read the juxtaposition of images as the passport to the past as virtual entity. Rather, life force and the rapture that Orlando once experienced are enfolding her experience of childbirth right now by virtue of sharing similar intensities and rhythms. Orlando in this scenario encounters the tension delimited by her body as the threshold: she cannot think rationally while a baby is struggling painfully out of her womb. Yet how great is the intensity that Orlando perceives? As a force, it would “splinter the whole and tear us asunder and wound us and split us apart in the night when we would sleep; but sleep, sleep, so deep that all shapes are ground to dust of infinite softness, water of dimness inscrutable, and there, folded, shrouded, like a mummy, like a moth, prone let us lie on

the sand at the bottom of sleep" (281). As we can see, Woolf is simulating the rhythm of giving birth to a child, which is intertwined with birth throe and suspense. During the throe, the mother would feel being "tore asunder, wounded and being split apart" but when the throe suspends, she can rest and recline for a while till the next wave of throe comes. The intensity of bodily sensations is destructive ("to split us apart") and the mother is anxious for a temporary rest (to repose "like a mummy").

Nevertheless, intensity also signifies future and life. On the one hand, once again, the Deleuzian future can be interpreted how the subjectivity of Orlando is dismantled when confronting the subjectivity of time by which is meant that by giving birth to a child, Orlando is becoming-child for her subjectivity is disintegrated by life force. Although we can never become children again, according to Deleuze, it is always possible for us to experience becoming-child because we can always be transformed into a BwO when real time as life force slices over us. As Deleuze says, "The child in us . . . is contemporary with the adult, the old man and the adolescent. Thus it is that the past which is preserved takes on all the virtues of beginning and beginning again: it is what holds in its depths or in its sides the surge of the new reality, the bursting forth of life" (*Cinema 2* 89). This dynamic experience of becoming BwO or becoming-child of Orlando suggests it is the body which encounters the affect coming from time, or as Ansell Pearson says, "The struggle against entropy is not a struggle

against the mere passing of time, a mad desire to mummify the living against the forces of decay and decomposition, a clinging on to life out of a fear of death and obliteration, but a struggle for the future. This is a struggle or battle that is necessarily born out of our becoming in time" (2002: 196). Ansell Pearson's argument also becomes the best footnote to *Orlando* and it corresponds to the subject matter of this chapter: we should not read Orlando, a character who lives over hundreds of years, as a testimony against the withering of time. Rather, she manifests a new way for us to conceive of the subjectivity of time. On the other hand, if real time as event has two sides, the actualization and pure virtualities and if the above argument emphasizes the disclosure of life force as becoming-child, on the side of actualization, we still can interpret this childbirth scenario in a subject-centered and humanitarian way. Thus to say, it is plausible to interpret the imagery of death that Orlando experiences here ("folded, shrouded, like a mummy, like a moth, prone let us lie on the sand at the bottom of sleep") as the hope for birth and future because as argued on Clarissa's epiphany in Chapter One, death is just the beginning of life. The imagery of the moth that Woolf uses here also signifies hope and birth because it will break through its cocoon eventually. For Woolf, it always signifies hope and life,[18] and that's what Orlando is doing right now: she is giving birth to a new life.

---

[18] In "The Death of the Moth," a moth signifies life. As the narrator says, "Watching him [the moth], it

In this light, her mansion has become a time-image since the beginning of this scenario. During the whole narration, we cannot conceive of Orlando's behavior and we even forget it is the place where Orlando gives birth to her child or forget Orlando *is* actually giving birth to a child. Thus, if real time refers not to any kind of time presented to and sensed by humans but to life force and its becoming, time-image in this childbirth scenario allows us to have a glimpse of what a body can do in this any-space-whatever. Frankly speaking, in this scenario, a body can do *nothing* in the traditional philosophical sense. But right because of its incapacity, we witness not so much a barren situation as Deleuze argues in his two cinema books as any-space-whatever in which life force is surging and opening up the boundary of the body. In any-space-whatever, every *body* is acted on and transformed into a body without organs by life force.

In this chapter, I exemplify a department store, Orlando's gallery and her mansion to demonstrate how houses are no longer spaces but transformed into any-spaces-whatever or time-images in which we readers can perceive time's subjectivity. What Woolf leads us to witness is not so much Orlando's life as how the pure past as virtuality represents itself when being evoked by the present. If most of

---

seemed as if a fiber, very thin but pure, of the enormous energy of the world had been thrust into his frail and diminutive body. As often as he crossed the pane, I could fancy that a thread of vital light became visible. He was little or nothing but life" (180).

the time, the pure past as virtuality is invisible and imperceptible, that how we can know it and to know what it can do becomes the cardinal issue that we should discuss. In this light, artists' mission becomes significant because their creation is to represent those ineffable things, i.e., "to render sensible, sonorous (or visible), those forces that are ordinarily imperceptible" (Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust and Time" 72). Returning to the term "crystal-image" that Deleuze designates as time-image, this term, crystal, refers to time's modulation whose entity consists of layers or strata as in Bergson's inverted cone and such a complex combination of multiple *plateaus* denotes the eternal involution of the past, the present and the future within its circuit. All in all, by way of the indiscernibility of the actual and virtual, the present and the past, we have to *read* and *think through* these images. We do not simply read a biography, knowing the ups and downs in Orlando's life. Rather, through the exemplified spaces, we know Woolf is sensitive to time and she discloses time's subjectivity in this mock biography.

As I said, Chapter Three is consonant with Chapter One to argue the fragmentation of humans' body into the body without organs (Orlando's becoming-microscope, becoming-child with Clarissa's becoming-imperceptible) and Chapter Four will have a correlation with Chapter Two by focusing on the issue of language. If free indirect discourse argued in Chapter Two focuses on *To the Lighthouse* in Woolf's mature and productive phase, in Chapter Four, I will argue how these immature short stories are

experimental to the extent that by means of them, Woolf tests her *proper* relation with language.

Chapter Four

The Language of Image in “A Haunted House”

Art begins not with flesh but with the house.

—Deleuze and Guattari. *What Is Philosophy?*

Whence the triple definition of writing:

to write is to struggle, to resist; to write is to become.

—Deleuze. *Foucault*.



We seem to be continuing to live,

only in another house or country perhaps.

—Woolf. *Granite and Rainbow*.

In the previous three chapters, I have demonstrated real time as life force discloses itself by disintegrating the subjectivity and language of the character. In Chapter One, Clarissa is becoming-imperceptible by involuntarily being encompassed within the subjectivity of time by means of Septimus’s death while Chapter Three argued Orlando is becoming-microscope, becoming-imperceptible and becoming-child for her body is

transformed into a body without organs. The little room of Clarissa and the department store, Orlando's gallery and her mansion are temporalized as any-spaces-whatever or as time-images when the disclosure of real time is enfolding these spaces within. Chapter Two began by arguing that free indirect discourse is the sheer approach for Woolf to get close enough to a nonhuman speaking position when everything is fragmented into pieces *yet* indiscernible from each other. I argued that when "Time Passes" is narrated from this unidentifiable speaking position, the summerhouse of the Ramsays becomes just a facet recorded from a viewpoint ensuing from this mysterious fourth-person speaker. As I mentioned, Chapter Four will further discuss Woolf's ambivalent relation with language by contextualizing it in the early stage of her writing. I will argue that the short stories Woolf publishes around 1919~1921 are *experimental* to the extent that she is attempting to balance her relation with language.

I. A Haunted House

From 22 Hyde Park Gate in which Woolf spends her childhood to Monk's House in which she and Leonard receive their friends and visitors, the houses Virginia stays become almost as famous as she is. In the literature review in Introduction, numerous critics have devoted themselves to studying them and Asheham House in Sussex is no

exception. Even though Asheham (mostly as Asham in the Woolfs) is not as eminent as her other houses, it still plays an important role in Virginia's life. She rents this house before she marries Leonard and the Woolfs stay there for nine years till they buy Monk's House in East Sussex (1911~1919). During 1913~1914, Virginia convalesces in it when she has another serious breakdown (*D* 1:xvii). When thinking of Asheham in retrospect in 1928, Virginia describes it with deep emotions: "how I adore the emptiness, bareness, air & color of this! . . . A relic I think of my fathers feeling for the Alps—this ecstasy of mine over the bare slope of Asheham hill. But then, as I remind myself, half the beauty of a country or a house comes from knowing it. One remembers old lovelinesses [sic]: knows that it is now looking ugly; waits to see it light up; knows where to finds its beauty; how to ignore the bad things. This one can't do the first time of seeing" (*D* 3:192).

Asheham does not *just* designate the physicality and domesticity of the Woolfs during that time. It is also an inspiration for Virginia to compose her short story "A Haunted House." According to Leonard,

> Asham was a strange house. The country people on the farm were convinced that it was haunted, that there was treasure buried in the cellar, and no one would stay the night in it. It is true that at night one often heard extraordinary noises both in the cellars and in the attic. . . . It was, no doubt,

> the wind sighing in the chimneys, and, when there was no wind, probably rats in the cellar or the attic. I have never known a house which had such a strong character, personality of its own—romantic, gentle, melancholy, lovely. It was Asham and its ghostly footsteps and whisperings which gave Virginia the idea for *A Haunted House*, and I can immediately see, hear, and smell the house when I read the opening words. . . . (qtd. in Steele 155-56)

In other words, without Woolf's intricate observation and great attachment to this house, "A Haunted House" would never be released in the same way as it is. As Hermione Lee says, "'A Haunted House,' the little story she wrote about Asheham (which *was* supposed to be a haunted house), is full of that sense of beauty and loss" (313).

"A Haunted House" is anthologized in *Monday or Tuesday* published in 1921. It is the only collection of short stories published during Woolf's lifetime.[19] When Woolf is scrupulously yet unsuccessfully struggling against the realist influence in *The Voyage Out* (1915) and *Night and Day* (1919), as argued in Introduction, these short stories direct her to a new route and by contextualizing them in Woolf's writing, we know they pave the way for her to write *Jacob's Room* in 1920 which has been regarded

[19] According to Susan Dick, the only collection published during Virginia's lifetime is *Monday or Tuesday* (1921). After Virginia's death in 1941, Leonard publishes the other two collections: *The Death of the Moth and Other Essays* and *A Haunted House and Other Short Stories* (both in 1941). In 1973, *Mrs. Dalloway's Party: A Short Story Sequence* which is another collection of Woolf's short stories is edited by Stella McNichol and published by A Harvest Book. It is as late as 1986, *The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf* is published whose chief editor is Susan Dick. This collection includes Virginia's published and unpublished short stories, even the ones in manuscripts (Dick 2002).

as the first experimental fiction in her corpus. These short stories are the inception of Woolf's "literary turn."

Generally speaking, these short stories are famous for their "experimentality" and critics' perspectives are very diverse when arguing *in what way* these short stories are important. Sue Roe argues Woolf is deeply influenced by the post-impressionist paintings so that she deploys the technique of "synaesthetic picture-making" (174) in her short stories. For Elke D'Hoker, this genre provides an opportunity for Woolf to explore "the role and function of imagination" while for Liliane Louvel, Woolf's short stories are full of visuality and her literary experiment goes astraddle over the boundary among genres. Teresa Prudente's argument is analogous to the Bergsonian critics who focus on the consciousness of the character. In Prudente's view, these short stories prepare Woolf for the creation in her mature phase whose feature is "a dynamic narrative counterpoint between the linear progression of time and the a-temporal dimension of consciousness." Yet as Prudente notices, no sooner do we probe into these short stories than we discover there is barely any characterization, event, setting and plot narration because Woolf's short story "re-composes fragmentation without superimposing linearity and sequentiality to the elements of narration." So there is barely any central line or framework on which readers can rely; rather, because we merely have an aggregate of fragments, we hardly can deduce a complete meaning from

the pieces that Woolf provides, and *that* corresponds to Woolf's intention for this literary experiment: writing is to present the atom showers falling on the mind, however incoherent they are. According to Prudente, "Woolf's emphasis on the transient nature of instants of revelation reveals how the sense of a whole is felt by her as an ephemeral experience and must thus be conveyed in writing through equally dynamic structures which reproduce not only the re-composition of reality into a coherent design, but also . . . the inevitable 'flight of time & the consequent break of unity in my design (Woolf 1980: 36).'" In this respect, using Prudente's argument as the point of departure, I would like to argue, if the main point of reading these short stories does not rest on inferring an ultimate and complete thematic meaning, I will direct the critical attention to the *form* and discuss Woolf's relation with language in her writing.

Just as the Deleuizan body argued in Chapter Three is merely a heap of flesh and blood when life force discloses itself, language, in this sense, is neither a rational tool for communication. When the force lurking inside of language is unleashed, writing becomes an assemblage of words. In this light, apart from the epochal meanings that the aforesaid critics argued, how are we able to conceive of the significance of Woolf's literary experiment, especially when the elements that readers expect to have in reading are devoid and when there is nothing left but *language* in these short stories? These are the questions that I want to explore in this chapter. Before answering these

questions, firstly, I will have a thorough recourse to Deleuze's conception of language, especially his "language of image." It is a type of language which confronts its own limit and by means of it, the *dehors* can be glimpsed and an unthought can be put into thought. I will further argue "image" and its inherent power in the language of image is time-image which Deleuze argues in his two books on cinema and life/time as forever mutative force unleashed in time-image makes language stutter. Secondly, I will exemplify Woolf's "A Haunted House" to demonstrate the house in this short story is becoming a time-image because it is composed entirely by this language.

II. Deleuze's Theory of Image and Language

Woolf has manifested her radical attitude towards language in numerous essays and reviews. In "A Sketch of the Past" when mentioning she read a poem collected in *The Golden Treasury* with Vanessa in her childhood, Woolf says, "I had a feeling of transparency in words when they cease to be words and become so intensified that one seems to experience them; to foretell them as if they developed what one is already feeling" (93). And in "Craftsmanship" (1937), Woolf ardently claims that by discovering the mutative force underlying English, it is urgent to readjust ourselves in the face of language: "We are beginning to invent another language—a language perfectly and beautifully adapted to express useful statements, a language of signs"

because “Words, English words, are full of echoes, of memories, of associations—naturally” (138; 140). Here we have another convergence between Woolf and Deleuze on the issue of language because Deleuze also says, “Is there than no salvation for words, like a new style in which words would at last open up by themselves, where language would become poetry, in such a way as to actually produce the visions and sounds that remained imperceptible behind the old language (‘the old style’)?” (*Essays* 173). From Deleuze’s and Woolf’s perspectives, the old language is dead and sterile; a new language needs inventing. Language, for them, is never impartial and dispassionate paraphernalia but a dynamic organism with its own life and force.

Furthermore, Deleuze is well known for pushing language to its limits even at the expanse of signification. His favorite authors, like Virginia Woolf, Frantz Kafka and Samuel Beckett, lead readers to have a glimpse of the beyond where language is “‘far from equilibrium,’ [or when] *langue* itself vibrates or . . . ‘stutters’” (Stevenson 79). As Deleuze says,

> Make the language system stutter—is it possible without confusing it with speech? Everything depends on the way in which language is thought: if we extract it like a homogeneous system in equilibrium, or near equilibrium, and we define it by means of constant terms and relations, it is evident that the

> disequilibriums and variations can only affect speech. . . . But if the system appears to be in perpetual disequilibrium, if the system vibrates—and has terms each one of which traverses a zone of continuous variation—language itself will begin to vibrate and stutter. (*Essays* 108)

In Deleuze's view, language is not a system in equilibrium so we should not conflate its "disequilibriums and variations" with any language disorder (like stammer or aphasia). Language exhausts nothing but itself and many writers exhaust themselves by virtue of the exhaustion of language. Beckett is one of them.

In "The Exhausted" anthologized in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (1998), Deleuze enumerates three types of language in Beckett's oeuvre: language 1 (the language of names), language 2 (the language of voices) and language 3 (the language of images) as three stages, correlative with Beckett's consecutive reflection on, obsession with and resistance to language. As Frank Stevenson says, "the three stages in Deleuze's 'exhaustion' model/machine correspond respectively to Beckett's novels (in particular *Watt*), his novels and plays but especially radio plays, and his more extremely experimental late writing in *How It Is* and the television plays" (91). But for Jean-Jacques Lecercle, by commenting on Beckett's works, Deleuze turns to explicate his cardinal concept of language. As he says: "The opportunity this 'text' [Beckett's *Nacht und Traüme*] gives Deleuze is that of a reflection on the limitations of language,

and the theorization of the consequent hostility to language. . . . Language does not, contrary to appearances and to its explicit function, foster the emergence and circulation of meaning: it freezes into common sense; it betrays the violence of the event in articulate discourse" (Lecercle 6-7). Therefore, the beyond of language outside the terrain of common sense fosters writers to portray the singularity and materiality of language and even to work with other media: "And yet this pessimistic view of language is, *at the same time*, a *pean* to the necessity of literature, the art of language, which *can* capture and welcome the event, by pushing language to its limits, on that frontier where it meets other media" (7). According to Lecercle, the other media includes "music or picture" (5) because Beckett's last television play *Nacht und Traüme* combines music and picture where language vanishes into silence. However, if language at its limits no longer entails any signification, what is the singular force underlying it that makes it vanish, "far from equilibrium" or even stutter? When Lecercle demonstrates the language of *images* by exemplifying Beckett's numb television plays (the combination of sounds and images in which images equal to visuality), besides briefly elaborating on the other two language types/stages, in the below section, I will focus specifically on the concept of image and argue it is encoded with multiple meanings as the conceptual nucleus in Deleuze's philosophical thinking.

Language 1 is “a language in which enumeration replaces propositions and combinatorial relations replace syntactic relations: a language of names” (*Essays* 156). Multitudinous as the accumulation of names is, the speaker cannot gain mastery of words; they are not capable of making sense of them: “name-words are disjunct atoms, their sequences form enumerations or lists, not propositions, and their combination is algebraic, in the obsessional Beckettian manner, rather than syntactic” (Lecercle 4). Language 1 resembles an inventory of names but these names are in and by themselves; they cannot transmit meanings by forming any sentence. Language 2 is the language of voices. The world constructed by language 2 is a cacophonous world, laden with babel. The exhaustion of language from stage one to stage two is also a gradual diminution of the speaking subject. According to Lecercle, in language 1 at least “there is a still a subject, a speaker, who is in charge of naming” (4) whereas in language 2 “there was still a sender, not me (as it was not *my* language); not even a speaker (the Voice being impersonal), but something like a source of linguistic sequences, of strings of words” (5). Language 3 is the language of images, which renders visible the limits of language. There is no subject any more than any reliable signifying system; only audiences remain. As Lecercle says, “Language no. 3 has neither subject nor object, speaker nor referent. But it still has an addressee, the audience, and there is still something going on, the process of emergence of those

images. . . . Language no. 3 is the language of the limits of language, when it turns into silence, or to another medium, music or picture" (5). When language is pushed to its limits, it does not serve as a rational tool for communication but merely a raw materiality, full of holes, cracks and interstices: "There is therefore a *language III*, which no longer relates language to enumerable or combinable objects, nor to transmitting voices, but to immanent limits that are ceaselessly displaced—hiatuses, holes, or tears that we would never notice, or would attribute to mere tiredness, if they did not suddenly widen in such a way as to receive something from the outside or from elsewhere" (*Essays* 158). In this respect, Deleuze and Beckett consider crossing over the limits of language in order to have collaborations with other media. Beckett turns to numb television plays while Deleuze makes a cinematic turn. Despite that both of them turn toward visual arts, language still fails Beckett (so in his last television plays, only silence remains) but Deleuze's perspective about language is not directed toward death and nihilism insomuch as he is made to conceive of the underlying force *in* and *of* images. However, what is the connection between image and language in Deleuze? Why can image appear in language when it refers to visuality (as in Beckett whose television plays have no "language" at all) while language, in common sense, refers to written/spoken words? Or if image does not refer merely to visuality, how are we able to renew our understanding of it and of its relation to language? In the below section, I

will argue, right before "The Exhausted" published in 1993 (the French edition) where Deleuze argues the concept of language 3, he has been reflecting on the issue of images throughout out his oeuvre. In Deleuze, image is never restricted in designating something we *see* only; it also designates an inexplicable force inherent in the world, including that in images (understood in visual sense, like in Beckett's plays and in cinema which we will discuss later) and in language (how it stutters by this force).

In western philosophy, since Plato on, image has been studied in a negative way. Along with the issue of representation (to re-present the origin), image also needs an origin. In literature, image has two important traits: firstly, it is to represent the sensory perception and secondly, it is to solidify meaning. For William Harmon and C. Hugh Holman, image is to represent the perceptive experiences by means of our senses. In *A Handbook to Literature*, they define image as "a literal and concrete representation of a sensory experience or of an object that can be known by one or more of the senses" (262). For M. H. Abrams, image not only signifies our sensory perceptions, but in more recent usages, image frames "the overall tonality" of the text, "controlling literary subject, or *theme*, worked itself out in many plays, poems, and novels" (122). Literary critics all agree that image is to make the text concrete and the writer hazards to implant images in the text so as to strengthen the impression of the reader when reading the text (like the image of fire in John Milton's *Paradise Lost*). In other words, image in

literature stresses casualty and signification: it is to assure that message can be clearly and unmistakably conveyed from signifier to signified, from the author to the reader. But on such a reading, image is read as an impartial and flawless tool; there is no possibility of transformation implicated in and of itself. As we will see, Deleuze is set against such a reading of image.

In the early stage of his conceptualization, Deleuze distrusts image, but not because it is double away from truth but because it has been regarded as a self-sufficient doctrine that humans worship and follow blindly. Image designates an order-world or the commonsensical world in which truth is the ultimate goal. As in *Dialogues*, Deleuze clearly argues "'Images' here doesn't refer to ideology but to a whole organization which effectively trains thought to operate according to the norms of an established order or power, and moreover, installs in it an apparatus of power, sets it up as an apparatus of power itself. . . . They can all be summarized in the order-word: have correct ideas!" (23). Deleuze names this type of image as "an image of thought" (23) or cliché: "We therefore normally perceive only clichés. . . . In fact, it is a civilization of the cliché where all the powers have an interest in hiding images from us, not necessarily in hiding the same thing from us, but in hiding something in the image" (*Cinema 2* 20). So if we want to think beyond the image of thought, "*one must think without an image*" (Flaxman 12). It is because "[t]hought is thereby filled with no

more than an image of itself, one in which it recognizes itself the more it recognizes things: this is a finger, this is a table, Good morning Theaetetus" (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 138). Image traps humans inside of tautology and the only teleological end is to pursue the truth it establishes.

Nevertheless, when composing his two books on cinema, Deleuze is aware that there is a force dwelling inside of the (visual) image. In *Cinema 1*, he argues that the image of thought which mostly appears in movement-image has dominated the prewar cinema. Cinema of movement-image is swarmed with image of thought "which would impede thinking, which would impede the exercise of thought" (*Dialogues* 23). As I said, it is because movement-image is circulating around not so much the main character as truth because what audiences expect to have in the end is an action which can solve all the problems. As Deleuze avers,

> We simply note that the sensory-motor schema is concretely located in a "hodological space" . . . which is defined by a field of forces, oppositions and tensions between these forces, resolutions of these tensions according to the distribution of goals, obstacles, means, detours. . . . This economy of narration, then, appears both in the concrete shape of the action-image and hodological space and in the abstract figure of the movement-image and Euclidean space. (*Cinema 2* 124)

Movement-image is to enunciate truth and in so doing, a well-constructed commonsensical world can be established. As Gregory Flaxman says, "The sensory-motor schema [of movement-image] is the mechanism of our relation to the world of images, the result of which is narrative, but this narrative must be understood as having been underwritten by a moral exigency, the promise to make good, common sense" (5).

Nevertheless, at the end of *Cinema 1*, movement-image encounters a crisis caused by World War II which is a catastrophe in human history. Physically and mentally, people are "stuck" in this barren and waste world; they can see, hear, wander around, exhaust themselves but cannot take any action. But Deleuze reads this catastrophe in human history as the onset of the "cinematic turn;" cinema turns to produce a new type of images: time-image. In contrast to movement-image which emphasizes the expansion of the narration (the climax of which is action-image), in time-image, we only have a great extent of force and intensity for image discloses itself by enclosing itself. For Deleuze, time is the force of becoming inside of image which changes everything without itself being changed. In other words, unlike movement-image construing "a civilization of the cliché" (20), time-image cannot be concretized and thus be exhausted for, in and by the commonsensical world. Rather, it is to goad the audience to think something which has not been taken into account *yet*: to think beyond

the cliché and to think the unthought. As Deleuze says, “the power of thought gave way, then, to an unthought in thought, to an irrational proper to thought, a point of outside beyond the outside world, but capable of restoring out belief in the world” (175).

As a consequence, truth which movement-image propagates is anything but transcendent out there because it should be put under the critical lens of examination. The so-called “truth” or “image of thought” is merely an image encountering other images on the plane of immanence. There is no image that can be elevated as the ultimate or sufficient one because images are always in the process of becoming. If movement-image is image of thought which establishes truth as Ideal, the advent of time-image shatters our belief in the cliché world. For Deleuze, the importance of this cinematic turn is that time-image illuminates a new way of thinking and consequently, the commonsensical world can be challenged. As I said, time-image which shatters the criteria of truth designates the power of the false: “The formation of the crystal, the force of time and the power of the false are strictly complementary, and constantly imply each other as the new co-ordinates of the image” (128). And only when there is an *interstice* in our belief in truth and in the world it creates, can the possibility of thinking be inaugurated. It is because life does not consist of appearance and representation but of potentials and forces: “By raising the false to power, life freed

itself of appearances as well as truth: neither true nor false, an undecidable alternative, but power of the false, decisive will" (140).

In other words, what Deleuze concerns is "tearing a real image from clichés" (20). For him, although we are besieged by the cliché, image "constantly attempts to break through the cliché, to get out of the cliché" (20) because the force of time or the "profound, vital intuition [sic]" (21) encompassed in image refuses to be ossified and exhausted.[20] In this light, image does not refer to what we *see* only. Even though our world has been dominated by visuality, Deleuze encourages us not to think *without* images but to think *within* images and we just need to distinguish images of difference (the thinking image) from images of the same (cliché/the image of thought). In the later period of Deleuze's thinking, image can be regarded as something we see, equal to visuality *and* it is also indicative of the underlying time as a forever mutative force. Time-image can be regarded either as time (as the force) in image or time is image (time=image). So when such a force is intrinsic to language, it cannot convey the image of thought as if it were simply a pure and rational tool. Rather, by virtue of time's permeating in language, language stutters as if it stumbled over its own holes. As Deleuze says "The image is not defined by the sublimity of its content but by its

[20] The phrase, "profound, vital intuition," is consonant with the term, élan vital, that Bergson argues in *Creative Evolution*. As a power that can forever resuscitate life on earth, in numerous critical essays, this term is translated as "vital impetus." Nevertheless, not every thinker has positive interpretations of this term. For Ansell Pearson, he stakes out three contentions concerning élan vital: its definition, its constituents, and how to contextualize it in modern evolutionism (2002: 90-91).

form, that is, by its 'internal tension,' or by the force it mobilizes to create a void or to bore holes, to loosen the grip of words, to dry up the oozing of voices, so as to free itself from memory and reason: a small, alogical, amnesiac, and almost aphasic image, sometimes standing in the void, sometimes shivering in the open. The image is not an object but a 'process'" (*Essays* 159). The language of image can be understood as the language of time-image in Deleuze.

Deleuze further argues that language 3, the language of (time) image operates with space, but space is not the Euclidean space with concrete spatial traits. It is any-space-whatever: "Language III does not operate only with images but also with spaces. And just as the image must attain the indefinite, while remaining completely determined, so space must always be an any-space-whatever, disused, unmodified, even though it is entirely determined geometrically" (160). As I argued, in his two books on cinema, Deleuze also argues that in time-image, space is transformed into any-space-whatever or more radically speaking, into time-image in that the force surging in this space is tremendous to the extent that any spatial trait is deprived. According to Deleuze, "The any-space-whatever retains one and the same nature: it no longer has co-ordinates, it is a pure potential, it shows only pure Powers and Qualities, independently of the states of things or milieux which actualize them (have actualized them or will actualize them, or neither the one nor the other—it hardly matters)"

(*Cinema 1* 120). Even though any-space-whatever indicates the empty, futile and agonizing state of mind of modern people in the postwar cinemas as presented as "deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste ground, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction" (*Cinema 2* xi), now this space is connoted with positive meanings: the imperceptible, intangible and invisible time discloses itself in it. Nevertheless, as I said, we should not misrecognize any-space-whatever as a bizarre and imaginary space. It is real and it still can be measured by the Euclidean geometry ("a square with these sides and diagonals, a circle with these zones, a cylinder 'fifty meters round and sixteen high'") (*Essays* 160). It is just that any-space-whatever exceeds the gauge of the Euclidean geometry and can merely be understood in terms of topology and time. We also have to re-*cognize* the fact that it is not we who are thinking; rather we are the ones who are thought, captured and affected by time. It is we who are enclosed in time and we are the parchments that register the inscription of time which never stops changing everything. We are encompassed in time so much so that subjectivity never belongs to us but to time. As a space stripped of spatiality, any-space-whatever leads us to see how the issue of subjectivity should be re-cognized and re-understood. As Tom Conley says: "The transformation of 'subjectivity' is at issue less in movement in space than in an *invention of an erasure of space*" ("The Film Event" 308).

Broadly construed, any-space-whatever in cinema as well as in language coincidently singles out the zone of indiscernibility of time by encompassing space: image is indicative of time's subjectivity, space is just another time-image and language is an image. In Deleuze's oeuvre, time, space, image and language eventually refer to each other, even though they are not identical. And if language of time-image is not restricted either in cinema or in Beckett's texts, can we observe this language, the language of time-image or of thinking image, in Woolf? How is her language also the language of thinking image or of time-image? How can our understanding of her language assist us to take into account her literary turn and in what way can her language assist us to read rooms, houses and interior spaces in her works as time-images?

III. Reading the House as a Time-image in "A Haunted House"

—If "it wasn't that you woke us," then who did?

"A Haunted House" is about a ghostly couple wandering around in their old house which is anthologized in *Monday or Tuesday* published in 1921. When interpreting this short story, most critics read it, alongside with other short stories published around

the same year, as Woolf's experiment with form. Sharing this major theme, critics develop each of their own analyses of "A Haunted House." Sue Roe argues that Woolf's words bring us close to the supernatural world in contrast to the solid and cruel reality in which we reside (174). In David Dachies, "A Haunted House" is more like scrawls of a painter; it is neither complete nor in unity (qtd. in Araujo 157). Victor de Araujo argues that this short story successfully connects "life and death, past and present, senses and imagination, intellect and intuition, hands and heart" (157). As for Elizabeth Steele, she argues that we have to read this ghost story along with the traditional Japanese drama, Noh (154). Being swept by the cultural fashion led by Ezra Pound, Woolf might have heard of a Noh play, *Nishikigi* and along with her personal experience living in the Asheham House, Woolf composes "A Haunted House" (154-55).

From the above critical reviews, we know "A Haunted House" is neither complete nor mature; its writing strategy is also very confusing. Nevertheless, viewing this short story *merely* as a ghost story or just a trial paving the way for Woolf's mature works is underestimating its experimental significance. With our previous discussion on Deleuze's language of time-image, in the below section, I will demonstrate two points: firstly, this short story is *experimental* to the extent that it is composed by the language of time-image. There are numerous holes, gaps and ruptures in narrative

which cause the incomplete and even fragmentary thematic meaning. But right because of that, time as the force of becoming is encompassed in language which makes it stutter. Secondly, by arranging three articulations, the ghostly couple, the house owner and time, Woolf attempts to demonstrate that through this language, the house is just a time-image because the whole story is eventually narrated from the perspective of time and each articulation is somehow involuted within it. The house is *haunted* not so much by the ghostly couple as by time.

Before we explore this short story, let us pause for a moment: if this is a story about a house, what do we know about it? In this short story, we can observe many details describing the materiality and spatiality of this house. For example, in the drawing room, there are "The window panes [which] reflected apples, reflected roses; all the leaves were green in the glass" (3). It is very quite with only the sound of the wood pigeons and silence: "The shadow of a thrush crossed the carpet; from the deepest wells of silence the wood pigeon drew its bubble of sound" (3). We also know that the later part of the story takes place in a windy but moonlit night and there is a candle burnt to light up the house: "The wind roars up the avenue. Trees stoop and bend this way and that. Moonbeams splash and spill wildly in the rain. But the beam of the lamp falls straight from the window. The candle burns stiff and still" (4). But as argued earlier, even though we can measure the house by the Euclidian geometry and

know certain details about it, the focus will be put on its transformation from a space to a "temporalized" any-space-whatever. For achieving this, Woolf arranges three different articulations.

Firstly, we have the ghostly couple. Due to the inserted quotation marks, we have the first-hand articulations emanating *directly* from them: "'Here we left it,' she said. And he added, 'Oh, but here too!' 'It's upstairs,' she murmured. 'And in the garden,' he whispered. 'Quietly,' they said, 'or we shall wake them'" (3). These are the instances of direct discourse by which characters' thoughts are conveyed directly. However, besides the direct presentation of this ghostly couple's thoughts, Woolf further embeds two other impossible but perhaps compossible articulations in the text. The second one is the house owner's and we can further separate his/her articulation into two parts: the one in the daytime and the one at night. When he/she is conscious in the daytime, this house owner is aware of the existence of the ghostly couple in the house and s/he still calmly and rationally says, "But it wasn't that you woke us. Oh, no" (3). From his/her next articulation, this house owner is reading as if he/she were observing the adventure of this ghostly couple *in a book*:

> "They're looking for it; they're drawing the curtain" one might say, and so read on a page or two. "Now they've found it," one would be certain, stopping the pencil on the margin. And then, tired of reading, one might rise

> and see for oneself, the house all empty, the doors standing open, only the wood pigeons bubbling with content and the hum of the threshing machine sounding from the farm. "What did I come in here for? What did I want to find?' My hands were empty." (3)

From this passage, we can clearly observe this house owner's personality through his/her acts (to read a few pages more, to write some notes on the margin, to explore the house) and habit (to rise up when getting tired of reading). He/she uses the first person (I, we, us) to solidify his/her speaking position by repetitiously saying "My hands were empty" for not being able to find the treasure buried in the house and he/she is aware that death is between the ghostly couple and them (4). However, we cannot help but notice an alogical situation here: the ghostly couple cannot coexist with the house owner simultaneously *both* in a book and in the house. In a chrono(logical) sense, either the ghostly couple have to exist *first* so that the house owner can read their adventure in a book and even search for the buried treasure *later* or both of them are supposed to exist in the same literary world and read by us the actual reader. In addition, in the later part of the story, we can still hear the direct articulation of the house owner even though they are fast asleep at night. The below example comes from him/her who is describing the observation of the ghostly couple: "Nearer they [the ghostly couple] come; cease at the doorway. . . . Our eyes darken; we hear no steps beside us; we see no lady spread her

ghostly cloak. His hands shield the lantern. 'Look,' he breathes. 'Sound asleep. Love upon their lips.' Stooping, holding their silver lamp above us, long they look and deeply. Long they pause" (4). Then, here comes the pressing question: if the house owner is fast asleep, why and how can he/she *see* the ghostly couple coming toward them and describe how they observe them? If the house owner cannot possibly be the seer/speaker, who and what sees this and narrates this scenario? The other strange thing is the house owner uses the first personal *plural* (we, us) in narrative. However, if he/she is in sleep, not in a conversation with his/her partner to exchange thoughts and being made aware of something approaching is very subjective, why does the house owner use "we" to describe this experience? I bring this up because at the end of the story, he/she suddenly uses "I" to solidify his/her speaking position again: "Waking, I cry 'Oh, is *this* your buried treasure? The light in the heart'" (4). Then, how can we explain this situation?

I would like to argue in this short story, there is actually a third speaker. This mysterious and invisible speaker leads us to follow the ghostly couple's steps, to hear the thought of the fast asleep house owner and it even articulates itself. As argued earlier, when life force discloses itself, neither the subjectivity nor the language of the character can be held intact, and under this circumstance, Woolf is speculating what can be seen from this position since no one can occupy it as a beyond. In other words,

only when real time discloses itself, can we have this speaker lurking around but imperceptible and invisible to anyone in the house. As argued, this position can be occupied by no one but time and in this short story, this mysterious position of time watches and narrates some parts of the story. For example, in the beginning, it says, "Whatever hour you woke there was a door shutting. From room to room they went, hand in hand, lifting here, opening there, making sure—a ghostly couple" (3). This passage comes neither from the ghostly couple (the object of observation) nor from the house owner (who would use I or we were this passage articulated by him/her). As I said, Woolf arranges this invisible yet possible observer in this house to watch the ghostly couple and tells the house owner what he/she will see on awakening. Later, it even watches the avenue and the scenes outside the window: "The wind roars up the avenue. Trees stoop and bend this way and that. Moonbeams splash and spill wildly in the rain. But the beam of the lamp falls straight from the window. The candle burns stiff and still" (4). It also watches the ghostly couple to watch the fast asleep house owner: "Long they pause. The wind drives straightly; the flame stoops slightly. Wild beams of moonlight cross both floor and wall, and, meeting, stain the faces bent; the faces pondering; the faces that search the sleepers and seek their hidden joy" (4). This speaker is detachedly commenting on the act of the ghostly couple and the house owner who was the main articulator in the daytime now becomes the object of double

observation: the direct one emanating from the ghostly couple and the meta-one from time. Time as the third speaker is topologically inside of the house but its position is outside the framework of the story and becomes imperceptible.

Furthermore, from the first paragraph I quote, we know time interweaves the other two speakers to the extent that these seemingly incompossible articulations can coexist *simultaneously* and somehow they form an indiscernible relation with each other. If the ghostly couple is the past, the house owner is the present while the reader personified by the house owner later signifies the future, this zone of indiscernibility of time involutes them together, just as the future is implicated in the present while the past always repeats itself in the present. It is very difficult for the actual reader to distinguish the identity of each speaker. As argued in Introduction, such a coexistent and indiscernible condition is the prototype of time. The inverted cone of Bergson and the crystal-image of Deleuze explicate respectively the *simultaneous* coexistence of these three *seemingly* incompossible speakers. From time's perspective, it sees the wandering of the ghostly couple and sees them see the sleepers and it even involutes the response of the reader personified by the house owner within its own articulation because future is simply a possibility which can be actualized in some cases *proper*. Or, on the other hand, since Woolf uses "the impersonal third person *one*" (Araujo 158) to convey this reading experience, we can argue in the text Woolf embeds the

meta-response of the actual reader when reading this short story: "'They're looking for it; they're drawing the curtain'" and "'Now they've found it'" (3). Whether it is the actual reader or the personified reader by the house owner, this alogical and non-chronologically possible coexistence becomes compossible in the light of being encompassed in and by time. Put another way, every articulation is involuted inside of time or just being a facet of time's subjectivity. In contrast to common sense in which humans (mis)recognize themselves as the center/subject of the world (exemplified as the house owner using the first person in articulation), everything, including human beings, is ensuing from this indiscernible subjectivity of time. And the reason why the house owner uses the first person plural to describe what happens when they are fast asleep is because Woolf imagines the way that time sees the ghostly couple see them when they are fast asleep. In effect, he/she along with his/her partner are just involuted in time. As Prudente says, "The first-person narrative voice present in some of the stories can thus be understood not as Woolf's alter ego, but rather as a bodiless and abstract voice which anticipates the writer's confrontation with 'abstract mystical eyeless' . . . forms of writing." These diverse articulations are not different from each other because they are indicative of time's subjectivity as a zone of indiscernibility. Time is difference in and of itself.

Unlike the omniscient narrator in narratology who controls and knows everything, the whole narration in this short story is filled with gaps and holes. Let us exemplify the first quote again. Firstly, we have the house owner's articulation: "But it wasn't that you woke us. Oh, no" (3). Then, without any indication or transition, we directly have the reader's response: "'They're looking for it; they're drawing the curtain' one might say, and so read on a page or two" (3). Again, without any precaution or turning point, next speaking position is switched to the bewildered house owner again: "'What did I come in here for? What did I want to find?'" (3). The thematic meaning in this narration is incomplete and very confusing because the speaking position has been switched perpetually and cannot be stabilized. There are so many gaps in narration which ruptures its fluency and readability; some useful information is even left unprovided. Therefore, if "A Haunted House" is Woolf's literary turn which makes her writing turn toward the modernist direction, the focus should be laid on how Woolf is aware of the force of time which is intrinsic to the world and through this literary experiment, she discloses this force in her language. By creating incomplete and fragmentary thematic meaning and narrative, time as the inherent force which makes language stutter is thus perceivable in Woolf. In other words, "A Haunted House" embodies exactly the characteristic of the language of time-image. The limit of language is exposed because time as life force cannot be

conveyed completely by it: “There is therefore a *language III*, which no longer relates language to enumerable or combinable objects, nor to transmitting voices, but to immanent limits that are ceaselessly displaced—hiatuses, holes, or tears that we would never notice, or would attribute to mere tiredness, if they did not suddenly widen in such a way as to receive something from the outside or from elsewhere” (*Essays* 158). Due to the inaugural of time-image in language, the truth of believing we are the center of the world no longer sustains. This literary turn of Woolf challenges the subject-centered truth and her language re-testifies to *the* truth that subjectivity is never ours but time’s. “A Haunted House” verifies the truth that “time has always put the notion of truth into crisis” (*Cinema 2* 126).

As argued in the very beginning of this section, this haunted house is very *spatial* with its own architectural style and measurable coordinates. After the above demonstration, this house is also *temporal* because even though this story is about a *haunted* house, it is seen and narrated from the perspective of time and multiple articulations are immersed into this indiscernible vortex of time. This house is any-space-whatever which is “populated and well-trodden, it is even that which we ourselves populate and traverse, but it is opposed to all our pseudoqualified [sic] extensions, and is defined as ‘neither here nor there where all the footsteps ever fell can never fare nearer to anywhere nor from anywhere further away’” (*Essays* 160). And

reading this house as a time-image would not be accomplished without our having conceived of the inherent force in Woolf's language. It is because after conceiving of the radical meaning that Deleuze puts on image, we know time is image while image is time in Woolf. Time permeates the house; it also permeates her language.

If we examine Woolf's relation with language in a broader scope, making visible the invisible is the task that Woolf wants herself along with other modernist writers to accomplish. As early as in "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" and "Modern Fiction," Woolf explicates that the responsibility for writers is not to build a commonsensical world but to record myriad impressions of the mind as atom showers. The structure, scaffold or gauge of the fiction becomes nothing as compared with these moments of being ("Modern Fiction" 160-61). In other words, what Woolf tries to accomplish is not just to overturn the realist style of writing but also to sever the world of truth by the stuttering of her language. Otherwise, the so-called cannon that we are producing and reproducing are simply the accumulation of image of thought in Deleuzian sense. Under this circumstance, the importance of creation cannot be overstressed because it has to renew not only the writing style in literature but also our perspective about the world. For Woolf and Deleuze, truth has to be created, even in different terrains. For Deleuze, one of them is in cinema: "the cinema can call itself *cinémavérité,* all the more because it will have destroyed every model of the true so as to become creator and

producer of truth: this will not be a cinema of truth but the truth of cinema" (*Cinema 2* 146). For Woolf, it is exclusively in words: "words are the only things that tell the truth and nothing but the truth" ("Craftsmanship" 137). Despite of different wording, Woolf and Deleuze claim exactly the same conception about art and the task it needs to accomplish even by means of different media. For them, there is no more the discourse of truth than the truth of discourse. And through the aforesaid demonstration, we can fully comprehend Woolf's cardinal position both as the spokesperson of modernist literature and as a talented creator. Her pioneering position on behalf of the modernist literature is openly acknowledged. Nevertheless, only when we are made aware that her creation is to make visible the invisible, can we understand how epochal and experimental her short stories are, both in the history of her writing and in the history of literature.

Conclusion

This dissertation begins by introducing the literature review of real houses lived by Woolf and textual houses created by Woolf by arguing despite of critics' different strategies, readings as such are framed in the rhetoric of spatialized thinking: space is space while time is subordinate to it and becomes abstract. When spatialized thinking and spatialized time formulate our world, it becomes very difficult to perceive real time which has been lost to the tide of quotidian life. Under this circumstance, we need an altogether different method to approach real time. Thus, I detour through Woolf's relation with cinema and argue this inchoate medium directs Woolf to a new path to confront real time when the brain temporally dysfunctions. Right on this point, I also have recourse to Deleuze and his conception of time-image to elaborate on how it is possible to perceive real time in cinema. From Deleuze's perspective, the Second World War, the catastrophe in human history, rather initiates the disclosure of real time in cinemas. For him, when there is a crack, an interstice, or an irrational cut suspending our commonsensical world, it becomes the moment when the unthought, the subjectivity of real time, can be put into thought.

In other words, images in cinemas are not just designed to constitute diegesis because their importance resides in calling particular attention to the disclosure of real

time and when it does, humans are affected and overwhelmingly merged in time and they can perceive nothing but violent sensations. Why are sensations violent? It is because common sense which establishes our world is no longer held intact and it is our body that confronts real time. As Flaxman says, "Sensation always initially betokens a kind of violence: insofar as the dogmatic image of thought solidifies itself in its own inertia (habits, rituals, conventions), sensation is like the setting off of a trip wire, the communication of a kind of synaptic frenzy through the faculties" (13). So when there is a crack through which the *dehors* force is penetrating into the safe and rational zone which the image of thought builds, for Deleuze, it is the starting point to think the unthought. The end of the sensible is the sheer beginning of sensation and it is also the sheer moment at which life force disentangles humans' subjectivity and their language.

Since real time becomes the nucleus of Woolf's creations and Deleuze's philosophical thinking, I have further tackled what exactly real time is by contextualizing it in Bergson's philosophy of time. In Bergson's view, real time consists of splitting itself up and synthesizing itself. The splitting-up of time is the actualization of an event and the image actualized as recollection-image moves toward the future. It formulates the chronological sense of time while the synthesis of time refers to the fact that no sooner is it actualized than the actualized image and the actualized state of affairs will be (re)enfolded in virtual entity. Real time, for Bergson

as well as for Deleuze, contains simultaneous coexistence of actualization and virtualization. In this sense, future becomes indeterminate and unknown insomuch as there are incongruous and incompatible germs in life force waiting to be unfolded. Thus to say, real time is a zone of indiscernibility, not just every object in the world is the contraction or dilation of real time, but also the past, the present, the future are contemporaneous. Provided that real time discloses itself, nothing can be distinguished from it or given a proper name because everything is a facet of real time. In this respect, space is just the product of common sense operating with spatialized thinking machines; it should now be re-*cognized* as any-space-whatever or as time-image. My dissertation demonstrates how it is possible and important to read the space in Woolf as time and there are four chapters.

Chapter One discusses *Mrs. Dalloway*. It conveys what writing should accomplish in Woolf's mind: not to slice life in accordance with proportion and conversion that Sir William and Dr. Holmes propel but being sliced over by life force to the extent that Clarissa's subjectivity and her language are dismantled. I exemplify how Clarissa regards herself and life and demonstrate how Woolf presents life as a zone of indiscernibility. When ruminating on the meaning of death, Clarissa is suddenly awash with "flows and ebbs" which make her realize "She would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were that" (*Mrs. Dalloway* 5). Clarissa conceives

of life in terms of dynamic force and on my reading, death is not a destructive act; its underlying force discloses the subjectivity of real time. When later at the end of her party, Clarissa is informed by Lady Bradshaw of Septimus's death, she can no longer think rationally but is entirely transformed into a body without organs which is a body with speeds and affects. The intensity that Septimus experienced is also experienced by Clarissa and as mentioned earlier, this nonhuman intensity disentangles Clarissa's subjectivity and her language. She "can no longer say 'I see, I hear', but I FEEL, 'totally psychological sensation'" (*Cinema 2* 153) for being transformed into becoming-imperceptible. Her language becomes too incoherent and inconsistent to rationally and logically transmit her thoughts. Under this circumstance, Clarissa's little room is transformed into a time-image. By sparing irrelevant descriptions of the interior decorations and objects in the room, Woolf simply points out the sound of the clock is becoming-imperceptible when being "dissolved in the air" while "The leaden circles" into which the clock transformed resemble waves, which not only suggests its transformation from medal to liquid and from form to color but also refers to the dynamic "flows and ebbs" that Clarissa perceives in the very beginning of the text (*Mrs. Dalloway* 165).

The focus of Chapter Two is to put on the free direct discourse that Woolf utilizes to compose *To the Lighthouse*. I have framed the positioning of the stream of

consciousness technique in modernist literature and further mapped it in modern life. But as one of the stream of consciousness techniques, free indirect discourse needs reformulating: it is *free* because every speaking position is decomposed to the extent that this writing technique is to have a glimpse of the perspective emanating from time, that which makes this writing technique *indirect*. In other words, by means of free indirect discourse, the fictional world that Woolf creates is akin to the one observed and narrated from the perspective ensuing from time. I also argue, "Time Passes" is entirely narrated from this fourth-person singular position and the summerhouse of the Ramsays is transformed into a time-image to verify the fact that subjectivity is never ours but time's.

Chapter Three tackles Orlando's body. By explicating three significant traits of the Deleuzian body, the body as materiality, the relations it assembles, and the becoming it initiates and undergoes, I argue on some occasions, Orlando's nonhuman body can be analyzed as a body without organs. Yet such a reading of body needs to be aligned with how space is transformed into any-space-whatever by life force. In the department store, in her gallery and in her mansion where she gives birth to her child, due to the great intensity unleashed by life force, Orlando confronts not only the re-presentation of the past as futile sediments in the present, but also the incapacity of her body to think and to act. By so doing, Woolf suggests not so much how it is

possible to resist the decaying force of the chronological time as a body is always a body, a pile of meat and flesh, yet by means of which, the subjectivity of real time is disclosed.

The last chapter puts the emphasis on the issue of language in Woolf's short story "A Haunted House." When life force discloses itself, writing should vibrate *with* the world and the world, as life, should be (re)understood as an indiscernible zone: "One must . . . speak *with*, write *with*. With the world, with a part of the world, with people" (*Dialogues* 52). Aligned with Deleuze's enumeration and conception of the language types in Samuel Beckett's works, we can read this short story as being composed by the language of (time) image by which is meant that image no longer refers to something we see only; image is time as life force. The underlying force undermines language as if language stumbled over its own holes, lacunas and gaps: language is short circuited. Furthermore, the three speakers that Woolf embeds in this short story are indiscernible to the extent that we cannot easily identify them. Just as what Woolf achieves in "Time Passes" of *To the Lighthouse*, the third mysterious speaker lurking in this short story speaks as the fourth-person singular, simulating the perspective ensuing from time. With this in mind, "A Haunted House" and this haunted *house* are made to vibrate with life and with the world when this fictional house in this fictional text is composed by the language of image to attest to the subjectivity of real time.

Under this circumstance, one may note that creation has forged its importance in Woolf's writing and in Deleuze's philosophy. Since the disclosure of real time is rarely perceived and its intensity is ephemeral and violent, for Woolf, writing should be transformed not only to keep up with the accelerating life pace in modern life but also to grasp life force as a sparkling glimpse. Also by means of creation, Woolf is able to cut the umbilical cord from her realist predecessors. By analogy, Deleuze also overtly claims that only creation can be consonant with the dynamic life force as real time. In his view, as an act of triggering molecular transformation and forming rhizomatic assemblages, creation pushes our thinking to the beyond. And the beyond, in this sense, is an unknown force, which always challenges what we have taken for granted. And not just the concept of subjectivity, space and language should be reconsidered, but more radically, our relation with the world should be reevaluated as well. "Music has stayed at home; what has changed now is the organization of the home and its nature" (Deleuze, *The Fold* 137). When Deleuze thus concludes at the end of *The Fold,* it becomes the inception point for us to revolutionize thinking hereafter.

Yet I have to admit that my reading strategy in this dissertation seems to follow Deleuze too faithfully. When Deleuze revolutionizes the discourse of truth by means of the powers of the false, he expects to see how thinking can have its own internal transformations. But my reading delimits such transformations and it is worthy to be

taken into account in my future study. Other limitations include the possible neglect of historicity and of political issues. I am fully aware that each of Woolf's fiction has its own historical context, but since my Deleuzian reading focuses on the coexistence of time, historical incidents based upon chronology becomes one of the issues that cannot be unraveled. In addition, neither can my reading unravel another important position taken by Woolf: she is the foremother of feminists and queer theorists so that any gender and latent homoerotic issues cannot be explored in my present Deleuzian structure. For instance, the issue of female silence in patriarchal society cannot be discussed here, let alone to discover any female empowerment and autonomy and we can exemplify Lady Bruton. However ambitious she is, she cannot have any official position in the cabinet. She can only maneuver her influence on some private occasions. Or the homoerotic affection between Clarissa and Sally, between Septimus and Evans is another issue which cannot be tackled.

Nevertheless these limitations and unraveled issues goad us to have further, deeper and more thorough thinking. For instance, despite I claim that gender issues cannot be tackled in my present Deleuzian framework, yet he and Guattari's study on Alice's body (or on her body without organs) can be the starting point of my future research to have another interesting conversation with gender issues. It is when arguing how becoming-woman can produce the universal girl that Deleuze and Guattari exemplify

the size-distortion of Alice in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass* to demonstrate how Alice is resisting at being trained as a molar woman. Or it is also promising to connect Woolf and Deleuze further on the issue of color, when Woolf's "Blue and Green" and Deleuze's two cinema books respectively tackle their conceptions of color and sensations. But can such an aesthetic convergence not be understood in relation to painting but still to cinema? As we know, Paul Cézanne's influence on Woolf and her intricate relation with paintings have been widely disputed while Cézanne's influence on Deleuze's thinking on cinema has not been explored much before. But Éric Alliez's footnote can be our point of departure: "One should keep in mind that, in a certain way, Deleuze's book *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* (1981) prepares the ground for the work on cinema. . . . Deleuze actually poses the question of how cinematographic affection 'explodes' in the neorealism—New Wave periods, by means of the pictorial sensation that emerges from the Cézanne—Bacon lineage" (29n302). Although we can unravel the contiguous assemblage among Cézanne, Bacon and Deleuze, yet to what extent and in what way these two different media (painting and cinema) and fields of expertise (visual arts and philosophy) negotiate so as to produce a thinking machine requires further study and research. In other words, my Deleuzian readings of Woolf would not end here. Just as the robust rhizome which can sprout and further be connected with other rhizomes,

Deleuze always encourages us to think. Our thinking should always be like our (Deleuzian) subjectivity, which is neither one nor multiple, but always in the middle.

Works Cited

Abbott, H. Porter. *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print.

Abrams, M. H. *A Glossary of Literary Terms*. 7th ed. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999. Print.

Alliez, Érich. "Midday, Midnight: The Emergence of Cine-Thinking." Trans. Patricia Dailey. *The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*. Ed. Gregory Flaxman. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000. 293-300. Print.

Ansell Pearson, Keith. *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life*. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.

-----. "The Reality of the Virtual: Bergson and Deleuze." *MLN* 120 (2005): 1112-27. Print.

Araujo, Victor de. "'A Haunted House'—The Shattered Glass." *Studies in Short Fiction* 3.2 (Winter 1966): 157-64. Print.

Armstrong, Tim. *Modernism: A Cultural History*. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. Print.

Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis: The Interpretation of Reality in Western Literature*. 1953. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003. Print.

Banfield, Ann. "Remembrance and Tense Past." Shiach 48-64. Print.

-----. *Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction*. Boston: Routledge, 1982. Print.

Bergson, Henri. *Creative Evolution*. Trans. Arthur Mitchell. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1998. Print.

-----. *Key Writings*. Eds. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey. Trans. Melissa McMahon. New York: continuum, 2002a. Print.

-----. *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*. *Gutenberg Project*. Gutenberg, January 14, 2002b. Web. December 20 2010. < http://ebooks.lib.ntu.edu.tw/1_file/Gutenberg/4352/laemc10.txt>.

-----. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. T. E. Hume. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999. Print.

Berman, Jessica. "Ethical Folds: Ethics, Aesthetics, Woolf." *Modern Fiction Studies* 50.1 (Spring 2004): 151-72. Print.

Bogue, Ronald. *Deleuze on Cinema*. New York: Routledge, 2003. Print.

Bowlby, Rachel. Introduction. *Orlando: A Biography*. By Virginia Woolf. xii-xlvii. Print.

Bradshaw, David. "The Social-Political Vision of the Novels." Roe and Sellers 191-208. Print.

Braidotti, Rosi. "Intensive Genre and the Demise of Gender." *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 13.2 (August 2008): 45-57. Print.

Bryden, Mary. *Gilles Deleuze: Travels in Literature*. New York: Palgrave, 2007. Print.

Chang Hsiao-hung. "Snapshocking Virginia Woolf." *Review of English and American Literature* 16 (June 2010): 1-22. Print.

Conley, Tom. "From Multiplicities to Folds: On Style and Form in Deleuze." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 96.3 (Summer 1997): 629-46. Print.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 1: The Movement-image.* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: Continuum, 1986. Print.

-----. *Cinema 2: The Time-image.* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: Continuum, 1989. Print.

-----. *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.* Trans. Daniel W. Smith. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2003. Print.

-----. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. London: continuum, 1983. Print.

-----. *Essays Critical and Clinical.* Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. Print.

-----. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.* Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993. Print.

-----. *The Logic of Sense*. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia UP, 1990. Print.

-----. *Difference and Repetition.* Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. Print.

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. Print.

-----. *What Is Philosophy?* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. Print.

Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. *Dialogues*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Columbia UP, 1987. Print.

D'Hoker, Elke. "The Role of the Imagination in Virginia Woolf's Short Fiction." *Journal of the Short Story in English* 50. Spring 2008. 2010. 6. Aug. 17 2010 < http://jsse.revues.org/index692.html>.

DiBattista, Maria. "Virginia Woolf and the Language of Authorship." Roe and Sellers 127-45. Print.

Dick, Susan. "Literary Realism in *Mrs. Dalloway, To the Lighthouse, Orlando* and *The Waves.*" Roe and Sellers 50-71. Print.

-----. "A Book She Never Made: Editing *The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf.*" *Editing Virginia Woolf: Interpreting the Modernist Text*. Eds. James M. Haule and J.H. Stape. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 114-26. Print.

Fernihough, Anne. "Consciousness as a Stream." Schiach 65-81. Print.

Flaxman, Gregory. Introduction. *The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*. Ed. Gregory Flaxman. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000. 1-57. Print.

Grosz, Elizabeth. "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics." *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*. Eds. C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowlski. New York: Routledge, 1994. 187-210. Print.

Hankins, Leslie Kathleen. "'Across the Screen of My Brain': Virginia Woolf's 'The Cinema' and Film Forums of the Twenties." *The Multiple Muses of Virginia Woolf*. Ed. Diane F. Gillespie. Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1993. 148-79. Print.

-----. "A Splice of Reel Life in Virginia Woolf's 'Time Passes': Censorship, Cinema and 'the Usual Battlefield of Emotions.'" *Criticism* 35.1 (Winter 1999): 91-114. Print.

Hill-Miller, Katherine. *From the Lighthouse to Monk's House: A Guide to Virginia Woolf's Literary Landscapes*. London: Duckworth, 2001. Print.

Harmon, William and C. Hugh Holman. *A Handbook to Literature*. 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996. Print.

Hotchkiss, Lia M. "Writing the Jump Cut: Mrs. Dalloway in the Context of Cinema." *Virginia Woolf: Texts and Contexts*. Eds. Beth Rigel Daugherty and Eileen Barrett. New York: Pace UP, 1996. 134-39. Print.

Hughes, John. *Lines of Flight: Reading Deleuze with Hardy, Gissing, Conrad and Woolf*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic P, 1997. Print.

Humm, Maggie. *Modernist Women and Visual Culture: Virginia Woolf, Vanessa Bell, Photography and Cinema*. Edinburgh, Edinburgh UP, 2002. Print.

Humphrey, Robert. *Stream of Consciousness Technique in the Modern Novel: A Study of James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, William Faulkner, and Others.* Berkeley: U of California P, 1972. Print.

James, William. *The Principles of Psychology*. 1890. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1918. Print.

Jensen, Meg. "Tradition and Revelation: Moments of Being in Virginia Woolf's Major Novels." Shiach 112-25. Print.

Kawash, Samira. "Men: Moving Bodies, or, the Cinematic Politics of Deportation." *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*. Eds. Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998. 127-41. Print.

Kellman, Steven G. "The Cinematic Novel: Tracking a Concept." *Modern Fiction Studies* 33.3 (1987): 467-77. Print.

Klein, Kathleen Gregory. "A Common Sitting Room: Virginia Woolf's Critique of Women Writers." *Virginia Woolf: Centennial Essays*. Eds. Elaine K. Ginsberg and Laura Moss Gottlieb. Troy, New York: The Whitston Publishing Company, 1983. 231-48. Print.

Kumar, Shiv K. *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*. New York: New York UP, 1963. Print.

Lecercle, Jean-Jacques. *Deleuze and Language*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Print.

Lee, Hermione. *Virginia Woolf*. New York: Vintage, 1996. Print.

Louvel, Liliane. "Telling 'by' Pictures: Virginia Woolf's Shorter Fiction." *Journal of the Short Story in English* 50. Spring 2008. 2010. 6. Aug. 17 2010 < http://jsse.revues.org/index699.html>.

Low, Lisa. "Refusing to Hit Back: Virginia Woolf and the Impersonality Question." *Virginia Woolf and the Essay*. Ed. Beth Carole Rosenberg and Jeanne Dubino. New York: St. Martin's P, 1997. 257-73. Print.

Nicholls, Peter. *Modernism: A Literary Guide*. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.

Marcus, Laura. *The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007a. Print.

-----. "The Legacy of Modernism." Shiach 82-98. Print.

Massumi, Brian. "Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgments." *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. By Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. xvi-xix. Print.

Monaco, Beatrice. "*Orlando* and *The Waves*: Machinic Triumph of Form." *Machinic Modernism: The Deleuze Literary Machines of Woolf, Lawrence and Joyce*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.

Newman, Herta. *Virginia Woolf and Mrs. Brown: Toward a Realism of Uncertainty*. New York: Garland Pub., 1996. Print.

Nicholls, Peter. *Modernism: A Literary Guide*. 1995. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.

Parr, Adrian, ed. *The Deleuze Dictionary*. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. Print.

Pisters, Patricia. *The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003. Print.

Poell, Thomas. "Movement and Time in Cinema." *Discern(e)ments: Deleuzian Aesthetics/Esthétiques Deleuziennes*. Eds. Joost de Bloois, Sjef Houppermans, and Frans-Willem Korsten. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. 1-21. Print.

Prudente, Teresa. "'To Slip Easily from One Thing to Another': Experimentalism and Perception in Woolf's Short Stories." *Journal of the Short Story in English* 50. Spring 2008. 2010. 6. Aug. 17 2010 <http://jsse.revues.org/index704.html>.

Rainey, Lawrence. *Modernism: An Anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. Print.

Rancière, Jacques. *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. Trans. Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum, 2006. Print.

Rodowick, D. N. *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*. Durham: Duke UP, 1997. Print.

Roe, Sue. "The Impact of Post-Impressionism." Roe and Sellers 164-90. Print.

Roe, Sue and Susan Sellers, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Virginia Woolf*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. Print.

Seeley, Tracy. "Virginia Woolf's Poetics of Space: 'The Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection.'" *Woolf Studies Annual* 2 (1996): 89-116. Print.

Shiach, Morag, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Modernist Novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.

Sinclair, May. "The Novels of Dorothy Richardson'. *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*. Ed. Bonnie Kime Scott. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990. 442-48. Print.

Snaith, Anna and Michael H. Whitworth. "Introduction: Approaches to Space and Place in Woolf." *Locating Woolf: The Politics of Space and Place*. Eds. Anna Snaith and Michael H. Whitworth. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 1-28. Print.

Squier, Susan M. "Talland House and Hyde Park Gate." *Virginia Woolf and London: The Sexual Politics of the City*. Chapel Hill: The U of North Carolina P, 1985. 13-34. Print.

Steele, Elizabeth. "'A Haunted House': Virginia Woolf's Noh Story." *Studies in Short Fiction* 26.2 (1989): 151-61. Print.

Stevenson, Frank. "Stretching Language to Its Limit: Deleuze and the Problem of *Poiesis*." *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies* 35.1 (March 2009): 77-108. Print.

Tiessen, Paul. "The Shadow in *Caligari*: Virginia Woolf and the 'Materialists'' Responses to Film." *Film Criticism* 11 (Fall-Winter 1986-1987): 75-83. Print.

Trotter, David. "Virginia Woolf and Cinema." *Film Studies* 6 (Summer 2005): 13-26. Print.

Wallace, Jeff. "Modernism on the Art of Fiction." Shiach 15-31. Print.

Whitworth, Michael. "Virginia Woolf and Modernism." Roe and Sellers 146-63. Print.

Wilson, Jean Moorcroft. *Virginia Woolf Life and London: A Biography of Place*. New York: Norton, 1987. Print.

Woolf, Virginia. *A Room of One's Own/Three Guineas*. 1929/1938. London: Penguin, 1993. Print.

-----. "A Haunted House." *The Crowded Dance of Modern Life: Selected Essays*. 2 vols. Ed. Rachel Bowlby. London: Penguin, 1993. Vol. 2: 3-4. Print.

-----. "The Cinema." 1926. *The Captain's Death Bed and Other Essays.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1950. 180-86. Print.

-----. "Craftsmanship." 1937. *The Crowded Dance of Modern Life: Selected Essays*. Vol. 2: 137-43. Print.

-----. "The Death of the Moth." *The Crowded Dance of Modern Life: Selected Essays*. Vol. 2: 179-81. Print.

-----. *The Diary of Virginia Woolf.* Ed. Anne Olivier Bell. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1977. Print.

-----. “The Elizabeth Lumber Room.” *The Common Reader: First Series*. 1925. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984. Print.

-----. “Flumina Amem Silvasque.” 1917. *Collected Essays*. Vol. 2: 161-165. Print.

-----. “Haworth, November, 1904.” 1904. *Collected Essays.* Vol. 1: 5-9. Print.

-----. “‘The House of Lyme.’” 1917. *Collected Essays*. Vol. 2: 96-102. Print.

-----. “*Jane Eyre* and *Wuthering Heights*.” *The Norton Anthology: Literature by Women*. 2nd ed. Eds. Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar. New York: Norton, 1996. 1328-32. Print.

-----. “The London Scene.” 1932. *The Crowded Dance of Modern Life*

-----. “Modern Fiction.” 1925. *Collected Essays*. Vol. 2: 157-65. Print.

-----. “The ‘Movie’ Novel.” 1919. *Contemporary Writers*. New York: A Harvest Book, 1965. 82-86. Print.

-----. *Moments of Being: A Collection of Autobiographical Writing*. 1976. Ed. Jeanne Schulkind. San Diego: A Harvest Book/Harcourt, Inc., 1985. Print.

-----. “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown.” 1924. *The Captain’s Death Bed*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950. 94-119. Print.

-----. *Mrs. Dalloway*. 1925. London, Vintage, 2004. Print.

-----. *Orlando: A Biography*. 1928. Oxford: Oxford, 1998. Print.

-----. “The Schoolroom Floor.” 1924. *Collected Essays*. Vol. 3: 443-45. Print.

-----. *To the Lighthouse*. 1927. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. Print.

-----. *The Voyage Out*. 1917. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.